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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Elizabeth Watson v State of Alaska (5/28/2021) sp-7533
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before publication in the P ACIFIC REPORTER.
Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts,
303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878, email
corrections@akcourts.us.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
ELIZABETH WATSON, )
) Supreme Court No. S-16752
Petitioner, ) Court of Appeals No. A-11592
)
v. ) Superior Court No. 4BE-11-01326 CR
)
STATE OF ALASKA,
) O P I N I O N
)
Respondent.
) No. 7533 - May 28, 2021
)
Petition for Hearing from the Court of Appeals of the State of
Alaska, on appeal from the District Court of the State of
Alaska, Fourth Judicial District, Bethel, Dennis
P. Cummings, Judge and Bruce Ward, Magistrate Judge.
Appearances: Kelly R. Taylor, Assistant Public Defender,
and Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for
Petitioner. Donald Soderstrom, Assistant Attorney General,
Anchorage,and JahnaLindemuth,Attorney General,Juneau,
for Respondent.
Before: Bolger, Chief Justice, Winfree, Stowers, Maassen,
and Carney, Justices.
BOLGER, Chief Justice.
STOWERS, Justice, with whom CARNEY, Justice, joins, dissenting.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this petition, a minor convicted of driving under the influence (DUI)
argues that the statute that excludes misdemeanor traffic violations from juvenile court
----------------------- Page 2-----------------------
jurisdiction violates her right to equal protection under the Alaska Constitution. She
argues that the mandatory jail sentence for first DUI offenders is unfairly different than
the dispositions for other misdemeanors in the juvenile code. And she argues that it is
unfair for felony DUI offenses to be charged in juvenile court when misdemeanor
offenses are not.
We conclude that because driving is an adult activity, the legislature could
reasonably decide to treat misdemeanor traffic violations consistently to promote public
safety while also reasonably choosing to protect juvenile offenders from the harsh
collateral consequences of a felony conviction. We therefore conclude the statute is
constitutional and affirm the judgment of the district court.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
In 2011 Elizabeth Watson - then 14 years old -was involved in an auto
accident after a night of drinking with friends. The State charged Watson in district court
1 Watson moved to dismiss the charge
with two counts of DUI, a class A misdemeanor.
for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that she should be prosecuted in juvenile court and that
charging her as an adult deprived her of equal protection under the law. The district
court denied the motion, as well as Watson's subsequent motion for reconsideration.
The case proceeded to a one-day bench trial in April 2013, and the district
court found Watson guilty of both counts of DUI. The court sentenced Watson to 28
days' imprisonment but suspended 25 days. It also imposed fines, revoked her driver's
license for 90 days, and placed her on two years' probation.
1 AS 28.35.030(a) (criminalizing the operation of a vehicle "while under the
influence of an alcoholic beverage" and while having "0.08 percent or more [BAC]"
"within four hours after the alleged operating or driving"); AS 28.35.030(b) (classifying
first-time DUI as a class A misdemeanor).
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Watson appealed her conviction, arguing that the statute requiring her to
be charged in district court rather than juvenile court violated her equal protection and
2 The court of appeals rejected her arguments and affirmed her
due process rights.
3 Watson petitioned us to consider the court of appeals' decision, which we
conviction.
granted in order to resolve whether AS 47.12.030(b) violates equal protection by
requiring a minor who is accused of a non-felony traffic offense to be charged,
prosecuted, and sentenced in the district court in the same manner as an adult.
III. DISCUSSION
The Alaska Constitution provides that "all persons are equal and entitled
to equal rights, opportunities, and protection under the law."4 We interpret the equal
protection clause "to be a 'command to state and local governments to treat those who
5 The guarantee of equal protection under the Alaska
are similarly situated alike.' "
Constitution is more robust than that under theUnited States Constitution and so "affords
greater protection to individual rights than" its federal counterpart.6 We apply our
2 Watson v. State, 400 P.3d 121, 122 (Alaska App. 2017).
3 Id. at 122-24.
4 Alaska Const. art. I, § 1.
5 Pub. Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. Gallant, 153 P.3d 346, 349 (Alaska 2007) (quoting
Gonzales v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 882 P.3d 389, 396 (Alaska 1994)).
6 Alaska Civil Liberties Union v. State, 122 P.3d 781, 787 (Alaska 2005)
(quoting Malabed v. N. Slope Borough, 70 P.3d 416, 420 (Alaska 2003)). Therefore,
when presented with an equal protection challenge, we have "[t]ypically . . . focused
exclusively on Alaska's equal protection clause" and have not considered the federal
equal protection clause. Heller v. State, Dep't of Revenue, 314 P.3d 69, 77 (Alaska
2013); see also State v. Anthony, 810 P.2d 155, 157 (Alaska 1991).
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----------------------- Page 4-----------------------
7
"independent judgment to equal protection claims."
Under our equal protection analysis, "we first decide which classes must
8 "As a matter of nomenclature we refer to that portion of a [statute] that
be compared."
9 Once we have identified the relevant
treats two groups differently as a 'classification.' "
classes, we determine whether the statute discriminates between them by treating
similarly situated classes differently.10
After weidentifytheclasses to becompared,weapply "aflexiblethree-step
sliding-scale" analysis that considers the individual interest at stake, the government
interest served by the challenged classification, and the means-ends nexus between the
classification and the government interest.11 The sliding-scale analysis "places a
progressively greater or lesser burden on the state, depending on the importance of the
individual right affected bythe disputed classification and thenatureofthegovernmental
interest at stake."12 When an important individual right is implicated, we require a close
relationship between the challenged classification and an important government interest
13
in the classification.
7 Planned Parenthood of the Great Nw. v. State, 375 P.3d 1122, 1132
(Alaska 2016).
8 Id. at 1135.
9 Id. (quoting Gallant, 153 P.3d at 349).
10 See State v. Schmidt, 323 P.3d 647, 659 (Alaska 2014).
11 Planned Parenthood, 375 P.3d at 1137.
12 Schmidt, 323 P.3d at 662 (Alaska 2014) (quoting Alaska Civil Liberties
Union v. State, 122 P.3d 781, 787 (Alaska 2005)).
13 Titus v. State, Dep't of Admin., Div. of Motor Vehicles, 305 P.3d
(continued...)
-4- 7533
----------------------- Page 5-----------------------
A. The Classifications Created By The Juvenile Jurisdiction Statutes
In several recent cases, we have emphasized that a classification is defined
14
by the terms of the statute at issue.
The statutes implicated here classify individuals
according to the offenses of which they are accused. Alaska Statute 47.12.020
establishes a general rule that all "minor[s] under 18 years of age" who have violated
criminal laws are subject to the jurisdiction of juvenile court. Alaska Statute 47.12.030
provides a number of exceptions to this general rule, including one for
"minor[s] . . . accused of violating . . . a traffic statute or regulation," who "shall be
15
charged, prosecuted, and sentenced in the district court in the same manner as an adult."
But this exception does not apply when the minor has been accused of committing a
16
felony violation.
13 (...continued)
1271,1278-79 (Alaska 2013).
14 See, e.g. , Harris v. Millennium Hotel , 330 P.3d 330, 334 (Alaska 2014)
(reading the Alaska Workers' Compensation Act and the Marriage Amendment to create
two classes: opposite-sex couples for whom death benefits are available, and same-sex
couples for whom such benefits are unavailable); Schmidt, 323 P.3d at 659 (reading the
tax exemption statute and the Marriage Amendment to create two classes: opposite-sex
couples for whom tax benefits are available, and same-sex couples for whom such tax
benefits are unavailable); Titus, 305 P.3d at 1277 (reading an auto-insurance statute to
create two classes: uninsured drivers who may face license suspension, and uninsured
drivers who do not face license suspension); cf. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 122 P.3d
at 788 ("When a 'law by its own terms classifies persons for different treatment,' this is
known as a facial classification." (emphasis in original) (quoting J OHN E. N OWAK &
ONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.4, at 711 (7th ed. 2004))).
R
15
AS 47.12.030(b)(1).
16 AS 47.12.030(b) ("When a minor is accused of violating a statute specified
in this subsection, other than a statute the violation of which is a felony , . . . the minor
accused of the offense shall be charged, prosecuted, and sentenced in the district court
(continued...)
-5- 7533
----------------------- Page 6-----------------------
Taken together, these statutes create two classes: minors charged with
felony traffic offenses, who are charged as juveniles, and those charged with non-felony
traffic offenses, who are charged as adults. We therefore consider these two groups of
minors as the relevant classes for our equal protection analysis.
Watson argues that such a classification is too broad. Watson suggests that
we focus only on minors accused of non-felony DUI, and compare them either to minors
accused of most other offenses or minors accused of felony DUI. But this classification
would be too narrow. As the United States Supreme Court has explained, "the validity
of a broad legislative classification is not properly judged by focusing solely on the
17
portion of the disfavored class that is affected most harshly by its terms."
The same reasoning applies to our own equal protection clause. Here, the
law classifies all minors according to the severity and nature of their crime. We should
not evaluate the constitutionality of a statute impacting all juvenile traffic offenders by
considering only the treatment of those charged with a DUI. We therefore consider the
two statutorily defined classes of minors charged with non-felony traffic offenses and
minors charged with felony traffic offenses.
B. The Three-Step Equal Protection Analysis
We must next determine whether the rationales for AS 47.12.020 and
AS 47.12.030(b)(1) justify different treatment of minors charged with non-felony traffic
offenses and those charged with felony traffic offenses.18 As noted above, this analysis
16 (...continued)
in the same manner as an adult." (emphasis added)).
17 Schweiker v. Hogan, 457 U.S. 569, 589 (1982).
18
See Planned Parenthood of the Great Nw. v. State, 375 P.3d 1122, 1136
(Alaska 2016).
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----------------------- Page 7-----------------------
consists of a three-step process. We first consider the private interest affected by the
classification; we next consider the State's interest in the classification; finally, we
determine whether the relationship between the State's interest and the classification is
19 Throughout, we use a sliding scale
close enough to justify the challenged legislation.
to determine the appropriate level of review; "[d]epending upon the primacy of the
interest involved, the state will have a greater or lesser burden in justifying its
legislation."20
1. All offenders have a special interest in rehabilitation.
The first step of our equal protection analysis requires us to consider the
personal right or interest impacted by the State's classification. At statehood, Article I,
section12 oftheAlaskaConstitution provided that "[p]enaladministrationshall bebased
21 Based on
on the principle of reformation and upon the need for protecting the public."
this provision, we have recognized that both juvenile22 23
and adult offenders have a
19 Id . at 1137.
20 Id. (quoting Alaska Pac. Assurance Co. v. Brown , 687 P.2d 264, 269-70
(Alaska 1984)).
21 Section 12 was amended in 1994 to provide that criminal administration
shall be based upon "the need for protecting the public, community condemnation of the
offender, the rights of victims of crimes, restitution from the offender, and the principle
of reformation." Alaska Const. art. I, § 12.
22 State v. Sandsness, 72 P.3d 299, 307 (Alaska 2003) ("Society's
commitment to the goal of rehabilitating juveniles by reintegrating them with their
families and the public reflects an implicit belief that early reintegration is more likely
to maximize public safety in the long-term than prolonged isolation of juveniles from
their families and the broader community of law-abiding citizens.").
23 Abraham v. State , 585 P.2d 526, 531 (Alaska 1978); State v. Chaney, 477
P.2d 441, 444, 447 (Alaska 1970) (disapproving of a sentence, in part for failing to
(continued...)
-7- 7533
----------------------- Page 8-----------------------
special interest in rehabilitative treatment. Consequently, both the juvenile disposition
24 25
statute
and the adult sentencing statute require consideration of the offender's
rehabilitation as an important sentencing goal.
The dissenting opinion relies on the "uniquely rehabilitative focus" of the
juvenile system without addressing the details of the current juvenile statutes or the
numerous rehabilitative requirements of the DUI statute. A DUI conviction may include
the following consequences to discourage alcohol abuse and encourage good driving:
26 court access to prior
an ignition interlock device preventing drinking before driving,
treatment records,27 alcohol screening and treatment as required by an alcohol safety
action program,28 a term of inpatient treatment specified in the judgment,29 and
imprisonment at a community residential center or by electronic monitoring at a private
30 A defendant like Watson who completes an inpatient treatment program
residence.
23 (...continued)
encourage the "rehabilitation of the offender into a noncriminal member of society").
24 AS 47.12.140(1)(G) (requiring consideration of "the interest of the public
in securing the minor's rehabilitation").
25 AS 12.55.005(2) (requiring consideration of "the prior criminal history of
the defendant and the likelihood of rehabilitation").
26 AS 28.35.030(g).
27 AS 28.35.030(d).
28 AS 28.35.030(h).
29 AS 28.35.030(i).
30 AS 28.35.030(k).
-8- 7533
----------------------- Page 9-----------------------
31
may receive credit against her jail sentence for the time spent in treatment. A juvenile
disposition could also order some of these conditions, but there is no indication that a
juvenile offender would have greater access to rehabilitative treatment.
2. There are special problems involved with evaluating the
relationship between rehabilitation and the other important
sentencing goals.
There is a conflict between our recognition of rehabilitation as a special
individual interest and our past scrutiny of sentencing statutes. Ordinarily, the degree
of fit between the statute's means and end depends on the importance of the individual
32
interest at stake.
If the individual interest is relatively insignificant, there need only be
33
"a substantial relationship" between the classification and a legitimate state interest.
If the individual interest is important, there must be a "close relationship" between the
34
classification and an important State interest.
Ontheother hand,wehavehistoricallyrecognizedthat our equal protection
review of legislative sentencing decisions should be fairly deferential. "It is elementary
that the power to define crimes and fix punishments rests in the legislature. In the
31 AS 12.55.027.
32 State v. Schmidt , 323 P.3d 647, 662 (Alaska 2014) (citing Alaska Civil
Liberties Union v. State , 122 P.3d 781, 787 (Alaska 2005)).
33 Planned Parenthood of the Great Nw. v. State, 375 P.3d 1122, 1137
(Alaska 2016).
34 Titusv. State, Dep't of Admin., Div. of Motor Vehicles, 305 P.3d 1271, 1278
(Alaska 2013).
-9- 7533
----------------------- Page 10-----------------------
performance of that function, that body is to use the discretion lodged in it, and not be
confined by narrow or unduly restrictive limits." 35
This approach is consistent with the debate over Article I, section 12, in
which the founders indicated that a sentencing provision need not satisfy both of the
occasionally conflicting goals of criminal administration, thus leaving greater legislative
discretion for sentencing decisions.36 The language of this section was specifically
revised to make it clear that "a sentence which addressed either reformation or
community protection would be constitutionally valid."37
Since that time, the Alaska Constitution has been amended to explicitly
allow consideration of multiple sentencing goals. The pertinent language now provides:
"Criminal administration shall be based upon the following: the need for protecting the
public, community condemnation of the offender, the rights of victims of crimes,
restitution from the offender, and the principle of reformation."38
But the courts continue to followtheinterpretiveprinciple that the founders
embraced longago. "Thelegislaturemay reasonably emphasizecertaingoals over others
when determining the individual components of a criminal sentence."39 We have
35 Alex v. State , 484 P.2d 677, 684 (Alaska 1971).
36 Koteles v. State, 660 P.2d 1199, 1202 (Alaska App. 1983) (Singleton, J.,
concurring).
37 Id . (citing 2 Proceedings of the Alaska Constitutional Convention 1308-
1309 (Jan. 5, 1956)).
38 Alaska Const. art I, § 12.
39 Forster v. State, 236 P.3d 1157, 1174 (Alaska App. 2010).
-10- 7533
----------------------- Page 11-----------------------
therefore recognized that it is sufficient if each component of a criminal sentence "be
40
reasonably related to at least one of these constitutional principles."
As noted above, the conflict between these principles affects our scrutiny
of the statutes that define juvenile jurisdiction. However, we need not resolve that
conflict here because we conclude that the classification the statutes create is closely
related to important State interests.
3. The challenged classification is closely related to important
government interests.
Our equal protection analysis next requires us to consider the State's
interest in the classification and the means-end nexus between that classification and the
41
government interest. Here, the challenged classification serves two important
government interests: protecting the public and rehabilitating juvenile offenders. We
conclude that the classification created by AS 47.12.030(b) is closely related to both
goals and therefore does not violate the equal protection clause.
a. The uniform treatment of driving offenses is closely
related to the State's important interest in protecting the
public.
42
Driving is a dangerous and highly regulated adult activity, and the State
43
has an interest in holding traffic violators uniformly accountable for bad driving. A
40 State v. Ranstead , 421 P.3d 15, 20 (Alaska 2018).
41 See Planned Parenthood of the Great Nw. v. State , 375 P.3d 1122, 1137
(Alaska 2016).
42 SeeArdingerv.Hummell, 982 P.2d727, 731(Alaska1999) ("Children who
physically control vehicles must, for public safety reasons, be held to an adult standard
of care.").
43 Cf. Titus v. State, Dep't of Admin., Div. of Motor Vehicles, 305 P.3d 1271,
(continued...)
-11- 7533
----------------------- Page 12-----------------------
uniform penalty system promotes the State's interests in public safety and in general
44
deterrence, interestsrecognized in our constitution and statutes.
This includes deterring
all drivers fromengaging in unsafe driving behaviors such as drinking and driving. Such
behaviors inherently threaten public safety, especially when combined with minors'
relative lack of driving experience.
To further these goals, the legislature has enacted a uniform system of
graduated license penalties for driving offenses. Drivers convicted of DUI have their
licenses revoked for 90 days for a first offense, one year for a second offense, three years
45 Drivers convicted of
for a third offense, and five years for a subsequent offense.
reckless driving have their licenses revoked for a minimum of 30 days for a first offense,
one year for a second offense, and three years for a subsequent offense.46 The heavier
revocation consequences for DUI convictions are justified because DUI is amoreserious
offense, and thus the State's interest in deterring such unsafe behavior is greater.
The dissenting opinion concludes that juvenile DUI offenses should be
excluded from the adult system. This approach would completely upset the system of
43 (...continued)
1278 (Alaska 2013) (noting the State's interest in deterring uninsured driving).
44 State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441, 444 (Alaska 1970) (noting that the Alaska
Constitution includes the goal of "deterrence of other members of the community who
might possess tendencies toward criminal conduct similar to that of the offender");
AS 12.55.005(5) (requiring sentencing judges to consider "the effect of the sentence to
be imposed in deterring the defendant or other members of society from future criminal
conduct").
45 AS 28.15.181(c)(1)-(4).
46 AS 28.15.181(b)(1)-(2).
-12- 7533
----------------------- Page 13-----------------------
graduated penalties. A juvenile adjudication is not considered a criminal conviction, 47
48
and an adjudication does not impose any of the civil disabilities of a conviction. So if
juvenile DUI offenses were excluded, a juvenile convicted of the lesser offense of
reckless driving would still receive a mandatory minimum license revocation of up to
three years. But regardless of his or her prior record, a juvenile adjudicated for DUI
would not receive any mandatory license revocation at all. This would create a
sentencing scheme where the "gravity of the sanctions" did not "roughly follow the
49
gravity of the circumstances."
In addition, the traffic statutes require the department of public safety to
establish a uniform demerit point system "[f]or the purpose of identifying habitually
reckless or negligent drivers and habitual or frequent violators of traffic laws."50 If a
driver accumulates 12 points in one year or 18 points over two years, then the driver's
license must be suspended or revoked.51 Under this system, convictions for DUI or
52 Negligent driving, another
reckless driving each carry a value of 10 demerit points.
53 54 Speeding can carry
carries a value of 6 points.
lesser included offense of DUI,
47 AS 47.12.180(a)(3).
48 AS 47.12.180(a)(1).
49 Titus v. State, Dep't of Admin., Div. of Motor Vehicles, 305 P.3d 1271, 1279
(Alaska 2013).
50 AS 28.15.221(a).
51 AS 28.15.221(b).
52 2 Alaska Administrative Code (AAC) 90.310(a)(3), (6) (2021).
53 Comeau v. State, 758 P.2d 108, 117 (Alaska App. 1988).
54 2 AAC 90.310(a)(12).
-13- 7533
----------------------- Page 14-----------------------
55
between 2 and 6 points depending on the circumstances. This system is obviously
graduated in severity to support the State's interest in deterring bad driving. But if we
followed the dissenting opinion, a juvenile convicted of traffic infractions like negligent
driving or speeding would still accumulate demeritpointsthat could leadto asuspension;
a juvenile adjudicated for misdemeanor DUI offenses would not accumulate any points
at all.
We thus conclude that the inclusion of juvenile DUI offenses in the same
systemas other driving offenses closely promotes the State's interest in a uniformsystem
of penalties to deter bad driving and protect the public.
b. The exclusion of felony traffic offenses from the adult
system is closely related to the important goal of
rehabilitation.
The State also has an interest in promoting the rehabilitation of juvenile
56
offenders.
We have noted before that minors "do[] not have mature judgment and may
57
not fully realize the consequences of [their] acts." The State "has a substantial interest
58
in [the] welfare" of minors, and through rehabilitation minors may be given "the skills
55 2 AAC 90.310(a)(19).
56
See AS47.12.010; seealso Statev.Sandsness,72 P.3d299,302-04 (Alaska
2003) (noting the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile justice system and the benefits of
rehabilitation); State v. Ladd, 951 P.2d 1220, 1225 (Alaska App. 1998) ("There is a
public interest in 'rehabilitating wayward youths' who are in fact 'rehabilitatable in their
youth.' " (quoting W.M.F. v. State, 723 P.2d 1298, 1300 (Alaska App. 1986))).
57 Henson v. State, 576 P.2d 1352, 1354 (Alaska 1978) (quoting P.H. v. State,
504 P.2d 837, 841 (Alaska 1972), superseded by statute, Ch. 63, §§ 13, 15, SLA 1977,
as recognized by In re F.S., 586 P.2d 607, 610 (Alaska 1978)).
58 Wilsonoff v. Wilsonoff, 514 P.2d 1264, 1267 (Alaska 1973); cf. Pub. Def.
Agency v. Superior Court , 534 P.2d 947, 949 (Alaska 1975) ("Traditionally, the states
(continued...)
-14- 7533
----------------------- Page 15-----------------------
59
needed to live responsibly and productively." The legislature could reasonably
conclude that the consequences of a felony conviction would too severely impair its
interest in rehabilitating a juvenile convicted of a regulatory offense. 60
The tension between the important individual interest in rehabilitation and
the legislative discretion to choose among multiple sentencing goals affects our scrutiny
of the statutes that define juvenile jurisdiction. Alaska Statute 47.12.030(b) promotes a
uniformpolicydesigned to discouragedangerous driving by generallytreating all drivers
as adults. Strict adherence to this policy, however, would expose minors convicted of
felony driving offenses to the harsh consequences of an adult felony conviction. As the
court of appeals rightfully noted in this case, "[f]elony offenders are subject to
significantly increased amounts of imprisonment, as well as various lifetime legal
disabilities."61
The dissenting opinion treats the collateral consequences of a felony
conviction the same as a misdemeanor conviction. This allows the opinion to say that
the State's interest in rehabilitation is not closely related to the statutory exclusion of
regulatory felonies from the adult system. But the legal consequences of an adult felony
conviction go far beyond the stigma of wrongdoing. For example, a person convicted
58 (...continued)
have been legitimately concerned with the area of family law, and, under the doctrine of
parens patriae, in particular, in the promotion of the welfare of children dwelling within
their boundaries." (footnote omitted)).
59 AS 47.12.010(a).
60 Watson v. State, 400 P.3d 121, 123 (Alaska App. 2017) ("The legislature
could validly decide that minors should not face [the consequences of a felony
conviction] for their actions, even when the felony arises from the act of driving.").
61 Id . (citing AS 12.55.125).
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----------------------- Page 16-----------------------
62
of a felony may be barred from possessing a firearm or ammunition, may be
63 64
disqualified from voting,
may be disqualified from serving as a juror, and may be
65 A school district may deny admission to a
ineligible for a permanent fund dividend.
66 A felony conviction is also grounds for
child who has been convicted of a felony.
license denial or other sanctions for many professions.67 Thus, the legislature could have
reasonably concluded that the legal consequences of a felony conviction are too severe
for a minor convicted of a driving offense, but that the penalties for a misdemeanor
conviction are appropriate.
Watson's argument seems to assume that the three-day minimum jail
sentence for a DUI offender charged in district court makes this system harsher than the
juvenile system. But the maximum consequences of a juvenile adjudication are at least
twice as serious as those of a misdemeanor DUI conviction. The maximum sentence for
a first misdemeanor conviction is one year;68 however, a juvenile offender may be
ordered to an indeterminate detention of up to two years, and this sanction may be
62 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) (2018).
63 AS 15.05.030(a).
64 AS 09.20.020(2); AS 33.30.241(b).
65 AS 43.23.005(d).
66 AS 14.30.045(5).
67 See, e.g., AS 08.20.170(a)(4)(A) (chiropractors); AS 08.29.400(a)(2)
(licensed professional counselors); AS 08.36.315(5) (dentists); AS 08.38.040(4)
(dietitians); AS 08.54.605(a)(1)(B) (big game guides); AS 08.65.110(4) (midwives);
AS 08.45.060(4) (naturopaths); AS 44.50.020(5) (notaries public); AS 08.84.120(a)(3)
(physical therapists); 13 AAC 62.020(a)(6) (2019) (prison guards); AS 08.88.171(a)
(real estate brokers).
68 AS 28.35.030(b); AS 12.55.135(a).
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----------------------- Page 17-----------------------
69
extended until the juvenile reaches age 20. At the very least, the legislature could have
reasonably concluded that these longer potential periods of detention or supervision in
the juvenile system were sufficient to support a distinction between a felony DUI
disposition in the juvenile system and the more limited consequences of a misdemeanor
DUI conviction in the adult system.
Because of the severe consequences ofan adult felony conviction, the State
has chosen to temper its policy of deterrence by allowing minors charged with traffic
felonies the opportunity to have their cases tried in juvenile court. Classifying offenders
according to whether they are charged with a felony or misdemeanor violation is thus
closely related to the state's competing interests of deterrence and rehabilitation.
IV. CONCLUSION
The legislative classifications here are closely related to the State's
important interests. We therefore conclude that AS 47.12.030(b)(1) does not violate the
equal protection clause. The district court's judgment is AFFIRMED.
69 AS 47.12.120(b)(1). At least two juvenile offenders have unsuccessfully
argued that longer periods of detention and supervision in the juvenile system than those
imposed for adult misdemeanor penalties violates equal protection. See A.K. v. State ,
No. A-7824, 2001 WL 864193 at *2 (Alaska App. Aug. 1, 2001); M.O.W. v. State , 645
P.2d 1229, 1231 n.4 (Alaska App. 1982).
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----------------------- Page 18-----------------------
STOWERS, Justice, with whom CARNEY, Justice, joins, dissenting.
I dissent from the court's opinion in this case. The following analysis
explains my reasoning and is the opinion that the court should have issued. I urge the
legislature to carefully study my analysis and fix the injustice the court's opinion
perpetuates.
I. INTRODUCTION
A minor convicted of driving under the influence (DUI) argues that the
statute excludingmisdemeanor trafficviolations fromjuvenile court jurisdiction violates
her right to equal protection under the Alaska Constitution. She argues that the
mandatory jail sentence for first-time DUI offenders is unfairly different from the
dispositions for other misdemeanors in the juvenile code. And she argues that it is unfair
for felony DUI offenses to be charged in juvenile court when misdemeanor DUI offenses
are not.
I conclude that the juvenile court exclusion statute facially discriminates
between minors accused of felony DUI, who are tried in juvenile court, and minors
accused of misdemeanor DUI, who are tried in district court as adults. Juveniles have
an important interest in accessing the rehabilitative opportunities of the juvenile justice
system and in avoiding the collateral consequences of being charged and sentenced as
adults. The State also has an important interest in deterring unsafe driving and in
promoting the rehabilitation of juvenile offenders. But there is not a close relationship
between the State's interests andtheclassification createdbythe juvenile court exclusion
statute. I therefore would hold that the statute violates the minor's equal protection
rights, reverse the court of appeals' decision affirming the district court's judgment, and
remand for further proceedings.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
In 2011 Elizabeth Watson - then 14 years old - was involved in an auto
-18- 7533
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accident after a night of drinking with friends. The State charged Watson in district court
1
with two DUI counts, both class A misdemeanors.
Watson moved to dismiss the
charges for lack of jurisdiction; she argued that she should have been prosecuted in
juvenile court and that charging her as an adult deprived her of equal protection of the
law. The district court denied the motion, as well as Watson's subsequent motion for
reconsideration.
The case proceeded to a one-day bench trial in April 2013, and the district
court found Watson guilty of both DUI counts. The court consolidated the two charges
for sentencing purposes; the two counts became one, leading to a single conviction. The
court sentenced Watson to 28 days' imprisonment, but it suspended 25 days and stayed
execution of the sentence pending appeal. It also imposed fines, revoked her driver's
license for 90 days, and placed her on two years' probation.
Watson appealed her conviction, arguing that the statute requiring her to
be charged in district court rather than juvenile court violated her equal protection and
2 The court of appeals rejected her arguments and affirmed her
due process rights.
conviction.3 Watson petitioned for hearing of the court of appeals' decision, which we
granted to resolvewhether AS47.12.030(b), thejuvenilecourt exclusion statute, violates
equal protection by requiring a minor accused of a non-felony traffic offense to be
charged, prosecuted, and sentenced in the district court in the same manner as an adult.
1 See AS28.35.030(a)(1)-(2) (criminalizing bothoperation ofvehicle"while
under the influence of an alcoholic beverage" and operation of vehicle if person has
"0.08 percent or more" blood alcohol content "as determined by a chemical test taken
within four hours after the alleged operating or driving"); AS 28.35.030(b) (classifying
first-time DUI as a class A misdemeanor).
2 Watson v. State, 400 P.3d 121, 122 (Alaska App. 2017).
3 Id. at 123-24.
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----------------------- Page 20-----------------------
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
4
"We apply our independent judgment to equal protection claims." In
exercising our de novo review, we will adopt "the rule of law most persuasive in light
5
of precedent, reason, and policy."
IV. DISCUSSION
The Alaska Constitution "mandates 'equal treatment of those similarly
situated.' "6 It provides that "all persons are equal and entitled to equal rights,
opportunities, and protection under the law."7 We interpret the equal protection clause
"to be a 'command to state and local governments to treat those who are similarly
situated alike.' "8 The Alaska Constitution's equal protection guarantee is more robust
thanthat oftheUnited States Constitution and so "affords greater protectionto individual
rights" than its federal counterpart.9
4 Planned Parenthood of the Great Nw. v. State, 375 P.3d 1122, 1132
(Alaska 2016).
5 Id. (quoting State v. Schmidt, 323 P.3d 647, 655 (Alaska 2014)).
6 Alaska Civil Liberties Union v. State , 122 P.3d 781, 787 (Alaska 2005)
(quoting State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs. v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska, Inc., 28
P.3d 904, 909 (Alaska 2001)).
7 Alaska Const. art. I, §1.
8 Pub. Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. Gallant, 153 P.3d 346, 349 (Alaska 2007) (quoting
Gonzales v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 882 P.3d 389, 396 (Alaska 1994)).
9 Alaska Civil Liberties Union , 122 P.3d at 787 (quoting Malabed v. N. Slope
Borough, 70 P.3d 416, 420 (Alaska 2003)). When presented with an equal protection
challenge, we therefore have "[t]ypically . . . focused exclusively on Alaska's equal
protection clause" and have not considered the federal equal protection clause. Heller
v. State, Dep't of Revenue, 314 P.3d 69, 77 (Alaska 2013); see also State v. Anthony, 810
P.2d 155, 157 (Alaska 1991).
-20- 7533
----------------------- Page 21-----------------------
Under our equal protection analysis, "we first decide which classes must
10
be compared."
"As a matter of nomenclature we refer to that portion of a [statute] that
11 Once we have identified the
treats two groups differently as a 'classification.' "
12
relevant classes, we determine whether the statute discriminates between them.
Differential treatment poses an equalprotection problemonly ifsimilarly situated classes
are treated differently.13
Our core equal protection analysis consists of determining whether
individuals in the two classes are similarly situated.14 We apply "a flexible three-step
sliding scale" that considers the individual interest at stake, the government interest
served by the challenged classification, and the means-ends nexus between the
classification and the government interest.15 The sliding-scale analysis "places a
progressively greater or lesser burden on the [S]tate, depending on the importance of the
10 Planned Parenthood of the Great Nw., 375 P.3d at 1135.
11 Id. (quoting Gallant, 153 P.3d at 349).
12 See State v. Schmidt, 323 P.3d 647, 659 (Alaska 2014).
13 See State, Dep't of Nat. Res. v. Alaska Riverways, Inc., 232 P.3d 1203, 1220
(Alaska 2010) (holding that commercial user of public waterway "failed to establish a
violation of its equal protection rights" because among other things it had not shown that
the State treated it differently than other users).
14 See Planned Parenthood of the Great Nw., 375 P.3d at 1135 ("When equal
protection claims are raised, the question is whether two groups of people who are
treated differently are similarly situated and therefore are entitled to equal treatment
under the constitution." (quoting Gallant, 153 P.3d at 349)).
15 Id . at 1137.
-21- 7533
----------------------- Page 22-----------------------
individual right affected bythedisputed classification and the nature ofthegovernmental
interest at stake." 16
A. The Statute Creates Two Classes: Minors Charged With Felony DUI
And Minors Charged With Misdemeanor DUI.
The State argues that the law treats "every driver in Alaska . . . equally" by
requiring the adjudication of all non-felony traffic offenses in adult court, and that
without disparate treatment of classes, there is no equal protection issue. This argument
17
ignores the law's differing treatment of minors.
We have emphasized that a classification is defined by the statutory terms
18
at issue. Watson challenges AS 47.12.030(b), which provides:
When a minor is accused of violating a statute
specified in this subsection, other than a statute the violation
of which is a felony, this chapter and the Alaska Delinquency
Rules do not apply and the minor accused of the offense shall
be charged, prosecuted, and sentenced in the district court in
16 Schmidt, 323 P.3d at 662 (quoting Alaska Civil Liberties Union v. State ,
122 P.3d 781, 787 (Alaska 2005)).
17 Cf. Titus v. State, Dep't of Admin., Div. of Motor Vehicles, 305 P.3d 1271,
1277 (Alaska 2013) ("DMV argues there is no equal protection issue because the
proof-of-insurance statutes treat similarly situated persons alike by requiring all drivers
to carry insurance. But DMV's perspective is too broad. Here, similarly situated
uninsured motorists are treated differently. Alaska Statute 28.22.021 bases the
proof-of-insurance requirement, and ultimately suspension, on the results of a motor
vehicle accident . . . . In requiring proof of insurance and suspension for some, but not
all, uninsured motorists, the statutes treat similarly situated persons differently."
(emphasis in original)).
18 See id.; Harris v. MilleniumHotel, 330 P.3d 330, 334 &n.18 (Alaska 2014)
(looking to statute's terms and definitions to conclude "the workers' compensation
statute creates a classification between married and unmarried couples"); Schmidt, 323
P.3d at 659 ("The words of the tax exemption statute and regulations create a
classification between married couples and unmarried couples.").
-22- 7533
----------------------- Page 23-----------------------
the same manner as an adult; . . . the provisions of this
subsection apply when a minor is accused of violating
(1) a traffic statute or regulation, or a traffic ordinance
or regulation of a municipality; . . . .
On its face, AS 47.12.030(b) distinguishes between minors charged with a non-felony
traffic offense and minors charged with a felony traffic offense. 19
In addition to considering the statutory terms at issue, we also consider a
statute in relation to other laws that offer additional context and meaning.20 The
classification created by AS47.12.030(b) is further refined byits relationship to Alaska's
traffic statutes. Watson contends that the relationship between AS 47.12.030(b) and
AS 28.35.030, the DUI statute, results in differential treatment of similar classes.
Misdemeanor DUI, of which Watson was convicted in district court, carries a mandatory
minimum sentence of three days' imprisonment for a first offense and twenty days'
imprisonment for a second offense.21 In contrast, if Watson had not been a first-time
offender, but instead had previously been convicted of DUI two or more times, then she
19 See Alaska Civil Liberties Union , 122 P.3d at 788 ("When a 'law by its own
terms classifies persons for different treatment,' this is known as a facial classification."
(emphasis in original) (quoting JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
ONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.4, at 711 (7th ed. 2004))).
C
20 See Harris , 330 P.3d at 334-35 (reading Alaska Worker's Compensation
Act and Marriage Amendment together to create two classes: opposite-sex couples for
whom death benefits are available and same-sex couples for whom such benefits are
unavailable); Schmidt, 323 P.3d at 659-60 (reading tax exemption statute and related
regulation together with Marriage Amendment and concluding two classes are created:
opposite-sex couples for whom tax benefits are available and same-sex couples for
whom such tax benefits are unavailable).
21 AS 28.35.030(b)(1)(A)-(B); AS 28.35.030(b)(2) (prohibiting court from
suspending imposition of sentence and also from suspending execution of sentence
except on condition that offender serve the minimum term of imprisonment).
-23- 7533
----------------------- Page 24-----------------------
22
would have been guilty of felony DUI and subject to juvenile court jurisdiction. Alaska
Statutes 47.12.030(b) and 28.35.030 therefore create a structure where a minor who is
a repeat DUI offender is treated as a juvenile whereas a minor with no (or only one) prior
DUI is treated as an adult and is subject to a minimum sentence of imprisonment. Read
together, AS 47.12.030(b) and AS 28.35.030 thus create two classes: minors accused
of felony DUI, who are tried in juvenile court; and minors accused of misdemeanor DUI,
who are tried in district court as adults. I therefore consider these two groups of minors
as the relevant classes for our equal protection analysis.
B. The Statutes When Read Together Are Facially Discriminatory.
The next step in our equal protection analysis is determining whether the
statute has a discriminatory purpose. A claimant "must show either that [a] facially
neutral [statute] has a discriminatory purpose or that the [statute] is facially
23
discriminatory."
A statute is facially discriminatory when, "by its own terms," it
24 Asestablished above,AS47.12.030(b) and
"classifies persons for differenttreatment."
AS 28.35.030 treat two similar classes of minors differently; the statutes are therefore
facially discriminatory. "[W]hen a law is discriminatory on its face, 'the question of
discriminatory intent is subsumed by the determination that the classification established
by the terms of the challenged law or policy is, itself, discriminatory.' "25
22 See AS 28.35.030(n); AS 47.12.030(b).
23 Schmidt, 323 P.3d at 659 (footnote omitted).
24 Id. (quoting Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 122 P.3d at 788).
25 Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 122 P.3d at 788 (quoting Hamlyn v. Rock
Island Cty., Metro. Mass Transit Dist., 986 F. Supp. 1126, 1133 (C.D. Ill. 1997))
(concluding that programs granting benefits to spouses only in heterosexual relationships
are facially discriminatory).
-24- 7533
----------------------- Page 25-----------------------
C. Core Equal Protection Analysis
Having determined that the statutes are facially discriminatory, I proceed
to the core of our equal protection analysis: determining whether the rationales for
AS 47.12.030(b) and AS 28.35.030 justify differential treatment of minors charged with
26
misdemeanor DUI and felony DUI.
As noted above, this analysis consists of a
three-step process. We first consider the private interest affected by the classification;
we next consider the State's interest in the classification; and we finally determine
whether the relationship between the State's interest and the classification is close
27
enough to justify the challenged legislation. Throughout, we use a sliding scale to
determine the appropriate level of review; "[d]epending upon the primacy of the interest
28
involved, the [S]tate will have a greater or lesser burden in justifying its legislation."
1. Juvenile offenders have an important interest in the
rehabilitative focus of the juvenile justice system.
The first step of our core equal protection analysis requires us to consider
the personal right or interest impacted by the State's classification. The Alaska
Constitution establishes that reformation is one of the main principles on which criminal
29
administration is based, and thus all criminal offenders have an interest in
rehabilitation. Alaska Statute 12.55.005 furthers this principle by requiring sentencing
26 See Planned Parenthood of the Great Nw. v. State , 375 P.3d 1122, 1136
(Alaska 2016).
27 Id . at 1137.
28 Id. (quoting Alaska Pac. Assurance Co. v. Brown , 687 P.2d 264, 269-70
(Alaska 1984)).
29 Alaska Const. art. I, § 12.
-25- 7533
----------------------- Page 26-----------------------
30
judges in adult court to consider the "likelihood of [a defendant's] rehabilitation." And
we have long recognized the significance of rehabilitation for both the public and for the
offender.31
32
This interest in rehabilitation is especially acute for minors, like Watson.
Given their developing maturity, minors are particularly amenable to reform, and the
State has taken care to see that minors' sentences are not merely punitive. Indeed, the
State has created a juvenile justice system where "rehabilitation rather than punishment
is the express purpose of juvenile jurisdiction."33 Alaska Statute 47.12.010 exemplifies
this dedication to reform, stating that the purposes of the delinquent minors chapter are
to "respond to a juvenile offender's needs in a manner that is consistent
with . . . prevention of repeated criminal behavior . . . [and] development of the juvenile
into a productive citizen," and also to "provide an early, individualized assessment and
action plan for each juvenile offender in order to prevent further criminal behavior."
30 AS 12.55.005(2).
31
See Abraham v. State, 585 P.2d 526, 531 (Alaska 1978) ("[S]ociety will
benefit from [the reformation of an offender], but so will the offender . . . ."); Roman v.
State, 570 P.2d 1235, 1240 (Alaska 1977) ("[P]arole conditions must be reasonably
related to the rehabilitation of the offender and the protection of the public and must not
be unduly restrictive of liberty."); State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441, 444, 447 (Alaska 1970)
(disapproving of sentence in part for failing to encourage "rehabilitation of the offender
into a noncriminal member of society").
32 See State v. Sandsness, 72 P.3d 299, 307 (Alaska 2003) ("Society's
commitment to the goal of rehabilitating juveniles by reintegrating them with their
families and the public reflects an implicit belief that early reintegration is more likely
to maximize public safety in the long-term than prolonged isolation of juveniles from
their families and the broader community of law-abiding citizens.").
33 Id. at 302-03 (quoting Rust v. State, 582 P.2d 134, 140 n.21 (Alaska 1978)).
-26- 7533
----------------------- Page 27-----------------------
Minors thus have an important interest in rehabilitation, an interest that is vindicated by
accessing the juvenile justice system and its uniquely rehabilitative focus.
We have similarly noted that "the principal precept behind the [juvenile]
court concept" is that minors lack "mature judgment and may not fully realize the
consequences of [their] acts [and therefore] should not generally have to bear the stigma
34 Juveniles therefore also have an
of a criminal conviction for the rest of [their lives]."
important interest in avoiding the collateral consequences associated with a criminal
conviction that may impact future education and employment prospects.35 By denying
some minors access to the juvenile justice system, AS 47.12.030(b) burdens those
important interests; it therefore demands close scrutiny.36
2. The State has important interests in deterring unsafe driving
and rehabilitating minors.
When the law burdens an important interest, as in this case, it "must bear
a close relationship to an important state interest."37
The State has two important
interests that apply to the differential treatment of juvenile DUI offenders. Driving is a
34 P.H. v. State , 504 P.2d 837, 841 (Alaska 1972), superseded by statute ,
ch. 63, §§ 13, 15, SLA 1977, as recognized in In re F.S. , 586 P.2d 607, 610 (Alaska
1978).
35 See Journey v. State, 895 P.2d 955, 959 (Alaska 1995) ("The pernicious
effects of criminal records are well documented. . . . [A] person with a criminal record
is often burdened by social stigma, subjected to additional investigation, prejudiced in
future criminal proceedings, and discriminated against by prospective employers.").
36 See Malabed v. N. Slope Borough, 70 P.3d 416, 421 (Alaska 2003)
(explaining that "impairment" of important interest "requires us to give close scrutiny"
to challenged state action).
37 Titus v. State, Dep't of Admin., Div. of MotorVehicles, 305P.3d 1271, 1278
(Alaska 2013); see also Malabed, 70 P.3d at 421 (noting that state interest must be both
legitimate and important).
-27- 7533
----------------------- Page 28-----------------------
38
highly regulated adult activity, and the State argues that it has an interest in holding
traffic violators uniformly accountable for bad driving. 39
The State also has a general
deterrence interest that includes deterring juvenile drivers from engaging in unsafe
40 Such behavior inherently
driving behaviors such as driving while under the influence.
threatens public safety, especially when combined with minors' relative lack of driving
experience.41
The State also acknowledges that it has an interest in promoting the
rehabilitation of juvenile offenders.42 It is well-established that the State "has a
38 See Ardinger v. Hummell, 982 P.2d 727, 731 (Alaska 1999) ("Children who
physically control vehicles must, for public safety reasons, be held to an adult standard
of care.").
39 Cf. Titus, 305 P.3d at 1278 (noting State's interest in deterring uninsured
driving).
40 See AS 12.55.005(5) (requiring sentencing judges to consider "the effect
of the sentence to be imposed in deterring the defendant or other members of society
from future criminal conduct"); Alvarez v. State, Dep't of Admin., Div. of Motor
Vehicles, 249 P.3d 286, 299 (Alaska 2011) ("The act of driving while intoxicated is an
act of unfit driving, dangerous to the public."); State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441, 444
(Alaska 1970) (noting that Alaska's Constitution includes the goal of "deterrence of
other members of the community who might possess tendencies toward criminal conduct
similar to that of the offender").
41 Cf. Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990) ("No one
can seriously dispute the magnitude of the drunken driving problem or the States'
interest in eradicating it.").
42 See AS 47.12.010; State v. Sandsness, 72 P.3d 299, 302-04 (Alaska 2003)
(noting rehabilitative goals ofjuvenile justice system and benefits of rehabilitation); State
v. Ladd, 951 P.2d 1220, 1225 (Alaska App. 1998) ("There is a public interest in
'rehabilitating wayward youths' who are in fact 'rehabilitatable in their youth.' "
(quoting W.M.F. v. State, 723 P.2d 1298, 1300 (Alaska App. 1986))).
-28- 7533
----------------------- Page 29-----------------------
43
substantial interest in [the] welfare" of minors, and as discussed, minors "do[] not have
44
mature judgment and may not fully realize the consequences of [their] acts."
It is
through rehabilitation that juvenile offenders may be given "the skills needed to live
45
responsibly and productively."
3. There is not a close relationship between the State's interests
and the classification.
Having identified the State's interests and determined that they are
important, we next examine whether they bear "a close relationship" to the classification
at issue.46
The State must balance two important interests: deterring drivers from
engaging in unsafe driving practices and providing rehabilitative support for minors.
The classification scheme created by AS 47.12.030(b) and AS 28.35.030 does not
achieve that balance.
AlaskaStatute47.12.030(b) requiresthatjuvenileschargedwithnon-felony
traffic offenses be "charged, prosecuted, and sentenced in the district court in the same
manner as [adults]" but permits juveniles charged with felony traffic offenses to be
43 Wilsonoff v. Wilsonoff , 514 P.2d 1264, 1267 (Alaska 1973); cf. Pub. Def.
Agency v. Superior Court, Third Judicial Dist. , 534 P.2d 947, 949 (Alaska 1975)
("Traditionally, the states have been legitimately concerned with the area of family law,
and, under the doctrine of parens patriae, in particular, in the promotion of the welfare
of children dwelling within their boundaries." (internal citations omitted)).
44 Henson v. State, 576 P.2d 1352, 1354 (Alaska 1978) (quoting P.H. v. State,
504 P.2d 837, 841 (Alaska 1972), superseded by statute, ch. 63, §§ 13, 15, SLA 1977,
as recognized in In re F.S., 586 P.2d 607, 610 (Alaska 1978)).
45 AS 47.12.010(a).
46 Titus v. State, Dep't of Admin., Div. of Motor Vehicles, 305 P.3d 1271,
1278-79 (Alaska 2013).
-29- 7533
----------------------- Page 30-----------------------
47
charged in juvenile court. "It is a misdemeanor for a person to violate a provision [of
Alaska's traffic statutes] unless the violation is . . . declared to be a felony or an
48
infraction." There are seven traffic offenses that are felonies instead of
49
misdemeanors. Of those seven felony offenses, five have lesser included offenses that
50
are treated as misdemeanors. Of those five lesser included offenses, there are only two
that are structured based on an offender's conviction history and that include a
mandatory minimum sentence of imprisonment - DUI and refusal to submit to a
51
chemical test. As discussed, misdemeanor DUI carries amandatory minimumsentence
of three days' imprisonment for a first offense and twenty days' imprisonment for a
47 AS 47.12.030(b)(1).
48 AS 28.90.010.
49 See AS 28.35.030(n) (third DUI conviction in past ten years);
AS 28.35.032(p) (third conviction in past ten years for refusal to submit to chemical
test); AS 28.35.060(a), (c) (driver involved in accident fails to render reasonable
assistance to injured person); AS 28.35.161(f) (use of electronic devices while driving
which causes physical injury to another person); AS 28.35.182(a), (e) (failure to stop at
direction of peace officer while driving recklessly or driving stolen car, or if accident
occurs or person suffers serious physical injury); AS 28.35.320 (willful neglect or refusal
to return rental vehicle with intent to deprive owner of vehicle); AS 28.10.491 (altering,
forging, or counterfeiting title, registration, or identification number, and removal and
representation of vehicles).
50 See AS 28.35.030(a)-(b) (first or second DUI conviction); AS 28.35.032(a),
(g) (first or second conviction for refusal to submit to chemical test);
AS 28.35.060(a)-(b) (driver involved in accident fails to provide identifying
information); AS 28.35.161(a), (f) (use of electronic devices while driving);
AS 28.35.182(b) (failure to stop at direction of peace officer as soon as practical and
safe).
51 AS 28.35.030(a)-(b) (DUI); AS 28.35.032(a), (g) (refusal to submit to
chemical test).
-30- 7533
----------------------- Page 31-----------------------
52
second offense. AlaskaStatutes 47.12.030(b)and28.35.030thereforecreateastructure
where a minor who has had two or more prior DUI convictions is treated as a juvenile
whereas a minor who has never been convicted of DUI is treated as an adult and subject
to a minimum sentence of imprisonment.
This classification does not bear a close fit to the State's interest in
deterrence. That interest would arguably be better served by either (1) treating all
juvenile DUI offenders, both misdemeanor and felony, as adults; or (2) treating juvenile
felony DUI offenders, who are repeat offenders, as adults, and treating juvenile
misdemeanor DUI offenders, who are either first- or second-time offenders, as juveniles.
We have previously found "a constitutionally adequate nexus to the state interest" where
53
"[t]he gravity of the sanctions roughly follow[ed] the gravity of the circumstances."
But as Watson argues, the classification at issue here "inverts traditional principles of
criminal sentencing."
The classification also does not closely fit the State's interest in
rehabilitation. That interest would be better met by providing rehabilitative support to
minors who are more amenable to rehabilitation - i.e., first-time offenders.54 But
instead, the State's classification only offers rehabilitative support to offenders who have
52 AS 28.35.030(b)(1)(A)-(B); AS 28.35.030(b)(2)(A)(I).
53 Titus v. State, Dep't of Admin.,Div. ofMotorVehicles , 305P.3d 1271, 1279
(Alaska 2013); see also Bell v. State , 598 P.2d 908, 914 (Alaska 1979) ("It is well settled
that statutes may prescribe stiffer penalties for multiple offenders.").
54 Cf. State v. Ladd, 951 P.2d 1220, 1225 (Alaska App. 1998) ("There is a
public interest in 'rehabilitating wayward youths' who are in fact 'rehabilitatable in their
youth.' On the other hand, society also has a significant interest in utilizing adult
criminal sanctions to 'protect[] the public from youths who [cannot be] quickly
rehabilitated.' " (alterations in original) (quoting W.M.F. v. State, 723 P.2d 1298, 1300
(Alaska App. 1986))).
-31- 7533
----------------------- Page 32-----------------------
55
already been convicted of DUI two or more times. First-time juvenile DUI offenders
56
are required to be charged as adults in district court,
and they do not receive the
rehabilitative services that the juvenile justice system provides.
The State argues that "[t]he legislature reasonably decided to treat all
drivers alike, with a narrow exception for minors who would otherwise be subject to
felony penalties because in that case, the scales tip towards the juvenile justice model
with the primary goals of rehabilitation and reformation." But the legislative history of
AS 47.12.030(b) does not support that argument. Non-felony traffic offenses were
57 Legislative history
specifically excluded fromthe juvenile court's jurisdiction in 1961.
indicates that this exclusion occurred in order to process routine traffic violations in a
more simplified and expeditious manner than would occur in juvenile court - i.e., for
administrative efficiency, not to deter bad driving.58
55 See AS 47.12.030(b); AS 28.35.030(n).
56 See AS 47.12.030(b); AS 28.35.030(b).
57 Ch. 76, SLA 1961.
58 Governor William Egan introduced the bill that created what is now
AS 47.12.030; he stated in a letter to the Chairman of the House Rules Committee:
The main purpose and policy behind the special
consideration given juveniles in our courts . . . is to avoid the
stigma and emotional disturbances that often occur because
of a criminal conviction. The purpose is to insure that the
juvenile will not receive a bad start in life because of youthful
mistakes.
All of this is usually unnecessary when regulatory
offenses not involving moral turpitude are in issue. There
appears to be no reason why the offense of running a stop
sign or excessive speed should not be processed as quickly
(continued...)
-32- 7533
----------------------- Page 33-----------------------
In 1969 the legislature eliminated an exception to the juvenile court
59
exclusion statute that had permitted DUI offenders to remain in juvenile court.
But the
offense of DUI in 1969 differed in several material respects from DUI today. First, DUI
carried no mandatory minimum sentence, nor was it ineligible for suspended entry of
60 In addition, in 1969 the offense of
judgment and suspended imposition of sentence.
felony DUI did not exist,61 and thus all minors charged with DUI faced the same
treatment: being charged in the district court. Therefore, when the legislature excluded
DUI from the juvenile court's jurisdiction, it did so at a time when there was no
mandatory minimum sentence for DUI and the juvenile's age could be fully considered
58 (...continued)
and as expeditiously where a juvenile is concerned, as where
an adult driver is involved.
Because of the very large number of traffic violations
which involve juvenile drivers, simplification of juvenile
procedures for the adjudication of these offenses . . . certainly
is in the interests of the public.
1961 House Journal 197-98. In a subsequent letter, Governor Egan requested that the
draft bill be amended to exclude DUI, reckless driving, and leaving the scene of an
accident, as these offenses were "serious enough to indicate a need for Juvenile Court
processing and planning." Id. at 199. The final bill included an exclusion for these three
offenses. Ch. 76, § 1, SLA 1961.
59 Ch. 64, § 1, SLA 1969.
60 The legislature did not set a mandatory minimum sentence for DUI until
nearly a decade later in 1978. Ch. 152, § 2, SLA 1978. And it did not disallow
suspended imposition of sentence for DUI convictions until 1983. Ch. 77, § 14, SLA
1983. AS 28.35.030(b)(2) now provides that the court may not suspend imposition of
sentence for misdemeanor DUI, and it may not suspend execution of sentence except on
condition that the offender serve the minimum term of imprisonment.
61 The legislature did not create felony DUI until 1995, which at that time
meant a third DUI offense within five years. Ch. 80, § 7, SLA 1995.
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by the district court. It also did so at a time when the offense of felony DUI did not exist
- therefore the legislature could not have been consciously balancing competing
interests in differentiating treatment for the two offenses as the State claims. Rather, the
legislative history shows that the legislature excluded DUI from the juvenile court's
jurisdiction and then later made changes to the criminal code that affected the
significance of that earlier exclusion. As far as the legislative history shows, the
legislature was likely unaware that these changes inverted the principles of criminal
sentencing for juvenile DUI offenders.
Alaska Statutes 47.12.030(b) and 28.35.030 thus create a sentencing
structure where the "gravity of the sanctions" does not "roughly follow the gravity of the
62 And that structure does not align with the State's interests in deterring
circumstances."
63 Because there is not a
bad driving and providing rehabilitative support for minors.
close relationship between the State's interests and the classification, AS 47.12.030(b)
violates Watson's equal protection rights.64
62 Titus v. State, Dep't of Admin., Div.of Motor Vehicles, 305 P.3d 1271, 1279
(Alaska 2013).
63 See Planned Parenthood of the Great Nw. v. State, 375 P.3d 1122, 1143
(Alaska 2016) (looking to whether State's asserted interests justify distinction between
two classes that are similarly situated); State v. Ladd, 951 P.2d 1220, 1225 (Alaska App.
1998) ("In deciding which minors should receive juvenile delinquency dispositions for
criminal acts, the legislature can draw distinctions between different groups so long as
those distinctions are not arbitrary or based on a discriminatory classification.").
64 I likewise note that the field of juvenile sentencing is presently in a state of
flux and at least one sister court has even invalidated all mandatory prison sentences for
juveniles as cruel and unusual under its state constitution. See State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d
378, 400 (Iowa 2014), as amended (Sept. 30, 2014); cf. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460,
479 (2012) ("[T]he Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life
in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders."); Burrell v. State, 207
(continued...)
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D. Remedy
Because I have concluded that AS 47.12.030(b) violates Watson's equal
protection rights, I must now address the question of what remedy should follow from
that conclusion. The State argues that if we declare AS 47.12.030(b) invalid, then
minors accused of non-felony traffic offenses would effectively be immunized from
prosecution pending legislative action. But this concern is unfounded.65 Alaska
Statute 47.12.020(a) defines juvenile court jurisdiction and provides that "[p]roceedings
relating to a minor [alleged to have violated a criminal law] . . . are governed by this
chapter, except as otherwise provided in this chapter." Alaska Statute 47.12.030 then
describes the specific offenses that are excluded from the juvenile court's broad
jurisdiction over minors under 18 years of age; as discussed, misdemeanor DUI is one
of the offenses excluded. Invalidating this exclusion will not render juvenile
misdemeanor DUI offenders immune from prosecution; under AS 47.12.020, the
juvenile court's jurisdiction will automatically extend to all juvenile DUI offenders.
I conclude that excluding misdemeanor DUI, but not felony DUI, from
juvenile court jurisdiction violates equal protection, and AS 47.12.030(b) is therefore
invalid as applied to juvenile misdemeanor DUI.66
64 (...continued)
A.3d 137, 145 (Del. 2019) (reasoning that state legislature "adequately addressed the
constitutional concerns identified in Miller" with criminal statute prescribing different
mandatory minimum sentence for juveniles). The parties in this case did not raise this
issue so we have no occasion to address it.
65 See Egan v. Hammond, 502 P.2d 856, 871 (Alaska 1972) ("A statute bad
in part is not necessarily void in its entirety." (quoting Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286,
289 (1924))).
66 The same is true as applied to juvenile misdemeanor charges for refusal to
(continued...)
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V. CONCLUSION
I therefore would reverse the court of appeals' decision affirming the
district court's judgment and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with my
dissenting opinion.
66 (...continued)
submit to a chemical test under AS 28.35.032(a), (g).
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