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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Marquinn Jones-Nelson v. State of Alaska (6/24/2022) sp-7599

Marquinn Jones-Nelson v. State of Alaska (6/24/2022) sp-7599

          Notice:  This opinion is subject to correction before publication in the PACIFIC  REPORTER.  

          Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts,  

          303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878, email  

          corrections@akcourts.gov.  



                     THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA                                   



MARQUINN  JONES-NELSON,                                           )  

                                                                  )   Supreme  Court  No.  S-17555  

                              Petitioner,                         )  

                                                                                                         

                                                                  )   Court of Appeals No. A-11966  

                                                                                                                              

          v.                                                      )   Superior Court No. 3AN-11-05289 CR  

                                                                  )  

                    

STATE OF ALASKA,                                                                         

                                                                  )   O P I N I O N  

                                                                  )  

                              Respondent.                                                              

                                                                  )   No. 7599 - June 24, 2022  

                                                                  )  



                                                                                                              

                    Petition for Hearing from the Court of Appeals of the State of
  

                                                                                                             

                    Alaska, on appeal from the Superior Court of the State of
  

                    Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Gregory Miller,
  

                    Judge.
  



                                                                                                                  

                    Appearances:            Cynthia  Strout,  Anchorage,  for  Petitioner.
  

                                                                                               

                    Timothy W. Terrell, Assistant Attorney General, Anchorage,
  

                                                                                                           

                    and  Kevin  G.  Clarkson,  Attorney  General,  Juneau,  for
  

                    Respondent.
  



                                                                                     

                    Before:  Bolger, Chief Justice, Winfree, Maassen, Carney,
  

                                              

                    and Borghesan, Justices.
  



                                       

                    CARNEY, Justice.
  

                                                           

                    BORGHESAN, Justice, concurring.
  

                                                            

                    BOLGER, Chief Justice, dissenting.
  



I.        INTRODUCTION  



                                                                                                                                 

                    Adefendant convictedoffirst-degreemurderappealed hisconviction to the  



                                                                                                                                  

court of appeals, arguing that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on the law of  


----------------------- Page 2-----------------------

self-defense.   The court of appeals agreed the instruction was erroneous but concluded                                                                                            



that the error was harmless and affirmed the defendant's conviction.                                                                   



                               The defendant petitioned us, asking that we reverse the court of appeals'                                                                         



decision and his conviction because the erroneous instruction relieved the State of its                                                                                                               



burden to disprove self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.                                                                                     We agree.                   We therefore   



reverse   the   decisions   of   the   superior   court   and   court   of   appeals   and   vacate   the  



defendant's   conviction   because   the   challenged  instruction   is   legally   incorrect   and  



impermissibly lightens the prosecution's burden to disprove self-defense.                                                                      



                                                                                              1  

II.             FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS              



                A.             Facts  



                               Marquinn Jones-Nelson shot and killed Devante Jordan in March 2011.  

                                                                                                                                                                                                              



Both young men were at a party at the home of an acquaintance.  At some point Jordan  

                                                                                                                                                                                            



confronted Jones-Nelson in a bedroom, alleging that Jones-Nelson had spread a rumor  

                                                                                                                                                                                            



that Jordan was a "snitch."  Jordan then left the bedroom.  

                                                                                                                                         



                               Jones-Nelson later called a friend of Jordan's into the bedroom and asked  

                                                                                                                                                                                              



him to get Jordan.  When Jordan returned, he approached Jones-Nelson aggressively;  

                                                                                                                                                                            



Jordan was significantly larger than Jones-Nelson and had previously knocked him  

                                                                                                                                                                                                  



unconscious in a fight.  Accounts of what happened next differed.  Jones-Nelson and a  

                                                                                                                                                                                                         



friend testified at trial that Jordan reached into his waistband for a handgun.  Another  

                                                                                                                                                                                       



witness testified that he did not see Jordan reach for a gun.  

                                                                                                                                            



                               It is undisputed that Jones-Nelson then pulled out a handgun and shot  

                                                                                                                                                                                                 



Jordan repeatedly.  He disposed of the gun used in the shooting, asked friends to lie  

                                                                                                                                                                                                     



about his whereabouts, and attempted to secure false identity documents to flee the state.  

                                                                                                                                                                                                              



                1  

                               The   factual   details   are   laid   out   in   greater   detail   in  the   court of   appeals'  

decision,  Jones-Nelson  v.  State,  446  P.3d  797,  798-801  (Alaska  App.  2019).  



                                                                                                  -2-                                                                                                   7599  


----------------------- Page 3-----------------------

He was arrested the next day and charged with first-degree murder as well as other                                                                                                        



offenses that are not at issue here.                                            



               B.              Trial  



                               Jones-Nelson gave notice before trial that he would claim self-defense. At                                                                                        



the end of the four-week-long trial, the trial court gave the jury three instructions on the                                                                                                    



law of self-defense.  The first two, numbered 30 and 31, were pattern instructions that   



                                                                                                                                                                                 2  

described   the   use   of   nondeadly   force   and   deadly   force   in   self-defense.     These  



                                                                                                        3 

                                                                                                                                                                                 

instructions correctly stated the relevant law.                                                              The deadly force instruction explained  



                                                                                                                                                                                              

that if a person is justified in using nondeadly force in self-defense, the person can also  



                                                                                                                                                                                                  

use  deadly  force  "when  the  person  reasonably  believes  the  use  of  deadly  force  is  



                                                                  

necessary for self-defense."  



                                                                                                                                                                                           

                               At the prosecution's request and over Jones-Nelson's objection, the court  



                                                                                                                                                

also gave the following instruction, drafted by the prosecutor:  



                                                                                                                                                     

                               A basic tenet of the doctrine of self-defense is that [the] use  

                                                                                                                                                                    

                               of deadly force is unreasonable . . . if non-deadly force is  

                                                                                                                                                                    

                               obviously sufficient to avert the threatened harm.  Even in  

                                                                                                                                                             

                               circumstances when a person is permitted to use deadly force  

                                                                                                                                                                    

                               in self-defense[,] that person may still not be authorized to  

                                                                                                                                                                  

                               employ all-out deadly force because such extremeforceis not  

                                                                                                   [4]  

                                                                                  

                               necessary to avert the danger.                                            



               2  

                               See  Alaska Pattern Jury Instructions - Crim. 11.81.330 (nondeadly force);                                                                               

former Alaska Pattern Jury Instructions - Crim. 11.81.335 (2013) (deadly force).                                                                                            



               3  

                               See AS 11.81.330, 11.81.335.  

                                                                                                     



               4  

                              Jones-Nelson, 446 P.3d at 803 (alterations in original).  

                                                                                                                                        



                                                                                                -3-                                                                                        7599
  


----------------------- Page 4-----------------------

                      Jones-Nelson's   attorney   argued   that   the   instruction   was   "dicta   from  



            [5]                                                                                   [6]  

 Walker                                                                                                                                   

                 and it's from the dissenting opinion in  Weston.                                       So . . . I think it's an  



                                                                                                                                   

inaccurate or incorrect statement of the law.   It's not necessary.   It's not a pattern  



                              

instruction . . . ."  



                                                                                                                                                

                      The prosecutor responded, "Counsel hasn't articulated how it's incorrect.  



                                                                                                                                

It is dicta from  Weston but it is a direct quote from . . .  Walker.  It is not an incorrect  



                                                                                   

statement of the law, and it should be given . . . ."  



                                                                                                                                              

                      The trial court decided to give the instruction.  "I'm going to give this. . . .  



                                                                                                                              

[A]nd I've given this before.  I find that this is a nice, clear statement of the difference  



                                                                                                                                          

between . . . deadly and non-deadly force.  I find that the . . . pattern instructions . . . are  



                                                                             

a little confusing and this one clarifies them."  



                                                                                                                                           

                      Neither counsel explicitly discussed the third self-defense instruction in  



                                                                                                                                     

their  closing  arguments,  but  both  devoted  time  to  discussing  self-defense.                                                  After  



                                                                                                                                      

explaining to the jury the requirement that a defendant "reasonably believe" deadly force  



                                                                                                                                           

was necessary, the prosecutor argued that the jury had to conclude "that's the level of  



                                                                                                                            

violence that I am prepared to excuse, forgive, condone, and acquit in the community  



                                                                                                                                         

where I live, that's the standard."  He continued by urging the jurors to "decline the  



                                                                                                                                                

invitation to say that the conduct you've heard described in this case is reasonable."  



                                                                                                                                          

Jones-Nelson's attorney then countered the prosecutor's argument, concluding that his  



                                                                                                                                         

client knew "[i]t was either kill or be killed."  In rebuttal, the prosecutor argued that the  



                                                                                                     

defense was asking the jury to conclude that Jones-Nelson's actions were "reasonable  



                                                                                                                                          

- the level of violence that you would approve of, condone, and vote to acquit . . . -  



           5          State v. Walker          , 887 P.2d 971, 978 (Alaska App. 1994).                  



           6  

                                                                                                                                          

                      Weston  v.  State,  682  P.2d  1119,  1124  (Alaska  1984)  (Compton,  J.,  

dissenting).  



                                                                     -4-                                                              7599
  


----------------------- Page 5-----------------------

 in the community where you live."                                                            He continued, telling the jurors, "You can't make                                                                     



 that finding.                    You can't make that finding.                                                  It's not reasonable . . ." because the level of                                                              



 force was not necessary.                                          



                                   The jury rejected Jones-Nelson's self-defense claim and convicted him of                                                                                                                  



 first-degree murder.                                  



                  C.               Appeal  



                                   Jones-Nelson raised two issues on appeal but raises only one in his petition  

                                                                                                                                                                                                               



              7  

 to us.            That issue is the self-defense instruction drafted by the prosecutor. Jones-Nelson  

                                                                                                                                                                                               



 argued before the court of appeals that the instruction erroneously suggested that the jury  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                        



 evaluate the use of deadly force retrospectively "to determine whether deadly force was  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                        



 in fact objectively necessary, rather than . . . whether the defendant's use of deadly force  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                     

 was reasonable under the circumstances known to the defendant at the time."8  

                                                                                                                                                                                            



                                   The appeals court first agreed with Jones-Nelson that "a defendant may be  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                             



justified in using deadly force (even 'all-out' deadly force) if, under the circumstances  

                                                                                                                                                                                             



 known to the defendant, the defendant reasonably believed that this amount of force was  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                         



 necessary - even if it later turns out that this belief was mistaken, and that lesser force  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                     

 would have sufficed."9                                           It also "agree[d] with Jones-Nelson that the wording of the  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                          



 challenged instruction failed to unambiguously recite the concept of 'reasonableness'  

                                                                                                                                                                                       



                  7                Jones-Nelson, 446 P.3d at 798-99.                                                              In addition to the self-defense issue                                              



 raised here, Jones-Nelson argued (and the State conceded) that the trial court improperly                                                                                                            

prohibited him from eliciting testimony about Jordan's reputation for violence or past                                                                                                                                  

 acts of violence.                           Id.   The court of appeals held that the error was harmless.                                                                                              Id.  



                  8                Id. at 803 (emphasis in original).  

                                                                                                 



                  9                Id. at 803-04.  

                                                   



                                                                                                              -5-                                                                                                    7599
  


----------------------- Page 6-----------------------

                                                                                      10  

that is central to the law of self-defense."                                                But the court concluded that when the                                    



instruction "is read in conjunction with the other jury instructions on self-defense, and                                                                            



in the context of the parties' closing arguments . . . , there is little chance that the jurors                                                                 

                                                                            11  The court pointed out that neither counsel had  

would have been misled on this issue."                                                                                                                               



referred   to   the   instruction   in   closing   arguments   and   affirmed   Jones-Nelson's  

                                                                                                                                           



                      12  

conviction. 



                          In a concurring opinion, Judge Allard commented on "the danger of lifting  

                                                                                                                                                                



language fromappellate court decisions and then asking jurors to interpret and apply this  

                                                                                                                                                                     

language without the benefit of its original context."13                                                          Addressing the prosecutor's  

                                                                                                                                                   



argument that someofthe languagein theinstruction "was,drawn, essentially verbatim,"  

                                                                                                                                                       



from an instruction the court of appeals had upheld in a previous case, she cautioned,  

                                                                                                                                                       



"The fact that a jury instruction contains a verbatim quote from one of this Court's  

                                                                                                                                                            



decisions does not guarantee that the instruction is an accurate or complete statement of  

                                                                                                                                                                        



                  14  

the law." 

        



III.         STANDARD OF REVIEW  

                                                   



                          The parties disputetheapplicablestandard of review. The adequacy of jury  

                                                                                                                                                                    

instructions is generally a legal question, which is reviewed de novo.15   But if a party  

                                                                                                                                                                 



             10           Id.  at 803.   



             11  

                          Id.  at 803-04.   



             12  

                          Id. at 804.  

                                      



             13           Id. at 805 (Allard, J., concurring).  

                                                                      



             14           Id.  

                                  



             15            Young v. State, 374 P.3d 395, 405 (Alaska 2016).  

                                                                                                                



                                                                                   -6-                                                                           7599
  


----------------------- Page 7-----------------------

                                                                                                                                 16  

fails to preserve the issue for appeal, we review for plain error.                                                                     Jones-Nelson argues   



that he preserved his argument for appeal, while the State argues that Jones-Nelson failed                                                                             



to preserve his objection by inadequately explaining his grounds for objecting.                                                                                           We  

                                                                                                                                                        17  Under the  

review de novo the issue of whether a claim has been preserved for appeal.                                                                                                  

de novo review standard, "we exercise our independent judgment."18  Finally, questions  

                                                                                                                                                               



of law involving the interpretation of a statute are reviewed by using a sliding scale  

                                                                                                                                                                        



approach where "the plainer the language of thestatute,themoreconvincing thecontrary  

                                                                                                                                                                  

legislative history must be."19  

                                                  



IV.           DISCUSSION  



                            Jones-Nelson argues that the court of appeals was wrong to conclude that  

                                                                                                                                                                           



the incorrect jury instruction was harmless.  And he argues that the instruction reduced  

                                                                                                                                                                  



the State's duty to disprove self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.  The State argues  

                                        



that the jury instruction correctly stated the law and that any imperfections in the jury  

                                                                                                                                                                          



instruction did not affect the verdict.  We agree with Jones-Nelson that the instruction  

                                                             



erroneously described the law of self-defense, the error was constitutional in nature, and  

                                                                                                                                                                           



the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  

                                                                                                    



              A.            Jones-Nelson Preserved His Right To Appeal The Jury Instruction.  

                                                                                                                                                      



                            We first decide which standard of review to apply.  "To preserve an issue  

                                                                                                                                                                        



for appeal, a party must clearly state the grounds for [the] objection 'so that the [superior]  

                                                                                                                                                               



              16           Jordan  v.  State,  420  P.3d   1143,   1151  (Alaska  2018).  



              17           Id.  at   1148.  



              18           Johnson  v.  State,  328  P.3d  77,  81  (Alaska  2014).  



              19            State   v.   Groppel,   433   P.3d   1113,   1116   (Alaska   2018)   (quoting  Alaska  



Airlines, Inc. v. Darrow, 403 P.3d 1116, 1121-22 (Alaska 2017)).                                                         

                                                                        



                                                                                      -7-                                                                               7599
  


----------------------- Page 8-----------------------

                                                                                                20  

court may intelligently rule upon the objection.' "                                                  The State argues that Jones-Nelson         



failed to clearly state the grounds for his objection.                                               We disagree.               We have held that an                 



objection was not properly preserved where a party objected to one witness's testimony                                                                 

                                                                                                                                              21  and when a  

and relied on that objection to challenge a different witness's testimony,                                                                         



party, having been asked by a judge what his grounds were for objecting, failed to  

                                                                                                                                                                     



                               22  

articulate  them.                      But  we  have  also  held  that  a  verbal  objection  was  sufficient  to  

                                                                                                                                                                     



preserve an objection for appeal even where it "did not articulate the finer points of [a  

                                                                                                                                                                      

party's] argument on appeal."23  

                                           



                          Jones-Nelson's attorney timely objected to the instruction, saying, "[I]t's  

                                                                                                                       



dicta from Walker and it's from the dissenting opinion in Weston. So, I mean, it's . . . an  

                                                                                                                                                                     



inaccurate or incorrect statement of the law.   It's not necessary.   It's not a pattern  

                                                                                                                                                            



instruction; [I] would ask [it] not be given."  The court heard a response from the State  

                                                                                                                                                                



before admitting the instruction and moving on to other instructions.  Jones-Nelson's  

                                                                                                                                           



attorney was not asked for further explanation or given the opportunity to clarify his  

                                                                                                                                                                    



objection beforethesuperior court ruled. AlthoughJones-Nelson's objection could have  

                                                                                                                                                                 



been  more  detailed,  it  clearly  identified  the  instruction  objected  to  and  indicated  

                                                                                                                                                       



counsel's belief that the instruction was an inaccurate statement of the law because it was  

                                                                                                                                                                  



drawn from dicta from one case and a dissent from another.  

                                                                                                      



             20           Davisonv.State                 ,282P.3d 1262, 1267 (Alaska2012) (alteration in original)                                       



(quoting   Williams v. State                       , 629 P.2d 54, 62 (Alaska 1981)).                   



             21  

                          Leopold  v.  State,  278  P.3d  286,  292-93  (Alaska  2012).  



             22  

                           Williams,  629  P.2d  at  61-62.  



             23           Davison,  282  P.3d  at  1267;  see  also  Manes  v.  Coats,  941  P.2d  120,  125  n.4  



(Alaska 1997) (holding objection was preserved where counsel's "remarks indicate[d]  

                                                                                                                                                     

counsel's opposition to the omission, as well as the basis for that opposition," even  

                                                                                                                                                                

though objection was "oblique").  

                                            



                                                                                  -8-                                                                           7599
  


----------------------- Page 9-----------------------

                           In   Young v. State                , we cautioned that "as long as the instructions actually                                         



given . . . adequately set forth the applicable law," trial courts should refrain from giving                                                                      



additional    instructions    drafted    by    parties    "unless    [such    an    instruction]    'would  

                                                                                                              24  In addition to objecting to the  

substantially aid the jury in arriving at a just verdict.' "                                                                                                              



combination of language pulled from dicta in one case and the dissenting opinion in  

                                                                                                                                                                           



another,Jones-Nelson's attorney argued that theState's instruction did not correctly state  

                                                                                                                                                                       



the law and was "not a pattern instruction" and "not necessary."  

                                                                                                           



                           Alaska Criminal Rule 30(a)'s test to determine whether an objection is  

                                                                                                                                                                            



sufficient to preserve an issue for appeal is borrowed from cases construing the similar  

                                                                                                                                                                  

provisions of Alaska Civil Rule 51(a).25  The objection must "enable the trial judge to  



avoid error by affording [the judge] an opportunity to correct [the] charge before it goes  

                                                                                                                                                                      

to the jury."26  An objection is sufficient to preserve an issue "only if the judge is clearly  

                                                                                                                                                                  



made  aware  of  the  alleged  error  in  or  omission  from  the  instructions.                                                                          Counsel's  

                                                                                                                                                          



objections must be specific enough to clearly bring into focus the precise nature of the  

                                                                                                                                                                         

asserted error."27  

                  



                           Jones-Nelsonalerted thetrialcourtthat therewasnoneed toprovidefurther  

                                                                                                                                                                  



instruction on self-defense beyond the pattern instructions and that there was a danger  

                                                                                                                                                     



that doing so would be "an inaccurate or incorrect statement of the law" resulting from  

                                                                                                                                                                      



              24  

                           374 P.3d 395, 428 (Alaska 2016) (alteration omitted) (quoting                                                                   Robart v.   

State, 82 P.3d 787, 795 (Alaska App. 2004)).                                  



              25           Lengele v. State, 295 P.3d 931, 935 (Alaska App. 2013); see also Saxton  

                                                                                                                                                

v. Harris, 395 P.2d 71, 73 (Alaska 1964) (detailing the civil standard).  

                                                                                                                           



              26           Saxton, 395 P.2d at 73.  

                                                                    



              27           Id. (citing Mitchell v. Knight, 394 P.2d 892 (Alaska 1964)).  

                                                                                                                                     



                                                                                     -9-                                                                             7599
  


----------------------- Page 10-----------------------

the way the instruction had been drafted. He sufficiently preserved this issue for appeal.                                                                     



                                                                                          28  

We therefore review the jury instruction de novo.                                              



                                                                                                                                                  

            B.	         TheInstructionIncorrectly DirectedTheJury To RetroactivelyAssess  

                                                                                                                    

                        The Reasonableness Of Jones-Nelson's Use Of Force.  



                                                                                                                                                          

                        Jones-Nelson argues that the instruction improperly directed the jury to  



                                                                                                                                                     

retroactively assess his use of force.   Alaska has codified the common law of self- 



                                                                                                                                            

defense.  The use of nondeadly force is governed by AS 11.81.330.  When a defendant  



                                                                                                                                                         

uses deadly force as defined in AS 11.81.900(b)(16), the defendant must show that the  



                                                                                                     29  

                                                                                                                                                        

additional requirements of AS 11.81.335 are satisfied.                                                      A person is entitled to use  



                                                                                                                                                        

deadly force in self-defense if nondeadly force is justified under AS 11.81.330 and the  



                                                                                                                                                 

person "reasonably believes the use of deadly force is necessary for self-defense against  



                                                                                                                                                   30  

                                                                                                                                       

. . . death[,] . . . serious physical injury," or one of the crimes listed in the statute. 



                                                                                                                                                       

                        Whether  such  force  is  necessary  must  be  evaluated  based  on  the  



                                                                                                                                                 31  

                                                                                                                                                       

circumstances as they appeared to the defendant at the time the force was used.                                                                        We  



                                                                                                                                                          

have recognized that "[d]etached reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of an  



                            32  

                                                                                                                                                      

uplifted knife."                 For that reason, "[e]ven if the defendant's fear turns out to have been  



                                                                                                                                                        

mistaken, [self-defense] still may be established if the defendant proves that, under the  



            28          Jordan  v.  State,  420  P.3d   1143,   1152  (Alaska  2018).  



            29          See  Ha  v.  State,  892  P.2d   184,   190  (Alaska  App.   1995).  



            30          AS   11.81.335(a).  



            31          McCracken  v.  State,  914  P.2d  893,  898  (Alaska  App.  1996)  (citing  Weston  



v. State,  682  P.2d   1119,   1121  (Alaska   1984)).  

     



            32           Weston, 682 P.2d at 1121-22 (alteration in original) (quoting Brown v.  

                                                                                                                                                          

                                                                

 United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921)).  

                                                              



                                                                           -10-	                                                                    7599
  


----------------------- Page 11-----------------------

circumstances, he or she reasonably feared imminent deadly attack at the hand of the                                                  

victim."33  



                      Once a defendant has introduced "some evidence" placing self-defense at  

                                                                                                                                         



                                                                                                                                        34  

issue, the State has the burden of disproving the defense beyond a reasonable doubt.                                                         



The burden upon a defendant to place self-defense at issue is thus significantly less than  

                                                                                                                                     



the prosecution's resulting obligation to disprove it in order to convict the defendant of  

                                                                                                                                        



an offense.  

      



                     In this case, the first two self-defense instructions were pattern instructions  

                                                                                                                         

presenting the jury with the definitions of nondeadly and then deadly force.35                                                      The  

                                                                                                                                    

pattern instructions closely tracked  the statutory  language.36                                       The third instruction,  

                                                                                                                         



number 34, was drafted by the prosecutor. In a 2006 article written "by a prosecutor for  

                                                                                                                                       

prosecutors . . . [from] a prosecutorial focus,"37 the prosecutor addressed "the daunting  

                                                                                                                              

task  of  disproving  self-defense  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt."38                                         Among  the  topics  

                                                                                                                                 

explored in the article was the use of excessive force.39  

                                                                             



           33        McCracken,  914  P.2d  at  898.  



           34        Morrell  v.  State,  216  P.3d  574,  577-78  (Alaska  App.  2009).  



           35        See  Alaska  Pattern  Jury  Instructions  -  Crim.  11.81.330  (nondeadly  force);  



former  Alaska  Pattern  Jury  Instructions  -  Crim.   11.81.335  (2013)  (deadly  force).  



           36  

                                                                                                                                       

                                                                          

                     Instruction  30  corresponds  to  AS  11.81.330,  which  governs  use  of  

        eadly force in self-defense.  Instruction 31 corresponds to AS 11.81.335, which  

nond                                                                                                                             

governs use of deadly force in self-defense.  

                                                                        



           37        James Fayette,  "If You Knew Him Like I Did,  You'd  Have Shot Him,  

                                                                                                                                   

Too . . ." A Survey of Alaska's Law of Self-Defense, 23 ALASKA  L.R                                       EV.171,       174 (2006).  

                                                                                       



           38        Id. at 233.  

                                



           39        Id.  at 202-03.   



                                                                  -11-                                                             7599
  


----------------------- Page 12-----------------------

                          The article correctly stated that because the use of force in self-defense is                                                            



permitted only "when and to the extent" necessary, it is possible that a defendant's use                                                                        

                                                                                         40  The article then offered the following  

of force could become excessive at some point.                                                                                                     



advice:           "When  faced  with  an  excessive  force  scenario,  a  court  could  find  useful  

                                                                                                                                                         



language  in  Justice  Matthews's  Weston  opinion  and  Judge  Mannheimer's  Walker  

                                                                                                                                                       



                                                                                                                                                     41  

opinion, and from these two could craft a useful 'excessive force' instruction."                                                                           What  

                                                                                                                                                            



followed was a three-sentence jury instruction, the last two sentences of which are  

                                                                                                                                                               



identical to Instruction 34:  

                                             



                         A basic tenet of the doctrine of self-defense is that use of  

                                                                                                                                        

                          deadly force is unreasonable if non-deadly force is obviously  

                                                                                                                          

                          sufficient            to      avert        the       threatened              harm.              Even          in  

                                                                                                                        

                          circumstances when a person is permitted to use deadly force  

                                                                                                                                   

                          in self-defense, that person may still not be authorized to  

                                                                                                                                        

                          employall-out deadly force because such extreme force is not  

                                                                                                                                       

                         necessary to avert the danger.[42]  

                                                                                          



                          The court of appeals concluded that the error in Instruction 34 was that "the  

                                                                                                                                                              



wording . . . failed to unambiguously recite the concept of 'reasonableness' that is central  

                                                                                                                                                         

to the law of self-defense."43  The court observed that the question before the jury "is not  

                                                                                                                                                                



whether  a  defendant's  use  of  force,  and  the  level  of  force  used,  was  necessary  in  

                                                                                                                                                                 



hindsight (or, using the language of the challenged instruction, whether some lesser  

                                                                                                                                                           



amount of force can now be seen to be 'obviously sufficient to avert the threatened  

                                                                                                                                                  



             40          Id.  at 202.   



             41  

                                     

                         Id. at 203.  



             42          Id.  



             43  

                                                                                                                                     

                         Jones-Nelson v. State, 446 P.3d 797, 803 (Alaska App. 2019).  



                                                                               -12-                                                                         7599
  


----------------------- Page 13-----------------------

                   44  

harm')."                 We agree.                  Because the instruction implied that reasonableness could be                                                                           



assessed in hindsight, the instruction was in error.                                               



               C.	            The InstructionErroneously                                         Distinguished Between Deadly And"All-  

                              Out Deadly" Force.              



                              Jones-Nelson also argues that the instruction improperly distinguished                                                              



between   deadly   force   and  "all-out  deadly   force"   or   "extreme   force."     The   second  



sentence of the instruction directed that "[e]ven in circumstances when a person is                                                                                                         



permitted to use deadly force in self-defense[,] that person may still not be authorized to                                                                                                 



employ  all-out deadly force                                    because such                   extreme force                    is not necessary to avert the                            



                   45                                                                                                                                      46  

danger."                                                                                                                                                          

                          The instruction is derived from language in State v. Walker.                                                                            Jones-Nelson  



                                                                                           

contends that language was taken out of context and was "quite specific to the facts of  



                                                                                                                                                                     

that case."   The court of appeals rejected this argument, noting that the "instruction  



                                                                                                                                                                                            

correctly captured the concept that the defendant's use of force must be proportionate to  



                                                  47  

                                

the perceived danger." 



                              Alaska law permits the use of deadly force "when and to the extent the  

                                                                                                                                                                                         

person reasonably believes the use of deadly force is necessary."48  

                                                                                                                                                                                        

                                                                                                                                                  The State argues that  



                                                                                                                                                                              

this "when and to the extent" language requires courts to distinguish not only between  



                                                                                                                                                                                    49  

                                                                                                                                                                                          In  

deadly and nondeadly force, but also between different degrees of deadly force. 



               44  

                             Id.  



               45            Id.  (second alteration in original) (emphasis added).                                              



               46             887 P.2d 971, 978 (Alaska App. 1994).                                    



               47            Jones-Nelson, 446 P.3d at 803.  

                                                                                         



               48             AS 11.81.335(a) (emphasis added).  

                                                                                            



               49             TheStateconcedes that defendantsarenot requiredto "usetheleast amount  

                                                                                                                                                                                

                                                                                                                                                                  (continued...)  



                                                                                            -13-	                                                                                    7599
  


----------------------- Page 14-----------------------

addition   to   Walker,   the   State   bases   its   argument   on   the   common   law   principle   of  



proportionality. We have not previously addressed whether the "when and to the extent"                                                                                                                         



language in AS 11.81.335(a) requires a defendant authorized to use deadly force to                                                                                                                                          



distinguish between different degrees of deadly force.                                                                                        We hold that it does not.                               



                                   Alaska's law of self-defense is contained in a pair of interlocking statutes.                                                                                                                    



The first, AS 11.81.330, sets out the general principles authorizing the use of nondeadly                                                                                                             



force:   "A person is justified in using nondeadly force upon another                                                                                                                 when and to the                    



extent the person reasonably believes it is necessary for self-defense against what the                                                                                                                                  



person reasonably believes to be the use of unlawful force by the other person," unless                                                                                                                          

                                                                               50       Alaska Statute 11.81.335(a) provides for the use of  

a specified exception applies.                                                                                                                                                                                             



deadly force in self-defense:  "[A] person who is justified in using nondeadly force in  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                            



self-defense under AS 11.81.330 may use deadly force in self-defense . . . when and to  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                            



the extent the person reasonably believes the use of deadly force is necessary for self- 

                                                                                                                                                                                                                      

defense against (1) death; [or] (2) serious physical injury . . . ."51   Both statutes require  

                                                                                                                                                                                                               



that the person using force in self-defense reasonably believe that the force is necessary  

                                                                                                                                                                                                        



and that the person reasonably believe that the other person is using unlawful force. The  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                       



plain language of both statutes makes clear that if either of these beliefs is unreasonable  

                                                                                                                                                                                               



at the time the person uses force in self-defense, then the use of force in self-defense is  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                             



not permitted.                             Nothing in  the plain  language of AS 11.85.335(a)  even  implies an  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                          



                 49                (...continued)  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                         

of force possible" but argues that a reviewing court must consider "how closely the  

                                                                                                                                                                                                  

defendant's use of force corresponds with the minimum force necessary to meet the  

                     

threat."  



                  50               AS 11.81.330 (emphasis added).  

                                                                                                     



                  51               AS 11.81.335(a) (emphasis added).  

                                                                                                            



                                                                                                           -14-                                                                                                     7599
  


----------------------- Page 15-----------------------

 additional reasonable belief about the level of deadly force necessary to defend against                                                                                                                                   



 death or serious physical injury.                                     



                                     Although the dissent asserts that our decision removes a "proportionality"                                                                              



 requirement in Alaska's law of self-defense which implies levels of deadly force, its                                                                                                                                                  



 discussion actually supports the premise that the use of any force in self-defense is                                                                                                                                                    

                                                                                   52  State v. Walker presented a similar scenario. Although  

justified only when                                   necessary.                                                                                                                                                     



 the trial judge ruled the verdicts inconsistent after the jury acquitted Walker of stabbing  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                        



 one man in the arm but convicted him for stabbing a second man repeatedly in the back,  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 

 the jury found Walker's second use of deadly force was not necessary for self-defense.53  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  



 Jones-Nelson's case also raises the question of the necessity of firing shots at Jordan  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                            



 after he fled the room, but that issue has nothing to do with the degree of force Jones- 

                                                                                                                                                                                                                             

Nelson used.54  

                      



                   52                Dissent   at  42-47.   Our   interpretation   of   the   "to   the   extent   necessary"  



 language is temporal - deadly force is not justified after its use for self-defense has                                                                                                                                              

 ended. The dissent, in contrast, interprets it to mean that only a proportionally necessary                                                                                                                         

 amount of deadly force can be justified, using the example of a police officer continuing                                                                                                                        

 a choke-hold after subduing a subject. But neither interpretation would allow an officer                                                                                                                                    

 to continue using deadly force against a subdued subject.                                                                               



                   53                State v. Walker, 887 P.2d 971, 976-77 (Alaska App. 1994).  

                                                                                                                                                                                       



                   54                The dissent refers to statutes governing the use of force by police officers  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                          

 against suspects and by parents against children to argue that the self-defense statutes  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                          

 contain an element of proportionality.  See Dissent at 42-45 (first citing AS 11.81.370;  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                 

 and then citing AS 11.81.430(a)(1)). Those different statutory schemes address different  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                        

 policy concerns andexplicitly incorporatetheconceptofproportionality; theself-defense  

                                                                                                                                                                                                              

 statutes do not.   Compare AS 12.25.070 (limiting an arresting officer  or  person to  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         

 "necessary and proper" force (emphasis added)), and AS 11.81.430 (limiting parents to  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          

 "reasonable and appropriate nondeadly force" (emphasis added)), with AS 11.81.335  

                                                                                                                                                                                                        

 (permitting the use of deadly force "when and to the extent the person reasonably  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                

 believes the use of deadly force is necessary").  

                                                                                                



                                                                                                                  -15-                                                                                                           7599
  


----------------------- Page 16-----------------------

                                                     The legislative history of these statutes indicates that the legislature meant                                                                                                                                                                                            



the "when and to the extent" language to refer to a binary distinction between deadly and                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                

                                                                  55  The commentary to the Tentative Draft for the Alaska Criminal Code  

nondeadly force.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  



Revision of 1977 refers to the language of both AS 11.81.330 and AS 11.81.335, which  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              

the tentative draft had originally merged into a single provision.56                                                                                                                                                                                                                     While the draft  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   



mentions both levels and degrees of force, the commentary portrays "deadly force" as  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   

a singular degree or level of force.57  It uses the term "level" to explain the dichotomy  



between deadly  and  nondeadly  force.                                                                                                                            "The use of force is classified  according  to  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             



whether it is 'physical force' or, a special level of physical force:   'deadly physical  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    



                           55                        The dissent argues that AS 11.81.900(b)(16)'s definition of "deadly force"                                                                                                                                                                                                



mandates consideration                                                                             of   varying degrees of deadly force when deciding whether                                                                                                                                                        

deadly force was justified because the definition "includes intentionally . . . pointing a                                                                                                                                                                                                                    

firearm in the direction of another person . . . and intentionally placing another person                                                                                            

in fear of imminent serious physical injury by means of a dangerous instrument[.]"                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     But  

this language was added two years after the self-defense statutes were enacted. Ch. 102,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             

 §§ 29-32, SLA 1980.                                                                      To reduce the possibility that threatening deadly force would                                                                                                                                                                      

"tragically escalate a conflict, the legislature concluded that only peace officers making                                                                                                                                                                                                                               

an arrest should have the authority to threaten deadly force in situations where the actual                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     

use   of   deadly   force   was   not  justified."     Comment.   &   Sectional   Analysis   on   the  

Amendments to Alaska's Revised Crim. Code, S. Journal Supp. No. 44 at 20, 1980 S.                                                                                                                                                                                                              

Journal (May 29, 1980).                                               



                                                     The   definition   of   "deadly   force"   in  AS   11.81.900(b)(16)   does   not  

differentiate these examples by degree of deadliness; rather, it lists them all because they                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          

are all deadly. Including varying degrees of deadliness within the statutory definition of                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     

"deadly force" confirms the binary distinction between nondeadly and deadly force.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              



                           56                        AlaskaCriminal CodeRevisionPart II,at 39(Tent.Draft1977)(hereinafter  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         

Tentative Draft).  

                                       



                           57                        Id. at 45-47.  

                                                                           



                                                                                                                                                                    -16-                                                                                                                                                            7599
  


----------------------- Page 17-----------------------

              58  

force.' "          The commentary mentions "situations in which any degree of force may be                                                 



                                                           59  

appropriate including deadly force."                                                                                                

                                                               Even the commentary's explication of the "when  



                                                                                                                              

and to the extent . . . necessary" language suggests a split between deadly and nondeadly  



                                                                                    

force, rather than a spectrum of degrees of deadly force:  



                                                                                                               

                      Any use of force is justifiable only "when and to the extent  

                                                                                                                      

                      [the  person  claiming  the  defense]  reasonably  believes  it  

                                                                                                           

                      necessary."            Therefore,  even  though  the  use  of  "deadly  

                                                                                                                      

                      physical force " may be authorized in a particular section, it is  

                                                                                                      

                      not justified if the person claiming the defense believed at  

                                                                                                                     

                      that time that he could accomplish his purpose by the use of  

                      non-deadly force.[60] 

                                           



The commentary explains "to what degree a person is justified in using physical force  

                                                                                           



against another in self-defense" by saying, "Subject to the limitations on the use of  

                                                                                                                                           



deadly physical force, [a person] may exercise that degree of force which he reasonably  

                                                                                                                             

believes to be necessary."61  

                                                



           58         Id.  at  45.  



           59         Id.  at  47.  



           60         Id.  at  48 (first  alteration  in  original)  (emphasis added).   The  State  claims  



that  the  staff  counsel  for  the  revision  commission  acknowledged  that  the  "when  and  to  

                                   

                                                                                                                                   

the extent" language reflects a proportionality requirement, but the article it cites merely  

                                                                                                                                        

echoes the passages quoted in this paragraph.  For instance, staff counsel wrote that  

                                                                                                                                          

because of the "when and to the extent" language, use of deadly force "will not be  

                                                                                                                                         

justified if [the claimant] believed  at the time that he could have accomplished his  

                                                                                                                             

purpose by the use of 'non-deadly physical force' " and that "where the [claimant]  

                                                                                                                                         

believes a verbal request would be adequate, even 'non-deadly physical force' may not  

                                                                                                                                

be used or threatened." See Barry Jeffrey Stern, The Proposed Alaska Revised Criminal  

                             LASKA  L. R        EV. 1, 26 (1977).            

 Code, 7 UCLA A 



           61         Tentative Draft, at 51 (emphasis added).  

                                                                             



                                                                    -17-                                                              7599
  


----------------------- Page 18-----------------------

                                There is little support for the State's argument that common law principles                                                                           



                                                                                                                                                                                                62  

of proportionality require a distinction between different degrees of deadly force.                                                                                                                   In  



                                                                                                                                                                                        

Rowe v. United States, the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant wielding  



                                                                                                                                                                                   

deadly force in self-defense had no duty to "so carefully aim[] his pistol as to paralyze  

                                                                                                                                                          63     Many courts have  

                                                                                                                                                                                                  

the arm of his assailant, without more seriously wounding him." 



applied  general  principles  of  proportionality  to  self-defense  without  distinguishing  

                                                                                                                                                                          

between subcategories of deadly force.64  

                                                                               



                                We have adopted the United States Supreme Court's view that "[d]etached  

                                                                                                                                                                                  

reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife."65  We agree with the  

                                                                                                                                                                                                      



Court's observation that a person justified in using deadly force need not "consider  

                                                                                                                                                                                     



whether a reasonable man might not think it possible to fly with safety or to disable his  

                                                                                                                                                                                                      



                62             But see Rajnic v. State                                , 664 A.2d 432, 435-36 (Md. App. 1995) (holding     



that evidence was sufficient for jury to conclude that appellant did not reasonably believe                                                                                                  

he was in danger of death or serious bodily harm or that he used excessive force);                                                                                                          

Fersner v. United States                                  , 482 A.2d 387, 393 (D.C. 1984) (interpreting jury instruction                                                

defining deadly force as force "likely to cause death or serious bodily harm" to mean                                                                                                           

there are "degrees of deadly force").                                



                63              164 U.S. 546, 558 (1896).  

                                                                             



                64              See, e.g., Statev. Etienne, 35 A.3d523,537(N.H. 2011) (applyingcommon  

                                                                                                                                                                                         

law principles of proportionality to require "reasonable necessity to justify the use of  

                                                                                                                                                                                                        

deadly force" absent explicit statutory language to that effect); State v. Walden, 932 P.2d  

                                                                                                                                                                                                   

 1237, 1240 (Wash.1997) (en banc) (approvingportionofjuryinstruction explaining that  

                                                                                                                                                                                                     

defendant "has no right to repel a threatened assault" with deadly force when he does not  

                                                                                                                                                                                                      

have reasonable grounds to believe he "is in imminent danger of death or great bodily  

                                                                                                                                                     

harm" (emphasis omitted)); State v. Rader, 186 P.79, 85-86 (Or. 1919) (making no  

                                                                                                                                                                                                      

distinctions between different forms of deadly force); Geralds v. State, 647 N.E.2d 369,  

                                                                                                                                                                                                   

373 (Ind. App. 1995) (holding that defendant's use of deadly force was "excessive in the  

                                                                                                                                                                                                      

face of [the victim's] obvious retreat and lack of aggression towards him").  

                                                                                                                                                                   



                65              Weston  v.  State, 682  P.2d  1119,  1121-22  (Alaska 1984)  (alteration  in  

                                                                                                                                                                                                        

original) (quoting Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921)).  

                                                                                                                                                  



                                                                                                  -18-                                                                                           7599
  


----------------------- Page 19-----------------------

                                                                                                 66  

assailant rather than to kill him."                                                                      Legislative history and the common law do not                                                                                      



support the State's argument that AS 11.81.335(a) distinguishes between regular and                                                                                                                                                        



"all-out" deadly force. The State concedes that a defendant "faced with a knife-wielding                                                                                                                  



assailant" need not "analyze each [defensive] option and decide which would best do the                                                                                                                                                      



defensive job while minimizing the harm to one's assailant, at risk of getting stabbed . . .                                                                                                                                                      



while pondering the options."                                                           But distinguishing between ordinary deadly force and                                                                                               



"all-out deadly force" would require defendants to do just that.                                                                                                      



                                      The   Walker  decision from which the jury instruction was drawn involved                                                                                                              



an unusual context; the defendant in                                                                Walker  claimed self-defense against one victimwho                                                                                    

                                                                                                                                                                          67  But to the extent Walker  

was stabbed in the arm and one who was stabbed in the back.                                                                                                                                                                      



stands for the proposition that there are different levels of deadly force, it misstates  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                           



Alaska law. Alaska law recognizes only two categories of force: nondeadly and deadly.  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       



It is a binary choice:  either the force used is deadly or it is not.  The instruction implies  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 



that there is an additional distinction - that there can be more or less deadly versions  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                              



of deadly force.  This is legal error.  

                                                                                     



                   D.                 The Jury Instruction Was Not Harmless Error.  

                                                                                                                                                                  



                                      The court of appeals held that the error of including Instruction 34 was  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          



harmless, reasoning that "when the supplemental instruction is read in conjunction with  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         



the other jury instructions . . . and in the context of the parties' closing arguments . . .  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                



                   66  

                                      Brown,  256  U.S.  at  343.  



                   67                 State  v.   Walker,  887  P.2d  971,  976  (Alaska  App.   1994).  



                                                                                                                     -19-                                                                                                                         7599  


----------------------- Page 20-----------------------

                                                                                                                                                         68  

there is little chance that the                             jurors would               have been misled on                         this issue."                  We  



disagree.  

                                                                                        69 the defendant must show that the error  

                          Where an error is not structural,                                                                                                   

                                                           70  If the error is a constitutional violation, it "will always  

was prejudicial to obtain relief.                                                                                                                          

                                                 



affect  substantial  rights  and  will  be  prejudicial  unless  the  State  proves  that  it  was  

                                                                                                                                                                

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."71  Errors undermining the State's burden to prove  

                                                                                                                                                             



             68           Jones-Nelson v. State                     , 446 P.3d 797, 803-04 (Alaska App. 2019).                                                 The  



court of appeals held the jury instruction was harmless because "there [was] little chance                                                                 

that the jurors would have been misled on this issue."                                                  Id.   But the court's analysis itself                 

was  mistaken:   it   should   have   analyzed   whether   the   error   was   "harmless   beyond   a  

reasonable doubt."                     See Adams v. State                   , 261 P.3d 758, 771 (Alaska 2011) (explaining                        

harmless  beyond   a   reasonable   doubt   standard   is   used   to   analyze   constitutional  

violations).  



             69           Jones-Nelson implies that the jury instruction may constitute structural  

                                                                                                                                                     

error, which is not subject to harmlessness review.  See Jordan v. State, 420 P.3d 1143,  

                                                                                                                                                             

 1148 (Alaska 2018) ("Structural errors require automatic reversal and a new trial.").  

                                                                                                                                                                          

Jones-Nelson only hints at this argument in his briefing and does not discuss the factors  

                                                                                                                                                           

considered when deciding whether to classify an error as structural. See id. (listing " 'the  

                                                                                                                                                                

difficulty of assessing the effect of the error' and . . . other factors, including fundamental  

                                                                                                                                                

fairness and whether harmlessness is irrelevant under the circumstances" as factors to be  

                                                                                                                                                                    

considered when determining whether error is structural).  We consider this argument  

                                                                                                                                                      

waived due to inadequate briefing by Jones-Nelson.  See Windel v. Carnahan, 379 P.3d  

                                                                                                                                                               

971, 980 (Alaska 2016) (holding argument was waived where it was "given only a  

                                                                                                                                                                     

cursory statement in the argument portion of [the] brief" (quoting Burts v. Burts, 266  

                                                                                                                                                                

P.3d 337, 344 (Alaska 2011))).  

                                             



             70           See Young v. State, 374 P.3d 395, 429-30 (Alaska 2016) (holding that  

                                                                                                                                              

failure to give requested jury instruction was harmless error).  

                                                                                                           



             71           Khan  v.  State,  278  P.3d  893,  900  (Alaska  2012)  (emphasis  omitted)  

                                                                                                                                                       

(quoting Adams , 261 P.3d at 773).  

                                                         



                                                                                -20-                                                                          7599
  


----------------------- Page 21-----------------------

                                                                                                                         72  

its case beyond a reasonable doubt are constitutional errors.                                                                  We have previously     



applied the constitutional error standard to errors that limited a defendant's evidence and                                                                       

                    73     We agree with  the court of appeals  that jury  instructions erroneously  

argument.                                                                                                                                        



defining an offense's or affirmative defense's elements in a way that eases the State's  

                                                                                                                                                           

burden  of  proof  are  constitutional  error.74                                          In  this  case,  the  erroneous  instruction  

                                                                                                                                                   



lightened  the  State's  burden  to  disprove  self-defense  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt.  

                                                                                                                                                                          



Therefore the error was constitutional and the State has the burden of proving that the  

                                                                                                                                                                   



error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  

                                                                                              



                          Jones-Nelson argues that Instruction 34 was prejudicial because it could  

                                                                                                                                                              



have led the jury to "weigh whether, in hindsight, the force and degree of force Jones- 

                                                                                                                              



Nelson used was actually necessary," or to conclude that Jones-Nelson was barred from  

                                                                                                                                                                



claiming self-defense because "he could have exercised other, less violent options."  

                                                                                                                                                                          



(Emphasis added.)  The State argues that the instruction was not prejudicial because  

                                                                                                                                                         



"Jones-Nelson's version of events was highly implausible" when considered against the  

                                                                                                                                                                   



evidence and because any error was cured by counsel's statements in closing arguments.  

                                                                                                                                                                          



                          The State argues the jury most likely rejected Jones-Nelson's self-defense  

                                                                                                                                                  



claim because Jones-Nelson did not sincerely believe he was in danger of death or  

                                                                                                                                                                    



serious bodily injury.  If that were the case, the erroneous instruction would not have  

                                                                                                                                                                



affected the jury's verdict, because the jury would have rejected Jones-Nelson's self- 

                                                                                                                                                                



defense claim "at a higher level on the decision tree."   The State argues that Jones- 

                                                                                                                                                            



             72           Adams v. State               , 440 P.3d 337, 344-45 (Alaska App. 2019),                                             abrogated on   



other grounds by Phornsavanh v. State                                        , 481 P.3d 1145, 1159-60 (Alaska App. 2021).                                  



             73           Smithart v. State, 988 P.2d 583, 589 (Alaska 1999).  

                                                                                                                   



             74           See, e.g., Adams , 440 P.3d at 344-45; Brown v. State, 698 P.2d 671, 673  

                                                                                                                                                                 

(Alaska  App.  1985);  Coney  v.  State,  699  P.2d  899,  904  (Alaska  App.  1985)  

                                                                                                                                                            

(disapproving instruction that reduced prosecution's burden of proof).  

                                                                                                                            



                                                                                -21-                                                                           7599
  


----------------------- Page 22-----------------------

Nelson's self-defense claim was "completely implausible" for several reasons. First, the                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        



 State argues that it is implausible that Jones-Nelson could have seen Jordan reach for a                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  



 silver gun and in the same moment taken a black gun off a window ledge, turned back                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 



to Jordan, and shot him, all before Jordan could get off a single shot.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 Even though this                                                                   



version of events may seem unlikely, the jury is the arbiter of credibility and Jones-                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   



Nelson's testimony on this point did not stand alone.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              It was corroborated by another                                                                                                                   



witness's testimony that Jones-Nelson shot after Jordan reached for a silver gun while                                                                                                                                                                              



moving threateningly toward Jones-Nelson and that Jones-Nelson then picked up the                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             



 silver gun and carried it away.                                                                                                                                                              This version of events was also corroborated by the                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             



physical evidence of both a black gun and a silver gun recovered in the case and by                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              



 another witness's testimony that she saw Jones-Nelson with a silver gun the night of the                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      



 shooting.    While deliberating, the jury requested to re-hear testimony "regarding the                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      



 silver gun,"                                                          so the jury appeared to at least consider the possibility that Jones-Nelson's                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  



 story was true.                                           



                                                                                Second, the State points out that Jones-Nelson's actions after the shooting                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   



 show consciousness of guilt.                                                                                                                                                 The State points to evidence that Jones-Nelson lied and                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      



 asked others to lie about his whereabouts, sought false identity papers to flee the state,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          



 and had a friend dispose of the gun used in the shooting.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          The State points out that                                                                                                            



 "courts have recognized that flight and                                                                                                                                                                                                             suppression of evidence are probative of a                                                                                                                                                                                                                         



 defendant's lack of . . . belief that their crime was justified as self-defense."                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             But, as the                                     



 court of appeals has recognized, "[t]here are . . . many reasons why a person might flee                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             75  The jury could  

 a crime scene, and consciousness of guilt is only one potential reason."                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        



have agreed with the State that Jones-Nelson's actions after the shooting were probative  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         



                                        75                                       Wilkerson  v.  State,  271  P.3d  471,  475  (Alaska  App.  2012).  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      -22-                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            7599  


----------------------- Page 23-----------------------

 of a guilty conscience, but it could also have concluded that Jones-Nelson feared the                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         



police or retaliation from Jordan's associates even if he had acted in self-defense.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            



                                                                        Third, the State argues that Jones-Nelson's story is inconsistent with his                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              



 statements after the shooting, including a statement that he had "smoked" Jordan.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      In a   



recorded call with a friend, Jones-Nelson implied that he shot Jordan because Jordan                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       



 "disrespected" him and because Jordan was a "snitch."                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                On the same call, Jones-Nelson                                                                   



 said, "[Jordan] came at me disrespectful, like, he towering over me," and that "he came                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            



 at me like he wanted to box" so "I just popped him point blank right there."                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             Although  



this evidence strongly supported the State's version of events, it is not inconceivable that                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 



the jury could have viewed these statements as after-the-fact posturing to a woman                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     



Jones-Nelson was trying to impress. When cross-examined about the statements, Jones-                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          



Nelson explained, "I like her . . . . I don't want her to know I'm really scared like that,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             



you know what I'm saying?"                                                                                                                                   Pressed further, he stated that he was on drugs at the time                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 



 and "on the phone venting" to "a female I've been talking to."                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      While Jones-Nelson's   



 statements   in   the   phone   call   are   strong   evidence   against   him,   the   jury   could   still  



reasonably have interpreted them differently than the State suggests.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         



                                                                        The State also argues that any harm from Instruction 34 was cured by                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     



 arguments                                                         of                   counsel,                                               namely                                           the                        prosecutor's                                                                 explanation                                                              of                   the                        objective  



reasonableness standard during closing argument. The court of appeals has "repeatedly                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        76  

held that [closing arguments] can cure flaws or omissions in the jury instructions."                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  



Jones-Nelson counters that precedent from the court of appeals establishes only that  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           



 closing arguments can cure flaws in jury instructions if they correct those flaws directly.  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      



                                    76                                  Buckwalter  v.  State,  23  P.3d  81,  87  (Alaska  App.  2001).  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                              -23-                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              7599  


----------------------- Page 24-----------------------

In this case, Jones-Nelson contends, the prosecutor's arguments actually                                                                                                                       compounded  



                                                                77  

the instruction's defects.                                             



                                   The State did concede that reasonable belief must be assessed from the  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                         



defendant'spoint of view. But theprosecutor also invitedjurors toassess reasonableness  

                                                                                                                                                                                           



froma removed perspective, saying thatadefendant's beliefbeing reasonablemeans "[a]  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                        



reasonable person would do exactly what [the defendant] did."  Further, the prosecutor  

                                                                                                                                                                                                      



argued that Jones-Nelson's behavior was not reasonable because it "doesn't reflect  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                



community standards."   He also argued that finding Jones-Nelson had acted in self- 

                                                                                                                                                                                                                     



defense would be equivalent to saying, "[T]hat's the level of violence that I am prepared  

                                                                                                                                                                                                           



to excuse, forgive, condone, and acquit in the community where I live."  In rebuttal, the  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                          



prosecutor reiterated that finding Jones-Nelson acted in self-defense required the jury to  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                             



conclude that his actions were "the level of violence that you would approve of."  This  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                     



is not what the law requires.  

                                                   



                                   Theprosecutor'sargument alsocompounded theerroneous instruction that  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                        



"all-out" deadly force is not authorized even if deadly force is. The law does not require  

                                                                                                                                                                                                               



that deadly force used in self-defense be a "level of violence that [a juror] would approve  

                                                                                                                                                                                                             



of."  By tying the permitted level of deadly force to community standards rather than  

                                                                                                                                                                                                     



what the defendant reasonably believed was necessary, the prosecutor invited the jury  



to approve only certain "levels" of deadly force.  And he told the jury, "[Y]ou need not  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                         



                  77               Jones-Nelson also argues in his reply brief that it is "impossible to square"                                                                                              



case law holding that defective jury instructions can be cured by closing arguments with                                                                                                                              

case law holding that jurors are presumed to follow jury instructions and with the court's                                                                                                                      

instruction that the jury must "follow the court's instructions and not the arguments of                                                                                                                                    

counsel."   See Pralle v. Milwicz, 324 P.3d 286, 289 (Alaska 2014) ("We presume that  

a jury follows the court's instructions"). Because                                                                            Jones-Nelson first raised this argument  

in his reply brief, the argument is waived and we do not consider it.                                                                                                         State v. Parker                        , 147   

P.3d 690, 698 (Alaska 2006) ("[W]e do not consider arguments raised for the first time                                                                                                                                

in a reply brief.").        



                                                                                                           -24-                                                                                                     7599
  


----------------------- Page 25-----------------------

be unanimous about why self-defense does not [apply].                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   Six of you could say force is                                                                                                                              



 excessive.   Six of you could say not reasonable, and so forth.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           Doesn't matter."                                                                                     This  



 suggests that even if deadly force were reasonable, the jury could still reject the self-                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          



 defense claim if they thought the degree of deadly force was excessive. Far from curing                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  



the instruction, this argument exacerbated it.                                                                                                                                                                                            



                                                                          Nor is the erroneous instruction cured by the use of Instructions 30 and 31,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       



which correctly stated the law of self-defense. The jury could have been confused about                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        



the reasonableness standard even in light of these correct instructions. And Instructions                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   



 30 and 31 did nothing to correct Instruction 34's "all-out deadly force" language.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  



                                                                          The State has failed to show that the erroneous instruction was harmless                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         



beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, we reverse the court of appeals' holding that the                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      



 error was harmless.                                  



V.                                   CONCLUSION  



                                                                          We  REVERSE  the  court  of  appeals'  decision  that  the  erroneous  jury  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    



instruction  was  harmless  error.                                                                                                                                                                      Accordingly,  we  VACATE  the  conviction  and  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     



REMAND the case to the superior court for further proceedings consistent with this                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      



 opinion.  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     -25-                                                                                                                                                                                                                           7599
  


----------------------- Page 26-----------------------

BORGHESAN, Justice, concurring.                            



                                I join the vast majority of the court's opinion and disagree only with one   



aspect of the court's harmless error analysis.                                                                 Although true that Jury Instruction 34                                                 



"failed to unambiguously recite the concept of 'reasonableness' that is central to the law                                                                                                           



                                       1  

                                           I believe this error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  It is hard  

of self-defense,"                                                                                                                                                                                 



to  see how the jury  could  have failed  to  consider  whether  using  deadly force was  

                                                                                                                                                                                                   



                                                                                                                                                                                                          2  

reasonable from Jones-Nelson's perspective: jury instructions must be read as a whole; 

                                                                                                                                                                                         



the preceding jury instructions explained that the jury must decide whether the defendant  

                                                                                                                                                                                      



reasonably believed deadly force was necessary; and we presume that the jury follows  

                                                                                                                                                                                           

the instructions as written.3  But because I agree with the court's reasoning that the error  

                                                                                                                                                                                                  



concerning the degree of force permitted is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, I  

                                                                                                                                                                                          



agree with its ultimate conclusion to reverse the judgment.  

                                                                                                                   



                1  

                               Jones-Nelson v. State                               , 446 P.3d 797, 803 (Alaska App. 2019).                                                           



                2  

                                Geisinger v. State                        , 498 P.3d 92, 111 (Alaska App. 2021) ("[A] claim of                                                                          

error relating to jury instructions must be evaluated by reference to the content of the                                                                                                             

instructions as a whole.").  

                                                                 



                3               Coffin v. State, 425 P.3d 172, 175 (Alaska App. 2018) ("As a general  

                                                                                                                                                                                           

matter, jurors are presumed to follow the instructions that they are given . . . .").  

                                                                                                                                                                                               



                                                                                                  -26-                                                                                           7599
  


----------------------- Page 27-----------------------

BOLGER, Chief Justice, dissenting.                            



                                The vital question raised by the court's opinion is whether a person who                                                                            



uses deadly force in self-defense is authorized to kill his attacker when killing is not                                                                                                                 



reasonably necessary.                                  The court's opinion concludes that such force may be justified                                                                        



even if it is unnecessary, reasoning that the self-defense statute does "not" require "a                                                                                                                   



defendant authorized to use deadly force to distinguish between different degrees of                                                                                                                       



                                1  

                                    and that "[n]othing in the plain language of [the self-defense statute] even  

deadly force"                                                                                                                                                                                         



implies an additional reasonable belief about the level of deadly force necessary to  

                                                                                                                                                                                                           



                                                                                                                     2  

defend against death or serious physical injury." 

                                                                                                   



                                I disagree with these conclusions. Throughout the justification statutes, the  

                                                                                                                                                                                                          



legislature consistently limits the use of force "to the extent" the defendant reasonably  

                                                                                                                                                                                       



believes it is necessary.  This language prevents a defendant from using excessive force  

                                                                                                                                                                                                     



in a variety of circumstances when the use of lesser force may be justified.  The drafters  

                                                                                                                                                                                               



specifically  intended  to  follow  our  prior  case  law  to  avoid  the  implication  that  an  

                                                                                                                                                                                                          



unnecessary homicidecouldbejustified as self-defense. Our courts havethuspreviously  

                                                                                                                                                                                        



interpreted these statutes to require the use of force to be reasonably proportionate to the  

                                                                                                                                                                                                          



perceived threat.  

                         



                A.              Background  



                                As noted in the court's opinion, Jones-Nelson shot Devante Jordan after a  

                                                                                                                                                                                                              

                                                                                                                                                       3     The prosecution also  

confrontation in the bedroom of an apartment during a party.                                                                                                                                           

                                                                                                                                       



presented strong evidence that Jones-Nelson continued to shoot Jordan in the back as he  

                                                                                                                                                                                                            



was trying to flee.   One tenant, Nikita Sanders, testified that Jones-Nelson followed  

                                                                                                                                                                                           



                1  

                                Slip Op. at 14.             



                2               Slip Op. at 14-15.  

                                                            



                3               Slip Op. at 2.              



                                                                                                   -27-                                                                                              7599
  


----------------------- Page 28-----------------------

Jordan out of the bedroom and shot him four times in the back as he ran into the kitchen.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 



On cross-examination, Jones-Nelson agreed with the prosecutor's suggestion that he                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            



"fired shots at a man who was running away from [him], who had dropped his own gun,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     



and who was yelling for help."                                                                                       Another witness testified that Jones-Nelson admitted to                                                                                                                                                    



him that, after Jordan began to run away, Jones-Nelson ran behind him and shot him five                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   



more times. And                                                 the photographs fromJordan's                                                                                        autopsy showed that he had indeed been  



shot four times in the back.                                                       



                                                   At the end of the trial, the prosecution proposed an instruction to deal with                                                                                                                                                                                        



this evidence:   



                                                                            A basic tenet of the doctrine of self-defense is that use                                                                                                                                    

                                                   of   deadly   force   is   unreasonable,   if   non-deadly   force   is  

                                                   obviously sufficient to avert the threatened harm.                                                                                                                                                Even in   

                                                   circumstances when a person is permitted to use deadly force                                                                                                                                                    

                                                   in   self-defense   that   person   may   still   not   be   authorized   to  

                                                   employ all-out                                         deadly force because such extreme force is not                                                                                                                  

                                                   necessary to avert the danger.                                                      



The proposed instruction noted that the first sentence was drawn from the dissenting                                                                                                                                                                                                            



                                                                                                       4  

                                                                                                              and that the second sentence was drawn from  Walker v.  

opinion in                                Weston v. State                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        



                      5 

State.  



                                                   Jones-Nelson's attorney objected to this instruction, stating, "[I]t's dicta  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     



from  Walker and it's from the dissenting opinion in  Weston.   So . . . I think it's an  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              



inaccurate or incorrect statement of the law.   It's not necessary.   It's not a pattern  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            



instruction . . . ."  

                                                 



                         4                         682  P.2d   1119,   1124  (Alaska   1984)  (Compton,  J.,  dissenting).  



                         5                         887  P.2d  971,  978  (Alaska  App.   1994).  



                                                                                                                                                             -28-                                                                                                                                                     7599  


----------------------- Page 29-----------------------

                                                  In response, the prosecutor disagreed and explained the reason for his                                                                                                                                                                                               



request,   



                                                  Counsel hasn't articulated how it's incorrect. It is dicta from                                                                                                                                               

                                                   Weston  but it is a direct quote from what Judge Mannheimer                                                                                                                    

                                                  wrote in   Walker.  It is not an incorrect statement of the law,                                                                                                                                                

                                                  and it should be given, particularly in a case here where one                                                                                                                                                     

                                                  of the themes is excessive force and                                                                                                        shooting an unarmed                              

                                                  man in the back as he ran away                                                                                          .  



(Emphasis added.)                                                       Defense counsel did reply to the prosecutor's argument, but he did                                                                                                                                                                             



not clarify his objection or offer any explanation about why the instruction was legally                                                                                                                                                                                                                  



incorrect.   Defense counsel simply replied that the instruction may have come from an                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     



Arizona case.   The trial judge overruled the objection, observing that he had given the                                                                                                                                                                                                                                



instruction before, and gave the instruction to the jury.                                                                                                                                  



                         B.                       Jones-Nelson Did Not Preserve These Issues For Appeal                                                                                                                                                                            .  



                                                  Alaska Criminal Rule 30(a) requires counsel to make a specific objection                                                                                                                                                                       



to preserve a dispute over a jury instruction: "No party may assign as error any portion                                                                                                                                                                                                                



of the charge or omission therefrom unless the party objects thereto before the jury                                                                                                                                                                                                                               



retires to consider its verdict,                                                                            stating distinctly the matter to which the party objects and                                                                                                                                              

                                                                                                                   6  We have construed this language to require counsel to  

the grounds of the objections                                                                                ."                                                                                                                                                                                                             



state the specific legal grounds for such an objection:  

                                                                                                                                                                 



                                                  The purpose of this rule is to enable the trial judge to avoid  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             

                                                  error by affording him an opportunity to correct his charge  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        

                                                  before it goes to the jury. The dictates of the rule are satisfied  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   

                                                  only if the judge is clearly made aware of the alleged error in  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           

                                                  or omission from the instructions. Counsel's objections must  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                



                         6  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     

                                                  Alaska R. Cr. P. 30(a) (emphasis added). Alaska Civil Rule 51(a) contains  

                                                            

nearly identical language.  



                                                                                                                                                           -29-                                                                                                                                                   7599  


----------------------- Page 30-----------------------

                         be specific enough to clearly bring into focus the precise                                       

                         nature of the asserted error.                      [7]  



                         For example, in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Aurora Air Service, Inc. ,  

                                                                                                                                         



the appellant made only a general objection to the instructions on tortious interference  

                                                                                                                                           

with contract.8   We concluded that a general objection that did not state specific legal  

                                                                                                                                                        

grounds was insufficient to preserve any issue for appeal.9                                                        In Roderer v. Dash, the  

                                                                                                                                                           



appellant made a similar general objection to an instruction recognizing that a physician  

                                                                                                                                              



is required to maintain treatment records, stating, "[J]ust for the record, I object to the  

                                                                                                                                                           

whole instruction."10                     We declined to review the instruction because of the lack of a  

                                                                                                                                                               



                                  11  

specific objection. 

                



                         Similarly in this case, Jones-Nelson made only a general objection to the  

                                                                                                                                                           



instruction, stating, "I think it's an inaccurate or incorrect statement of the law."  Under  

                                                                                                                                                      



our case law, this objection was insufficient to preserve these issues for appeal.  

                                                                                                                                      



                         The court's opinion relies on two other parts of Jones-Nelson's objection,  

                                                                                                                                               



                                                                                                                                                    12  

but neither part would be sufficient to alert the superior court to any specific error.                                                                  The  

                                                                                                                                                          



court first relies on counsel's statement that the instruction was "dicta from Walker and  

                                                                                                                                                          



it's from the dissenting opinion in Weston." But many of our jury instructions are drawn  

                                                                                                                                                      



            7            Saxton  v.  Harris,  395  P.2d  71,  73  (Alaska   1964).  



            8            604  P.2d   1090,   1094-95  (Alaska   1979).  



            9            Id. ;  see  also  9C  CHARLES  ALAN  WRIGHT  &  ARTHUR  R.  MILLER,  FEDERAL  



PRACTICE  AND  PROCEDURE  §  2554,  at  80-81  (3d  ed.  2008)  (stating  "the  case  law  is  quite  

clear; a general objection stating no grounds is insufficient to satisfy the requirement of                                                                  

                              

Rule 51(c)(1)").   



             10          233 P.3d 1101, 1110 (Alaska 2010).  

                                                                                 



             11          Id .  



             12  

                         Slip Op. at 8-9.  

                                               



                                                                            -30-                                                                       7599
  


----------------------- Page 31-----------------------

from case law, so simply repeating the source of the text did not tell the trial judge                                                                                                



anything   about why                             the instruction                    was legally incorrect.                                 And there was likewise               



nothing in counsel's objection to suggest that the combination of these two statements                                                                                      



was misleading.                       The court of appeals had previously approved a single jury instruction                                                               

containing the same combination of text from these two cases.                                                                                13  



                              The court's opinion also relies on counsel's statement that the instruction  

                                                                                                                                                                           



                                                                                                                        14  

was "not necessary" and "not a pattern instruction."                                                                           Again, this objection told the  

                                                                                                                                                                                            



superior court nothing about why the instruction was legally incorrect.  The Preface to  

                                                                                                                                                                                               



the Alaska Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions makes it clear that the pattern instructions  

                                                                                                                                                                         



are not legally  binding:                                   "These  instructions are not submitted  for  approval to  nor  

                                                                                                                                                                                           



adopted by the Alaska Supreme Court.  Rather the instructions . . . are offered as a basis  

                                                                                                                                                                                       

for trial judges and practitioners to tailor instructions for a particular case."15  

                                                                                                                                                                               



                              The court's opinion quotes Young v. State to support the argument that this  

                                                                                                                                                                                           

objection  was  sufficient.16                                     But  the  quote  from  Young  says  nothing  about  pattern  

                                                                                                                                                                                  



                                                                                                                                                                      17  

instructions; it only refers to the "instructions actually given" by the court.                                                                                              In Young,  

                                                                                                                                                                                   



the superior court rejected a jury instruction on eyewitness identification requested by  



the defendant, concluding that this issue was adequately addressed by the pattern jury  

                                                                                                                                                                                          



instructions regarding the credibility of witnesses generally and the State's burden of  

                                                                                                                                                                                              



               13              Wilkerson v. State                      , 271 P.3d 471, 474-75 (Alaska App. 2012).
                                          



               14  

                              Slip Op. at 8-9.
         



               15
            Alaska Court System, Alaska Pattern Jury Instructions - Crim. Preface  

                                                                                                                                                                                  

(2011).  



               16  

                                                                                                                                                                                  

                              Slip Op. at 9 (quoting Young v. State, 374 P.3d 395, 428 (Alaska 2016)).  



               17  

                                                                           

                              Young, 374 P.3d at 428.  



                                                                                             -31-                                                                                       7599
  


----------------------- Page 32-----------------------

           18  

proof.         But we held that the pattern instructions were inadequate and that the superior                                      



court   erred   when   it   failed   to   give   a   specific   jury   instruction   on   the   reliability  of  

                                            19   Young supports the proposition that it may be insufficient  

eyewitness identifications.                                                                                                   



for the trial court to rely on the pattern instructions when additional explanation is  

                                                                                                                                              



needed.   Therefore, Jones-Nelson's argument that Instruction 34 was "not a pattern  

                                                                                                                                     



instruction" did not give the trial court any indication why the instruction was incorrect.  

                                                                                                                                  



                       There was nothing in Jones-Nelson's objection that identified a specific  

                                                                                                                                    



legal error as required by court rule.  If this objection is deemed sufficient, then the rule  

                                                                                                                                           



will no longer require a litigant to state the specific grounds supporting an objection.  A  

                                                                                                                                               



trial attorney with a losing case may simply argue that the opponent's proposals are  

                                                                                                                          



"legally incorrect" or "not pattern instructions" without advising the trial judge about  

                                                                                                                                        



why they are wrong or how they can be fixed. Then these Easter eggs can be uncovered  

                                                                                                                                



during appeal to reverse the loss and require a second trial.  

                                                                                            



                       There is another reason Jones-Nelson's "objections" were inadequate. On  

                                                                                                                                             



appeal, an appellant may only rely on the specific reasons for an objection that were  

                                                                                                                                         



raised in the trial court: "the reason for appealing an instruction cannot be 'entirely  

                                                                                                                                   

different' from the objection raised before the trial court."20  

                                                                                       



                       Thecourt's opinion identifiestwo portions ofJones-Nelson's objectionthat  

                                                                                                                                            



are deemed sufficient: that this instruction was based on a combination of prior case law  

                                                                                                                                            



            18        Id .  at  403.  



            19        Id .  at  428-29.  



           20         ASRC  Energy   Servs.  Power   &   Commc'ns,  LLC   v.   Golden   Valley  Elec.  



Ass'n, Inc ., 267 P.3d 1151, 1160 (Alaska 2011) (quoting                                             Van Huff v. Sohio Alaska       

                                      

Petrol. Co., 835 P.2d 1181, 1187 (Alaska 1992)); see also Chilcote v. State, 471 P.3d  

                                                                                                                                          

599, 603 (Alaska App. 2020) (declining review of an issue not raised in the trial court).  

                                                                                                                                      



                                                                     -32-                                                               7599
  


----------------------- Page 33-----------------------

                                                                                                                                                                                              21  

and that the instruction was not a pattern instruction.                                                                                                                                                But these are not the issues                                                    



Jones-Nelson raises on appeal. On appeal Jones-Nelson argues that this instruction was                                                                                                                                                                                                         



improperly retroactive and that there is no limit on the extent of force a person may use                                                                                                                                                                                                        



to repel a serious attack. There was nothing in Jones-Nelson's objection that would alert                                                                                                                                                                                                     



the superior court to these issues.                                                                                   Jones-Nelson did not preserve the issues the court's                                                                                                          



opinion addresses because he did not raise them in a way that could be recognized and                                                                                                                                                                                                           



addressed by the superior court.                                                           



                        C.                     The Instruction Was Not Improperly Retroactive.                                                                                             



                                               The    instruction    in    question    addressed    the    use    of    deadly    force    in  



self-defense, a defense that is governed by statute:                                                                                                  



                                               [A]   person   who   is   justified   in   using   nondeadly   force   in  

                                               self-defense . . . may use deadly force in self-defense upon                                                                                                                                 

                                               another person when and to the extent the person reasonably                                                                                                               

                                              believes the use of deadly force is necessary for self-defense                                                                                                        

                                               against   



                                               (1)  death;   



                                               (2)  serious physical injury;                                                                  

                                               (3)  kidnapping; [or other serious crimes].                                                                                                     [22]  



Under this statute, "a defendant must satisfy both an objective and subjective standard;  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               



he must have actually believed deadly force was necessary to protect himself, and his  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  

belief must be one that a reasonable person would have held under the circumstances."23  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               



                       21  

                                               Slip Op. at 8-10.                      



                       22                     AS 11.81.335(a).  

                                                            



                       23                      Weston v. State                                      , 682 P.2d 1119, 1121 (Alaska 1984).                                                                        



                                                                                                                                                -33-                                                                                                                                        7599
  


----------------------- Page 34-----------------------

Applying the objective standard, the question for the jury is "whether a reasonable                                                      



                                                                                                                         24  

person would have acted in self-defense under the circumstances."                                                             



                        In this case, the instructions on self-defense are included in a section of the  

                                                                                                                                                        



written  instructions  describing  all  of  the  charges  and  defenses  that  applied  to  

                                                                                                                                                        



Jones-Nelson and his codefendant Parrish Harris. Instructions 17-23 detail the elements  

                                                                                                                                              



of each of the charges the jury was required to consider.  Immediately following the  

                                                                                                                                                        



elements of the charges, Instructions 24-29 define and explain the terms used in those  

                                                                                                                                                    



elements.  For example, Instruction 25 explains that "[m]otive is not an element of the  

                                                                                                                                                        



crime charged."  And Instruction 27 defines the term "intentionally," a term that is used  

                                                                                                                                                     



in the elements of first-degree murder in Instruction 17.  

                                                                                                



                        The instructions on self-defense follow the same pattern.  Instructions 30  

                                                                                                                                                         



and 31 define the elements that justify the use of nondeadly force and deadly force in  

                                                                                                                                                          



self-defense.  Instruction 32 explains that the term "reasonably believes" that is used in  

                                                                                                                                                          



the  self-defense  instructions  "refers  to  the  reasonable  belief  of  a  sober  person."  

                                                                                                                                                               



Instruction  33  explains  which  charges  the  self-defense  instructions  apply  to.                                                               And  

                                                                                                                                                     



Instruction  34  returns  to  an  explanation  of  reasonableness,  beginning  with  the  

                                                                                                                                                      



explanation that "use of deadly force is unreasonable, if non-deadly force is obviously  

                                                                                                                             



sufficient to avert the threatened harm."  

                                                             



                        The court's opinion adopts the court of appeals' conclusion that Instruction  

                                                                                                                                          

34 is improperly retroactive.25  But there is no basis for this conclusion in the text of this  

                                                                                                                                                       



instruction.  This instruction applies the same temporal perspective as all of the other  

                                                                                                                                                    



instructions on the charges and defenses.  Each of these instructions is phrased in the  

                                                                                                                                                        



present tense, requiring the jury to apply the stated legal standards to the defendant's  

                                                                                                                                        



            24          Id .  



            25          Slip Op. at 12-13.       



                                                                           -34-                                                                          7599  


----------------------- Page 35-----------------------

mental state, conduct, and the other circumstances of the charged offense. For example,                                                                                                             



Instruction 30 advises the jury that "[a] person is justified in using nondeadly force upon                                                                                                                   



another   when   and   to   the   extent   the   person   reasonably   believes   it   is   necessary   for  



self-defense."   Telling the jury that "use of deadly force is unreasonable, if non-deadly                                                                                                    



force is obviously sufficient" merely requires the jury to apply the same approach to a   



slightly different legal requirement.                                                      There is nothing in the wording of this instruction                                                 



that   suggests   that   the   jury   should   apply   this   instruction   to   anything  other   than   the  



circumstances as they existed at the time of the charged offenses.                                                                                                          And since a self-     



defense claim must be both sincere and reasonable it was no error for the instructions to                                                                                                                             



clarify those requirements separately.                              



                                  Our focus should be on "whether the instructions given, when read as a                                                                                                               

                                                                                                                                         26  Here, the instructions made it  

whole, adequately inform the jury of the relevant law."                                                                                                                                                                



clear that the reasonableness of the defendant's reaction to a threat must be judged from  

                                                                                                                                                                                                              



his perspective.  Instruction 30 states, "A person is justified in using nondeadly force  

                                                                                                                                                                                                             



upon another when and to the extent the person reasonably believes it is necessary for  

                                                                                                                                                                                   



self-defense against what the person reasonably believes to be the use of unlawful force  

                                                                                                                                                                                                              



by the other person . . . ."  (Emphasis added.)  Instruction 31 allows the use of deadly  

                                                                                                                                                                                                         



force "when the person reasonably believes the use of deadly force is necessary for self- 

                                                                                                                                                                                                                



defense."  (Emphasis added.)  Instruction 32 explains the term "reasonably believes" as  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                     



used in theseprevious instructions. And Instruction 34 begins with asentence describing  

                                                                                                                                                                                                



when the use of deadly force is "unreasonable."   Anyone hearing or reading these  

                                                                                                                                                                                                            



instructions one after another would understand that Instruction 34 (just like Instruction  

                                                                                                                                                                                               



32) is an explanation of the requirement of reasonableness stated in Instructions 30 and  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                 



                 26  

                                                                                                                                                                                                            

                                  Gov't Emps. Ins. Co. v. Gonzalez, 403 P.3d 1153, 1161 n.22 (Alaska 2017)  

                                                                                                                                                                            

(quoting City of Hooper Bay v. Bunyan, 359 P.3d 972, 978 (Alaska 2015)).  



                                                                                                        -35-                                                                                                           7599  


----------------------- Page 36-----------------------

 31.   I agree with the court of appeals' conclusion that the proper perspective is clear from                                                                       

these instructions when they are read as a whole.                                                  27  



                                                                                                                                                                    

              D.	          The   Self-Defense   Statute   Places   A   Reasonable   Limit   On   The  

                                                                                          

                           Justifiable Extent Of Deadly Force.  



                                                                                                                                                              

                           "Statutory interpretation . . . begins with the plain meaning of the statute's  

           28  We presume that "the legislature intended every word, sentence, or provision  

text."                                                                                                                                                      



 of a statute to have some purpose, force, and effect, and that no words or provisions are  

                                                                                                                                                                         

 superfluous."29  In this case, the self-defense statutes were part of a set of justification  



                                                                                                                                                                30  

provisions enacted in a comprehensive revision of the criminal code in 1978.                                                                                           We  

                                                                                                                                                                       

 should therefore construe the terms used in these statutes together.31  

                                                                                                                     



                           These justification statutes refer to the use of "force," which includes both  

                                                                                                                                                                      

 "deadly and non-deadly force."32   There is a broad range of severity for either type of  

                                                                                                                                                                          



 force.  At a minimum, "force" includes "any bodily impact, restraint, or confinement or  

                                                                                                                                                                           



              27           Jones-Nelson  v.   State,    446    P.3d    797,    803-04    (Alaska    App.    2019)  



 (concluding that "when the                            supplemental instruction is read in conjunction with the other                                                

jury instructions on self-defense, and in the context of the parties' closing arguments at                                                                                 

 Jones-Nelson's trial, there is little chance that the jurors would have been misled on this                                                                            

 issue").  



              28	           Ward v. State, Dep't of Pub. Safety, 288 P.3d 94, 98 (Alaska 2012).  

                                                                                                                                                       



              29           Nelson v. Mun. of Anchorage, 267 P.3d 636, 642 (Alaska 2011) (quoting  

                                                                                                                                                              

Mech. Contractors of Alaska, Inc. v. State, Dep't of Pub. Safety, 91 P.3d 240, 248  

                                                                                                                                                                      

 (Alaska 2004)).  

                                  



              30	          See ch. 166, § 10, SLA 1978.  

                                                                            



              31           Bullock v. State, Dep't of Cmty. & Reg'l Affs., 19 P.3d 1209, 1214-15  

                                                                                                                                                             

 (Alaska 2001) (stating that we construe "statutes in pari materia where two statutes were  

                                                                                                                                                                     

 enacted at the same time, or deal with the same subject matter" (quoting  Underwater  

                                                                                                                                                      

 Constr., Inc. v. Shirley, 884 P.2d 150, 155 (Alaska 1994))).  

                                                                                                        



              32           AS 11.81.900(b)(28).  

                                    



                                                                                   -36-	                                                                            7599
  


----------------------- Page 37-----------------------

                                                                                                                                        33  

the threat of any bodily impact, restraint, or confinement."                                                                                   And "deadly force" is                           



 likewise defined quite broadly:                    



                               "[D]eadly force" means force that the person uses with the                                                                     

                               intent of causing, or uses under circumstances that the person                                                          

                              knows create a substantial risk of causing, death or serious                                                     

                              physical   injury;    "deadly    force"    includes    intentionally  

                               discharging or pointing a firearm in the direction of another                                                        

                              person or in the direction in which another person is believed                                                       

                              to   be   and   intentionally   placing   another   person   in   fear   of  

                               imminent serious physical injury by means of a dangerous                                                     

                               instrument[.][34]  



 So "deadly force" is not necessarily lethal.  Intentionally pointing a gun at someone or  

                                                                                                                                                                                              



 intentionally threatening to shoot someone are both examples of "deadly force," even if  

                                                                                                                                                                                                

no shots are fired.35  

                             



                               The broad extent of these definitions undercuts the court's assumption that  

                                                                                                                                                                                           



there can be no varying degrees of force.  As we have recognized previously, "Even  

                                                                                                                                                                                     



 someone lawfully refusing to retreat cannot meet a light push or grab with a knockout  

                                                                                                                                 



               33             Id .  



               34             AS   11.81.900(b)(16).  



               35              The  court's  opinion  misinterprets  the  commentary  that  applies  to  the  1980  



 amendment to  this  statutory  definition.  Slip  Op. at 16 n.55.  The commentary explains  

that when the legislature adopted AS 11.81.370 in 1978 (ch. 166, § 10, SLA 1978), "the  

                                                         

                                                                                                                                                                                          

 legislature concluded that only peace officers making an arrest should have the authority  

                                                                                                                                                                               

to threaten deadly force in situations where the actual use of deadly force was not  

                                                                                                                                                                                           

justified."  Comment. & Sectional Analysis on the Amendments to Alaska's Revised  

                                                                                                                                                                                 

 Crim. Code, S. Journal Supp. No. 44 at 20, 1980 S. Journal (May 29, 1980).  Although  

                                                                                                                                                                              

AS 11.81.370 thus implied that "nondeadly force does not include a threat of deadly  

                                                                                                                                                                                    

 force," the 1980 legislature decided to amend the statute to clarify that the definition of  

                                                                                                                                                                                               

 "deadly force" includes these threats.  Id .  In any event, it is the current version of this  

                                                                                                                                                                                           

 definition that applies to the justification statutes that we interpret in this case.  

                                                                                                                                                                     



                                                                                             -37-                                                                                       7599
  


----------------------- Page 38-----------------------

            36  

blow."            And this also holds true for deadly force; the consequences of holding a                                                           



wrongdoer at gunpoint are much less serious than shooting him until he is dead.                                                    



                       The   justification   statutes  allow   a   person   to   use   force   in   a   variety   of  

                                              37                                                 38                                           39  in  

                                                                                                      in defense of property,                      

                                                   to defend another person,                                                   

situations: in self-defense,                                                         

making an arrest,40  or to prevent an escape.41                                     Parents may use force to promote the  

                                                                                                                                                  

welfare of a child;42  a schoolteacher or a bus driver may use force to maintain order.43  

                                                                                                                                                         



But there is a similar limit on every justifiable use of force:  a person may use force only  

                                                                                                                                                



                                                                                                                                                     44  

"when and to the extent the person reasonably believes" the use of force is "necessary." 

                                                                                                                               



                       The Alaska Criminal Code Revision Subcommission recommended this  

                                                                                                                                                 



language in part to correct a problem with the former justifiable homicide statute. Before  

                                                                                                                                            



the code revision, this statute appeared to justify any homicide committed to prevent a  

                                                                                                                                       

felony or to arrest a felony suspect.45  We had noted that "[t]his statute on its face seems  

                                                                                                                                             



            36         Dennis Q. v. Monika M                    ., No. S-15084, 2014 WL 1888270, at *6 (Alaska                            



May  7,  2014).  



            37  

                       AS   11.81.330-.335.  



            38  

                       AS   11.81.340.  



            39  

                       AS   11.81.350.  



            40  

                       AS   11.81.370-.390.  



            41  

                       Id .  



            42  

                       AS   11.81.430(a)(1).  



            43         AS   11.81.430(a)(2).  



            44  

                       AS  11.81.330-.400;  see  also  AS  11.81.430(a)  (authorizing  force  in  specific  

circumstances "[w]hen and to the extent reasonably necessary and appropriate").  

                                                                                                                     



            45         Former AS 11.15.100 (1970) provided:  

                                                                            

                                                                                                                               (continued...)  



                                                                        -38-                                                                  7599
  


----------------------- Page 39-----------------------

to eliminate the requirement that the killing be necessary to effect the arrest or to prevent                                           



                    46  

the felony."                                                                                                                          

                         We therefore adopted the Oregon interpretation of this statute, requiring  

                                                                                                               47    Our decision also  

                                                                                                                                              

a finding of necessity before such a killing could be justified. 



recognized the fundamental difficulty with allowing an unlimited right of self-defense:  

                                                                                                                                



                       The control of man's destructive and aggressive impulses is  

                                                                                                                            

                       one of the great unsolved problems of our society.  Our rules  

                                                                                                                      

                       of law should discourage the unnecessary use of physical  

                                                                                                                

                       force between man and man. Any rule which promotes rather  

                                                                                                                     

                       than inhibits violence should be re-examined.[48]  

                                                                                

                                                                                                            



Seven years later, the subcommission adopted this reasoning for its recommendations,  

                                                                                                                      



noting that "while the existing statute seems to provide an unchecked grant of authority  

                                                                                                                                      



           45	         (...continued)  



                                                                                                                           

                       Justifiable  homicide.                    The  killing  of  a  human  being  is  

                                                                                    

                      justifiable when committed by any person  



                                                                                                                      

                       (1) to prevent the commission of a felony upon him, or upon  

                                                                                                                 

                       his husband, wife, parent, child, master, mistress, or servant;  



                                                                                                               

                       (2) to prevent the commission of a felony upon his property,  

                                                                                                               

                       or upon property in his possession, or upon or in a dwelling  

                                                            

                       house where he may be;  



                                                                                                                       

                       (3) in the attempt, by lawful means, to arrest a person who  

                                                                                                                

                       has committed a felony, or in the lawful attempt to suppress  

                                                            

                       a riot or preserve the peace.  



           46          Gray v. State, 463 P.2d 897, 908 n.16 (Alaska 1970).  

                                                                                                        



           47          Id.  



           48          Id. at 909 (quoting Miller v. State, 462 P.2d 421, 426 (Alaska 1969)).  

                                                                                                                                   



                                                                       -39-	                                                                7599
  


----------------------- Page 40-----------------------

to use deadly physical force in self-defense, that authority is significantly limited by the                                                                  

implied requirement of 'necessity' found by the Supreme Court."                                                            49  



                         The subcommission also noted that the justifiable homicide statute "might  

                                                                                                                                                      



lead a person to believe that he may kill another to prevent the commission of any felony  

                                                                                                                                                       

upon his property."50  The subcommission therefore recommended the legislature limit  

                                                                                                                                                          



the use of deadly force in property defense to the most dangerous property crimes: arson  

                                                                                                                                                         

or  burglary  of  an  occupied  building.51                                           But  even  in  those  circumstances  the  

                                                                                                                                                            



subcommission  maintained  "the  requirement  that  the  force  is  'reasonably  believed  

                                                                                                                                                  

necessary' to accomplish the prevention or termination" of the crime.52  

                                                                                                                       



                         Despite  these  explanations,  the  court's  opinion  concludes  that  the  

                                                                                                                                                           



subcommission was recommending that there should be no limit on the degree of force  

                                                                                                                                                         

a person can use to respond to one of the statutory threats.53  But this is a misreading of  

                                                                                                                                                               



this commentary;overallthesubcommission recommended aconsistent requirement that  

                                                                                                                                                            



the extent of the force must be necessary.  For example, the subcommission concluded  

                                                                                                                                                



its introduction to this chapter with an emphasis on the necessity requirement:  

                                                                                                                           



                                     Any use of force is justifiable only "when and to the  

                                                                                                                                    

                         extent [the person claiming the defense] reasonably believes  

                                                                                                                           

                         it necessary."   Therefore, even though the use of "deadly  

                                                                                                                           

                         physical force" may be authorized in a particular section, it is  

                                                                                                                                       

                         not justified if the person claiming the defense believed at  

                                                                                                                                      



             49          Alaska   Criminal   Code   Revision   Part   II,   at  50  (Tentative   Draft   1977),  



[hereinafter Tentative Draft].             



             50          Id.  at  54.  



             51          Id.  at  56-57.  



             52          Id. at 57.  

                                     



             53          Slip  Op.  at   13-19.  



                                                                             -40-                                                                        7599
  


----------------------- Page 41-----------------------

                        that time that he could accomplish his purpose by the use of                                            

                        non-deadly force.               [54]  



The court's opinion concludes that this language "suggests a split between deadly and  

                                                                                                           

                                                                                                                         55  But this reading  

nondeadly force, rather than a spectrum of degrees of deadly force."                                                                          

                                                                                                             



unnecessarily eliminates the subcommission's recommendation that the use of any force  

                                                                                                                                                  



(including  deadly  physical  force)  is  justifiable  only  "to  the  extent"  the  force  is  

                                                                                                                                                       



                   56  

necessary. 



                        A better reading of this quoted text preserves all of the language of the  

                                                                                                                                                     



subcommission's proposal. Thefirst sentencestates the general rule that limits the extent  

                                                                                                                                                 



of any use of force (even deadly force), and the second sentence states an example  

                                                                                                                                            



showing when the use of excessive force is obviously unjustified.  Just as the jury was  

                                                                                                                                                    



instructed in this case, the "use of deadly force is unreasonable, if non-deadly force is  

                                                                                                                                                        



obviously sufficient to avert the threatened harm."  

                                                                                            



                        The subcommission also specifically discussed "to what degree a person  

                                                                                                                                               

is justified in using physical force against another in self-defense."57  

                                                                                               



                                    Subsection (a) allows a person to defend himself from  

                                                                                                                           

                        what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of  

                                                                                                                                

                        unlawful physical force. Subject to the limitations on the use  

                                                                                                                              

                        of deadly physical force, he may exercise that degree of force  

                                                                                                                           

                        which he reasonably believes to be necessary.[58]  

                                                                                        



            54          Tentative Draft, at 48 (alteration in original).                



            55          Slip Op. at 17.       



            56          Tentative Draft, at 39.            



            57          Id. at 51.  

                                   



            58          Id.   



                                                                          -41-                                                                    7599
  


----------------------- Page 42-----------------------

Again the court's opinion concludes that the second sentence of this quote eliminates any                                                           

requirement that the extent of any self-defense must be limited by necessity.                                                          59  



                        But the second sentence of this quote does not support this construction.  

                                                                                                                                                            



The second sentence recognizes two limitations on the use of force in self-defense.  The  

                                                                                                                                                    



use of force is "subject to the limitations on the use of deadly physical force" which are  

                                                                                                                                                     



later explained to include defending against deadly force, a kidnapping, a robbery, or a  

                                                                                                                                                        

forcible sexual assault.60   But the limitation on the extent of justifiable force applies to  

                                                                                                                                                       



all self-defense situations:  the defendant may exercise only "that degree of force which  

                                                                                                                                                



he reasonably believes to be necessary."  

                                                    



                        We may consider legislative history to construe a statute, but "[t]he plainer  

                                                                                                                                              



the statutory  language  is,  the more convincing the evidence of contrary  legislative  

                                                                                                                                       

purpose or intent must be."61  Here there is nothing in the revision subcommission's draft  

                                                                                                                                                  



or its commentary that is inconsistent with the comprehensive statutory requirement that,  

                                                                                                                                                   



to be justified, force must be no greater than the extent reasonably necessary to respond  

                                                                                                                                            



to a threat.  

        



                        As noted above, the subcommission's recommendation for a reasonable  

                                                                                                                                       



necessity  requirement  was  eventually  included  in  each  section  of  the  justification  

                                                                                                                                    



statutes.  So it may help to consider how this requirement works in various scenarios.  

                                                                                                                                                            



For example, one section allows a peace officer to use deadly force to make an arrest of  

                                                                                                                                                       



            59          Slip  Op.  at   16-17.  



            60          Tentative  Draft,  at  52.  



            61          State,  Dep't  of  Com.,  Cmty.  &  Econ.  Dev.,  Div.  of  Ins.  v.  Alyeska  Pipeline  



                                                                                                                                                      

                                        

Serv.  Co.,  262  P.3d  593,  597  (Alaska  2011)  (quoting  Gov't  Emps.  Ins.  Co.  v.  

                                                                                     

Graham-Gonzalez, 107 P.3d 279, 284 (Alaska 2005)).  



                                                                         -42-                                                                    7599
  


----------------------- Page 43-----------------------

                                                                                                                                                                         62  

a person who has committed a felony involving the use of force.                                                                                                                  Suppose that an                     



officer is able to catch and subdue such a suspect by using a chokehold.                                                                                                             Can the officer       



continue to strangle the suspect until his heart stops beating?                                                                                           The answer is no because                     



the officer may use deadly force "only when and to the extent the officer reasonably                                                                                                            

believes the use of deadly force is necessary to make the arrest."                                                                                                  63  



                                  The court's opinion appears to agree that the duration of the officer's  

                                                                                                                                                                                                     



chokehold is limited by the language that allows the use of deadly force only "when  

                                                                                                                                                                                                           

necessary."64                         This interpretation gives vitality to the first limitation required by the  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                   



statute.  



                                  But there is a second important limitation in the statute: the officer may use  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                   



deadly force only "to the extent the officer reasonably believes the use of deadly force  

                                                                                                                                                                           

is necessary."65                            Since there is no statutory definition of the word "extent," it must be  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                     

construed  "according  to  [its] common  and  approved  usage."66                                                                                                        At the time of this  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                  

legislation, the word "extent" was defined as "[a]mount; scope; range; magnitude."67  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                              



This second limitation therefore requires that the officer must reasonably believe that the  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                    



amount or magnitude of the force he uses is necessary to make the arrest.  

                                                                                                                                                                          



                 62               AS 11.81.370(a)(1).   



                 63               AS 11.81.370(a).                              This limitation is consistent with a statute, first enacted                                                             



in 1962, ch. 34, § 2.08, SLA 1962, providing that "[a] peace officer or private person                                                                                                                    

may  not  subject  a  person  arrested  to  greater  restraint  than  is  necessary and proper for the  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                    

arrest  and  detention  of  the  person."   AS   12.25.070.    



                 64               Slip Op. at 15.  

                                                                          



                 65               AS  11.81.370(a).  

                                            



                 66               AS 01.10.040(a).  

                                            



                 67               Extent, Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979).  

                                                                                                                                         



                                                                                                         -43-                                                                                                  7599
  


----------------------- Page 44-----------------------

                        The court's opinion interprets this second limitation to be only "temporal"                                    

-  deadly force is not justified after the necessity has ended.                                             68  But there is nothing in  



                                                                                                                                             

the text of the statute, the legislative history, or the common usage of this term to suggest  



                                                                                                                                                    

such a narrow definition.  And the court's interpretation makes the limitation on the  



                                                                                                                                                 

"extent" of the force into a limit on the timing and duration of the force - the same  



                                                                                                                                                   

limitation as the language requiring the force to be used only "when" necessary.  The  



                                                                                                                                                

court's interpretation thus violates the presumption that "the legislature intended every  



                                                                                                                                                    

word, sentence, or provision of a statute to have some purpose, force, and effect, and that  



                                                                         69  

                                                  

no words or provisions are superfluous." 



                        We can modify the forgoing example to isolate the importance of this  

                                                                                                                                                   



second limitation on the amount or magnitude of justifiable force.  As noted, a peace  

                                                                                                                                                



office may use deadly force to make an arrest of a person who has committed a felony  

                                                                                                        

involving the use of force against a person.70   Suppose that the officer believes that he  

                                                                                                                  



can restrain a fleeing suspect using a minimal amount of deadly force: he must draw his  

                                                                                                                                                     



service revolver and shout, "Stop or I will shoot!" Instead of restraining the suspect, can  

                                                                                                                                                    



the officer simply shoot the suspect in the back without a warning?  The answer is no  

                                                                                                                                                      



because the officer may use deadly force "only . . . to the extent the officer reasonably  

                                                                                                                                       

believes the use of deadly force is necessary to make the arrest."71  

                                                                                                      



            68          Slip Op. at 15 n.52.         



            69          Nelson v. Mun. of Anchorage, 267 P.3d 636, 642 (Alaska 2011) (quoting  

                                                                                                                                           

Mech. Contractors of Alaska, Inc. v. State, Dep't of Pub. Safety, 91 P.3d 240, 248  

                                                                                                                                                   

(Alaska 2004)).  

                              



            70          AS 11.81.370(a)(1).  

                               



            71          AS 11.81.370(a).  

                               



                                                                         -44-                                                                    7599
  


----------------------- Page 45-----------------------

                         Another section of the justification statutes allows a parent or guardian to                                                           

use force to promote the welfare of a child.                                      72                                                                      

                                                                                       Suppose a parent decides to give a child  



                                                                                                                                                      

 a spanking as punishment for misconduct.   Can the parent give the child a violent  



                                                                                                                                                         

beating?  The answer is no because the parent may use force only "[w]hen and to the  



                                                                                                                                                          73  

                                                                                                                                                                

 extent reasonably necessary and appropriate to promote the welfare of the child." 



                          The text of this child welfare section is slightly different than the other  

                                                                                                                                                          



justification statutes, but the same reasoning applies. The justification statutes limit both  

                                                                                                                                                            



the timing and the magnitude of justifiable force.  Just as the magnitude of a parent's  

                                                                                                                                                    



 discipline is limited "to the extent necessary and appropriate," the magnitude of deadly  

                                                                                                                                                       



 force is limited to the extent necessary to make an arrest or to repel an attack.  

                                                                                                                                      



                          The court of appeals has interpreted the self-defense statutes consistently  

                                                                                                                              



with the statutory limitations on the extent of justifiable force.  One example is a case  

                                                                                                                                                           



where  the  court  of  appeals  used  the  language  that  became  the  second  sentence  of  

                                                                                                                                                               



Instruction  No.  34.                    In   State v.  Walker,  a defendant was charged  with  assault for  

                                                                                                                                                              

 stabbing two men with a knife during a fight that broke out at a party.74  At trial, Walker  

                                                                                                                                                      

 claimed self-defense.75  He was convicted of stabbing one man three times in the back,  

                                                                                                                                                          

but acquitted of stabbing another man a single time in the arm.76  

                                                                                                                                The superior court  

                                                                                                                                                          



 granted  Walker's  motion  for  a  new  trial,  reasoning  that  these  two  verdicts  were  

                                                                                                                                                          



             72          AS 11.81.430(a)(1).   



             73          Id .  



             74           887 P.2d 971, 976 (Alaska App. 1994).                         



             75          Id .  



             76          Id .  



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                                                                                                                                                     77  

inconsistent, since both victims were involved with Walker in the same brief melee.                                                                      



                                            

But the court of appeals reversed.  



                                                                                                                                                    

                       The court of appeals recognized that the common law allowed force in  



                                                                                                                                       

self-defense only "to the extent necessary" to respond to the danger, the same limitation  

                                                                              78  The court concluded that Walker's jury  

                                                                                                                                                

expressed in the Alaska justification statutes. 



may have reasoned that the circumstances required Walker to stab one man in the arm,  

                                                                                                                                                



but that stabbing the other man three times in the back "was not necessary and was  

                                                                                                                                                

therefore  not  legally  justified."79                         The  court  explained  its  decision  with  the  same  

                                                                                                                                              



language  that  the  superior  court  used  for  the  instruction  in  this  case:                                                     "even  in  

                                                                                                                                                   



circumstances when a person is permitted to use deadly force in self-defense . . . that  

                                                                                                                                                



person may still not be authorized to employ all-out deadly force because such extreme  

                                                                                                                                         

force is not necessary to avert the danger."80  

                                                            



                       The Walker decision demonstratestheneedfor aproportionalityinstruction  

                                                                                                                                     



in a case like this one.   If the jury chose to believe Jones-Nelson, then it may have  

                                                                                                                                 



concluded that his initial shot was justified.  But the jury could also conclude that it was  

                                                                                                                                                



unnecessary for Jones-Nelson to shoot Jordan four times in the back as he was running  

                                                                                                                                          



away.  



            77         Id . at 976-77.     



            78  

                                                        

                       Id . at 978 (citing 2 PAUL  H. R                  OBINSON, C         RIMINAL  LAW  DEFENSES  § 131(c),   

at 77 (1984)).     



            79         Id .  



            80         Id.  The court's opinion suggests that this result was required by the timing  

                                                                                                                                            

of the attacks on Walker's two victims.  Slip Op. at 15.  But the court of appeals did not  

                                                                                                                                                  

specify which victim was stabbed first, and the trial judge indicated the stabbings all  

                                                                                                                                                   

happened "in the space of approximately one second."  Walker, 887 P.2d at 977.  The  

                                                                                                                                                

court of appeals reasoned that the jury may have returned different verdicts based on the  

                                                                                                                                                  

relative "severity" of the two attacks.  Id. at 978.  

                                                                              



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----------------------- Page 47-----------------------

                     The recent decision in             Ledbetter v. State   shows another example of this                      



                                            81  

proportionality requirement.                                                                                                        

                                                Ledbetter testified that he stabbed another man during a  



                                                                                                                    

fight when the man began to strangle him, and that "he deliberately chose to stab [the  



                                                                                                                             

man] in the leg, rather than another part of the body, because he 'wanted to make [him]  

                                                                  82   In response, the prosecutor argued that  

                                                                                                                                

let go' but 'didn't want to kill the guy.' " 



Ledbetter's intentions were irrelevant because Ledbetter's asserted "right to stab" was  

                                                                                            

the same as a "right to kill."83                  The court of appeals reversed Ledbetter's conviction  

                                                                                                                     



based on this statement and other misleading arguments, noting that in Alaska, "the  

                                                                                                                               

person's use of force must be proportionate to the perceived danger."84  

                                                                                               



                     In  summary,  when  the  legislature  adopted  the  justification  statutes,  it  

                                                                                                                                   



included in every section the revision subcommission's recommendation that justifiable  

                                                                                                                       



force is limited to the extent necessary to respond to dangerous circumstances.   The  

                                                                                                                               



subcommission  included  this  language  in  part  to  incorporate  our  decision  that  the  

                                                                                                                                



common  law  required  that  a  killing  must  be  necessary  before  a  homicide  can  be  

                                                                                                                                 



justifiable.  Subsequent decisions have promoted this goal by consistently applying the  

                                                                                                                                 



statutory language that requires the use of force to be proportionate to the perceived  

                                                                                                                      



danger. We should continue to recognize this limitation to follow the legislature's intent  

                                                                                                                             



and to mitigate the harsh consequences of an unlimited right of self-defense.  

                                                                                                   



           81        482  P.3d   1033  (Alaska  App.  2021).  



           82        Id .  at   1035-36.  



           83        Id.  at   1036.  



           84        Id .   This  court  has  likewise  recognized  that  "domestic  violence  self-defense  



claims  are   'subject  to  the  necessity  and  proportionality  requirements  that  apply  to  all  

                              

other self-defense claims involving non-deadly force.' " See Sarah D. v. John D., 352  

                 

                                                                                                                              

P.3d 419, 432 n.50 (Alaska 2015) (quoting Dennis Q. v. Monika M., No. S-15084, 2014  

                                                         

WL 1888270, at *6 (Alaska May 7, 2014)).  



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