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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Norman Randle v. Bay Watch Condominium Association (6/18/2021) sp-7537
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before publication in the P ACIFIC REPORTER.
Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts,
303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878, email
corrections@akcourts.gov.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
NORMAN RANDLE, )
) Supreme Court No. S-17570
Appellant, )
) Superior Court No. 3HO-18-00247 CI
v. )
) O P I N I O N
BAY WATCH CONDOMINIUM )
ASSOCIATION,
) No. 7537 - June 18, 2021
)
Appellee. )
)
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third
Judicial District, Homer, Jane F. Kauvar and Jason M. Gist,
Judges.
Appearances: Norman Randle, pro se, Homer, Appellant.
Notice of nonparticipation filed by Charles G. Evans, Law
Office of Charles G. Evans, Homer, for Appellee.
Before: Bolger, Chief Justice, Winfree, Maassen, Carney,
and Borghesan, Justices.
MAASSEN, Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
A man's condominium unit has the only access to a crawl space containing
water pipes that serve several other units. The condominium association's president and
a maintenance man entered the unit twice, with the owner's permission, to address water-
related maintenance issues in the crawl space, where they identified what they thought
----------------------- Page 2-----------------------
were serious problems of leaking and mold. But the unit owner denied their further
requests for access to deal with these problems.
The association brought suit against the unit owner, alleging that he had
caused damage by concealing the leaking in the crawl space and making his own
negligent repairs; it also asked for a declaratory judgment concerning its right of entry.
The superior court, after an evidentiary hearing, granted a preliminary injunction
allowing further inspections. After those inspections revealed that repairs were not
needed after all, the association dropped its negligence claim. But it moved for summary
judgment on its request for declaratory relief, which the superior court granted, deciding
that theassociation's declaration allowedreasonableentryfor purposes ofinspection and
repair.
The unit owner appeals. We conclude that the superior court did not abuse
its discretion in issuing the preliminary injunction or err in granting summary judgment
on the claim for declaratory relief. Nor do we find any abuse of discretion in the superior
court's procedural rulings or its award of attorney's fees to the association. We therefore
affirm the superior court's judgment.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
A. Facts
Norman Randle owns and lives in a unit at Bay Watch Condominiums in
Homer. Beneath his unit is a crawl space that is a common area; it contains piping and
water for several units in the building and can be accessed only through his unit.
In May 2018 David Duke, president of the Bay Watch Condominium
Association, and Keith Nelson, a maintenance man, were working on a leak in Duke's
unit, which is above Randle's. With Randle's permission, they entered his unit so they
could access the crawl space and turn off the water. In the crawl space Duke and Nelson
saw what Duke described as "a minimum of three to four leaks" and "black stuff" that
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they "surmised . . . might be mold." They informed Randle of what they had seen and
told him they would have to have a contractor come in to assess the damage. But Randle
replied that "mold is nothing to worry about" and that he couldn't afford any additional
repairs to his unit. Over the next week, Duke and Nelson requested entry to Randle's
unit to access the crawl space, and Randle refused to allow it.
B. Proceedings
In September 2018 Bay Watch filed a complaint against Randle in superior
court alleging essentially two claims: (1) one for declaratory relief that the association's
declaration gave it certain rights of access to the common area underneath Randle's unit
and that Randle had violated the declaration by making unauthorized and negligent
repairs in the crawl space; and (2) one for damages related to structural issues that Bay
Watch suspected Randle had negligently caused. Randle denied making unauthorized
repairs and asserted that Bay Watch had no reason to enter his unit.
Bay Watch moved for a preliminary injunction, asking the court to order
Randle to allow Bay Watch to access the common area below his unit to prevent further
irreparable harm to the building's plumbing system. The court held an evidentiary
hearing at which both Duke and Nelson testified about their dealings with Randle and
their observations in the crawl space. Randle countered that there was no emergency and
that Bay Watch's entry was not justified. But the court granted the preliminary
injunction, requiring Randle to allow Bay Watch "to enter [Randle's] unit to access the
crawl space and common space to assess the situation and to determine what work may
need to be done."
Representatives of Bay Watch then inspected the area underneath Randle's
unit and concluded that no repairs were necessary after all; they also found no evidence
of water damage. Bay Watch therefore voluntarily dismissed its second count, the
negligence claim for damages. It moved for summary judgment on its claim for
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declaratory relief, asking the court to interpret the association's declaration to allow it
access to the area below Randle's unit whenever it considered it necessary for purposes
of inspection and repair.
The court held a hearing during which it heard argument from the parties.
It also heard from a friend of Randle's, purporting to be his assistant, who read a
statement and argued extensively on his behalf. The court worked through the relevant
portionsoftheassociation's declaration orally, ultimately concluding thatBayWatchhas
"the right of entry to access the common areas through Mr. Randle's unit when the
association deems it proper and necessary." The court reiterated its holding in a later
written order that "restrained [Randle and his agents] from making [their] own
interpretation of the governing documents of the Bay Watch [Condominium
Association]" and ordered that Randle "shall, with reasonable notice, allow Bay Watch
entry through his Unit 1 to gain access to the crawl space for reasonable inspection and
repairs to the Building." The court determined that Bay Watch was the prevailing party
and awarded it attorney's fees of $5,000.
Randle filed this appeal, in which Bay Watch does not participate.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the superior court's grant of a preliminary injunction for abuse
1 and its grant of summary judgment de novo.2 Also reviewed for abuse of
of discretion
discretion are the superior court's limitations on lay representation,3 its "determination
1 City of Kenai v. Friends of Recreation Ctr., Inc., 129 P.3d 452, 455 (Alaska
2006).
2 Peterson v. State, Dep't of Nat. Res., 236 P.3d 355, 361 (Alaska 2010).
3
See Arnett v. Baskous, 856 P.2d 790, 792 (Alaska 1993) (reviewing denial
of lay counsel assistance for abuse of discretion).
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4 5
of prevailing party status," and its award of attorney's fees.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion Or Err By Granting
Bay Watch's Request For A Preliminary Injunction.
Randle challenges the superior court's grant of a preliminary injunction on
several interrelated grounds. He first argues that there was too little evidence of an
emergency to justify injunctive relief; specifically, he argues that the court should have
required Bay Watch to produce pictures ofthealleged damage, which "would have given
credence to" its allegations, and that the court should have required more briefing on
"Bay Watch's fictitious emergency." He accuses the court of failing to consider his
evidence and of relying instead on Duke's "fabricated lies." But the court plainly had
evidence before it sufficient to justify a preliminary injunction.
"A plaintiff may obtain a preliminary injunction by meeting either the
6 The superior court
balance of hardships or the probable success on the merits standard."
in this case used the balance of the hardships standard, which requires, among other
elements not challenged here, "balancing the harm the plaintiff will suffer without the
4 Halloran v. State, Div. of Elections , 115 P.3d 547, 550 (Alaska 2005).
5 Black v. Municipality of Anchorage, Bd. of Equalization, 187 P.3d 1096,
1099 (Alaska 2008).
6 Alsworth v. Seybert , 323 P.3d 47, 54 (Alaska 2014) ("A preliminary
injunction is warranted under [the balance of hardships] standard when three factors are
present: '(1) the plaintiff must be faced with irreparable harm; (2) the opposing party
must be adequately protected; and (3) the plaintiff must raise serious and substantial
questions going to the merits of the case; that is, the issues raised cannot be frivolous or
obviously without merit.' " (quoting State v. Kluti Kaah Native Vill. of Copper Ctr., 831
P.2d 1270, 1273 (Alaska 1992))).
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7
injunction against the harm the injunction will impose on the defendant."
At the hearing the court explicitly found "that there [was] water leaking in
that area underneath [Randle's] unit that [could] affect the common area of these other
condo owners." The court continued, "If these leaks continue unabated, if [Bay Watch]
[is] not allowed to get in and do anything to stop the leaks, the Court finds that there
would be harm to the other condo owners . . . and that there is a necessity to have this
looked at." These findings are supported by the evidence and not clearly erroneous.
Both Duke and Nelson testified about leaks and mold underneath Randle's unit. Nelson,
an experienced maintenance man and licensed contractor, testified that he was worried
about the stability of the joists, explaining that they were "sagging" and that "three
joists . . . in a row . . . were pretty wet." He testified that the situation was "dangerous
to [Randle], that's why [he] even brought it up." The court was entitled to accept this
8
testimony; we do not second-guess its credibility findings.
On the other side of the balance, the harm Randle claimed was an invasion
of his privacy. But the court could reasonably conclude that this claimed harm was
outweighed by the potential harm alleged by Bay Watch. The court observed that Bay
Watch was making only a "limited request" that included giving notice and setting up
an agreeable time for access. Directing its remarks to Randle, the court explained,
"[B]ased on the testimony . . . about the leaks down there and potential mold, [and]
because you happen to own a unit that is the only way to access the common area, . . .
7 Id.
8 Ebertz v. Ebertz, 113 P.3d 643, 646 (Alaska 2005) ("We give 'particular
deference' to the trial court's factual findings when they are based primarily on oral
testimony, because the trial court, not this court, performs the function of judging the
credibility of witnesses and weighing conflicting evidence." (quoting In re Adoption of
A.F.M. , 15 P.3d 258, 262 (Alaska 2001))).
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your privacy has to give way to the other condo owners' right to have this looked at,
because it's the only way that it can be done." We see no abuse of discretion in the
court's weighing of the relative harms and its decision to issue the requested injunction.
Randle argues that the superior court erroneously shifted the burden of
proof from Bay Watch, requiring him to prove why a preliminary injunction should not
9 He points to the court's statement when summarizing the evidence that it
be granted.
had not "heard anything from [Randle] that indicates that there is not something [in the
crawl space] that should be looked at." But the court had heard evidence from Duke and
Nelson that there was "something that should be looked at"; the court was simply noting
the absence of contrary evidence, not shifting the burden of proof.
Finally, Randleargues that theinjunction violated several of his federal and
state constitutional rights, including his rights to due process, equal protection, privacy,
and "to be secure in his home." But his constitutional argument is made in one
10 We
conclusory sentence without any analysis, and we therefore do not consider it.
conclude that the superior court neither abused its discretion nor erred in issuing the
preliminary injunction.
B. The Superior Court Did Not Err By Granting Summary Judgment To
Bay Watch On Its Claim For Declaratory Relief.
Randle next contends that the superior court erred by granting summary
judgment on Bay Watch's request for declaratory relief. The court interpreted the
9 See State v. Norene , 457 P.2d 926, 934 n.5 (Alaska 1969) ("The applicant
has the burden of showing his right to injunctive relief by evidence and that irreparable
injury will result if the injunction is not granted . . . .").
10 Wright v. Anding, 390 P.3d 1162, 1175 (Alaska 2017) (" '[W]here a point
is given only a cursory statement in the argument portion of a brief, the point will not be
considered on appeal.' This is true for pro se litigants as well as represented litigants."
(quoting Hagen v. Strobel, 353 P.3d 799, 805 (Alaska 2015))).
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association's declaration as allowing it "the right, with reasonable notice, to gain access
to the crawl space through [Randle's unit] for reasonable inspection and repairs to the
Building." This was not error.
Under the heading "Rights of Entry," the declaration states:
The Association shall have a limited right of entry in and
upon all limited common areas and the exterior of all units for
the purpose of taking whatever corrective action may be
deemed necessary and proper by the Association. Nothing in
this Article shall in any manner limit the right of the unit
owner to exclusive control over the interior of his unit.
Provided, however, that the owner shall grant a right of entry
to the Association, or any other person authorized by the
Association, in case of any emergency originating in or
threatening his unit, whether the owner is present or not.
Provided further, that an owner shall permit other owners, or
their representatives, to enter his unit for the purpose of
performing required installation, alterations or repair of the
mechanical or electrical services to a residence, provided that
requests for entry are made in advance and that such entry is
at a time convenient to the owner whose unit is to be entered.
In case of an emergency, such right of entry shall be
immediate.
Randle first argues that the stated rights of entry are limited to "all limited
common areas"; that the crawl space is a "common area" rather than a "limited common
area"; and that therefore the declaration gives Bay Watch no authority to enter the crawl
space. The relevant terms are defined in the declaration. "Limited common areas" are
those areas "for which exclusive easements are reserved for the benefit of unit owners,"
such as "decks, assigned parking spaces[,] and storage areas." "Common areas" include
"all areas on the property[] except the units, and [also] include, for maintenance purposes
of the Association, all gas, water and waste pipes, all sewers, all ducts, chutes, conduits,
wires and other utility installation of the multifamily structure wherever located." As
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reasonablyinterpreted, andconsistent with thedefinitionsused inAlaska'scondominium
statutes, limited common areas are those which belong to the association but of which
11 whereas common areas are those
certain unit owners may have rights of exclusive use,
which belong to the association and are equally accessible to everyone.12 These terms
are indeed different.
But the clear flaw in Randle's argument is his assumption that the "Rights
of Entry" provision applies only to limited common areas. This assumption would mean,
absurdly, that Bay Watch reserved no rights to enter common areas - areas accessible
to everyone - for purposes of maintenance and repair, even in emergencies. The
"Rights of Entry" provision separately addresses two types of entry: entry into limited
common areas and - at issue here - entry into a unit. The provision does not need to
address entry into common areas, becausecommon areasareaccessibleto theassociation
anyway; if, for example, the crawl space underneath Randle's unit was accessible from
outside the building, the "Rights of Entry" provision would not be implicated at all. The
only reason it is implicated is because access to the crawl space is through Randle's unit,
and the provision addresses the circumstances under which that access may be obtained.
Thus, the first sentence of the "Rights of Entry" provision - addressing
"limited common areas and the exterior of all units" - is irrelevant here, because, as
Randle himself argues, there is no "limited common area" at issue. The next sentence,
11 See AS 34.07.450(11) (defining "limited common areas and facilities" to
include "those common areas and facilities designated in the recorded declaration[] as
reserved for use of certain apartment or apartments to the exclusion of the other
apartments").
12 See AS 34.07.450(6) (defining "common areas and facilities" to mean,
among specified others, "the installations of central services such as power, light, gas,
hot and cold water" and "all other parts of the property necessary or convenient to its
existence, maintenance, and safety, or normally in common use").
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----------------------- Page 10-----------------------
on which Randle primarily relies, addresses not common areas or limited common areas
but rather unit interiors, emphasizing "the right of the unit owner to exclusive control
over the interior of his unit." But this "right of the unit owner" is expressly limited by
the two separate provisos that immediately follow. The first is: "Provided, however, that
an owner shall grant a right of entry to the Association . . . in case of any emergency
originating in or threatening his unit." (Emphasis added.) The second proviso is:
"Provided further, that an owner shall permit other owners, or their representatives, to
enter his unit for the purpose of performing required installation, alterations, or repair of
the mechanical or electrical services to a residence, provided that requests for entry are
made in advance and that such entry is at a time convenient to the owner whose unit is
to be entered"; although "[i]n case of an emergency, such right of entry shall be
immediate." (Emphasis added.)
Both of these express limitations on the unit owner's right "to exclusive
control" may be implicated in this case. First, Bay Watch could enter Randle's unit in
case of an emergency "originating in or threatening" his unit. And second, even if there
was no emergency, Bay Watch could still enter Randle's unit to install, alter, or repair
"the mechanical or electrical services," as long as it gave advance notice and set a
convenient time; if there was an emergency, Bay Watch could enter immediately. We
conclude that the superior court's grant of declaratory relief - that Bay Watch has "the
right of entry to access the common areas through Mr. Randle's unit when the
association deems it proper and necessary" - is consistent with the only reasonable
interpretation of the "Rights of Entry" provision and therefore correct as a matter of law.
Randle argues that the superior court's interpretation fails to account for
abuse of the right of entry; he contends that Bay Watch's entry in this case was based on
"undisputed false allegations" that he had made negligent repairs in the crawl space. But
the court explained at the hearing that potential abuse of the right was a separate issue;
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the declaratory relief under consideration concerned only the right's existence. And
although Randle devotes pages of his brief to attacking the credibility of Bay Watch's
witnesses, witness credibility was irrelevant to the interpretation of the declaration,
13
which presented a pure question of law decided correctly by the superior court.
C. Randle's Remaining Objections To The Declaratory Judgment Are
Without Merit.
Randle challenges the declaratory judgment on other grounds, none of
which have merit. He contends that when Bay Watch dismissed the second count of its
complaint - alleging that he had made negligent repairs - it necessarily dismissed the
first count - the declaratory judgment claim - as well, because the negligence count
"adopt[ed] and reallege[d]" all preceding allegations. The argument is frivolous. The
practice of incorporating preceding allegations by reference is meant to avoid needless
repetition, not to create an interlocking puzzle that falls apart with the loss of one piece.14
Bay Watch's dismissal of its second count left undisturbed all preceding paragraphs of
15 The superior court
its complaint, which clearly stated a claim for declaratory relief.
13 See Fannon v. Polo , 436 P.3d 956, 960 (Alaska 2019) ("The interpretation
of a covenant is a question of law to which we apply our independent judgment."
(quoting HP Ltd. P'ship v. Kenai River Airpark, LLC, 270 P.3d 719, 726 (Alaska
2012))).
14 See 5A ARTHUR R. M ILLER, M ARY KAY KANE & A. B ENJAMIN SPENCER,
EDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1326 (4th ed. 2020) ("When the pleader asserts
F
several claims for relief or defenses that rest on a common factual pattern, incorporation
by reference eliminates any unnecessary repetition of the transactions and events upon
which the pleader relies.").
15 See Kajima Eng'g &Constr., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d
187, 195 (Cal. App. 2002) (observing that "[c]omplaints generally incorporate prior
allegations into subsequent causes of action" and rejecting argument that entire
complaint should have been stricken once court struck claims that had been incorporated
(continued...)
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properly rejected Randle's argument that Bay Watch had inadvertently dismissed its
entire action when it dismissed its negligence claim.
Randle also appears to argue that the superior court impermissibly
expanded the issues in the case by granting prospective declaratory relief when, Randle
argues, Bay Watch did not ask for it. As Randle interprets the complaint, the first count
requested only immediate access to assess the damages caused by the negligence alleged
in the second count; once the second count was dismissed, the reason for the first count's
request evaporated, and the superior court erred by issuing a declaratory judgment about
Bay Watch's prospective right of entry. But the complaint clearly described a dispute
over access that was not confined to a single incident, and it expressly requested "a
judgment declaring its rights as against Randle," including "the right with reasonable
notice to gain access to the crawl space through [Randle's unit] for reasonable inspection
and repairs to the Building." The superior court could reasonably conclude that a
declaratory judgment on Bay Watch's right of entry would serve the traditional purposes
of declaratory relief: "to clarify and settle legal relations, and to 'terminate and afford
16
relief from the uncertainty, insecurity, and controversy giving rise to the proceeding.' "
The court did not impermissibly expand the scope of the relief requested.
Randle also argues that the superior court failed to consider his own motion
for declaratory relief, which he filed ten days before the declaratory judgment hearing.
His motion alleged that Bay Watch was levying excessive fines against him, interfering
with his attempts to secure a mortgage, and delaying his request for "an independent
audit of the Association books and records in accordance with the Association's
15 (...continued)
into others).
16 Lowell v. Hayes , 117 P.3d 745, 755 (Alaska 2005) (quoting Jefferson v.
Asplund , 458 P.2d 995, 998 (Alaska 1969)).
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Bylaws." At the declaratory judgment hearing, when Randle asked whether the judge
had read his motion, the judge responded that he was "not going to get into the middle
of all the disputes you have with the association." The judge continued: "That's not part
of this lawsuit, right? You're not asking me to decide was the $50 a day fine proper or
not proper, you're not asking me to do any of that." Randle replied, "No, no," and he
argued only that Bay Watch's actions had to be taken into account because they
handicapped his financial ability to defend himself. He did not seek to amend his answer
to assert a counterclaim based on any of these additional allegations.
The only claim remaining in the case at the time was Bay Watch's request
for a declaratory judgment, which, as noted above, presented only a question of law.
Although the superior court could have treated Randle's motion as an attempt to amend
his answer, it was not an abuse of discretion not to do so given Randle's disavowal of
17
any such intent.
D. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Denying Randle
The Aid Of His Assistant During The Preliminary Injunction Hearing.
At the preliminary injunction hearing, a man whom the clerk identified as
Everett Winslow informed the court that he would be "assisting" Randle because Randle
"needs help in hearing and other things." The court informed Winslow that unless he
could show he was Randle's attorney, he was required to "sit behind the bar," which
Winslow reluctantly did. Randle argues that this was an error because he is
disabled - he suffers from poor eyesight and deficiencies in hearing and
17 See Ardinger v. Hummell , 982 P.2d 727, 737 (Alaska 1999) ("The superior
court has broad discretion to allow amendment of pleadings."). Randle also contends
that the declaratory judgment violated his state and federal constitutional rights, but he
provides no substantive analysis, and we consider the argument waived. See Wright v.
Anding , 390 P.3d 1162, 1175 (Alaska 2017).
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----------------------- Page 14-----------------------
mobility -and that he has rights to assistance under the Americans with Disabilities Act
18
and the state and federal constitutions.
Whether to allow a non-lawyer to assist a litigant in the courtroom is
19 We will not find an abuse of discretion
committed to the superior court's discretion.
in the court's decision to place limits on lay representation absent a showing of
prejudice.20 Here, the court provided Randle with hearing equipment at the start of the
proceeding, asked for Randle's assurance that he could hear, and advised a witness to
"speak right into the microphone, because that's what transmits to [Randle's] hearing
aid." Randle participated fully in the hearing and does not identify any part that he
missed or failed to understand because of a claimed disability. In the absence of any
showing of prejudice, we find no abuse of discretion.21
E. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Awarding
Attorney's Fees To Bay Watch.
The superior court determined that Bay Watch was entitled to Alaska Civil
Rule 82 attorney's fees as the prevailing party. Attorney's fees calculated under
Rule 82(b)(2) - for a case "resolved without trial" in which "the prevailing party
recovers no money judgment" -totaled approximately $10,000, 20%ofthe"reasonable
actual attorney's fees which were necessarily incurred." But because Bay Watch
18 The judge at the later declaratory judgment hearing allowed Winslow to
participate fully as Randle's assistant and mouthpiece.
19 Arnett v. Baskous , 856 P.2d 790, 792 (Alaska 1993).
20 Ferguson v. Dep't of Corr., 816 P.2d 134, 140 n.15 (Alaska 1991); see also
Skuse v. State, 714 P.2d 368, 371 (Alaska App. 1986) (holding that "absent a showing
of prejudice, we will not consider limitations on lay representation an abuse of
discretion").
21 Ferguson, 816 P.2d at 140 n.15.
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withdrew its negligence claim after inspecting the crawl space, the court reduced the
award to $5,000 by reference to Rule 82(b)(3)(F), which allows the court to modify a
scheduled award based on "the reasonableness of the claims and defenses pursued by
each side." The court considered Bay Watch's actual fees high given that "this was a
relatively straightforward declaratory relief action that should have been resolved
quickly," but it found $5,000 to be an appropriate award because Randle's unwillingness
to "allow[] access early on" generated "unnecessary fees."
Randle challenges the attorney's fees award on several grounds. His first
argument, though difficult to understand, appears to relate to the award's timing.
Rule 82(c) requires motions for attorney's fees to be "filed within 10 days after the date
shown in the clerk's certificate of distribution on the judgment as defined by Civil
Rule 58.1." The clerk's certificate shows that the final judgment was distributed on
September 10 and 11, and Bay Watch filed its attorney's fees motion on September 16,
well within the time allowed. The court issued its order on attorney's fees on October 28
and amended the final judgment the same day to include the ordered amounts. We see
no issues with the timing or procedure.
Randle also contends that the court failed to consider other Rule 82(b)(3)
factors that may have justified a greater downward departure from the scheduled award.
He cites (E) ("the attorneys' efforts to minimize fees"), (G) ("vexatious or bad faith
conduct"), (H) ("the relationship between the amount of work performed and the
significance of the matters at stake"), (I) ("the extent to which a given fee award may be
so onerous to the non-prevailing party that it would deter similarly situated litigants from
the voluntary use of the courts"), (J) ("the extent to which the fees incurred by the
prevailing party suggest that they had been influenced by considerations apart from the
case at bar, such as a desire to discourage claims by others against the prevailing party
or its insurer"), and (K) ("other equitable factors deemed relevant"). We note that
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----------------------- Page 16-----------------------
Randle raised none of these factors in his opposition to Bay Watch's attorney's fees
motion. Moreover, "[a]pplication of Rule 82(b)(3) factors is discretionary, not
22
mandatory." The superior court expressly considered the nature of the parties' claims
and defenses, their relative success, and Randle's unnecessary resistance to Bay Watch's
right of access, and reflecting these considerations it made an award of attorney's fees
23
that was less than half of what would have been presumptively correct. We see no
abuse of discretion in its failure to consider other Rule 82(b)(3) factors.
Randle's remainingobjections to theattorney'sfeesawardappeartolargely
reiterate his arguments about the merits of the court's decision on summary judgment,
which we address above. Because the court did not abuse its discretion either in its
prevailing party determination or its calculation of an appropriate amount of fees, we
24
affirm its attorney's fees award.
V. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the judgment of the superior court.
22 Greene v. Tinker , 332 P.3d 21, 41 (Alaska 2014) (quoting Rhodes v. Erion ,
189 P.3d 1051, 1055 (Alaska 2008)).
23 See id. ("[A]wards of attorney's fees made pursuant to the schedule set out
in Rule 82 are presumptively correct, and the superior court need not make any findings
in support of the award.").
24 See Alaskasland.Com, LLC v. Cross, 357 P.3d 805, 825 (Alaska 2015)
(noting that "both the determination of prevailing party status and the award of costs and
fees are committed to the broad discretion of the trial court" (quoting Schultz v. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A., 301 P.3d 1237, 1241 (Alaska 2013))).
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