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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Trevor Stefano v. State of Alaska, Department of Corrections and Earl Houser, in an official capacity (12/8/2023) sp-7675

Trevor Stefano v. State of Alaska, Department of Corrections and Earl Houser, in an official capacity (12/8/2023) sp-7675

         Notice:  This opinion is subject to correction before publication in the Pacific Reporter.   

         Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts,  

         303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878, email  

         corrections@akcourts.gov.  

  

  

                   THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA  

                                              



  TREVOR J. STEFANO,                                       )     

                                                           )   Supreme Court No. S-18226  

                             Appellant,                    )     

                                                           )   Superior Court No. 3PA-19-02522 CI  

           v.                                              )     

                                                           )   O P I N I O N  

  STATE OF ALASKA, DEPARTMENT  )                                 

  OF CORRECTIONS, and EARL                                 )   No. 7675 - December 8, 2023  

  HOUSER, in an official capacity,                         )  

                                                           )  

                             Appellees.                    )  

                    

                  Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third  

                  Judicial District, Palmer, Kristen C. Stohler, Judge.  

  

                  Appearances:    Trevor  Stefano,  pro  se,  Palmer,  Appellant.   

                  Anna L. Marquez, Assistant Attorney General, Anchorage,  

                  and     Treg     R.    Taylor,      Attorney       General,       Juneau,      for  

                  Appellees.  

  

                  Before:  Maassen, Chief Justice, and Carney, Borghesan, and  

                  Henderson, Justices.  [Pate, Justice, not participating.]  

                    

                  BORGHESAN, Justice.  

  



         INTRODUCTION  



                  Regulations adopted by the Department of Corrections make a prisoner  



eligible  for  furlough  within  three  years  of  the  prisoner's  "firm  release  date."    The  



regulations  also define  what  counts  as  a  "firm  release date":    "the date  on which  a  



                                                           1                                                    7675  


----------------------- Page 2-----------------------

prisoner is scheduled to be released, as established by  . . . parole board action."1   In  



2016 the Department decided that this definition of "firm release date" includes the date  



the Parole Board sets for an inmate's release on discretionary parole.  But in 2019 the  



Department decided that a discretionary parole release date does not count as a "firm  



release date."   



                 A prisoner who was no longer eligible for furlough because of this change  



sued  the  Department.    He  argued  the  change  in  policy  violated  the  Administrative  



Procedures  Act  (APA)  because  it  amounted  to  revising  a  regulation  without  going  



through the APA's rulemaking process.  The superior court granted summary judgment  



to  the  Department.    The  court  concluded  that  the  changed  definition  was  merely  a  



commonsense  interpretation  of  existing  regulation,  so  formal  rulemaking  was  not  



required.    Commonsense  or  not,  the  Department's  most  recent  definition  of  "firm  



release date" is a changed  interpretation of existing regulation that had to be adopted  



through  rulemaking.    Because  it  was  not,  we  reverse  and  remand  for  further  



proceedings.     



        FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS  



        A.       Relevant Statutes And Regulations   



                Understanding this appeal requires familiarity with two different statutory  



schemes for prisoner release:  (1) discretionary parole and (2) discretionary furlough.    

                 Discretionary parole  is administered by the Parole Board. 2  Prisoners who  



meet  the  statutory  eligibility  criteria  may  apply  for  discretionary  parole.3    Their  



applications  are  then  evaluated  by  the  Board,  which  considers  different  criteria  to  



                                                                                                             

        1        22  Alaska Administrative Code (AAC) 05.660(a)(18).  



        2        The Board of Parole is an entity within the Department of Corrections that  

reviews      prisoner      applications      for    discretionary      parole.     AS     33.16.020(a);  

AS 33.16.060(a)(2); AS 33.16.100.    

        3        AS 33.16.090.  



                                                     2                                                 7675  


----------------------- Page 3-----------------------

determine if the prisoner should be released on discretionary parole.4  The steps for this  



procedure are prescribed in statute.5   Once the Board votes to release the prisoner on  



discretionary parole on a specific date, the Board must follow the same procedural steps  



                                          6 

to revoke or amend that decision.   



                 Discretionary furlough  is administered by the Department of Corrections.   



Some eligibility criteria for discretionary furlough  are established in statute,  and  the  



legislature  delegated  authority  to  the  Department  to  adopt  additional  criteria  for  



                                              7                                      8 

discretionary furlough in regulation.   The Department has done so.   These regulations  



provide, among other things, that a prisoner with a sentence of more than one year is  



eligible for discretionary furlough only if the prisoner is "within three years or less of  

the firm release date."9  The regulations  also define "firm release date" as "the date on  



which  a  prisoner  is  scheduled  to  be  released,  as  established  by  statutory  good  time  



                                                             10 

calculation, court order, or parole board action."               



        B.       Facts  



                 In 2016 the Parole Board granted discretionary parole to Trevor Stefano,  



an inmate in the Department's custody.  He was to be released on a certain date in 2021.   



Under the Department's policy at the time, this discretionary parole date was considered  



a  "firm  release  date,"  which  qualified  Stefano  to  apply  for  discretionary  furlough.  



                                                                                                               

        4        AS 33.16.100(a)(1)-(4).    



        5        AS 33.16.130.  



        6        AS  33.16.100(b) (giving prisoners right to formal hearing before  Parole  

Board may "rescind or revise [a] previously granted parole release date").  

        7        See,   e.g.,   AS   33.30.111(d)   (setting   a   mandatory   requirement   for  

discretionary   furlough   eligibility);   AS   33.30.101   (directing   the   Department   of  

Corrections Commissioner to create regulations for discretionary furlough program).    

        8        22 AAC 05.321.    



        9        22 AAC 05.321(c)(2).    



         10      22 AAC 05.660(a)(18).  



                                                      3                                                  7675  


----------------------- Page 4-----------------------

Stefano was released on furlough with electronic monitoring in 2018.  In 2019 Stefano  



was  remanded  back  to  custody.    He  again  applied  for  discretionary  furlough  with  



electronic  monitoring,  again  relying  on  his  discretionary  parole  release  date  for  



eligibility.  However, before he applied for release, the Department had announced that  



it would no longer consider the date of release on discretionary parole a "firm release  



date" for purposes of furlough eligibility.  The Department denied Stefano's request for  



furlough.  Stefano then filed an administrative grievance challenging this denial, which  



was also denied.    



        C.      Proceedings  



                Stefano   filed   a   complaint   in   the   superior   court   alleging   that   the  



Department's policy change violated the APA.  Stefano argued that the Department had  



changed the regulatory definition of "firm release date" -  specifically, by narrowing  



the definition to exclude discretionary parole release dates  -  without following the  



APA 's  rulemaking  procedures.    In  support  of  his  complaint,  Stefano  attached  (1)  a  



formal Department of Corrections memorandum  from 2016, which  stated that  "firm  



release date" included discretionary parole release dates and (2) an email sent in 2019  



by the Department's Deputy Chief Classification Officer announcing that "firm release  



date" would no longer include a date of release on discretionary parole.    



                The  State  filed  an  answer  admitting  that  the  Department  changed  its  



policies to exclude discretionary parole release dates from the definition of "firm release  



date"  but  denying  that  this  change  violated  the  APA.    The  parties  cross-moved  for  



summary judgment.  Both parties agreed that (1) the term "firm release date" is defined  



by   regulation;   (2) from   2016  to   2019   the   Department   considered   an   inmate's  



discretionary parole release date to be a "firm release date;" (3) Stefano was released in  



2018 based on the Department's then-existing policy; and (4) the Department stopped  



considering an inmate's discretionary parole release date to be a "firm release date" in  



2019.  But the parties disagreed about whether this change required rulemaking under  



the APA.    



                                                  4                                              7675  


----------------------- Page 5-----------------------

                 The  superior  court  granted  summary  judgment  for  the  Department  



because  it  concluded  the  policy  change  did  not  require  rulemaking.    The  court  



emphasized the discretionary nature of furlough decisions.  The court reasoned that the  



Department's  policy  of  not  treating  discretionary  parole  as  a  " 'firm   release  date'  



reflects a common sense interpretation of [the regulation] according to its own terms,"  



which does not require rulemaking.    



                 Stefano moved for reconsideration.  Stefano argued that the superior court  



had misunderstood the "firmness" of a discretionary parole release date.  He explained  



that when  the Parole Board orders that a prisoner may be released on discretionary  



parole on a certain date, that release date cannot be changed unless the Board votes to  



do  so.    Stefano  argued  that  an  inmate's  date  of  release  on discretionary  parole  was  



substantially more "firm" than the court had understood.     



                 The court denied reconsideration.  It did not address Stefano's argument  



about the nature of a grant  of  discretionary parole.  Instead it detailed the procedural  



history of the case before concluding that "[o]n the record before it, the court finds no  



error that would entitle Stefano to reconsideration."    



                 DISCUSSION  



                 Stefano  argues  that  the  Department's  changed  interpretation  of  "firm  



release date" is invalid because it was not adopted in accordance with the rulemaking  

procedures  of  the  APA.11    We  agree.    Commonsense  interpretations  of  existing  



                                                                                                               

         11      On appeal Stefano argues that the superior court erred by failing to grant  

his motion for reconsideration.  However, most of Stefano's arguments relate to the  

merits of the underlying order granting summary judgment, rather than the motion to  

reconsider.  Cf. Miller v. McManus , 558 P.2d 891, 892 (Alaska 1977) (noting appellate  

challenge to motion to reconsider raises only "the merits of reconsideration" rather than  

"the merits of the underlying order").  Stefano's argument is therefore better considered  

as a challenge to the summary judgment order.  See  Wright v. Anding, 390 P.3d 1162,  

1169  (Alaska  2017)  ("  'We  apply  a  more  lenient  standard  to  pro  se  litigants'  and  

  



                                                      5                                                  7675  


----------------------- Page 6-----------------------

regulation generally need not be adopted through rulemaking.   But when an agency  



alters  its  interpretation  of  existing  regulation  in  a  way  that  is  inconsistent  with  the  



                                                           12 

previous interpretation, rulemaking is required.                 



                 The APA's definition of "regulation" is broad:  It includes "every rule,  



regulation, order, or standard of general application or the amendment, supplement, or  



revision of a rule, regulation, order, or standard adopted by a state agency to implement,  

interpret, or make specific the law enforced or administered by [the agency]."13  "The  



label an agency places on a policy or practice does not determine whether that rule falls  

under  the  APA."14    Instead  we  consider  substance.15    When  an  agency  makes  a  



regulation, it must follow a formal rulemaking process, which requires notice and an  

opportunity  for  public  involvement.16    The  reason  for  these  notice  and  comment  



provisions  is  to  prevent  an  agency  from  having  "unfettered  discretion  to  vary  the  



requirements of its regulations at whim," which "invites the possibility that state actions  



                                                                                                              



'consider pro se pleadings liberally in an effort to determine what legal claims have  

been raised.' " (first quoting  Casciola v. F.S. Air Serv., Inc., 120 P.3d 1059, 1062-63  

(Alaska 2005); and then quoting  Toliver v. Alaska State Comm 'n for Hum. Rts., 279  

P.3d 619, 622 (Alaska 2012))).  

        12       We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, "affirming if the record  

presents no genuine issue of material fact and if the movant is entitled to judgment as a  

matter of law."  Beegan v. State, Dep 't of Transp. & Pub. Facilities, 195 P.3d 134, 138  

(Alaska 2008).  "Whether an agency action is a regulation is a question of law that does  

not involve agency expertise, which we review applying our independent judgment."   

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. State, Dep 't of Revenue, 387 P.3d 25, 35 (Alaska 2016) (quoting  

State,  Dep 't  of  Nat.  Res.  v.  Nondalton  Tribal  Council,  268  P.3d  293,  299  (Alaska  

2012)).  

        13       AS 44.62.640(a)(3).  



        14       Jerrel v. State, Dep 't of Nat. Res., 999 P.2d 138, 143 (Alaska 2000).  



        15       Id.  



        16       See  AS  44.62.180-290  (describing  process  for  adopting  administrative  

regulations).  



                                                      6                                                 7675  


----------------------- Page 7-----------------------

may be motivated by animosity, favoritism, or other improper influences."17  Yet "[w]e  



                                                                                                           18 

must balance these concerns with the practical realities of administrative governance."                         



Requiring   that   every   agency   interpretation   of  governing   law   "be   preceded   by  

rulemaking would result in complete ossification of the regulatory state."19  "[A]gencies  



must have some freedom to apply relevant statutes without the burden of adopting a  



                                          20 

regulation each time they do so."               



                 To determine whether an agency action is a regulation that requires formal  

rulemaking,  we  use  a  two-part  test.21    An  agency  adopts  a  regulation  when  it  



(1) implements, interprets, or makes specific a statutory directive and (2) that action  

impacts  the  agency's  dealings  with  the  public.22    Changing  the  definition  of  "firm  



release date" meets both parts of the test.   



        A.       The  Department's  Policy  Change  Was  A  Regulation  Because  It  

                 Altered The Agency's Previous Interpretation.  



                 Not  all  agency  interpretations  of  statute  or  existing  regulation  require  



rulemaking.         Generally      speaking,     a   "commonsense          interpretation     of   existing  

requirements" need not be adopted through the formal rulemaking process.23  But if the  



interpretation  adds  requirements  of  substance,  is  "expansive  or  unforeseeable,"  or  



                                                                                         24 

"alters [the agency's] previous interpretation," rulemaking is required.                       



                                                                                                               

         17      Jerrel , 999 P.2d at 144.  



         18      AVCG, LLC v. State, Dep 't of Nat. Res., 527 P.3d 272, 280 (Alaska 2023).  



         19      Marathon  Oil  Co.  v.  State,  Dep 't  of  Nat.  Res.,  254  P.3d  1078,  1086  

(Alaska 2011).  

        20       Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. State, Dep 't of Revenue, 387 P.3d 25, 36 (Alaska  

2016).  

        21       AVCG , 527 P.3d at 280.  



        22       Chevron, 387 P.3d at 36.  



        23       Id.  



        24       Id. at 37.  



                                                      7                                                  7675  


----------------------- Page 8-----------------------

                 The need for rulemaking when the agency changes its interpretation flows  



from the text of the APA itself.  The APA's definition of a regulation includes not only  



rules and standards of general application  but also  "the amendment, supplement, or  

revision" of such rules and standards.25  The need for rulemaking when an interpretation  



changes  also  rests  on  the  APA's  statutory  purpose  of  providing  adequate  notice  to  

regulated parties.26   The notice requirement allows "members of the public sufficient  



information to decide whether their interests could be affected by the agency action and  

thus whether to make their views known to the agency."27  Notice also gives potentially  



                                                                                                       28 

regulated parties a chance to conform their actions to the agency's expectations.                          



                 The  Department  changed  its  definition  of  "firm  release  date"  twice.   



Before  2016  the  Department  did  not  count  the  date  on  which  a  prisoner  was  to  be  



released on discretionary parole as a "firm release date."  In 2016 it took the position  



that a prisoner's "firm release date" included the date on which the prisoner is to be  



released on discretionary parole.  In 2019 the Department reversed course and decided  



that the date of release on discretionary parole did not count as a "firm release date."   



There is no question that the Department changed its interpretation of "firm release  



                                                                                            29 

date" as a change in official policy, so formal rulemaking was required.                          



                                                                                                                 

         25      AS 44.62.640(a)(3).  



         26      See  AS  44.62.180-290  (describing  process  for  adopting  administrative  

regulations, including notice of proposed action and opportunity for public comment).  

         27      State v. First Nat 'l Bank of Anchorage, 660 P.2d 406, 425 (Alaska 1982).  



         28      See AVCG, LLC v.  State, Dep 't of Nat. Res., 527 P.3d 272, 286 (Alaska  

2023)  ("Applying  standards  that  already  exist  does  not  require  formal  rulemaking  

because . . . [p]ast  decisions  provide  regulated  entities  with  notice  of  the  agency's  

expectations . . . .").   

         29      Chevron, 387 P.3d at 37 (stating agency action that "alters [the agency's]  

previous  interpretation"  requires  formal  rulemaking). But  cf.  id.  at  40  (holding  that  

deliberative  internal  documents  showing  agency  previously  considered  different  

  



                                                       8                                                   7675  


----------------------- Page 9-----------------------

                 The  Department's  arguments  to  the  contrary  are  unpersuasive.    The  



Department argues that its interpretation of "firm release date" is just "a commonsense  



interpretation of the regulation's applicability" and therefore not a regulation itself.  But  



the  Department  does  not  acknowledge  that  its  interpretation  of  the  regulation  has  



changed, and the cases it relies on involved commonsense interpretations of statute or  

regulation that were not changes from prior interpretations.30  The first time an agency  



adopts a commonsense interpretation of a statute, rulemaking may not be required. But  



when an agency  "alters its previous interpretation"  in a way that is inconsistent, then  

rulemaking is required.31  Because that is what the Department did here, its action met  



the first criterion for rulemaking.    



        B.       The Department's Multiple Changes To The Definition Affected The  

                 Public.  



                 The second criterion for rulemaking is that  the agency's action "affects  



the public" - or more precisely, its action "alter[s] the rights or interests" of members  



                                                                                                              



interpretation did not establish need for rulemaking because earlier interpretation was  

"never meant to represent . . . official policy"); North Slope Borough v. State, 484 P.3d  

106,  118  (Alaska  2021)  (holding  that  agency  did  not  violate  APA  when  it  applied  

statutory provision it had mistakenly failed to apply in previous years because "there  

[wa]s no indication in the record that . . . failure to apply the controlling law constituted  

a formal interpretation of the statute that would bind future review").  

        30       Specifically, the State cited Alaska C tr. for the En v't v. State, 80 P.3d 231  

(Alaska 2003)  (holding that  agency's interpretation of "major energy facility" to  not  

include an airport expansion project that only used fuel incidentally was common sense)  

and Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. State, Dep 't of Env 't Conservation, 145 P.3d 561, 573  

(Alaska 2006)  (holding that agency's interpretation of "costs," in context of program  

designed to make industry shoulder financial burden of permitting process, to include  

fees incurred in defending permit was commonsense interpretation that did not require  

rulemaking).  

        31       Chevron, 387 P.3d at 37.    



                                                     9                                                  7675  


----------------------- Page 10-----------------------

of the public.32  But an agency's action does not affect the public if it merely "alter[s]  



                                                                                                               33 

the manner in which the parties present themselves or their viewpoints to the agency."                              



                 Department of Natural Resources v. Nondalton Tribal Council illustrates  

this distinction.34  In that case the Department of Natural Resources created a land use  



plan   for  Bristol  Bay  that   split  the  region  into  subdivisions  and   identified  the  

administration's goals for each subdivision.35   Interested parties  challenged this plan,  



arguing that it was a regulation because the planned uses for each subdivision would  

alter the rights and interests of stakeholders.36  We disagreed.  The land use plan was  



simply a framework for future policymaking that would later be implemented "through  

downstream agency action."37  We acknowledged that those later agency actions would  



likely affect the parties' rights and interests.38   But the land use plan itself "[did] not  



alter the rights of the parties, [did] not deprive any party of a fair opportunity for public  



participation, embodie[d] no finding as to a particular application and [did] not establish  

criteria by which particular applications should be evaluated."39  Therefore it was not a  



regulation.  



                                                                                                                   

         32      State, Dep 't of Nat. Res. v. Nondalton Tribal Council, 268 P.3d 293, 304  

(Alaska 2012).  

         33      Id.    at  303     (quoting   Batterton        v.   Marshall ,      648    F.2d    694,      707  

(D.C. Cir.  1980)).  

         34      Id.  



         35      Id. at 296-97.    



         36      Id. at 304-05.  



         37      Id. at 305.    



         38      Id.  



         39      Id. at 303 (quoting Kachemak Bay Watch, Inc. v. Noah , 935 P.2d 816, 825  

(Alaska  1997));  accord  Kachemak  Bay  Watch ,  935  P.2d  at  825-26  (holding  that  

agency's act of creating districts for future management did not affect public because  

creation of districts did not affect any parties' interests or rights - it just provided an  

  



                                                       10                                                    7675  


----------------------- Page 11-----------------------

                 By  contrast,  the  definition  of  "firm  release  date"  affects  prisoners'  



interests because it determines when they will be eligible for release on furlough.  It  

"establish[es] criteria" by which applications for furlough will be evaluated.40  It also  



"embodies  [a]  finding  as  to  a  particular  application"41  because  a  prisoner  with  a  



sentence of more than one year  only qualifies for discretionary furlough within three  

years of the prisoner's firm release date.42  Under the new definition, Stefano and other  



similarly situated prisoners no longer qualify for discretionary furlough.  Their interests  



                                                             43 

have been affected in a direct and tangible way.                   



                 The  Department  counters  that  the  new  definition  is  not  a  regulation  

because  it  "relates  only  to  the  internal  management  of  a  state  agency."44    But  the  



Department does not acknowledge the narrowness of the "internal management of a  



                                                                                                                



administrative framework for later regulations to be applied in);  cf.  Kenai Peninsula  

Fisherman's Co-op. Ass 'n v. State, 628 P.2d 897, 905-06 (Alaska 1981) (holding that  

agency's management plan that specified how certain salmon runs should be managed  

affected public because management plan was cited as justification for closing fishing  

area).  

         40      Nondalton Tribal Council, 268 P.3d at 303.  



         41      Id.  



         42      22  AAC  05.321(c)  ("To  be  eligible  for  consideration  for  a  prerelease  

furlough, the prisoner  . . . must  . . . be within three years or less of the firm release  

date.").  

         43      Inmates do not have a right to be furloughed.  Hertz v. Macomber , 297  

P.3d 150, 157-58 (Alaska 2013).  But because the legislature has created a furlough  

program, inmates have a due process right to "fair and impartial consideration" of their  

furlough applications and to not have "furlough release conditions  [imposed]  for an  

improper  purpose."   Id.  at  158.    The  Department's  policy  change  affects  inmates'  

interests by eliminating their opportunity to seek furlough and have their applications  

considered.    

         44      AS  44.62.640(a)(3)  (defining  "regulations"  for  purposes  of  APA  and  

creating exception for policies that "relate[] only to the internal management of a state  

agency").  



                                                      11                                                  7675  


----------------------- Page 12-----------------------

state agency" exemption.  "[T]he exemption's critical feature is that it covers agency  

actions that do not themselves alter the rights or interests of parties."45  For example,  



an  agency's  hours  of  operation  is  the  prototypical  internal  policy.    It  may  affect  a  



person's ability to interact with the agency, but effect on the person's actual rights and  

interests is indirect and incidental.46   In contrast, the definition  change here directly  



renders some inmates ineligible for furlough when they previously would have been  



                                                                                           47 

eligible.  The change therefore "alters the rights or interests of parties."                   



                 The Department also defends the superior court's mistaken understanding  



of a discretionary parole release date.  The superior court stated that "even if an inmate  



meets the eligibility criteria defined in AS 33.16.100(a) by a certain date, his or her  



release is still discretionary," and "discretionary parole is just that -  discretionary.   



[The Department]'s decision to exclude an inmate's projected release date based on the  



date he or she becomes eligible for discretionary parole from its interpretation of 'firm   



release date' reflects a common sense interpretation of [the regulation]."  Although the  



superior  court  was  correct  that  a  prisoner  who  meets  the  eligibility  criteria  for  



discretionary parole is not entitled to receive discretionary parole,  that  is beside the  



point.    Once  the  Board  votes  to  grant  discretionary  parole,  this  grant  may  only  be  

rescinded or modified by another meeting of and vote by the Board.48   Inmates who  



have been granted a discretionary parole release date are not merely "eligible" for parole  



-  they have been granted parole and will be released on a specific date, unless the  



Board takes further action.  Stefano's discretionary parole release date is substantially  



"firmer" than the superior court suggested.  By deciding that a  discretionary parole  



                                                                                                                

         45      Nondalton Tribal Council, 268 P.3d at 303 (emphasis in original) (quoting  

Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 707 (D.C. Cir.  1980)).  

         46      Id.  



         47      Id.  



         48      AS 33.16.100(b).  



                                                      12                                                  7675  


----------------------- Page 13-----------------------

release date was not a "firm release date," the Department directly changed Stefano's  



status from an inmate eligible for furlough to an inmate ineligible  for furlough.  This  



change directly affected his interests (and those of inmates in the same position).    



                 Finally, the Department appears to assert that prisoners are not considered  



members  of  the  public  for  purposes  of  the  APA.    Yet  the  Department  does  not  



cite - and we cannot find -  any support in the text of the APA for this proposition.   



                                                                                                           49 

We have also previously treated prisoners as members of the public for APA purposes.                            



The Department also seems to rely on the statutory definition of prisoner:   "a person  



held    under     the   authority     of   state    law    in   official   detention      as   defined     in  

AS  11.81.900(b)."50  But the statutory text does not on its face suggest that prisoners  



are not members of the public for APA purposes, and the Department does not explain  



why it should be interpreted that way.  We therefore reject the argument.     



                 Because the Department's policy change met both prongs of our test for  



identifying a regulation, the Department was required to adopt it through rulemaking.  



It was therefore error to grant summary judgment to the Department against Stefano's  



APA claim.       



         CONCLUSION  



                 We  REVERSE  the  superior  court's  grant  of  summary  judgment  and  



remand for further proceedings.  



                                                         



  



                                                                                                               

        49       See  Hertz  v.  Macomber,  297  P.3d  150,  155  (Alaska  2013)  (applying  

APA's requirements to challenge of furlough regulations by prisoner).  

        50       AS 33.30.901(12).  



                                                      13                                                 7675  

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