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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Dawn Maynor, f/k/a Dawn Golden v. Timothy B. Golden (2/14/2025) sp-7747
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before publication in the PACIFIC REPORTER.
Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts,
303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878, email
corrections@akcourts.gov.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
DAWN D. MAYNOR, f/k/a Dawn D. )
Golden, ) Supreme Court No. S-18931
)
Appellant, ) Superior Court No. 3AN-18-07761 CI
)
v. ) O P I N I O N
)
TIMOTHY B. GOLDEN, ) No. 7747 - February 14, 2025
)
Appellee. )
Petition for Review from the Superior Court of the State of
Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Ian Wheeles,
Judge.
Appearances: Evan A. Barrickman, Law Office of Evan
Barrickman, P.C., Anchorage, for Appellant. C. Nicole
Daussin, The Law Office of Nicole Daussin, Inc., Wasilla,
for Appellee.
Before: Maassen, Chief Justice, and Borghesan, Henderson,
and Pate, Justices. [Carney, Justice, not participating.]
HENDERSON, Justice.
INTRODUCTION
Alaska 's codification of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) establishes circumstances in which Alaska state courts
have jurisdiction to make initial child custody determination s. Here, two parents sought
dissolution of their marriage in Alaska. Although the parents' child had never lived in
Alaska, the superior court issued a custody order as part of its dissolution decree. Years
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later, the father moved to modify the court's custody order. In response, the mother
filed a motion for relief from judgment, arguing that the superior court lacked
jurisdi ction over child custody when the original decree was entered and that the
original custody order was therefore void as a matter of law. The superior court denied
the mother's motion, and she filed a petition for review. We granted the petition.
Because we agree that the superior court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
to decide child custody when it dissolved the parties' marriage, we conclude it was error
for the court to deny the mother's motion for relief from judgment. We REVERSE the
denial of the mother's motion and VACATE the original custody order in light of the
superior court's lack of jurisdiction.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
A. Original Dissolution And Custody Order
Dawn Maynor and Timothy Golden resided together in Alaska until the
Army transferred Timothy to Oklahoma. The couple moved there together, and they
were married in Oklahoma on August 1, 2017. The military again transferred Timothy
in October 2017, this time to Fort Polk in Louisiana. The couple then had a child, born
in Louisiana in February 2018.
The couple separated shortly after the child's birth. They filed a petition
to dissolve their marriage in the superior court in Alaska and filled out a court-provided
dissolution form on May 29, 2018. Both claimed Alaska residency on the dissolution
petition, but Dawn and Timothy wrote down mailing addresses in Illinois and Louisiana
respectively.
The superior court granted the dissolution in August 2018. Under its
agreed-upon custody order, Dawn would have primary physical custody of the child,
and the parties were to share legal custody. Timothy would have visitation with the
child as his work schedule permitted, and Dawn would pay for the child's travel
expenses to visit Timothy on certain holidays and during winter break.
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Timothy separated from the military and moved back to Alaska in
November 2019. At the time the petition for dissolution was filed, Dawn and the child
still lived in Illinois.
B. Timothy's Motion To Modify And Dawn's Motion For Relief From
Judgment
In September 2023 Timothy filed a motion in the superior court to modify
the parties' custody arrangement. He requested joint physical custody of the child,
arguing circumstances had changed because he was now a civilian with a predictable
civilian work schedule, the child had reached school age, both Dawn and Timothy had
remarried, and Dawn was demonstrating "increasing resistance to fostering an ongoing
relationship between [the child] and Timothy." Timothy also requested clarification
that the parties' joint legal custody required Dawn to confer with Timothy in making
important decisions about the child.
Dawn did not file an opposition to Timothy's motion, but she moved for
relief from the 2018 custody order under Alaska Civil Rule 60(b)(4).1 Dawn argued
that the order was void because the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to decide
issues of child custody. She also argued that, even if the Alaska court had jurisdiction
to decide child custody at the time of its original decree, Alaska was now an
inconvenient forum and the court should decline to further exercise jurisdiction over
the custody issue.
Timothy opposed Dawn's motion. He argued that the Alaska court had
jurisdiction to enter its original custody order, and in particular that the court's exercise
of jurisdiction over custody issues was appropriate because no other state had
jurisdiction to decide the child's custody at that time. He also argued that Alaska law
provided no basis for vacating the custody order and that Alaska was not an
1 Alaska R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4) permits a court to relieve a party from a final
judgment that is void.
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inconvenient forum. Dawn replied, again asserting that Alaska courts lacked
jurisd iction, both in the first instance and under any notion of "continued" jurisdiction,
and that Alaska was an inconvenient forum, given that the child had never lived in the
state.
The superior court denied Dawn's motion for Rule 60(b)(4) relief. It noted
that both Dawn and Timothy had written in their dissolution petition that they were
Alaska residents in May 2018, that Charlotte was born in February 2018, and that the
parties again testified that they were both residents of Alaska at the dissolution hearing
in August 2018. The court concluded that Dawn and the child's presence outside of
Alaska was only a temporary absence from Alaska, and that Alaska was therefore the
child's home state "at the time of her birth, when this case was filed, and when custody
orders were issued in August 2018." The superior court also concluded that it had
continuing exclusive jurisdiction because Timothy now resides in Alaska. It
accordingly denied the motion for Rule 60(b)(4) relief.
Dawn filed a petition for review of the superior court's order denying her
motion. We granted the petition. Following oral argument, we issued a summary order
reversing the superior court's denial of Dawn's motion for relief from judgment,
vacating the court's original 2018 custody decision, and remanding for dismissal of the
Alaska proceedings. We now detail our reasoning in full.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"We review the superior court's decision on a Rule 60(b)(4) motion de
novo 'because the validity of a judgment is strictly a question of law.' "2 The question
2 Blaufuss v. Ball, 305 P.3d 281, 285 (Alaska 2013) (quoting Leisnoi, Inc.
v. Merdes & Merdes, P.C. , 307 P.3d 879, 884 (Alaska 2013)).
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----------------------- Page 5-----------------------
whether "a court can exercise jurisdiction under the UCCJEA is [also] a question of
law, which we review de novo."3
DISCUSSION
This matter requires us to examine whether the superior court had subject
matter jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination under AS 25.30.300
when Timothy and Dawn commenced dissolution proceedings in May 2018. The
superior court concluded that the judgment was not void because Timothy and Dawn
stated that they were Alaska residents in their dissolution petition and it deemed the
family's time outside of the state to be a "temporary absence" during which their child
was effectively also residing in Alaska. Dawn responds that the superior court failed to
undertake the proper analysis under AS 25.30.300, that none of the jurisdictional
grounds in that statute were satisfied, that the original custody order is void because the
court lacked authority to enter it, and that the court continues to lack jurisdiction to
address issues of child custody. We agree with Dawn, and we therefore reverse the
denial of her Rule 60(b)(4) motion and vacate the court's original child custody order.
A. Alaska Statute 25.30.300 Provides The Exclusive Bases For
Jurisdiction Over An Initial Child Custody Determination.
Alaska has adopted the UCCJEA, which "limits a court's jurisdiction in
custody matters to promote uniformity among courts in different states."4 The statute
provides five bases upon which a court may exercise jurisdiction to make an "initial
child custody determination" like the one contained within Timothy and Dawn's
3 Norris v. Norris, 345 P.3d 924, 928 (Alaska 2015) (quoting Steven D. v.
Nicole J. , 308 P.3d 875, 879 (Alaska 2013)).
4 Roman v. Karren, 641 P.3d 1252, 1256 (Alaska 2020) (citing Atkins v.
Vigil, 59 P.3d 255, 257 (Alaska 2002)). The Alaska UCCJEA is codified at
AS 25.30.300-.910.
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dissolution decree.5 Three of these jurisdictional bases require looking to the child's
"home state."6 Alaska's UCCJEA defines "home state" as:
the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person
acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months,
including any temporary absences of the child or parent or
person acting as a parent, immediately before the
commencement of a child custody proceeding, except that,
in the case of a child who is less than six months of age, the
term means the state in which the child lived from birth with
any of the persons mentioned, including any temporary
[7]
absences.
Under the first statutory basis, the superior court has jurisdiction if Alaska
8
"[was] the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceeding."
Under the second, the superior court has jurisdiction if Alaska "was the home state of
the child within six months before the commencement of the proceeding and the child
is absent from this state but a parent . . . continues to live in this state."9 Third, the
superior court "may have jurisdiction when no other state has jurisdiction under the first
two provisions if the child and at least one parent have a significant connection to the
10
state and substantial evidence relevant to the child's care is located in the state."
5 See AS 25.30.300. An "initial determination" is "the first child custody
determination concerning a particular child." AS 25.30.909(8).
6 See AS 25.30.300(a).
7 AS 25.30.909(7). The question of which - if any - state is a child's
home state "relates to where the child is physically present, not the child's domicile or
residence." LINDA D. ELROD, CHILD CUSTODY PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3:8 (2023).
8 AS 25.30.300(a)( 1).
9 AS 25.30.300(a)(2).
10 Roman v. Karren, 461 P.3d 1252, 1256-57 (Alaska 2020) (citing
AS 25.30.300(a)(3)).
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The remaining two bases for jurisdiction address custody disputes in
which all other states have declined jurisdiction or the child has no home state.11 The
superior court may therein have jurisdiction if "all courts having jurisdiction under the
criteria specified in [AS 25.30.300(a)(1)-(3)] have declined to exercise jurisdiction"
because Alaska is the more convenient forum or the parties' conduct requires the case
be heard in the state.12 Finally, the superior court may exercise jurisdiction if "no court
of another state would have jurisdiction under the criteria specified in
13
[AS 25.30.300(a)(1)-(4)]."
Notably, Alaska's UCCJEA expressly states that these provisions are the
"exclusive jurisdictional bases for making a child custody determination by a court of
this state."14 Accordingly, the superior court may make an initial custody determination
only if it determines it possesses subject matter jurisdiction under at least one of the
five statutory provisions.15 " '[A] court which does not have subject matter jurisdiction
16
is without power to decide a case.' "
B. The Superior Court Lacked Subject Matter Jurisdiction To Decide
Child Custody.
Dawn argues that the superior court erred when it denied her motion for
relief from a void judgment because the superior court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
to decide the child's custody in 2018. More specifically, she argues that Alaska has
11 AS 25.30.300(a)(4) and (a)(5), respectively.
12 AS 25.30.300(a)(4).
13 AS 25.30.300(a)(5).
14 AS 25.30.300(b).
15 See, e.g., Norris v. Norris, 345 P.3d 924, 931 (Alaska 2015) (discussing
jurisdiction under Alaska child custody statutes in terms of subject matter jurisdiction);
see also Berry v. Coulman, 440 P.3d 264, 269 (Alaska 2019) (same); Robertson v.
Riplett, 194 P.3d 382, 385-86 (Alaska 2008) (same).
16 Robertson, 194 P.3d at 386 (quoting Wanamaker v. Scott, 788 P.2d 712,
7 13 n.2 (Alaska 1990)).
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never been the child's home state and that, at the time the dissolution petition was filed,
Louisiana was the child's "recent home state." She contends that the superior court
therefore improperly exercised jurisdiction in 2018 because Louisiana never declined
ju risdiction over this custody matter. As we explain below, we agree with Dawn that
the superior court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to decide the child's custody
in 2018.
Because AS 25.30.300(a) provides the exclusive bases for asserting
jurisdiction to initially determine child custody, we analyze each of the five grounds
provided in AS 25.30.300(a), beginning with subsection (1). Subsection (1) requires
that Alaska be "the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the
proceeding."17 The parties do not dispute the fact that the child had never lived in or
18
even been to Alaska as of May 2018, when the parties filed their dissolution petition.
Given that the child had not resided in Alaska for at least six months or since birth with
a parent,19 the court could not rely on AS 25.30.300(a)(1) as a basis for asserting
jurisdiction .
Here, the superior court determined otherwise, appearing to rely upon
Alaska's general definition of residency20 to conclude that Timothy and Dawn had been
17 AS 25.30.300(a)(1).
18 The relevant date for determining a child's home state for purposes of a
child custody determination is the date of commencement of a proceeding in which
" 'legal custody, physical custody, or visitation with respect to a child is an issue,'
including divorce or separation proceedings." Roman v. Karren, 461 P.3d 1252, 1257
(Alaska 2020) (quoting AS 25.30.909(4)); see also Atkins v. Vigil, 59 P.3d 255, 257
(Alaska 2002) ("A child's home state is determined at the time an action commences.").
19 AS 25.30.909(7).
20 AS 01.10.055 provides that "[a] person establishes residency in the state
by being physically present in the state with the intent to remain in the state indefinitely
and to make a home in the state." The statute further explains that "[a] person who
establishes residency in the state remains a resident during an absence from the state
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----------------------- Page 9-----------------------
temporarily absent from Alaska throughout the child's life and thus that the child was
only temporarily absent from Alaska in spite of her never having been in Alaska. But
the superior court's conclusion rests on the incorrect assumption that Alaska's general
residency provisions, including its accounting for absences from the state, control what
it means for a child to live in a state with at least one of her parents for purposes of the
UCCJEA. Although these concepts of residency - presence in a state, and absence
from a state with intent to return - are certainly related when considered in the two
different contexts, we have never applied Alaska's general residency definitions to
determine whether a child was temporarily absent from the state for purposes of
deciding the child's home state. Indeed, we have indicated that courts should examine
the "totality of the circumstances"21 in analyzing similar questions under Alaska's
UCCJEA, looking "to all of the relevant circumstances in order to decide whether an
22
absence was temporary."
We note that a number of other states appear to take a similarly nuanced
approach, not relying upon parents' bare statements of residency to infer that a child
has been temporarily absent for purposes of establishing home state jurisdiction, but
attending to the circumstances surrounding the child's presence in or absence from a
particular state or states.23 And in fact, Elrod's treatise on Child Custody Practice and
Procedure observes that, "[a]s a general rule, if the child has never lived in the state, the
unless during the absence the person establishes or claims residency in another state,
territory, or country, or performs other acts or is absent under circumstances that are
inconsistent with the intent . . . to remain a resident of this state."
21 Norris v. Norris, 345 P.3d 924, 929 n.22 (Alaska 2015).
22 Id.
23 See ELROD, supra note 7, § 3:8; see also, e.g., In re Marriage of Sampley,
347 P.3d 1281, 1286-87 (Mont. 2015); Carter v. Carter, 758 N.W.2d 1, 8-9 (Neb.
2008); Bata v. Konan, 217 A.3d 774, 783-84 (N.J. 2019); In re Schwartz & Battini, 410
P.3d 319, 325-26 (Or. App. 2017); Garba v. Ndiaye, 132 A.3d 908, 914-15 (Md. App.
2016); In re S.M., 938 S.W.2d 910, 918 (Mo. App. 1997).
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----------------------- Page 10-----------------------
court has no jurisdiction."24 We need not determine in this case whether there are no
circumstances under which Alaska could be a child's home state when that child had
never physically been in the state. Here, the agreed-upon facts, including the child
having lived her first few months with her parents in Louisiana before moving with her
mother to Illinois, and never having been present in Alaska, fail to support the notion
that the child was temporarily absent from, and thus residing in, Alaska throughout her
life. Under these facts, Alaska was not the child's home state at the time Timothy and
Dawn filed their dissolution action.
Having addressed that first potential basis for jurisdiction, we move on to
the second statutory basis, under which the superior court may have jurisdiction if
Alaska "was the home state of the child within six months before the commencement
of the proceeding and the child is absent from this state but a parent or person acting as
a parent continues to live in this state."25 As we have just explained, the child's home
state was not Alaska when proceedings were initiated, nor had it been in the six months
prior because she was born in Louisiana in February 2018 and had not been to Alaska
during that period. The superior court therefore could not assert jurisdiction under
AS 25.30.300(a)(2).
The next jurisdictional provision, subsection (3), contains several
requirements. The first is that there must not be another state court with jurisdiction
"under provisions substantially similar" to subsections (1) and (2).26 In other words,
there must not be another state that was the child's home state when proceedings were
initiated or within the previous six months. Timothy argues that the child had no home
24 ELROD, supra note 7, § 3:8; see also, e.g., Seekins v. Hamm, 129 A.3d 940,
942-43 (Me. 2015); In re J.S., 175 S.W.3d 526, 527 (Tex. App. 2005).
25 AS 25.30.300(a)(2).
26 AS 25.30.300(a)(3). Alternatively, a court with jurisdiction under such
"substantially similar" provisions must have "declined to exercise jurisdiction on the
ground that [Alaska] is the more appropriate forum." See id.
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state because she would not meet Alaska's definition of home state with respect to any
state. Dawn argues that Louisiana was the child's recent home state when proceedings
commenced, because the child was born in Louisiana, resided there with at least one
parent, was less than six months old when the dissolution was filed, and Timothy lived
in the state from her birth through the pendency of the couple's dissolution.
We agree with Dawn that Louisiana was the child's home state within six
months prior to the parties ' filing their dissolution petition. Louisiana's implementation
of the UCCJEA relies on a definition of "home state" that is nearly identical to that of
Alaska.27 In relevant part, Louisiana 's statute explains that Louisiana is the home state
of a child less than six months old if Louisiana is "the state in which the child lived
from birth with any [parent or a person acting as a parent]."28 The child was born in
Louisiana in February 2018 and resided there with a parent until approximately May
17, 2018. The child's home state was therefore Louisiana during this period of about
three months, until she and her mother moved out of state in mid-May.
The next question that follows from this analysis is whether Louisiana
could have exercised jurisdiction under a provision "substantially similar" to
subsections (1) or (2). We conclude that it could have done so. Louisiana's own
codification of the UCCJEA provides that a court of that state has jurisdiction to make
an initial custody determination if "[Louisiana] is the home state of the child . . . within
six months before the commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from
29
[Louisiana] but a parent or a person acting as a parent continues to live in this state."
This jurisdictional basis is "substantially similar" to its counterpart at
27 See La. Stat. Ann. § 13:1802(7)(a) (2007).
28 Id.
29 Id. § 13:1813(A)(1).
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AS 25.30.300(a)(2); indeed, the statutory language is almost identical.30 Because the
child was in Louisiana from her birth in February until mid-May 2018, and the parties
filed for dissolution on May 29, 2018, Louisiana had been her home state "within six
months before the commencement of the proceeding."31 And at the time of the
commencement of the proceeding, the child was absent from the state - she had moved
to Illinois with her mother earlier in May - but "a parent . . . continue[d] to live in
[Louisiana]."32 Timothy lived in Louisiana until he moved back to Alaska in November
2019. Accordingly, Louisiana was "the home state of the child within six months before
the commencement of the proceeding and the child [was] absent from [Louisiana] but
a parent . . . continue[d] to live in [Louisiana]."33 Louisiana therefore had recent home
state jurisdiction of the child, under a provision "substantially similar" to
AS 25.30.300(a)(2).
Because a court of Louisiana could have asserted jurisdiction, the statute
also requires consideration of whether such a court in fact "declined to exercise
jurisd iction" because Alaska was a more appropriate forum.34 Nothing in the record
indicates Louisiana so declined. Therefore, the superior court could not have asserted
jurisdiction under subsection (3).
30 See AS 25.30.300(a)(2)("[A] court of [Alaska] has jurisdiction to make an
initial child custody determination only if . . . (2) [Alaska] was the home state of the
child within six months before the commencement of the proceeding and the child is
absent from [Alaska] but a parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in this
state.").
31 See AS 25.30.300(a)(2).
32 See id.
33 Id; cf. Sergeant v. DeRung, 213 So. 3d 423, 427 (La. App. 2017) (holding
that a four-month-old's home state was the state where he had resided with a parent
since birth).
34 AS 25.30.300(a)(3).
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We now turn to the final two jurisdictional bases, AS 25.30.300(a)(4) and
(5). Subsection (4) requires that any other court that may properly assert jurisdiction
has "declined to exercise jurisdiction" because Alaska is "the more appropriate
forum."35 But as just explained, nothing in the record indicates that Louisiana - or
any other state, for that matter - declined to exercise jurisdiction. We thus conclude
subsection (4) was not a viable jurisdictional ground in this case.
We reach the same conclusion with respect to subsection (5), which
permits the superior court to make a custody determination if no other court had
jurisdiction under the UCCJEA.36 Because Louisiana had recent home state
jurisdiction, the superior court could not have looked to subsection (5) as a basis for
exercising jurisdiction.
Having considered the five jurisdictional bases in Alaska's UCCJEA for
initial custody determinations, we conclude that the superior court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to issue its initial custody order in 2018. Given that a judgment rendered
by a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction is void,37 it was error for the court to deny
Dawn's Rule 60(b)(4) motion for relief from judgment.
C. Timothy's Remaining Arguments Are Unpersuasive.
Timothy contends that regardless of the above jurisdictional analysis, the
solution cannot be to vacate the original custody order. He first argues that "the
UCCJEA does not permit a court to vacate a custody order, leaving none in place." He
also urges that vacating the custody order in this case would lead to "an absurd result
where Timothy and Dawn are still married." These arguments are unavailing.
Timothy points to no statutory provision for the proposition that the
UCCJEA "does not permit" the vacatur of a custody order, citing only to an out-of-state
35 AS 25.30.300(a)(4).
36 AS 25.30.300(a)(5).
37 See Blaufuss v. Ball, 305 P.3d 281, 285 (Alaska 2013).
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decision that does not support his argument.38 Although we take seriously the
repercussions of vacating an existing custody order, we cannot discern any basis in
either the text of the UCCJEA or relevant precedent for treating a void custody order
differently than other types of void judgments.
As to Timothy's suggestion that vacatur of the custody order would result
in vacatur of the dissolution decree as a whole, we must disagree. The superior court,
as a court of general jurisdiction, has "the power to hear all controversies which may
be brought before it . . . except insofar as has been expressly and unequivocally denied
by the state's constitution or statutes."39 While AS 25.30.300 expressly limits the
superior court's subject matter jurisdiction to make a child custody determination unless
its provisions are satisfied, Timothy points to no authority that would have prohibited
the superior court from entering a decree of dissolution without making any custody or
visitation ruling.
CONCLUSION
As provided in our previous summary order, the superior court's order
denying Dawn's Rule 60(b)(4) motion for relief from judgment is REVERSED, and the
court's 2018 custody order is VACATED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
38 See State of New Mexico, ex rel. Child., Youth, & Fams. Dep't v. Donna
J. , 129 P.3d 167 (N.M. App. 2006).
39 Siggelkow v. State, 731 P.2d 57, 61 (Alaska 1987).
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