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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Elizabeth Watson v State of Alaska (5/28/2021) sp-7533

Elizabeth Watson v State of Alaska (5/28/2021) sp-7533

           Notice:   This opinion is subject to correction before publication in the P                    ACIFIC  REPORTER.  

           Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts,  

                                                                                                                        

           303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878, email  

                                                                                                                           

           corrections@akcourts.us.  



                       THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA                                       



ELIZABETH  WATSON,                                               )  

                                                                 )     Supreme  Court  No.  S-16752  

                                Petitioner,                      )    Court  of  Appeals  No.  A-11592  

                                                                 )  

                                                                                                                                 

           v.                                                    )     Superior Court No. 4BE-11-01326 CR  

                                                                 )  

                     

STATE OF ALASKA,                                                                           

                                                                 )    O P I N I O N  

                                                                 )  

                                Respondent.                                                              

                                                                 )    No. 7533 - May 28, 2021  

                                                                 )  



                                                                                                                    

                                         

                      Petition for Hearing from the Court of Appeals of the State of  

                                                                                                                   

                     Alaska, on appeal from the District Court  of  the State of  

                                                                                                        

                     Alaska,           Fourth         Judicial          District,         Bethel,         Dennis  

                                                                                                        

                      P. Cummings, Judge and Bruce Ward, Magistrate Judge.  



                                                                                                       

                     Appearances:  Kelly R. Taylor, Assistant Public Defender,  

                                                                                                                 

                      and  Quinlan  Steiner,  Public  Defender,  Anchorage,  for  

                                                                                                          

                      Petitioner.  Donald Soderstrom, Assistant Attorney General,  

                                                                                                           

                     Anchorage,and JahnaLindemuth,Attorney General,Juneau,  

                            

                      for Respondent.  



                                                                                                        

                      Before:  Bolger, Chief Justice, Winfree, Stowers, Maassen,  

                                           

                      and Carney, Justices.  



                                                   

                      BOLGER, Chief Justice.
  

                                                                                                                     

                      STOWERS, Justice, with whom CARNEY, Justice, joins, dissenting.
  



I.         INTRODUCTION  



                                                                                                                                  

                      In this petition, a minor convicted of driving under the influence (DUI)  



                                                                                                                                    

argues that the statute that excludes misdemeanor traffic violations from juvenile court  


----------------------- Page 2-----------------------

jurisdiction violates her right to equal protection under the Alaska Constitution.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    She  



 argues that the mandatory jail sentence for first DUI offenders is unfairly different than                                                                                                                                                                                                                            



 the dispositions for other misdemeanors in the juvenile code.                                                                                                                                                                            And she argues that it is                                                              



 unfair for                               felony  DUI offenses to be charged in juvenile court when misdemeanor                                                                                                                                                                    



 offenses are not.                              



                                                   We conclude that because driving is an adult activity, the legislature could                                                                                                                                                                                    



 reasonably decide to treat misdemeanor traffic violations consistently to promote public                                                                                                                                                                                                                        



 safety   while also                                                  reasonably   choosing   to   protect juvenile offenders from the harsh                                                                                                                                                                      



 collateral consequences of a felony conviction.                                                                                                                                          We therefore conclude the statute is                                                                                                   



 constitutional and affirm the judgment of the district court.                                                                                                                                           



 II.                      FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS                                   



                                                   In 2011 Elizabeth Watson - then 14 years old -was involved in an auto                                                                                                                                                                                                



 accident after a night of drinking with friends. The State charged Watson in district court                                                                                                                                                                                                                         

                                                                                                                                                                                       1   Watson moved to dismiss the charge  

 with two counts of DUI, a class A misdemeanor.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                



 for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that she should be prosecuted in juvenile court and that  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          



 charging her as an adult deprived her of equal protection under the law.  The district  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             



 court denied the motion, as well as Watson's subsequent motion for reconsideration.  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   



                                                   The case proceeded to a one-day bench trial in April 2013, and the district  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              



 court found Watson guilty of both counts of DUI.  The court sentenced Watson to 28  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              



 days' imprisonment but suspended 25 days.  It also imposed fines, revoked her driver's  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           



 license for 90 days, and placed her on two years' probation.  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       



                          1                        AS 28.35.030(a) (criminalizing the operation of a vehicle "while under the                                                                                                                                                                                                



 influence of an alcoholic beverage" and while having "0.08 percent or more [BAC]"                                                                                                                                                                                                                        

 "within four hours after the alleged operating or driving"); AS 28.35.030(b) (classifying                                                                                                                                                                                                  

 first-time DUI as a class A misdemeanor).                                                                                                                         



                                                                                                                                                                -2-                                                                                                                                                   7533
  


----------------------- Page 3-----------------------

                          Watson appealed her conviction, arguing that the statute requiring her to                                                                   



be charged in district court rather than juvenile court violated her equal protection and                                 

                                      2    The court of appeals rejected her arguments and affirmed her  

due process rights.                                                                                                                                                

                      3   Watson petitioned us to consider the court of appeals' decision, which we  

conviction.                                                                                                                                                         



granted  in  order  to  resolve  whether  AS  47.12.030(b)  violates  equal  protection  by  

                                                                                                                                                                    



requiring  a  minor  who  is  accused  of  a  non-felony  traffic  offense  to  be  charged,  

                                                                                                                                                        



prosecuted, and sentenced in the district court in the same manner as an adult.  

                                                                                                                                                          



III.         DISCUSSION  



                          The Alaska Constitution provides that "all persons are equal and entitled  

                                                                                                                                       

to equal rights, opportunities, and protection under the law."4                                                              We interpret the equal  

                                                                                                                                                               



protection clause "to be a 'command to state and local governments to treat those who  

                                                                                                                                                                 

                                                            5    The guarantee of equal protection under the Alaska  

are similarly situated alike.' "                                                                                                                            

                                                          



Constitution is more robust than that under theUnited States Constitution and so "affords  

                                                                                                                                                          

greater protection to individual rights than" its federal counterpart.6                                                                      We apply our  

                                                                                                                                                                   



             2             Watson  v.  State,  400  P.3d   121,   122  (Alaska  App.  2017).   



             3            Id.  at   122-24.   



             4            Alaska  Const.  art.  I,  §   1.   



             5            Pub.  Emps.'  Ret.  Sys.  v.  Gallant,  153  P.3d  346,  349  (Alaska  2007)  (quoting  



Gonzales  v.  Safeway  Stores,  Inc.,  882  P.3d  389,  396  (Alaska   1994)).   



             6            Alaska Civil Liberties   Union  v.  State,   122  P.3d   781,   787   (Alaska  2005)  



(quoting  Malabed  v.  N.  Slope  Borough,  70  P.3d  416,  420  (Alaska  2003)).  Therefore,  

when  presented  with  an  equal  protection  challenge,  we  have  "[t]ypically   .   .   . focused  

exclusively  on  Alaska's  equal  protection  clause"  and  have  not  considered  the  federal  

equal  protection   clause.   Heller   v.  State,  Dep't   of  Revenue,   314   P.3d   69,   77 (Alaska  

2013);  see  also  State  v.  Anthony,  810  P.2d   155,   157  (Alaska   1991).  



                                                                                  -3-                                                                           7533
  


----------------------- Page 4-----------------------

                                                                                 7  

"independent judgment to equal protection claims."                                  



                                                                                                                                 

                     Under our equal protection analysis, "we first decide which classes must  

                       8  "As a matter of nomenclature we refer to that portion of a [statute] that  

                                                                                                                                   

      

be compared." 

                                                                             9  Once we have identified the relevant  

treats two groups differently as a 'classification.' "                                                                      

                                                                             



classes,  we  determine  whether  the  statute  discriminates  between  them  by  treating  

                                                                                                                            

similarly situated classes differently.10  

                                                               



                     After weidentifytheclasses to becompared,weapply "aflexiblethree-step  

                                                                                                                          



sliding-scale" analysis that considers the individual interest at stake, the government  

                                                                                                                      



interest served by the challenged classification, and the means-ends nexus between the  

                                                                                                                                    

classification  and  the  government  interest.11                           The  sliding-scale  analysis  "places  a  

                                                                                                                                      



progressively greater or lesser burden on the state, depending on the importance of the  

                                                                                                                                    



individual right affected bythe disputed classification and thenatureofthegovernmental  

                                                                                                                   

interest at stake."12   When an important individual right is implicated, we require a close  

                                                                                                                                



relationship between the challenged classification and an important government interest  

                                                                                                                             



                                13  

in the classification.              

           



           7         Planned   Parenthood   of   the   Great   Nw.   v.   State,   375   P.3d   1122,  1132  



(Alaska  2016).  



           8         Id.  at   1135.  



           9         Id.  (quoting  Gallant,   153  P.3d  at  349).  



           10        See  State  v.  Schmidt,  323  P.3d  647,  659  (Alaska  2014).   



           11        Planned  Parenthood,  375  P.3d  at   1137.  



           12        Schmidt,  323  P.3d  at   662  (Alaska  2014) (quoting  Alaska   Civil  Liberties  



Union  v.  State,   122  P.3d  781,  787  (Alaska  2005)).  



           13        Titus  v.  State,  Dep't  of  Admin.,  Div.  of  Motor   Vehicles,  305  P.3d  

                                                                                                                                

                                                                                                                   (continued...)  



                                                                  -4-                                                           7533
  


----------------------- Page 5-----------------------

                  A.                 The Classifications Created By The Juvenile Jurisdiction Statutes                                                                                                      



                                     In several recent cases, we have emphasized that a classification is defined                                                                                                       



                                                                                                14  

by the terms of the statute at issue.                                                                                                                                                                        

                                                                                                       The statutes implicated here classify individuals  



                                                                                                                                                                                                               

according  to  the  offenses  of  which  they  are  accused.                                                                                                        Alaska  Statute  47.12.020  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                      

establishes a general rule that all "minor[s] under 18 years of age" who have violated  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                 

criminal laws are subject to the jurisdiction of juvenile court.  Alaska Statute 47.12.030  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                

provides                     a        number                    of          exceptions                         to         this           general                   rule,             including                      one             for  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     

"minor[s] . . . accused of violating . . . a traffic statute or regulation," who "shall be  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        15  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               

charged, prosecuted, and sentenced in the district court in the same manner as an adult." 



But this exception does not apply when the minor has been accused of committing a  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         



                                              16  

felony violation.                                   

                    



                  13                 (...continued)  



                                                               

 1271,1278-79 (Alaska 2013).  



                  14                See, e.g.               ,  Harris v. Millennium Hotel                                                   , 330 P.3d 330, 334 (Alaska 2014)                                               



(reading the Alaska Workers' Compensation Act and the Marriage Amendment to create  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                            

two classes:                       opposite-sex couples for whom death benefits are available, and same-sex                                                                                                        

couples for whom such benefits are unavailable);                                                                                      Schmidt, 323 P.3d at 659 (reading the                                                         

tax exemption statute and the Marriage Amendment to create two classes: opposite-sex  

                                                                                                                                                                                                         

couples for whom tax benefits are available, and same-sex couples for whom such tax                                                                                                                                                 

benefits are unavailable);  Titus, 305 P.3d at 1277 (reading an auto-insurance statute to                                                                                

create two classes:                                  uninsured drivers who may face license suspension, and uninsured                                                                                            

drivers who do not face license suspension); cf. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 122 P.3d  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                

at 788 ("When a 'law                                       by its own terms                              classifies persons for different treatment,' this is                                                                           

known as a facial classification." (emphasis in original) (quoting J                                                                                                                    OHN   E. N                  OWAK   &  

     ONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.4, at 711 (7th ed. 2004))).                                                                                                                   

R                                                                                                                                                   



                  15  

                                               

                                    AS 47.12.030(b)(1).  



                  16                AS 47.12.030(b) ("When a minor is accused of violating a statute specified                                                                                                      



in this subsection,  other than a statute the violation of which is a felony                                                                                                                        , . . . the minor   

accused of the offense shall be charged, prosecuted, and sentenced in the district court                                                                                                                                      

                                                                                                                                                                                                        (continued...)  



                                                                                                                  -5-                                                                                                          7533
  


----------------------- Page 6-----------------------

                                         Taken together, these statutes create two classes:                                                                                                        minors charged with                                 



felony traffic offenses, who are charged as juveniles, and those charged with non-felony                                                                                                                                             



traffic offenses, who are charged as adults.                                                                                       We therefore consider these two groups of                                                                                   



minors as the relevant classes for our equal protection analysis.                                                                                                    



                                        Watson argues that such a classification is too broad. Watson suggests that                                                                                                                                        



we focus only on minors accused of non-felony DUI, and compare them either to minors                                                                                                                                                             



accused of most other offenses or minors accused of felony DUI. But this classification                                                                                                                                       



would be too narrow.                                              As the United States Supreme Court has explained, "the validity                                                                                                             



of a broad legislative classification is not properly judged by focusing solely on the                                                                                                                                                                     



                                                                                                                                                                                                                             17  

portion of the disfavored class that is affected most harshly by its terms."                                                                                                                                                         



                                         The same reasoning applies to our own equal protection clause.  Here, the  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            



law classifies all minors according to the severity and nature of their crime.  We should  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 



not evaluate the constitutionality of a statute impacting all juvenile traffic offenders by  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              



considering only the treatment of those charged with a DUI.  We therefore consider the  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             



two statutorily defined classes of minors charged with non-felony traffic offenses and  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          



minors charged with felony traffic offenses.  

                                                                                                          



                    B.                   The Three-Step Equal Protection Analysis  

                                                                                                                                                      



                                        We must next determine whether the rationales for AS 47.12.020 and  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         



AS 47.12.030(b)(1) justify different treatment of minors charged with non-felony traffic  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    

offenses and those charged with felony traffic offenses.18   As noted above, this analysis  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             



                    16                   (...continued)  



                                                                                                                                     

in the same manner as an adult." (emphasis added)).  



                    17                  Schweiker v. Hogan, 457 U.S. 569, 589 (1982).  

                                                                                                                                                                  



                    18  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      

                                        See Planned Parenthood of the Great Nw. v. State, 375 P.3d 1122, 1136  

(Alaska 2016).   



                                                                                                                               -6-                                                                                                                     7533
  


----------------------- Page 7-----------------------

consists of a three-step process.                                      We first consider the private interest affected by the                                                       



classification; we next consider the State's interest in the classification; finally, we                                                                                           



determine whether the relationship between the State's interest and the classification is                                                                                              

                                                                                                          19   Throughout, we use a sliding scale  

close enough to justify the challenged legislation.                                                                                                                             



to determine the appropriate level of review; "[d]epending upon the primacy of the  

                                                                                                                                                                                   



interest  involved,  the  state  will  have  a  greater  or  lesser  burden  in  justifying  its  

                                                                                                                                                                                    

legislation."20  



                             1.            All offenders have a special interest in rehabilitation.                                 



                             The first step of our equal protection analysis requires us to consider the                                                                            



                                                                                                                                                                                       

personal right or interest impacted by the State's classification.  At statehood, Article I,  



                                                                                                                                                                               

section12 oftheAlaskaConstitution provided that "[p]enaladministrationshall bebased  

                                                                                                                                                                 21   Based on  

                                                                                                                                                                                     

                                                                                                                                                 

on the principle of reformation and upon the need for protecting the public." 

this provision, we have recognized that both juvenile22                                                                                         23  

                                                                                                                                                                                       

                                                                                                                            and adult                offenders have a  



               19           Id . at 1137.     



              20            Id. (quoting Alaska Pac. Assurance Co. v. Brown , 687 P.2d 264, 269-70  

                                                                                                                                                                           

(Alaska 1984)).  

                   



              21             Section 12 was amended in 1994 to provide that criminal administration  

                                                                                                                                                           

shall be based upon "the need for protecting the public, community condemnation of the  

                                                                                                                                                                                    

offender, the rights of victims of crimes, restitution from the offender, and the principle  

                                                                                                                                                                       

of reformation."  Alaska Const. art. I, § 12.  

                                                                                      



              22             State   v.   Sandsness,   72   P.3d   299,   307   (Alaska   2003)   ("Society's  

                                                                                                                                                                

commitment to the goal of rehabilitating juveniles by reintegrating them with their  

                                                                                                                                                                                

families and the public reflects an implicit belief that early reintegration is more likely  

                                                                                                                                                                  

to maximize public safety in the long-term than prolonged isolation of juveniles from  

                                                                                                                                                                                

their families and the broader community of law-abiding citizens.").  

                                                                                                                            



              23            Abraham v. State , 585 P.2d 526, 531 (Alaska 1978); State v. Chaney, 477  

                                                                                                                                                                                  

P.2d 441, 444, 447 (Alaska 1970) (disapproving of a sentence, in part for failing to  

                                                                                                                                                                      

                                                                                                                                                             (continued...)  



                                                                                          -7-                                                                                  7533
  


----------------------- Page 8-----------------------

special interest in rehabilitative treatment.                      Consequently, both the juvenile disposition         



          24                                                      25  

statute                                                                                                               

               and  the  adult  sentencing  statute                    require  consideration  of  the  offender's  



                                                                 

rehabilitation as an important sentencing goal.  



                                                                                                                                  

                     The dissenting opinion relies on the "uniquely rehabilitative focus" of the  



                                                                                                                                  

juvenile system without addressing the details of the current juvenile statutes or the  



                                                                                                                            

numerous rehabilitative requirements of the DUI statute. A DUI conviction may include  



                                                                                                                                        

the following consequences to discourage alcohol abuse and encourage good driving:  

                                                                                                   26  court access to prior  

                                                                                                                               

an ignition interlock device preventing drinking before driving, 

treatment records,27  alcohol screening and treatment as required by an alcohol safety  

                                                                                                                             

action  program,28            a  term  of  inpatient  treatment  specified  in  the  judgment,29                                and  

                                                                                                                                



imprisonment at a community residential center or by electronic monitoring at a private  

                                                                                                                             

                30  A defendant like Watson who completes an inpatient treatment program  

residence.                                                                                                               



           23        (...continued)  



encourage  the  "rehabilitation  of  the  offender  into  a  noncriminal  member  of  society").  



           24        AS  47.12.140(1)(G)  (requiring  consideration  of  "the  interest  of  the  public  



in  securing  the  minor's  rehabilitation").  



           25        AS  12.55.005(2)  (requiring  consideration  of  "the  prior  criminal  history  of  



the  defendant  and  the  likelihood  of  rehabilitation").  



           26        AS 28.35.030(g).  

                            



           27        AS 28.35.030(d).  

                            



           28        AS 28.35.030(h).  

                            



           29        AS 28.35.030(i).  

                            



           30        AS 28.35.030(k).  

                            



                                                                 -8-                                                          7533
  


----------------------- Page 9-----------------------

                                                                                                                                                                                                       31  

 may receive credit against her jail sentence for the time spent in treatment.                                                                                                                               A juvenile   



 disposition could also order some of these conditions, but there is no indication that a                                                                                                                                              



juvenile offender would have greater access to rehabilitative treatment.                                                                                              



                                     2.	               There    are    special    problems    involved    with    evaluating    the  

                                                       relationship   between   rehabilitation   and   the   other   important  

                                                       sentencing goals.   



                                     There is a conflict between our recognition of rehabilitation as a special                                                                                                      



 individual interest and our past scrutiny of sentencing statutes.                                                                                                          Ordinarily, the degree                      



 of fit between the statute's means and end depends on the importance of the individual                                                                                                                        



                                           32  

 interest at stake.                                                                                                                                                                                                                 

                                                  If the individual interest is relatively insignificant, there need only be  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      33  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             

 "a substantial relationship" between the classification and a legitimate state interest. 



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  

 If the individual interest is important, there must be a "close relationship" between the  



                                                                                                                          34  

                                                                                                                                

 classification and an important State interest. 



                                                                                                                                                                                                                

                                     Ontheother hand,wehavehistoricallyrecognizedthat our equal protection  



                                                                                                                                                                                                             

 review of legislative sentencing decisions should be fairly deferential.  "It is elementary  



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 

 that the power to define crimes and fix punishments rests in the legislature.   In the  



                   31	               AS 12.55.027.   



                   32                State v. Schmidt                            , 323 P.3d 647, 662 (Alaska 2014) (citing                                                                             Alaska Civil   



Liberties Union v. State                                         , 122 P.3d 781, 787 (Alaska 2005)).                                          



                   33               Planned  Parenthood  of  the  Great  Nw.  v.  State,  375  P.3d  1122,  1137  

                                                                                                                                                                                                         

 (Alaska 2016).  

                        



                   34                Titusv. State, Dep't of Admin., Div. of Motor Vehicles, 305 P.3d 1271, 1278  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                             

 (Alaska 2013).  

                        



                                                                                                                  -9-	                                                                                                       7533
  


----------------------- Page 10-----------------------

performance of that function, that body is to use the discretion lodged in it, and not be                                               

confined by narrow or unduly restrictive limits."                                         35  



                         This approach is consistent with the debate over Article I, section 12, in  

                                                                                                                                                            



which the founders indicated that a sentencing provision need not satisfy both of the  

                                                                                                                                                          



occasionally conflicting goals of criminal administration, thus leaving greater legislative  

                                                                                                                                              

discretion for sentencing decisions.36                                   The language of this section was specifically  

                                                                                                                                          



revised  to  make  it  clear  that  "a  sentence  which  addressed  either  reformation  or  

                                                                                                                                                           

community protection would be constitutionally valid."37  

                                                                                           



                         Since that time, the Alaska Constitution has been amended to explicitly  

                                                                                                                                              



allow consideration of multiple sentencing goals. The pertinent language now provides:  

                                                                                                                                                                  



"Criminal administration shall be based upon the following:  the need for protecting the  

                                                                                                                                                           



public,  community  condemnation  of  the  offender,  the  rights  of  victims  of  crimes,  

                                                                                                                                                  

restitution from the offender, and the principle of reformation."38  

                                                                                             



                         But the courts continue to followtheinterpretiveprinciple that the founders  

                                                                                                                                                



embraced longago. "Thelegislaturemay reasonably emphasizecertaingoals over others  

                                                                                                                                                     

when  determining  the  individual  components  of  a  criminal  sentence."39                                                                 We  have  

                                                                                                                                                      



            35          Alex v. State           , 484 P.2d 677, 684 (Alaska 1971).                   



            36          Koteles v. State, 660 P.2d 1199, 1202 (Alaska App. 1983) (Singleton, J.,  



concurring).  



            37          Id . (citing 2 Proceedings of the Alaska Constitutional Convention 1308- 

                                                                                                                                                     

 1309 (Jan. 5, 1956)).  

                          



            38           Alaska Const. art I, § 12.  

                                                                 



            39          Forster v. State, 236 P.3d 1157, 1174 (Alaska App. 2010).  

                                                                                                                          



                                                                            -10-                                                                      7533
  


----------------------- Page 11-----------------------

therefore recognized that it is sufficient if each component of a criminal sentence "be                                                                         



                                                                                                                                  40  

reasonably related to at least one of these constitutional principles."                                                                



                                                                                                                                                       

                          As noted above, the conflict between these principles affects our scrutiny  



                                                                                                                                                               

of the statutes that define juvenile jurisdiction.   However, we need not resolve that  



                                                                                                                                                         

conflict here because we conclude that the classification the statutes create is closely  



                                                                     

related to important State interests.  



                                                                                                                                                 

                          3.	          The  challenged  classification  is  closely  related  to  important  

                                                                 

                                       government interests.  



                                                                                                                                                         

                          Our  equal  protection  analysis  next  requires  us  to  consider  the  State's  



                                                                                                                                                                 

interest in the classification and the means-end nexus between that classification and the  



                                         41  

                                                                                                                                                   

government  interest.                            Here,  the  challenged  classification  serves  two  important  



                                                                                                                                                                

government interests:  protecting the public and rehabilitating juvenile offenders.  We  



                                                                                                                                                              

conclude that the classification created by AS 47.12.030(b) is closely related to both  



                                                                                                              

goals and therefore does not violate the equal protection clause.  



                                                                                                                                

                                       a.	         The  uniform  treatment  of  driving  offenses  is closely  

                                                                                                                                                                 

                                                   related to the State's important interest in protecting the  

                                                   public.  



                                                                                                                                          42  

                                                                                                                                                              

                          Driving is a dangerous and highly regulated adult activity,                                                         and the State  



                                                                                                                                                             43  

                                                                                                                                                                   

has an interest in holding traffic violators uniformly accountable for bad driving.                                                                                A  



             40	          State v. Ranstead                , 421 P.3d 15, 20 (Alaska 2018).                   



             41           See Planned Parenthood of the Great Nw. v. State                                                 , 375 P.3d 1122, 1137             



                 

(Alaska 2016).  



             42           SeeArdingerv.Hummell, 982 P.2d727, 731(Alaska1999) ("Children who  

                                                                                                                                                               

physically control vehicles must, for public safety reasons, be held to an adult standard  

                                                                                                                                                       

of care.").  

      



             43           Cf. Titus v. State, Dep't of Admin., Div. of Motor Vehicles, 305 P.3d 1271,  

                                                                                                                                                            

                                                                                                                                             (continued...)  



                                                                               -11-	                                                                         7533
  


----------------------- Page 12-----------------------

uniform penalty system promotes the State's interests in public safety and in general                                             



                                                                                                     44  

deterrence, interestsrecognized                     in our constitution          and statutes.                                  

                                                                                                         This includes deterring  



                                                                                                                                       

all drivers fromengaging in unsafe driving behaviors such as drinking and driving. Such  



                                                                                                                                 

behaviors inherently threaten public safety, especially when combined with minors'  



                                       

relative lack of driving experience.  



                                                                                                                                           

                      To further these goals, the legislature has enacted a uniform system of  



                                                                                                                                       

graduated license penalties for driving offenses.  Drivers convicted of DUI have their  



                                                                                                                                      

licenses revoked for 90 days for a first offense, one year for a second offense, three years  

                                                                                                     45    Drivers convicted of  

                                                                                                                                           

for a third offense, and five years for a subsequent offense. 



reckless driving have their licenses revoked for a minimum of 30 days for a first offense,  

                                                                                                                                  

one year for a second offense, and three years for a subsequent offense.46                                                The heavier  

                                                                                                                                  



revocation consequences for DUI convictions are justified because DUI is amoreserious  

                                                                                                                                   



offense, and thus the State's interest in deterring such unsafe behavior is greater.  

                                                                                                                         



                      The dissenting opinion concludes that juvenile DUI offenses should be  

                                                                                                                                          



excluded from the adult system.  This approach would completely upset the system of  

                                                                                                                         



           43         (...continued)  



                                                                                                                    

 1278 (Alaska 2013) (noting the State's interest in deterring uninsured driving).  



           44         State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441, 444 (Alaska 1970) (noting that the Alaska  

                                                                                                                                   

Constitution includes the goal of "deterrence of other members of the community who  

                                                                                                                                       

might possess tendencies toward criminal conduct similar to that of the offender");  

                                                                                                                            

AS 12.55.005(5) (requiring sentencing judges to consider "the effect of the sentence to  

                                                                                                                                           

be imposed in deterring the defendant or other members of society from future criminal  

                                                                                                                                 

conduct").  

                   



           45         AS 28.15.181(c)(1)-(4).  

                             



           46         AS 28.15.181(b)(1)-(2).  

                             



                                                                    -12-                                                              7533
  


----------------------- Page 13-----------------------

graduated penalties.              A juvenile adjudication is not considered a criminal conviction,                                   47  



                                                                                                                            48  

                                                                                                                                      

and an adjudication does not impose any of the civil disabilities of a conviction.                                              So if  



                                                                                                                                     

juvenile DUI offenses were excluded, a juvenile convicted of the lesser offense of  



                                                                                                                                     

reckless driving would still receive a mandatory minimum license revocation of up to  



                                                                                                                                 

three years.  But regardless of his or her prior record, a juvenile adjudicated for DUI  



                                                                                                                                      

would  not  receive  any  mandatory  license  revocation  at  all.                                    This  would  create  a  



                                                                                                                                   

 sentencing scheme where the "gravity of the sanctions" did not "roughly follow the  



                                               49  

                                                     

gravity of the circumstances." 



                     In addition, the traffic statutes require the department of public safety to  

                                                                                                                                     



establish a uniform demerit point system "[f]or the purpose of identifying habitually  

                                                                                                                         

reckless or negligent drivers and habitual or frequent violators of traffic laws."50                                              If a  

                                                                                                                                       



driver accumulates 12 points in one year or 18 points over two years, then the driver's  

                                                                                                                            

license must be suspended or revoked.51                             Under this system, convictions for DUI or  

                                                                                                                                     

                                                                                         52   Negligent driving, another  

reckless driving each carry a value of 10 demerit points.                                                                    

                                                                                

                                                   53                                              54   Speeding can carry  

                                                       carries a value of 6 points.                                             

lesser included offense of DUI,                                                          

                                            



           47        AS  47.12.180(a)(3).  



           48        AS  47.12.180(a)(1).  



           49        Titus  v.  State,  Dep't  of  Admin.,  Div.  of  Motor  Vehicles,  305  P.3d  1271,  1279  



(Alaska  2013).  



           50        AS  28.15.221(a).  



           51        AS  28.15.221(b).  



           52        2  Alaska  Administrative  Code  (AAC)  90.310(a)(3),  (6)  (2021).  



           53        Comeau  v.  State,  758  P.2d   108,   117  (Alaska  App.   1988).  



           54        2  AAC  90.310(a)(12).  



                                                                 -13-                                                           7533
  


----------------------- Page 14-----------------------

                                                                                                                                                                                          55  

between 2 and 6 points depending on the circumstances.                                                                                                                                            This system is obviously                           



 graduated in severity to support the State's interest in deterring bad driving.                                                                                                                                                                      But if we              



 followed the dissenting opinion, a juvenile convicted of traffic infractions like negligent                                                                                                                                                             



 driving or speeding would still accumulate demeritpointsthat                                                                                                                                     could leadto asuspension;                   



 a juvenile adjudicated for misdemeanor DUI offenses would not accumulate any points                                                                                                                                                                               



 at all.   



                                           We thus conclude that the inclusion of juvenile DUI offenses in the same                                                                                                                                                   



 systemas other driving offenses closely promotes the State's interest in a uniformsystem                                                                                                                                                                        



 of penalties to deter bad driving and protect the public.                                                                                                 



                                                                 b.	                  The exclusion of felony traffic offenses from the adult                                                                                                                      

                                                                                      system    is    closely    related    to    the    important    goal    of  

                                                                                      rehabilitation.  



                                           The State also has an interest in promoting the rehabilitation of juvenile                                                                                                                                       



                                 56  

 offenders.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              

                                         We have noted before that minors "do[] not have mature judgment and may  



                                                                                                                                                             57  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               

not fully realize the consequences of [their] acts."                                                                                                                  The State "has a substantial interest  



                                                                                       58  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     

 in [the] welfare" of minors,                                                                and through rehabilitation minors may be given "the skills  



                      55	                  2 AAC 90.310(a)(19).     



                      56  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              

                                           See AS47.12.010; seealso Statev.Sandsness,72 P.3d299,302-04 (Alaska  

 2003) (noting the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile justice system and the benefits of                                                                                                                                                          

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  

rehabilitation); State v. Ladd, 951 P.2d 1220, 1225 (Alaska App. 1998) ("There is a  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        

public interest in 'rehabilitating wayward youths' who are in fact 'rehabilitatable in their  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    

youth.' " (quoting  W.M.F. v. State, 723 P.2d 1298, 1300 (Alaska App. 1986))).  



                      57                   Henson v. State, 576 P.2d 1352, 1354 (Alaska 1978) (quoting P.H. v. State,  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     

 504 P.2d 837, 841 (Alaska 1972), superseded by statute, Ch. 63, §§ 13, 15, SLA 1977,  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    

 as recognized by In re F.S., 586 P.2d 607, 610 (Alaska 1978)).  

                                                                                                                                                                                   



                      58                    Wilsonoff v. Wilsonoff, 514 P.2d 1264, 1267 (Alaska 1973); cf. Pub. Def.
  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         

Agency v. Superior Court , 534 P.2d 947, 949 (Alaska 1975) ("Traditionally, the states
  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            (continued...)
  



                                                                                                                                     -14-	                                                                                                                             7533
  


----------------------- Page 15-----------------------

                                                                                    59  

needed   to   live   responsibly   and   productively."                                   The   legislature   could   reasonably  



conclude that the consequences of a felony conviction would too severely impair its                                                               

interest in rehabilitating a juvenile convicted of a regulatory offense.                                               60  



                                                                                                                                                

                       The tension between the important individual interest in rehabilitation and  



                                                                                                                                         

the legislative discretion to choose among multiple sentencing goals affects our scrutiny  



                                                                                                                                                     

of the statutes that define juvenile jurisdiction.  Alaska Statute 47.12.030(b) promotes a  



                                                                                                                                           

uniformpolicydesigned to discouragedangerous driving by generallytreating all drivers  



as adults.  Strict adherence to this policy, however, would expose minors convicted of  



                                                                                                                                                 

felony driving offenses to the harsh consequences of an adult felony conviction.  As the  



                                                                                                                                                  

court  of  appeals  rightfully  noted  in  this  case,  "[f]elony  offenders  are  subject  to  



                                                                                                                                             

significantly  increased  amounts  of  imprisonment,  as  well  as  various  lifetime  legal  

disabilities."61  



                       The  dissenting  opinion  treats  the  collateral  consequences  of  a  felony  

                                                                                                                                          



conviction the same as a misdemeanor conviction.  This allows the opinion to say that  

                                                                                                                                    



the State's interest in rehabilitation is not closely related to the statutory exclusion of  

                                                                                                                                                   



regulatory felonies from the adult system. But the legal consequences of an adult felony  

                                                                                                                                           



conviction go far beyond the stigma of wrongdoing.  For example, a person convicted  



            58         (...continued)  



                                                                                                                                                   

have been legitimately concerned with the area of family law, and, under the doctrine of  

                                                                                                                                           

parens patriae, in particular, in the promotion of the welfare of children dwelling within  

                                                  

their boundaries." (footnote omitted)).  



            59         AS 47.12.010(a).  

                               



            60          Watson v. State, 400 P.3d 121, 123 (Alaska App. 2017) ("The legislature  

                                                                                                                                    

could  validly  decide  that  minors  should  not  face  [the  consequences  of  a  felony  

                                                                                                                                          

conviction] for their actions, even when the felony arises from the act of driving.").  

                                                                                                                               



            61         Id . (citing AS 12.55.125).  

                                                 



                                                                       -15-                                                                  7533
  


----------------------- Page 16-----------------------

                                                                                                                62  

of   a   felony   may   be   barred   from   possessing   a   firearm   or   ammunition,                            may   be  



                                      63                                                                   64  

disqualified from voting,                                                                                                    

                                         may be disqualified from serving as a juror,                         and may be  

                                                             65  A school district may deny admission to a  

                                                                                                           

                                                

ineligible for a permanent fund dividend. 

                                                                66  A felony conviction is also grounds for  

child who has been convicted of a felony.                                                                                   

                                                      

license denial or other sanctions for many professions.67  Thus, the legislature could have  

                                                                                                                          



reasonably concluded that the legal consequences of a felony conviction are too severe  

                                                                                                                        



for a minor convicted of a driving offense, but that the penalties for a misdemeanor  

                                                                                                             



conviction are appropriate.  

                       



                    Watson's  argument  seems  to  assume  that  the  three-day  minimum  jail  

                                                                                                                            



sentence for a DUI offender charged in district court makes this system harsher than the  

                                                                                                                            



juvenile system.  But the maximum consequences of a juvenile adjudication are at least  

                                                                                                                          



twice as serious as those of a misdemeanor DUI conviction. The maximum sentence for  

                                                                                                                             

a first misdemeanor conviction is one year;68   however, a  juvenile offender may be  

                                                                                                                             



ordered to an indeterminate detention of up to two years, and this sanction may be  

                                                                                                                             



          62        18  U.S.C.  922(g)(1)  (2018).  



          63        AS   15.05.030(a).  



          64        AS  09.20.020(2);  AS  33.30.241(b).  



          65        AS  43.23.005(d).  



          66        AS   14.30.045(5).  



          67        See,   e.g.,   AS   08.20.170(a)(4)(A)   (chiropractors);   AS   08.29.400(a)(2)  



(licensed   professional   counselors);   AS   08.36.315(5)   (dentists);   AS   08.38.040(4)  

(dietitians);  AS   08.54.605(a)(1)(B)   (big   game   guides);  AS   08.65.110(4)   (midwives);  

AS  08.45.060(4)  (naturopaths);  AS  44.50.020(5)  (notaries  public);  AS  08.84.120(a)(3)  

(physical  therapists);   13  AAC   62.020(a)(6)   (2019)   (prison   guards);  AS   08.88.171(a)  

(real  estate  brokers).  



          68        AS 28.35.030(b); AS  12.55.135(a).  

                                                     



                                                             -16-                                                        7533
  


----------------------- Page 17-----------------------

                                                                                                                                                                                                                        69  

 extended until the juvenile reaches age 20.                                                                                                                                                                                      At the very least, the legislature could have                                                                                                                                                        



reasonably concluded that these longer potential periods of detention or supervision in                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              



the   juvenile   system were                                                                                                             sufficient   to   support   a   distinction   between   a   felony   DUI  



 disposition in the juvenile system and the more limited consequences of a misdemeanor                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             



DUI conviction in the adult system.                                                                                                                                                        



                                                                     Because of the severe consequences ofan adult felony conviction, the State                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       



has chosen to temper its policy of deterrence by allowing minors charged with traffic                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          



 felonies the opportunity to have their cases tried in juvenile court. Classifying offenders                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   



 according to whether they are charged with a felony or misdemeanor violation is thus                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    



 closely related to the state's competing interests of deterrence and rehabilitation.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              



IV.                                CONCLUSION  



                                                                      The   legislative   classifications   here   are   closely   related   to   the   State's  



 important interests. We therefore conclude that AS 47.12.030(b)(1) does not violate the  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                



 equal protection clause.                                                                                                    The district court's judgment is AFFIRMED.                                                                                                                               



                                   69                                AS 47.12.120(b)(1).                                                                                         At least two juvenile offenders have unsuccessfully                                                                                                                                               



 argued that longer periods of detention and supervision in the juvenile system than those                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          

 imposed for adult misdemeanor penalties violates equal protection.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              See A.K. v. State                                                                           ,  

No. A-7824, 2001 WL 864193 at *2 (Alaska App. Aug. 1, 2001);                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       M.O.W. v. State                                                                     , 645   

P.2d 1229, 1231 n.4 (Alaska App. 1982).                                                                                                                                             



                                                                                                                                                                                                                      -17-                                                                                                                                                                                                             7533
  


----------------------- Page 18-----------------------

                                                                                         

STOWERS, Justice, with whom CARNEY, Justice, joins, dissenting.  



                                                                                                                      

                    I dissent from the court's opinion in this case.   The following analysis  



                                                                                                                              

explains my reasoning and is the opinion that the court should have issued.  I urge the  



                                                                                                                       

legislature  to  carefully  study  my  analysis  and  fix  the  injustice  the  court's  opinion  



                     

perpetuates.  



I.        INTRODUCTION  



                    A minor convicted of driving under the influence (DUI) argues that the  

                                                                                                                              



statute excludingmisdemeanor trafficviolations fromjuvenile court jurisdiction violates  

                                                                                                                       



her  right  to  equal  protection  under  the  Alaska  Constitution.                               She  argues  that  the  

                                                                                                                             



mandatory  jail  sentence  for  first-time  DUI  offenders  is  unfairly  different  from the  

                                                                                                                              



dispositions for other misdemeanors in the juvenile code. And she argues that it is unfair  

                                                                                                                          



for felony DUI offenses to be charged in juvenile court when misdemeanor DUI offenses  

                                                                                                                       



are not.  

       



                    I conclude that the juvenile court exclusion statute facially discriminates  

                                                                                                               



between minors accused of felony DUI, who are tried in juvenile court, and minors  

                                                                                                                        



accused of misdemeanor DUI, who are tried in district court as adults.  Juveniles have  



an important interest in accessing the rehabilitative opportunities of the juvenile justice  

                                                                                                                         



system and in avoiding the collateral consequences of being charged and sentenced as  

                                                                                   



adults.   The State also  has an important interest in deterring unsafe driving and in  

                                                                                                                               



promoting the rehabilitation of juvenile offenders.  But there is not a close relationship  

                                                                                                                 



between the State's interests andtheclassification createdbythe juvenile court exclusion  

                                                                                                                     



statute.   I therefore would hold that the statute violates the minor's equal protection  

                                                                                                                   



rights, reverse the court of appeals' decision affirming the district court's judgment, and  

                                                                                                                             



remand for further proceedings.  

                              



II.       FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS  

                                 



                    In 2011 Elizabeth Watson - then 14 years old - was involved in an auto  

                                                                                                                            



                                                              -18-                                                        7533
  


----------------------- Page 19-----------------------

 accident after a night of drinking with friends. The State charged Watson in district court                                                                                              



                                                                                                                         1  

with two DUI counts, both class A misdemeanors.                                                                                                                                              

                                                                                                                               Watson moved to dismiss the  



                                                                                                                                                                                                

 charges for lack of jurisdiction; she argued that she should have been prosecuted in  



                                                                                                                                                                                              

juvenile court and that charging her as an adult deprived her of equal protection of the  



                                                                                                                                                                                              

 law.  The district court denied the motion, as well as Watson's subsequent motion for  



reconsideration.  



                                                                                                                                                                                      

                               The case proceeded to a one-day bench trial in April 2013, and the district  



                                                                                                                                                                                    

 court found Watson guilty of both DUI counts.  The court consolidated the two charges  



                                                                                                                                                                                            

 for sentencing purposes; the two counts became one, leading to a single conviction. The  



                                                                                                                                                                                       

 court sentenced Watson to 28 days' imprisonment, but it suspended 25 days and stayed  



                                                                                                                                                                                   

 execution of the sentence pending appeal.  It also imposed fines, revoked her driver's  



                                                                                                                  

 license for 90 days, and placed her on two years' probation.  



                                                                                                                                                                                                 

                               Watson appealed her conviction, arguing that the statute requiring her to  



                                                                                                                                                                    

be charged in district court rather than juvenile court violated her equal protection and  

                                             2     The court of appeals rejected her arguments and affirmed her  

                                                                                                                                                                                             

                              

 due process rights. 

 conviction.3                 Watson petitioned for hearing of the court of appeals' decision, which we  

                                                                                                                                                                                               



 granted to resolvewhether AS47.12.030(b), thejuvenilecourt exclusion statute, violates  

                                                                                                                                                                                    



 equal protection by requiring a minor accused of a non-felony traffic offense to be  

                                                                                                                                                                                               



 charged, prosecuted, and sentenced in the district court in the same manner as an adult.  

                                                                                                                                                                                        



                1              See  AS28.35.030(a)(1)-(2) (criminalizing                                                      bothoperation ofvehicle"while                           



under the influence of an alcoholic beverage" and operation of vehicle if person has                                                                                                         

 "0.08 percent or more" blood alcohol content "as determined by a chemical test taken                                                                                                    

within four hours after the alleged operating or driving"); AS 28.35.030(b) (classifying                                                                                   

 first-time DUI as a class A misdemeanor).                                                        



                2              Watson v. State, 400 P.3d 121, 122 (Alaska App. 2017).  

                                                                                                                                                                



                3             Id. at 123-24.  

                                                               



                                                                                              -19-                                                                                        7533
  


----------------------- Page 20-----------------------

III.       STANDARD OF REVIEW              



                                                                                                                                       4  

                      "We apply our independent judgment to equal protection claims."                                                      In  



                                        

exercising our de novo review, we will adopt "the rule of law most persuasive in light  



                                                        5  

                                            

of precedent, reason, and policy." 



IV.        DISCUSSION  



                      The Alaska Constitution "mandates 'equal treatment of those similarly  

                                                                                                                                

situated.'  "6           It  provides  that  "all  persons  are  equal  and  entitled  to  equal  rights,  

                                                                                                                                    

opportunities, and protection under the law."7                               We interpret the equal protection clause  

                                                                                                                                     



"to be a 'command to state and local governments to treat those who are similarly  

                                                                                                                                

situated alike.' "8           The Alaska Constitution's equal protection guarantee is more robust  

                                                                                                                                     



thanthat oftheUnited States Constitution and so "affords greater protectionto individual  

                                                                                                                               

rights" than its federal counterpart.9  

                                       



           4          Planned   Parenthood  of  the   Great   Nw.   v.   State,   375   P.3d   1122,   1132  



(Alaska 2016).   



           5          Id. (quoting State v. Schmidt, 323 P.3d 647, 655 (Alaska 2014)).  

                                                                                                                     



           6          Alaska Civil Liberties Union v. State , 122 P.3d 781, 787 (Alaska 2005)  

                                                                                                                                     

(quoting State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs. v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska, Inc., 28  

                                                                                                                                           

P.3d 904, 909 (Alaska 2001)).  

                                                    



           7          Alaska Const. art. I, §1.  

                                                               



           8          Pub. Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. Gallant, 153 P.3d 346, 349 (Alaska 2007) (quoting  

                                                                                                                                  

Gonzales v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 882 P.3d 389, 396 (Alaska 1994)).  

                                                                                                      



           9          Alaska Civil Liberties Union , 122 P.3d at 787 (quoting Malabed v. N. Slope  

                                                                                                                                       

Borough, 70 P.3d 416, 420 (Alaska 2003)).  When presented with an equal protection  

challenge, we therefore have "[t]ypically . . . focused exclusively on Alaska's equal  

                                                                                                                      

protection clause" and have not considered the federal equal protection clause.  Heller  

                                                                                                                                     

v. State, Dep't of Revenue, 314 P.3d 69, 77 (Alaska 2013); see also State v. Anthony, 810  

                                                                                                                                          

P.2d 155, 157 (Alaska 1991).  

                                       



                                                                    -20-                                                              7533
  


----------------------- Page 21-----------------------

                      Under our equal protection analysis, "we first decide which classes must                                          



                        10  

be compared."                                                                                                                             

                            "As a matter of nomenclature we refer to that portion of a [statute] that  

                                                                                         11    Once we have identified  the  

                                                                                                                                           

                                                                                       

treats two  groups differently as a 'classification.'  " 



                                                                                                                                             12  

relevant  classes,  we  determine  whether  the  statute  discriminates  between  them.                                                           

                                                                                                                                   



Differential treatment poses an equalprotection problemonly ifsimilarly situated classes  

                                                                                                                                     

are treated differently.13  

                   



                      Our  core  equal  protection  analysis  consists  of  determining  whether  

                                                                                                                                  

individuals in the two classes are similarly situated.14                                   We apply "a flexible three-step  

                                                                                                                                



sliding scale" that considers the individual interest at stake, the government interest  

                                                                                                                                    



served  by  the  challenged  classification,  and  the  means-ends  nexus  between  the  

                                                                                                                                          

classification  and  the  government  interest.15                                The  sliding-scale  analysis  "places  a  

                                                                                                                                              



progressively greater or lesser burden on the [S]tate, depending on the importance of the  

                                                                                                                                            



           10         Planned  Parenthood  of  the  Great  Nw.,  375  P.3d  at   1135.  



           11         Id.  (quoting  Gallant,   153  P.3d  at  349).  



           12         See  State  v.  Schmidt,  323  P.3d  647,  659  (Alaska  2014).   



           13         See  State,  Dep't  of  Nat.  Res.  v.  Alaska  Riverways,  Inc.,  232  P.3d  1203,  1220  



(Alaska 2010) (holding that commercial user  of public waterway "failed to establish a  

violation  of  its  equal  protection  rights"  because  among  other  things  it  had  not  shown  that  

the  State  treated  it  differently  than  other  users).  



           14         See Planned Parenthood of the Great Nw., 375 P.3d at 1135 ("When equal  

                                                                                                                                        

protection  claims  are raised,  the  question  is whether  two  groups  of people  who  are  

                                                                                                                                           

treated  differently are similarly situated and therefore  are entitled to  equal treatment  

                                                                                                                                

under the constitution." (quoting Gallant, 153 P.3d at 349)).  

                                                                                           



           15         Id . at 1137.  

                                 



                                                                     -21-                                                              7533
  


----------------------- Page 22-----------------------

individual right           affected bythedisputed                   classification and the nature ofthegovernmental             

interest at stake."           16  



                                                                                                                                              

           A.	         The Statute Creates Two Classes:  Minors Charged With Felony DUI  

                                                                                                     

                       And Minors Charged With Misdemeanor DUI.  



                                                                                                                                                 

                       The State argues that the law treats "every driver in Alaska . . . equally" by  



                                                                                                                                              

requiring the adjudication of all non-felony traffic offenses in adult court, and that  



                                                                                                                                     

without disparate treatment of classes, there is no equal protection issue. This argument  



                                                                                  17  

                                                                                       

ignores the law's differing treatment of minors. 



                                                                                                                                            

                       We have emphasized that a classification is defined by the statutory terms  



              18  

                                                                                                                 

at issue.          Watson challenges AS 47.12.030(b), which provides:  



                                                                                                                  

                                  When  a  minor  is  accused  of  violating  a  statute  

                                                                                                               

                       specified in this subsection, other than a statute the violation  

                                                                                                         

                       of which is a felony, this chapter and the Alaska Delinquency  

                                                                                                                       

                       Rules do not apply and the minor accused of the offense shall  

                                                                                                                           

                       be charged, prosecuted, and sentenced in the district court in  



            16         Schmidt, 323 P.3d at 662 (quoting                           Alaska Civil Liberties Union v. State                            ,  



 122 P.3d 781, 787 (Alaska 2005)).              



            17         Cf. Titus v. State, Dep't of Admin., Div. of Motor Vehicles, 305 P.3d 1271,  

                                                                                                                                            

 1277  (Alaska  2013)  ("DMV  argues  there  is  no  equal  protection  issue  because  the  

                                                                                                                                               

proof-of-insurance statutes treat similarly situated persons alike by requiring all drivers  

                                                                                                                                          

to  carry insurance.                 But DMV's perspective is too broad.                                   Here, similarly  situated  

                                                                                                                      

uninsured  motorists  are  treated  differently.                                   Alaska  Statute  28.22.021  bases  the  

                                                                                                                                               

proof-of-insurance requirement, and ultimately suspension, on the results of a motor  

                                                                                                                                           

vehicle accident . . . . In requiring proof of insurance and suspension for some, but not  

                                                                                                                        

all,  uninsured  motorists,  the  statutes  treat  similarly  situated  persons  differently."  

                                                                                                                               

(emphasis in original)).  

                        



            18         See id.; Harris v. MilleniumHotel, 330 P.3d 330, 334 &n.18 (Alaska 2014)  

                                                                                                                                            

(looking to statute's terms and definitions to conclude "the workers' compensation  

                                                                                                                             

statute creates a classification between married and unmarried couples"); Schmidt, 323  

                                                                                                                                               

P.3d  at  659  ("The  words  of  the  tax  exemption  statute  and  regulations  create  a  

                                                                                                                                                  

classification between married couples and unmarried couples.").  

                                                                                               



                                                                       -22-	                                                                7533
  


----------------------- Page 23-----------------------

                                      the   same   manner   as   an   adult;  .  .   .   the   provisions   of   this  

                                      subsection apply when a minor is accused of violating                                                                            



                                                         (1)  a traffic statute or regulation, or a traffic ordinance                                                               

                                      or regulation of a municipality; . . . .                                                         



On its face, AS 47.12.030(b) distinguishes between minors charged with a non-felony       

traffic offense and minors charged with a felony traffic offense.                                                                                                                    19  



                                      In addition to considering the statutory terms at issue, we also consider a  

                                                                                                                                                                                

statute  in  relation  to  other  laws  that  offer  additional  context  and  meaning.20                                                                                                                                                  The  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        



classification created by AS47.12.030(b) is further refined byits relationship to Alaska's  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                              



traffic statutes.  Watson contends that the relationship between AS 47.12.030(b) and  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           



AS  28.35.030,  the  DUI  statute,  results  in  differential  treatment  of  similar  classes.  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         



Misdemeanor DUI, of which Watson was convicted in district court, carries a mandatory  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                      



minimum sentence of three days' imprisonment for a first offense and twenty days'  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      

imprisonment for a second offense.21                                                                          In contrast, if Watson had not been a first-time  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                         



offender, but instead had previously been convicted of DUI two or more times, then she  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             



                   19                 See Alaska Civil Liberties Union                                                           , 122 P.3d at 788 ("When a 'law                                                          by its own       



terms  classifies persons for different treatment,' this is known as a facial classification."                                                                                                              

(emphasis                         in         original)                     (quoting                      JOHN                E.         NOWAK                       &         RONALD                       D.          ROTUNDA,  

     ONSTITUTIONAL LAW  § 14.4, at 711 (7th ed. 2004))).                                                                           

C                                                   



                   20                 See Harris                     , 330 P.3d at 334-35 (reading Alaska Worker's Compensation     



Act and Marriage Amendment together to create two classes:                                                                                                                     opposite-sex couples for                                       

whom death benefits are available and same-sex couples for whom such benefits are  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             

unavailable);  Schmidt, 323 P.3d at 659-60 (reading tax exemption statute and related                                                                                                                                             

regulation together with Marriage Amendment and concluding two classes are created:                                                                                                                                                                      

opposite-sex couples for whom tax benefits are available and same-sex couples for  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             

whom such tax benefits are unavailable).  

                                                                                



                   21                 AS 28.35.030(b)(1)(A)-(B); AS 28.35.030(b)(2) (prohibiting court from  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        

suspending imposition of sentence and also from suspending execution of sentence  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                             

except on condition that offender serve the minimum term of imprisonment).  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                             



                                                                                                                     -23-                                                                                                               7533
  


----------------------- Page 24-----------------------

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         22  

would have been guilty of felony DUI and subject to juvenile court jurisdiction.                                                                                                                                                                               Alaska  



 Statutes 47.12.030(b) and 28.35.030 therefore create a structure where a minor who is                                                                                                                                                



 a repeat DUI offender is treated as a juvenile whereas a minor with no (or only one) prior                                                                                                                                                                            



DUI is treated as an adult and is subject to a minimum sentence of imprisonment.                                                                                                                                                                                    Read  



together, AS 47.12.030(b) and AS 28.35.030 thus create two classes:                                                                                                                                                               minors accused   



 of felony DUI, who are tried in juvenile court; and minors accused of misdemeanor DUI,                                                                                                                                                                               



who are tried in district court as adults.                                                                                    I therefore consider these two groups of minors                                                                                   



 as the relevant classes for our equal protection analysis.                                                                                            



                      B.                   The Statutes When Read Together Are Facially Discriminatory.                                                                                                          



                                           The next step in our equal protection analysis is determining whether the                                                                                                                                                        



 statute has a discriminatory purpose.                                                                                      A claimant "must show either that [a] facially                                                                                   



neutral    [statute]    has    a    discriminatory    purpose    or    that    the    [statute]    is    facially  



                                                     23  

 discriminatory."                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                

                                                                A statute is facially discriminatory when, "by its own terms," it  

                                                                                                                                       24  Asestablished above,AS47.12.030(b) and  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           

 "classifies persons for differenttreatment." 



AS 28.35.030 treat two similar classes of minors differently; the statutes are therefore  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         



 facially discriminatory.  "[W]hen a law is discriminatory on its face, 'the question of  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               



 discriminatory intent is subsumed by the determination that the classification established  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   

by the terms of the challenged law or policy is, itself, discriminatory.' "25  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   



                      22                   See  AS  28.35.030(n);  AS  47.12.030(b).  



                      23                   Schmidt,  323  P.3d  at  659  (footnote  omitted).   



                      24                   Id.  (quoting  Alaska  Civil  Liberties   Union,   122  P.3d  at  788).   



                      25                   Alaska   Civil  Liberties   Union,   122  P.3d   at   788   (quoting  Hamlyn  v.  Rock  



Island   Cty.,   Metro.   Mass   Transit   Dist.,   986   F.   Supp.   1126,   1133   (C.D.   Ill.   1997))  

 (concluding that programs  granting benefits to spouses only in heterosexual relationships  

 are  facially  discriminatory).  



                                                                                                                                     -24-                                                                                                                             7533
  


----------------------- Page 25-----------------------

               C.	           Core Equal Protection Analysis                         



                             Having determined that the statutes are facially discriminatory, I proceed                                                                     



to the core of our equal protection analysis:                                                          determining whether the rationales for                                          



AS 47.12.030(b) and AS 28.35.030 justify differential treatment of minors charged with                                                                                               



                                                                                  26  

misdemeanor   DUI   and   felony   DUI.                                                                                                                                                    

                                                                                          As  noted  above,  this  analysis  consists  of  a  



                                                                                                                                                 

three-step process.  We first consider the private interest affected by the classification;  



                                                                                                                                                                       

we next consider the State's interest in the classification; and we finally determine  



                                                                                                                                                                                  

whether  the  relationship  between  the  State's  interest  and  the  classification  is  close  



                                                                                                  27  

                                                                                                                                                                                          

enough to justify the challenged legislation.                                                            Throughout, we use a sliding scale to  



                                                                                                                                                                              

determine the appropriate level of review; "[d]epending upon the primacy of the interest  



                                                                                                                                                                                          28  

                                                                                                                                                                

involved, the [S]tate will have a greater or lesser burden in justifying its legislation." 



                                                                                                                                                                                    

                              1.	           Juvenile                offenders                  have            an         important                    interest              in       the  

                                                                                                                                              

                                            rehabilitative focus of the juvenile justice system.  



                                                                                                                                                                            

                             The first step of our core equal protection analysis requires us to consider  



                                                                                                                                                                              

the  personal  right  or  interest  impacted  by  the  State's  classification.                                                                                    The  Alaska  



                                                                                                                                                                            

Constitution establishes that reformation is one of the main principles on which criminal  



                                                        29  

                                                                                                                                                                                        

administration  is  based,                                     and  thus  all  criminal  offenders  have   an   interest  in  



                                                                                                                                                                       

rehabilitation.  Alaska Statute 12.55.005 furthers this principle by requiring sentencing  



               26            See Planned Parenthood of the Great Nw. v. State                                                                , 375 P.3d 1122, 1136       



(Alaska 2016).   



               27            Id . at 1137.  

                                          



               28            Id. (quoting Alaska Pac. Assurance Co. v. Brown , 687 P.2d 264, 269-70  

                                                                                                                                                                              

(Alaska 1984)).  

                   



               29            Alaska Const. art. I, § 12.  

                                                                              



                                                                                           -25-	                                                                                   7533
  


----------------------- Page 26-----------------------

                                                                                                                                                    30  

judges in adult court to consider the "likelihood of [a defendant's] rehabilitation."                                                                    And  



we have long recognized the significance of rehabilitation for both the public and for the                                                                  

 offender.31  



                                                                                                                                                             32  

                                                                                                                                                                   

                                                                                                                                               

                         This interest in rehabilitation is especially acute for minors, like Watson. 



 Given their developing maturity, minors are particularly amenable to reform, and the  

                                                                                                                                                           



 State has taken care to see that minors' sentences are not merely punitive.  Indeed, the  

                                                                                                                                                           



 State has created a juvenile justice system where "rehabilitation rather than punishment  

                                                                                                                                            

 is the express purpose of juvenile jurisdiction."33   Alaska Statute 47.12.010 exemplifies  

                                                                                                                                            



this dedication to reform, stating that the purposes of the delinquent minors chapter are  

                                                                                                                                                           



to   "respond   to   a   juvenile   offender's   needs   in   a   manner   that   is   consistent  

                                                                                                                                            



with . . . prevention of repeated criminal behavior . . . [and] development of the juvenile  

                                                                                                                                                  



 into a productive citizen," and also to "provide an early, individualized assessment and  

                                                                                                                                                          



 action plan for each juvenile offender in order to prevent further criminal behavior."  

                                                                                                                                                                   



             30          AS 12.55.005(2).                  



             31  

                                                                                                                                    

                         See Abraham v. State, 585 P.2d 526, 531 (Alaska 1978) ("[S]ociety will  

                                                                                                                                                              

benefit from [the reformation of an offender], but so will the offender . . . ."); Roman v.  

                                                                                                                                             

State, 570 P.2d 1235, 1240 (Alaska 1977) ("[P]arole conditions must be reasonably  

                                                                                                                                                           

related to the rehabilitation of the offender and the protection of the public and must not  

                                                                                                                                                       

be unduly restrictive of liberty."); State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441, 444, 447 (Alaska 1970)  

                                                                                                                                                 

 (disapproving of sentence in part for failing to encourage "rehabilitation of the offender  

                                                          

into a noncriminal member of society").  



             32          See  State  v.  Sandsness,  72  P.3d  299,  307  (Alaska  2003)  ("Society's  

                                                                                                                                           

 commitment to the goal of rehabilitating juveniles by reintegrating them with their  

                                                                                                                                                        

 families and the public reflects an implicit belief that early reintegration is more likely  

                                                                                                                                            

to maximize public safety in the long-term than prolonged isolation of juveniles from  

                                                                                                                                                        

their families and the broader community of law-abiding citizens.").  

                                                                                                                                



             33          Id. at 302-03 (quoting Rust v. State, 582 P.2d 134, 140 n.21 (Alaska 1978)).  

                                                                                                                                                    



                                                                             -26-                                                                      7533
  


----------------------- Page 27-----------------------

Minors thus have an important interest in rehabilitation, an interest that is vindicated by                                                                                                           



accessing the juvenile justice system and its uniquely rehabilitative focus.                                                                                    



                               We have similarly noted that "the principal precept behind the [juvenile]                                                                             



court concept" is that minors lack "mature                                                                 judgment and may not fully realize the                                                   



consequences of [their] acts [and therefore] should not generally have to bear the stigma                                                                                                    

                                                                                                                          34    Juveniles therefore also have an  

of a criminal conviction for the rest of [their lives]."                                                                                                                                              



important interest in avoiding the collateral consequences associated with a criminal  

                                                                                                                                                                                      

conviction that may impact future education and employment prospects.35                                                                                                         By denying  

                                                                                                                                                                                         



some minors access to  the  juvenile justice system, AS 47.12.030(b)  burdens those  

                                                                                                                                                                                               

important interests; it therefore demands close scrutiny.36  

                                                                                                               



                               2.	             The State has important interests in deterring unsafe driving  

                                                                                                                                                                                         

                                               and rehabilitating minors.  

                                                                                              



                               When the law burdens an important interest, as in this case, it "must bear  

                                                                                                                                                                                                  

a  close  relationship  to  an  important  state  interest."37  

                                                                                                                                                                                    

                                                                                                                                      The  State  has  two  important  



                                                                                                                                                                                                          

interests that apply to the differential treatment of juvenile DUI offenders.  Driving is a  



                34             P.H. v. State                  , 504 P.2d 837, 841 (Alaska 1972),                                                     superseded by statute                                ,  



ch. 63, §§ 13, 15, SLA 1977,                                            as recognized in In re F.S.                                     , 586 P.2d 607, 610 (Alaska                      

 1978).  



                35             See Journey v. State, 895 P.2d 955, 959 (Alaska 1995) ("The pernicious  

                                                                                                                                                                                   

effects of criminal records are well documented. . . . [A] person with a criminal record  

                                                                                                                                                                                             

is often burdened by social stigma, subjected to additional investigation, prejudiced in  

                                           

future criminal proceedings, and discriminated against by prospective employers.").  

                                                                                                                                                                      



                36             See  Malabed  v.  N.  Slope  Borough,  70  P.3d  416,  421  (Alaska  2003)  

                                                                                                                                                                                             

(explaining that "impairment" of important interest "requires us to give close scrutiny"  

                                                                                                                                                                                       

to challenged state action).  

                                              



                37              Titus v. State, Dep't of Admin., Div. of MotorVehicles, 305P.3d 1271, 1278  

                                                                                                                                                                                                 

(Alaska 2013); see also Malabed, 70 P.3d at 421 (noting that state interest must be both  

                                                                                                                                                                                                  

legitimate and important).  

                                                               



                                                                                                 -27-	                                                                                          7533
  


----------------------- Page 28-----------------------

                                                    38  

highly regulated adult activity,                       and the State argues that it has an interest in holding                      

traffic violators uniformly accountable for bad driving.                                     39                                      

                                                                                                 The State also has a general  



                                                                                                                                      

deterrence interest that includes deterring juvenile drivers from engaging in unsafe  

                                                                                                   40   Such behavior inherently  

                                                                                                                                 

                                                                                   

driving behaviors such as driving while under the influence. 



threatens public safety, especially when combined with minors' relative lack of driving  

                                                                                                                                     

experience.41  



                      The  State  also  acknowledges  that  it  has  an  interest  in  promoting  the  

                                                                                                                                           

rehabilitation  of  juvenile  offenders.42                           It  is  well-established  that  the  State  "has  a  

                                                                                                                                               



           38         See Ardinger v. Hummell, 982 P.2d 727,  731 (Alaska 1999)  ("Children who  



physically  control  vehicles  must,  for  public  safety  reasons,  be  held  to  an  adult  standard  

of  care.").  



           39          Cf. Titus, 305 P.3d at 1278 (noting State's interest in deterring uninsured  

                                                                     

driving).  



           40         See AS 12.55.005(5) (requiring sentencing judges to consider "the effect  

                                                                             

of the sentence to be imposed in deterring the defendant or other members of society  

                                                                                                                                     

from  future  criminal  conduct");  Alvarez  v.  State,  Dep't  of  Admin.,  Div.  of  Motor  

                                                                                                                                      

 Vehicles, 249 P.3d 286, 299 (Alaska 2011) ("The act of driving while intoxicated is an  

                                                                                                                                             

act of unfit  driving, dangerous to the public.");  State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441, 444  

                                                                                                                                           

(Alaska  1970) (noting that Alaska's Constitution includes the goal of "deterrence of  

                                                                                                                                              

other members of the community who might possess tendencies toward criminal conduct  

                                                                                                                                     

similar to that of the offender").  

                                    



           41          Cf. Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990) ("No one  

                                                                                                                                           

can  seriously  dispute  the  magnitude  of  the  drunken  driving  problem  or  the  States'  

                                                                                                                                     

interest in eradicating it.").  

                                      



           42         See AS 47.12.010; State v. Sandsness, 72 P.3d 299, 302-04 (Alaska 2003)  

                                                                                                                                        

(noting rehabilitative goals ofjuvenile justice system and benefits of rehabilitation); State  

                                                                                                                                          

v.  Ladd,  951  P.2d  1220,  1225 (Alaska  App.  1998) ("There  is  a  public  interest  in  

                                                                                                                               

'rehabilitating wayward  youths'  who  are  in  fact  'rehabilitatable  in  their  youth.'  "  

                                                                                                                                               

(quoting W.M.F. v. State, 723 P.2d 1298, 1300 (Alaska App.  1986))).  

                                                                                                        



                                                                     -28-                                                               7533
  


----------------------- Page 29-----------------------

                                                                                               43  

 substantial interest in [the] welfare" of minors,                                                 and as discussed, minors "do[] not have                                



                                                                                                                                                                    44  

mature judgment and may not fully realize the consequences of [their] acts."                                                                                                    

                                                                                                                                                                           It is  



                                                                                                                                                                           

through rehabilitation that juvenile offenders may be given "the skills needed to live  



                                                                45  

                                   

responsibly and productively." 



                            3.	           There is not a close relationship between the State's interests  

                                                                                                                                                                 

                                          and the classification.  

                                                            



                            Having  identified  the  State's  interests  and  determined  that  they  are  

                                                                                                                                                                            



important, we next examine whether they bear "a close relationship" to the classification  

                                                                                                                                                         

at issue.46  

                                                                                                                                                                         

                         The State must balance two important interests:   deterring drivers from  



                                                                                                                                                                                     

engaging in unsafe driving practices and providing rehabilitative support for minors.  



                                                                                                                                                                            

The classification scheme created  by  AS  47.12.030(b)  and AS 28.35.030  does not  



                           

achieve that balance.  



                                                                                                                                                              

                            AlaskaStatute47.12.030(b) requiresthatjuvenileschargedwithnon-felony  



                                                                                                                                                                         

traffic offenses be "charged, prosecuted, and sentenced in the district court in the same  



                                                                                                                                                                              

manner as [adults]" but permits juveniles charged with felony traffic offenses to be  



              43            Wilsonoff v. Wilsonoff                        , 514 P.2d 1264, 1267 (Alaska 1973);                                           cf.  Pub. Def.   



Agency   v.   Superior   Court,   Third   Judicial   Dist. ,   534   P.2d   947,   949   (Alaska   1975)  

("Traditionally, the states have been legitimately concerned with the area of family law,                                                                                  

and, under the doctrine of parens patriae, in particular, in the promotion of the welfare                                                                   

of children dwelling within their boundaries." (internal citations omitted)).                                                          



              44            Henson v. State, 576 P.2d 1352, 1354 (Alaska 1978) (quoting P.H. v. State,  

                                                                                                                                                                        

 504 P.2d 837, 841 (Alaska 1972), superseded by statute, ch. 63, §§ 13, 15, SLA 1977,  

                                                                                                                                                                        

as recognized in In re F.S., 586 P.2d 607, 610 (Alaska 1978)).  

                                                                                                                   



              45            AS 47.12.010(a).  

                                    



              46            Titus v. State, Dep't of Admin., Div. of Motor Vehicles, 305 P.3d 1271,  

                                                                                                                                                                       

 1278-79 (Alaska 2013).  

                                     



                                                                                      -29-	                                                                              7533
  


----------------------- Page 30-----------------------

                                         47  

charged in juvenile court.                   "It is a misdemeanor for a person to violate a provision [of                              



Alaska's   traffic   statutes]   unless   the   violation   is   .   .   .   declared   to   be   a   felony   or   an  



                  48  

                                                                                                                                      

infraction."               There   are   seven   traffic   offenses   that   are   felonies   instead   of  



                        49  

                                                                                                                                      

misdemeanors.               Of those seven felony offenses, five have lesser included offenses that  



                                              50  

                                                                                                                                      

are treated as misdemeanors.                      Of those five lesser included offenses, there are only two  



                                                                                                                                         

that  are  structured  based  on  an  offender's  conviction  history  and  that  include  a  



                                                                                                                                         

mandatory minimum sentence of  imprisonment - DUI  and  refusal to  submit to  a  



                      51  

                                                                                                                              

chemical test.           As discussed, misdemeanor DUI carries amandatory minimumsentence  



                                                                                                                                   

of three days' imprisonment for a first offense and twenty days' imprisonment for a  



           47        AS  47.12.030(b)(1).   



           48        AS  28.90.010.  



           49        See    AS    28.35.030(n)                (third    DUI    conviction   in    past    ten    years);  



AS  28.35.032(p)   (third conviction  in  past  ten  years   for  refusal  to   submit  to   chemical  

test);   AS   28.35.060(a),   (c)   (driver   involved   in   accident   fails   to   render   reasonable  

assistance  to  injured  person);  AS  28.35.161(f)  (use  of  electronic  devices  while driving  

which  causes  physical  injury  to  another  person);  AS  28.35.182(a),  (e)  (failure  to  stop  at  

direction  of  peace  officer  while  driving  recklessly  or  driving  stolen  car,  or  if  accident  

occurs or  person suffers serious physical  injury);  AS  28.35.320  (willful neglect or  refusal  

to  return  rental  vehicle  with  intent  to  deprive  owner  of  vehicle);  AS  28.10.491  (altering,  

forging, or counterfeiting title, registration,  or identification number, and removal and  

representation  of  vehicles).  



           50        See AS 28.35.030(a)-(b) (first or second DUI conviction); AS 28.35.032(a),  

                                                                                                                       

(g)     (first      or     second        conviction           for     refusal        to    submit         to     chemical          test);  

                                                                                                                                 

AS   28.35.060(a)-(b)   (driver   involved   in   accident   fails   to   provide   identifying  

                                                                                                                        

information);   AS   28.35.161(a),   (f)   (use   of   electronic   devices   while   driving);  

                                                                                                                            

AS 28.35.182(b) (failure to stop at direction of peace officer as soon as practical and  

                                                                                                                                      

safe).  



           51        AS  28.35.030(a)-(b)  (DUI); AS  28.35.032(a),  (g)  (refusal to  submit to  

                                                                                                                                        

chemical test).  

                



                                                                  -30-                                                             7533
  


----------------------- Page 31-----------------------

                                                  52  

 second offense.                                         AlaskaStatutes 47.12.030(b)and28.35.030thereforecreateastructure                                                                                                                                



 where a minor who has had two or more prior DUI convictions is treated as a juvenile                                                                                                                                                                      



 whereas a minor who has never been convicted of DUI is treated as an adult and subject                                                                                                                                                                          



 to a minimum sentence of imprisonment.                                               



                                            This   classification  does  not   bear   a   close   fit   to   the   State's   interest   in  



 deterrence.    That interest would arguably be better served by either (1) treating all                                                                                                                                                                                      



juvenile DUI offenders, both misdemeanor and felony, as adults; or (2) treating juvenile                                                                                                                                                                     



 felony   DUI   offenders,   who   are   repeat   offenders,   as   adults,   and   treating   juvenile  



 misdemeanor DUI offenders, who are either first-                                                                                                            or second-time offenders, as juveniles.                                                                                      



 We have previously found "a constitutionally adequate nexus to the state interest" where                                                                                                                                                                           



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  53  

 "[t]he gravity of the sanctions roughly follow[ed] the gravity of the circumstances."                                                                                                                                                                                                    



 But as Watson argues, the classification at issue here "inverts traditional principles of  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                



 criminal sentencing."  

                             



                                            The  classification  also  does  not  closely  fit  the  State's  interest  in  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              



 rehabilitation.  That interest would be better met by providing rehabilitative support to  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 

 minors who are more amenable to rehabilitation  - i.e., first-time offenders.54                                                                                                                                                                                           But  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        



 instead, the State's classification only offers rehabilitative support to offenders who have  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        



                      52                    AS 28.35.030(b)(1)(A)-(B); AS 28.35.030(b)(2)(A)(I).                                                     



                      53                    Titus v. State, Dep't of Admin.,Div. ofMotorVehicles                                                                                                                   , 305P.3d 1271, 1279                                



 (Alaska 2013);                                  see also Bell v. State                                           , 598 P.2d 908, 914 (Alaska 1979) ("It is well settled                                                                                           

 that statutes may prescribe stiffer penalties for multiple offenders.").  

                                                                                                                                                                                    



                      54                    Cf. State v. Ladd, 951 P.2d 1220, 1225 (Alaska App. 1998) ("There is a  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   

 public interest in 'rehabilitating wayward youths' who are in fact 'rehabilitatable in their  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         

 youth.'   On the other hand, society also has a significant interest in utilizing adult  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      

 criminal  sanctions  to  'protect[]  the  public  from  youths  who  [cannot  be]  quickly  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             

 rehabilitated.' " (alterations in original) (quoting W.M.F. v. State, 723 P.2d 1298, 1300  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       

 (Alaska App. 1986))).  

                                              



                                                                                                                                      -31-                                                                                                                             7533
  


----------------------- Page 32-----------------------

                                                                                    55  

already been convicted of DUI two or more times.                                        First-time juvenile DUI offenders         



                                                                                            56  

are required to be charged as adults in district court,                                                                                     

                                                                                                and  they  do not receive the  



                                                                                           

rehabilitative services that the juvenile justice system provides.  



                                                                                                                                             

                      The State argues  that "[t]he legislature  reasonably decided  to  treat all  



                                                                                                                                              

drivers alike, with a narrow exception for minors who would otherwise be subject to  



                                                                                                                                       

felony penalties because in that case, the scales tip towards the juvenile justice model  



                                                                                                                                              

with the primary goals of rehabilitation and reformation."  But the legislative history of  



                                                                                                                                         

AS 47.12.030(b) does not support that argument.   Non-felony traffic offenses were  

                                                                                                              57  Legislative history  

                                                                                                                                      

specifically excluded fromthe juvenile court's jurisdiction in 1961. 



indicates that this exclusion occurred in order to process routine traffic violations in a  

                                                                                                                                                



more simplified and expeditious manner than would occur in juvenile court - i.e., for  

                                                                                                                                             

administrative efficiency, not to deter bad driving.58  

                                                                        



           55         See  AS  47.12.030(b);  AS  28.35.030(n).  



           56         See  AS  47.12.030(b);  AS  28.35.030(b).  



           57         Ch.  76,  SLA   1961.  



           58         Governor   William   Egan   introduced   the   bill   that   created   what  is   now  



AS  47.12.030;  he  stated  in  a  letter  to  the  Chairman  of  the  House  Rules  Committee:  



                                  The   main   purpose   and   policy   behind   the   special  

                      consideration  given  juveniles  in  our  courts  .  .  .  is  to  avoid  the  

                      stigma and emotional disturbances that often occur  because  

                      of   a   criminal  conviction.   The  purpose  is  to  insure  that  the  

                      juvenile  will  not  receive  a  bad  start  in  life  because  of  youthful  

                      mistakes.  



                                                                                                         

                                 All  of  this  is  usually  unnecessary  when  regulatory  

                                                                                                                 

                      offenses not involving moral turpitude are in issue.   There  

                                                                                                                    

                      appears to be no reason why the offense of running a stop  

                                                                                                              

                      sign or excessive speed should not be processed as quickly  

                                                                                                                          (continued...)  



                                                                     -32-                                                               7533
  


----------------------- Page 33-----------------------

                      In   1969   the   legislature   eliminated   an   exception   to   the   juvenile   court  



                                                                                                                          59  

exclusion statute that had permitted DUI offenders to remain in juvenile court.                                                       

                                                                                                                              But the  



                                                                                                                                    

offense of DUI in 1969 differed in several material respects from DUI today. First, DUI  



                                                                                                                              

carried no mandatory minimum sentence, nor was it ineligible for suspended entry of  

                                                                              60   In addition, in 1969 the offense of  

                                                                                                                                       

judgment and suspended imposition of sentence. 

felony  DUI  did  not  exist,61   and  thus  all  minors  charged  with  DUI  faced  the  same  

                                                                                                                                  



treatment:  being charged in the district court. Therefore, when the legislature excluded  

                                                                                                                            



DUI  from the  juvenile  court's  jurisdiction,  it  did  so  at  a  time  when  there  was  no  

                                                                                                                                      



mandatory minimum sentence for DUI and the juvenile's age could be fully considered  

                                                                                                                         



           58	        (...continued)
  



                                                                                                            

                      and as expeditiously where a juvenile is concerned, as where
  

                                                  

                      an adult driver is involved.
  



                                                                                                      

                                Because of the very large number of traffic violations  

                                                                                                        

                     which  involve  juvenile  drivers,  simplification  of  juvenile  

                                                                                                         

                     procedures for the adjudication of these offenses . . . certainly  

                                                            

                      is in the interests of the public.  



                                                                                                                                      

 1961 House Journal 197-98.  In a subsequent letter, Governor Egan requested that the  

                                                                                                                                      

draft bill be amended to exclude DUI, reckless driving, and leaving the scene of an  

                                                                                                                                 

accident, as these offenses were "serious enough to indicate a need for Juvenile Court  

                                                                                                                                   

processing and planning." Id. at 199. The final bill included an exclusion for these three  

                                              

offenses.  Ch. 76, § 1, SLA 1961.  



           59	        Ch. 64, § 1, SLA 1969.  

                                                   



           60         The legislature did not set a mandatory minimum sentence for DUI until  

                                                                                                                     

nearly  a  decade  later in 1978.   Ch. 152, § 2, SLA 1978.   And it did not disallow  

                                                                                                                                            

 suspended imposition of sentence for DUI convictions until 1983.  Ch. 77, § 14, SLA  

                                                                                                                                   

 1983.  AS 28.35.030(b)(2) now provides that the court may not suspend imposition of  

                                                                                                                                       

 sentence for misdemeanor DUI, and it may not suspend execution of sentence except on  

                                                                                                                                       

condition that the offender serve the minimum term of imprisonment.  

                                                                                         



           61         The legislature did not create felony DUI until 1995, which at that time  

                                                                                                                                   

meant a third DUI offense within five years.  Ch. 80, § 7, SLA 1995.  

                                                                                                      



                                                                  -33-	                                                           7533
  


----------------------- Page 34-----------------------

by the district court.                        It also did so at a time when the offense of felony DUI did not exist                                                                 



-   therefore   the   legislature   could   not   have   been   consciously   balancing   competing  



 interests in differentiating treatment for the two offenses as the State claims. Rather, the                                                                                           



 legislative history shows that the legislature excluded DUI from the juvenile court's                                                                                        



jurisdiction   and   then   later   made   changes   to   the   criminal   code   that   affected   the  



 significance   of   that   earlier   exclusion.     As   far   as   the   legislative   history   shows,   the  



 legislature was likely unaware that these changes inverted the principles of criminal                                                                                      



 sentencing for juvenile DUI offenders.                         



                              Alaska   Statutes   47.12.030(b)   and   28.35.030   thus   create   a   sentencing  



 structure where the "gravity of the sanctions" does not "roughly follow the gravity of the                                                                                             

                                   62  And that structure does not align with the State's interests in deterring  

 circumstances."                                                                                                                                                           

                                                                                                                                      63    Because there is not a  

bad driving and providing rehabilitative support for minors.                                                                                                                                

                                                                                                                     



 close relationship between the State's interests and the classification, AS 47.12.030(b)  

                                                                                                                                                                  

violates Watson's equal protection rights.64  

                                                                              



               62             Titus v.        State, Dep't of Admin., Div.of                                   Motor Vehicles, 305 P.3d 1271, 1279                                  



 (Alaska 2013).   



               63             See Planned Parenthood of the Great Nw. v. State, 375 P.3d 1122, 1143  

                                                                                                                                                                                   

 (Alaska 2016) (looking to whether State's asserted interests justify distinction between  

                                                                                                                                                                            

two classes that are similarly situated); State v. Ladd, 951 P.2d 1220, 1225 (Alaska App.  

                                                                                                                                                                                    

 1998) ("In deciding which minors should receive juvenile delinquency dispositions for  

                                                                                                                                                                                        

 criminal acts, the legislature can draw distinctions between different groups so long as  

                                                                                                                                                                                          

those distinctions are not arbitrary or based on a discriminatory classification.").  

                                                                                                                                             



               64             I likewise note that the field of juvenile sentencing is presently in a state of  

                                                                                                                                                                                          

 flux and at least one sister court has even invalidated all mandatory prison sentences for  

                                                                                                                                                                                        

juveniles as cruel and unusual under its state constitution.  See State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d  

                                                                                                                                                                             

 378, 400 (Iowa 2014), as amended (Sept. 30, 2014); cf. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460,  

                                                                                                                                                                                     

 479 (2012) ("[T]he Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life  

                                                                                                                                                                                       

 in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders."); Burrell v. State, 207  

                                                                                                                                                                                      

                                                                                                                                                                 (continued...)  



                                                                                           -34-                                                                                    7533
  


----------------------- Page 35-----------------------

          D.        Remedy  



                    Because I have concluded that AS 47.12.030(b) violates Watson's equal  

                                                                                                                           



protection rights, I must now address the question of what remedy should follow from  

                                                                                                                            



that conclusion.   The State argues that if we declare AS 47.12.030(b) invalid, then  

                                                                                                               



minors accused of non-felony traffic offenses would effectively be immunized from  

                                                                                                                           

prosecution  pending  legislative  action.                      But  this  concern  is  unfounded.65                   Alaska  

                                                                                                                        



 Statute 47.12.020(a) defines juvenile court jurisdiction and provides that "[p]roceedings  

                                                                                                             



relating to a minor [alleged to have violated a criminal law] . . . are governed by this  

                                                                                                                             



chapter, except as otherwise provided in this chapter."  Alaska Statute 47.12.030 then  

                                                                                                                            



describes  the  specific  offenses  that  are  excluded  from  the  juvenile  court's  broad  

                                                                                                                         



jurisdiction over minors under 18 years of age; as discussed, misdemeanor DUI is one  

                                                                                             



of  the  offenses  excluded.                  Invalidating  this  exclusion  will  not  render  juvenile  

                                                                                                                     



misdemeanor  DUI  offenders  immune  from  prosecution;  under  AS  47.12.020,  the  

                                                                                                                             



juvenile court's jurisdiction will automatically extend to all juvenile DUI offenders.  

                                                                                                                



                    I conclude that excluding misdemeanor DUI, but not felony DUI, from  

                                                                                                                           



juvenile court jurisdiction violates equal protection, and AS 47.12.030(b) is therefore  

                                                                                                                     

invalid as applied to juvenile misdemeanor DUI.66  

                                                                   



          64        (...continued)  



                                                                                                                              

A.3d 137, 145 (Del. 2019) (reasoning that state legislature "adequately addressed the  

                                                        

constitutional concerns identified in Miller" with criminal statute prescribing different  

                                                                                                                             

mandatory minimum sentence for juveniles).  The parties in this case did not raise this  

                                                              

issue so we have no occasion to address it.  



          65        See Egan v. Hammond, 502 P.2d 856, 871 (Alaska 1972) ("A statute bad  

                                                                                                                             

in part is not necessarily void in its entirety." (quoting Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286,  

                                                                                                                            

289 (1924))).  

        



          66        The same is true as applied to juvenile misdemeanor charges for refusal to  

                                                                                                                                

                                                                                                              (continued...)  



                                                              -35-                                                        7533
  


----------------------- Page 36-----------------------

V.        CONCLUSION  



                   I  therefore  would  reverse  the  court  of  appeals'  decision  affirming  the  

                                                                                                                       



district court's judgment and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with my  

                                                                                                                        



dissenting opinion.  

                



          66       (...continued)  



submit to a chemical test under AS 28.35.032(a), (g).  

                                                                        



                                                            -36-                                                       7533  

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