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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Andy L. James v. Alaska Frontier Constructors, Inc. and Nanuq, Inc. (7/31/2020) sp-7475
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before publication in the P ACIFIC REPORTER.
Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts,
303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878, email
corrections@akcourts.us.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
ANDY L. JAMES, )
) Supreme Court No. S-17353
Appellant, )
) Superior Court No. 2BA-16-00282 CI
v. )
) O P I N I O N
ALASKA FRONTIER CONSTRUCTORS, )
INC. and NANUQ, INC., ) No. 7475 - July 31, 2020
)
Appellees. )
)
rom the Superior Court of the State of Alaska,
Appeal f
SecondJudicial District, Utqiagvik, Romano D. DiBenedetto,
Judge.
Appearances: Mark A. Sandberg, Law Office of Mark A.
Sandberg, Anchorage, and Dennis Mestas, Law Office of
Dennis Mestas, Anchorage, for Appellant. Susan Orlansky,
Reeves Amodio LLC, Anchorage, for Appellees.
Before: Bolger, Chief Justice, Winfree, Maassen, and
Carney, Justices. [Stowers, Justice, not participating.]
WINFREE, Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
A worker was injured on the job and later filed personal injury lawsuits,
which were consolidated, against two companies. The companies sought and obtained
summary judgment rulings that they had statutory employer immunity from the injury
claimsunder the Alaska Workers' Compensation Act's exclusive liability provision. The
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worker appeals; because numerous issues of material fact make it impossible to
determine whether the companies are entitled to judgment as a matter of law that they are
immune from liability under the Act, we reverse the summary judgment decision, vacate
the judgment against the worker, and remand for further proceedings.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
A. Employment And Injury
In late 2014 Andy James was working in Deadhorse for Northern
Construction & Maintenance, LLC, a company owned by John Ellsworth and members
of his family. Ellsworth also owned Alaska Frontier Constructors, Inc. Alaska Frontier
had some kind of business relationship with Nanuq, Inc.
In late December Northern Construction sent James from his usual work
assignment to work in some capacity in connection with an ice road being constructed
and maintained for Caelus Energy Alaska, LLC. James was instructed to work at the
direction of Scott Pleas. Despite dangerous blizzard conditions, Pleas directed James to
accompany another worker, Johann Willrich, to check fuel levels on equipment idling
outside; James objected due to the weather, but was threatened with the loss of his job
if he did not follow the direction. James complied; he climbed a large grader to fuel it,
but a wind gust blew him off, resulting in shoulder and spinal injuries. James received
workers' compensation benefits from Northern Construction.
B. Lawsuits
Alleging that Alaska Frontier negligently and recklessly sent workers out
in the dangerous weather conditions, James sued it for his personal injuries. Alaska
Frontier responded that Pleas and Willrich were not Alaska Frontier employees. James
then filed a separate lawsuit against Nanuq, alleging that Pleas and Willrich were
employees either of Nanuq or of Nanuq and Alaska Frontier operating a "joint venture."
The lawsuits were consolidated.
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AlaskaFrontier and Nanuq jointlymovedforsummary judgmenttodismiss
James's lawsuit. They asserted that for project owner Caelus's ice road project Nanuq
was a general contractor, Nanuq subcontracted with Northern Construction on the
1 Nanuq was immune from the
project, and, under the Act's exclusive liability provision,
personal injury claim. They also asserted that, assuming Nanuq and Alaska Frontier
were joint venturers on the project (as James had alleged in the alternative), Alaska
Frontier had the same statutory immunity. Alaska Frontier separately filed another
summaryjudgment motion to dismiss James'slawsuit,asserting thatbecauseitemployed
neither Pleas nor Willrich, James's claim against Alaska Frontier had to be dismissed.
Jamescontestedthesummaryjudgmentmotions'evidentiaryunderpinnings
by pointing to alleged deficiencies in the supporting evidence and presenting evidence
he contended contradicted the companies' evidence. He also asserted that Alaska
Frontier was a vendor and not a contractor who might be entitled to statutory employer
1 AS 23.30.055, the Act's exclusive liability provision, provides in relevant
part:
The liability of an employer prescribed in AS 23.30.045 is
exclusive and in place of all other liability of the employer
and any fellow employee to the employee . . . on account of
the injury or death. . . . In this section, "employer" includes
. . . a person who, under AS 23.30.045(a), is liable for or
potentially liable for securing payment of compensation.
See also AS 23.30.045(a) (providing that if employer is subcontractor and fails to secure
compensation, contractor is liable for that compensation, and that if, in turn, contractor
fails to secure compensation, project owner is liable to secure that compensation).
Statutes such as AS 23.30.045 are referred to as "contractor-under" provisions. See
Miller v. Northside Danzi Constr. Co., 629 P.2d 1389, 1391 (Alaska 1981) (describing
enactment of " 'contractor-under' provision," which "substituted the pre-statehood
'exclusive remedy' provision with an 'exclusive liability' provision").
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2
immunity under the Act. Alaska Frontier and Nanuq replied to James's opposition,
raising some new arguments and presenting new evidentiary submissions. They
conceded that no written agreements documented the relevant relationships among
Nanuq, AlaskaFrontier, and Northern Construction, arguinginstead thatacontract could
be implied from affidavit testimony about the "working relationship" between the
companies. They contended that Alaska Frontier was not a vendor and that the implied
contractual agreements could mean: (1) Nanuq and Alaska Frontier were joint venturers
and the joint venture subcontracted with Northern Construction; (2) Nanuq directly
subcontracted with Northern Construction, but Alaska Frontier also was immune as a
joint venturer with Nanuq; or (3) Nanuq subcontracted with Alaska Frontier, and Alaska
Frontier in turn sub-subcontracted with Northern Construction. They argued that under
any of the configurations both corporations had statutory employer immunity from
liability. The companies later gave the superior court notice of supplemental authority 3
4 apparently believing this
involving one of our decisions about "lent employees,"
bolstered their statutory employer immunity argument.
C. Superior Court's Orders Granting Summary Judgment
Although oral argument had been requested, the superior court granted
summary judgment for the companies without it. The court denied James's
2 See AS 23.30.045(f)(1) (excluding from statutory immunity "a vendor
whose primary business is the sale or leasing of tools, equipment, other goods, or
property").
3 See Alaska R. Civ. P. 77(l) (allowing citation to supplemental authority but
prohibiting argument related to it).
4 See Anderson v. Tuboscope Vetco, Inc., 9 P.3d 1013, 1017 n.13 (Alaska
2000).
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reconsideration motions regarding both the failure to allow oral argument and the
rulings' merits. Judgment was entered against James for attorney's fees.
1. Alaska Frontier's summary judgment order
The superior court stated that it was taking all reasonable inferences from
theevidentiary presentations in James's favor; forsummaryjudgment purposes, thecourt
assumed Pleas and Willrich were Alaska Frontier employees. But the court concluded
as a legal matter that Alaska Frontier was immune from liability to James because either
(1) Alaska Frontier and Northern Construction were joint venturers as a result of
Ellsworth's common corporate ownership or (2) Alaska Frontier subcontracted work to
Northern Construction.
2. Nanuq's summary judgment order
The superior court stated that it was taking all reasonable inferences from
theevidentiarypresentationsin James's favor; for summary judgment purposes, thecourt
assumed the following material facts: (1) Caelus hired companies for its ice road project;
(2) Caelus and Nanuq entered into a Master Services Agreement in July 2014 for projects
that might be awarded to Nanuq, agreeing that Nanuq was an independent contractor
required to furnish and maintain its own equipment for projects; (3) in September 2014
Caelus awarded Nanuqtheice road project; (4) Northern Construction was an equipment
repair and maintenance contractor but had no written agreement with or evidence of
payments from Nanuq; (5) Alaska Frontier hired Northern Construction and billed
Nanuq for Northern Construction's and Alaska Frontier's labor; (6) there was no proof
of a joint venture between Nanuq and Alaska Frontier; (7) Northern Construction "was
called to send a mechanic" to the project, James was sent and was working in the scope
of his employment with Northern Construction when he was injured; and (8) James
received workers' compensation benefits from Northern Construction.
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From these facts the court concluded that: (1) Caelus was the project
owner; (2) Nanuq was the general contractor; (3) Nanuq subcontracted with Alaska
Frontier and Alaska Frontier billed Nanuq for both Alaska Frontier's and Northern
Construction's work; (4) Northern Construction had a "casual temporary labor
agreement relationship" with Alaska Frontier and James was an employee of either
5 (5) regardless of which entity employed
Northern Construction or Alaska Frontier;
James, statutoryemployer immunity protected NanuqfromJames's injury claimbecause
Nanuq was by law responsible for workers' compensation for James if neither Northern
Construction nor Alaska Frontier provided him workers' compensation.
James appeals both the refusal to allow oral argument and the summary
judgment rulings' merits. Because we agree that summary judgment was not warranted
on the evidentiary presentation and relevant law and therefore reverse and remand, we
do not need to address the superior court's erroneous failure to allow oral argument on
the summary judgment motions.6
5 This suggests that the superior court believed, as Nanuq and Alaska
Frontier suggested in their supplemental authorities, that the lent employee cases were
encompassed within the contractor-under rule. See AS 23.30.045 (looking to contract-
chain relationships to determine if businesses are liable to secure workers' compensation
coverage for immunity from common law liability under AS 23.30.055).
6 See Alaska R. Civ. P. 77(e) (providing oral argument must be held on
summary judgment motion when requested).
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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
7
"We review grants of summary judgment de novo."
Summary judgment
is proper only when undisputed material facts lead to the conclusion that a party is
8
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Under our long-standing summary judgment framework, the moving party
has the initial burden of proving, through admissible evidence, that there are no genuine
9
If
issues of material fact and that the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
that burden is met, the party seeking to avoid summary judgment must present specific
facts showing there is "evidence reasonably tending to dispute or contradict" the moving
10
party's evidence, thereby creating a genuine issue of material fact. The opposing party
does not need to produce enough evidence to persuade the court that it would prevail at
11
trial, only enough evidence to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact. "[A]
12
material fact is one upon which resolution of an issue turns." "[B]ecause the existence
7 Christensen v. Alaska Sales & Serv., Inc., 335 P.3d 514, 516 (Alaska 2014).
8 Alaska R. Civ. P. 56(c); Christensen, 335 P.3d at 517.
9 Christensen, 335 P.3d at 517.
10 Id. (quoting State, Dep't of Highways v. Green, 586 P.2d 595, 606 n.32
(Alaska 1978)).
11 Id. at 519-20.
12 Id. at 519.
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of a dispute over a material fact issue is a question of law, the determination is
13
objectively based and employs a reasonableness standard."
The "summary judgment standard does not allow trial courts . . . to make
14 "[T]he
trial-like credibility determinations [or] conduct trial-like evidence weighing."
only questions to be answered at the summary judgment stage are whether a reasonable
person could believe the [opposing] party's assertions and whether a reasonable person
could conclude those assertions create a genuine dispute as to a material fact."15 The
evidentiary threshold to preclude summary judgment is low, serving the important
function of preserving the right to trial.16
B. Relevant Workers' Compensation Legal Concepts
The Act makes workers' compensation generally an employee's exclusive
17 the term "employer" in AS 23.30.055 includes both a
remedy against an employer;
worker's direct employer18
and anyone "liable for or potentially liable for securing
payment of compensation" under the Act. Alaska Statute 23.30.045(a) sets out the
entities in a chain of contractual relations that may be liable for securing workers'
compensation payment for subcontractors' and contractors' employees:
13 Id. (footnote omitted).
14 Id. at 520.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 520-21.
17 See AS 23.30.055 (providing that unless employer fails to secure payment
of workers' compensation under Act, employer's sole liability to employee is under Act).
18 See AS 23.30.395(20) (defining "employer" as "a person employing one
or more persons in connection with a business or industry coming within the scope of
this chapter and carried on in this state").
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If the employer is a subcontractor and fails to secure the
payment of compensation to its employees, the contractor is
liable for and shall secure the payment of the compensation
to employees of the subcontractor. If the employer is a
contractor and fails to secure the payment of the
compensation to its employees or the employees of a
subcontractor, the project owner is liable for and shall secure
the payment of compensation to employees of the contractor
and employees of a subcontractor, as applicable.
Alaska Statute 23.30.045(f)(2) defines "project owner" as someone "who
in the course of the person's business, engages the services of a contractor and who
enjoys the beneficial use of the work." Alaska Statute 23.30.045(f)(1) defines
"contractor" as someone "who undertakes by contract performance of certain work for
another but does not include a vendor whose primary business is the sale or leasing of
tools, equipment, other goods, or property." Alaska Statute 23.30.045(f)(3) defines
"subcontractor" as someone "to whom a contractor sublets all or part of the initial
undertaking."19
BecauseNorthernConstructionpaidJames's workers'compensationclaim,
the Act's exclusive liability provision protects from civil liability for his injuries both
Northern Construction and any entities who have the requisite contractual relationships
with Northern Construction.20 There seems to be no dispute between the parties that
19 See also Everette v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. , 614 P.2d 1341, 1345-46
(Alaska 1980) (holding that agent corporation for oil companies owning permit to build
pipeline was not within contractor-under statute because agent corporation did not
"relegate[] any of its duties previously undertaken" in its contract with oil companies
when it hired contractors to build pipeline); Subcontract, B LACK 'S LAW DICTIONARY
(11th ed. 2019) (defining "subcontract" as "[a] secondary contract made by a party to the
primary contract for carrying out the primary contract, or a part of it").
20 See AS 23.30.055 (stating exclusive liability provision); AS 23.30.045(a)
(continued...)
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Caelus is the project owner. For the exclusive liability provision to preclude James's
injury claims against both Nanuq and Alaska Frontier, (1) Caelus would have to jointly
contract with Nanuq and Alaska Frontier and they would have to subcontract with
21 or (2) Caelus would have to contract with Nanuq, Nanuq would
Northern Construction
have to subcontract with Alaska Frontier, and Alaska Frontier would have to joint
ventureor subcontract with Northern Construction. Thecontractual relationships among
Northern Construction, Nanuq, and Alaska Frontier thus are critical to a legal conclusion
that the latter two companies are entitled to judgment as a matter of law that they have
immunity under AS 23.30.055 from James's injury claims.22
If Alaska Frontier and Nanuq are not joint venturers, then Alaska Frontier
might be either a vendor or a subcontractor to Nanuq. If Nanuq subcontracted with
Alaska Frontier, then for statutory immunity in the AS 23.30.045(a) chain as a contractor
or subcontractor to apply, Northern Construction would have to be either a joint venturer
with or a subcontractor to Alaska Frontier. If Alaska Frontier and Nanuq are not joint
venturers, Nanuq could directly subcontract with Northern Construction as the
corporations initially contended before the superior court, but this would leave Alaska
Frontier outside the contracting chain; we do not consider this possibility because the
20 (...continued)
(setting out chain of contractual relations).
21 In their brief before us, the corporations assert that Alaska Frontier
"contracted with Caelus" possibly as "a contractor in its own right" rather than as "a joint
venturer with Nanuq." But the only evidence they cite is a letter from Caelus; according
to a Nanuq employee's affidavit, the letter "awarded Nanuq the work on the ice road and
pad construction project."
22 Cf. Lovely v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 459 P.3d 1162, 1169-70 (Alaska 2020)
(emphasizing importanceofcontractual relationshipsandrequiringallegedprojectowner
to have contractual relationship with contractor).
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superior court did not address it. And if Alaska Frontier is a vendor, then it is not in the
contractingchain, regardless ofits contractual relationshipwithNorthernConstruction. 23
Finally, contractor-under immunity under AS 23.30.055 and AS 23.30.045
is different from employer immunity under the "lent employee" doctrine. The former
looks to contract-chain relationships between businesses to determine if the businesses
areliableto secureworkers' compensationcoverageand thus immune fromcommon law
liability under AS 23.30.055.24 The latter looksto theemploymentrelationships between
an individual and two possible employers, the "general employer" and the "special
employer."25 If a special employment relationship exists, the special employer may be
liable for workers' compensation coverage and therefore may, as an employer under
AS 23.30.395(20), rely on the exclusive liability defense to a common law injury claim.26
23 See AS 23.30.045(f)(1) (excluding vendor from contractor definition).
24 See Lovely, 459 P.3d at 1167-69.
25 See Anderson v. Tuboscope Vetco, Inc., 9 P.3d 1013, 1017 (Alaska 2000).
26 See Buckley v. Am. Fast Freight, Inc., 444 P.3d 139, 145 (Alaska 2019).
In Tuboscope Vetco, Inc. we adopted the following three-part test for special
employment relationships:
When a general employer lends an employee to a special
employer, the special employer becomes liable for
workmen's compensation only if:
(a) the employee has made a contract of hire, express or
implied, with the special employer;
(b) the work being done is essentially that of the special
employer; and
(c) the special employer has the right to control the details of
the work.
(continued...)
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Actual contractual relationships thus are as important foralent employeeanalysis as they
are for the contractual chain analysis of project owners, joint venturers, contractors, and
subcontractors.27
C. Factual And Legal Disputes Barring Summary Judgment
1. Joint venture between Alaska Frontier and Northern
Construction
No party asserted or presented evidence during the summary judgment
28 Indeed,
briefing that Alaska Frontier and Northern Construction were joint venturers.
the superior court noted that "neither party . . . has presented evidence of a[] joint
venture." (Emphasis in original.) The sole source of the court's contingent
determination that the two companies might have been working under a joint venture
26 (...continued)
RTHUR LARSON & L EX K. L ARSON, L ARSON 'S WORKERS'
9 P.3d at 1017 (quoting 3 A
OMPENSATION LAW § 48.00, at 8-434 (1997)).
C
27 See Buckley , 444 P.3d at 146-47 (discussing terms of temporary-labor
contract between two companies when considering implied contract between employee
and special employer); Tuboscope Vetco, Inc. , 9 P.3d at 1017-19 (detailing terms of
contract between special and general employersto evaluatewhetherimplied employment
contract existed between employee and special employer); cf. Word v. Motorola, Inc.,
662P.2d1024,1026-27(Ariz. 1983)(distinguishing temporary labor fromsubcontractor
status); Hamberg v. Sandia Corp. , 179 P.3d 1209, 1211-13 (N.M. 2008) (same).
28 A "joint venture" is "[a] business undertaking by two or more persons
engaged in a single defined project" with the following "necessary elements": "(1) an
express or implied agreement; (2) a common purpose that the group intends to carry out;
(3) shared profits and losses; and (4) each member's equal voice in controlling the
project." Joint venture, BLACK 'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). A joint venture
"may be implied from the facts or circumstances of the case." N. Lights Motel, Inc. v.
Sweaney, 561 P.2d 1176, 1187 (Alaska 1977). "Although each venturer need not
exercise actual physical control of the instrumentalities used in the enterprise each must
have a legal right to some voice in the direction and control of the enterprise." Id.
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agreement was that Ellsworth was an owner of both companies, as the only reference
James made about the companies' relationship was that they were "sister companies"
29 Sister corporations are not, based only on their common ownership,
Ellsworth owned.
30 Absent any evidence about the factors necessary to
a joint venture as a matter of law.
determine that Alaska Frontier and Northern Construction were joint venturers, it was
error to suggest or conclude that a joint venture could exist to provide Alaska Frontier
with statutory immunity as a direct employer.31
2. James as Alaska Frontier's employee
In granting Nanuq summary judgment, the superior court explicitly stated
that Nanuq and Alaska Frontier were not joint venturers. The court decided, based on
invoices James submitted as evidence, that Alaska Frontier was a subcontractor to
Nanuq. The court stated that Nanuq had statutory employer immunity because "James
was either an employee of [Alaska Frontier] or [Northern Construction]" or because
NorthernConstruction"hada'casual temporarylabor agreement relationship'(otherwise
known as a contract) with [Alaska Frontier]." The court concluded that under "either
scenario" Nanuq would have been liable to pay workers' compensation if both Alaska
Frontier and Northern Construction failed to do so.
No party argued or presented evidence during the summary judgment
briefing to establish that James was a general or special employee of Alaska Frontier.
And the court said in its statement of the facts underlying its grant of summary judgment
29 A "sister corporation" is "[o]ne of two or more corporations controlled by
the same, or substantially the same, owners." Sister corporation, BLACK 'S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
30 See N. Lights Motel, Inc., 561 P.2d at 1187 n.18 (noting that "mere joint
ownership" does not "in effect establish[] a business partnership or joint venture").
31 See id. at 1187 (setting out factors important to existence of joint venture).
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that James was injured while working in the scope of his employment for Northern
Construction and that Northern Construction paid workers' compensation to James. The
corporations assert on appeal that James was "in fact" employed by Northern
Construction. Absent any evidence of or discussion about the factors necessary to
determine that James was Alaska Frontier's special employee under the lent employee
32 it was error to suggest or conclude that James could be an Alaska Frontier
doctrine,
employee such that (1) Alaska Frontier would have direct employer exclusive liability
protection under the Act, and (2) assuming Nanuq subcontracted with Alaska Frontier,
Nanuq would have been required by law to secure compensation payment for James if
Alaska Frontier had not and Nanuq therefore had exclusive employer liability protection
under the Act.
3. Alaska Frontier's status as a contractor or subcontractor
Alaska Frontier and Nanuq argue on appeal that both were contractors as
defined in AS 23.30.045(f)(1) because either (1) they were joint venturers contracting
with the project owner, or (2) Caelus contracted directly with Alaska Frontier and Nanuq
on the ice road project. Material factual disputes preclude summary judgment on either
theory. An affidavit the corporations submitted during summary judgment briefing
stated Caelus contracted only with Nanuq, and only Nanuq entered into the master
services agreement with Caelus that was incorporated into the contract award. The
Master Services Agreement, includedas an exhibit,showed thecontracting parties to that
agreement were "Caelus Energy Alaska LLC and Affiliates" and "Nanuq, Inc." No
evidence on important factors supporting the existence of a joint venture - such as a
32
See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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33
control-sharing arrangement and a profit-sharing arrangement - was presented to the
superior court. The court determined that, taking all inferences from the evidentiary
presentations in James's favor, Caelus's only contractor was Nanuq. We see no error in
that determination.
The corporations alternatively asserted that Nanuq subcontracted with
Alaska Frontier but presented scant evidence supporting their legal theory. They
contended Nanuq could have an implied subcontract with Alaska Frontier, which
34 Evidence reflects
depends on a factual evaluation to determine the parties' intention.
that the vast majority of monies Nanuq paid to Alaska Frontier were for equipment
rentals, suggesting Alaska Frontier may have been primarily a vendor on the ice road
project and not a subcontractor to Nanuq.35 And to determine whether Alaska Frontier
was a subcontractor, evidence would have to establish exactly what part of the main
33 See supra note 28.
34 "The existence or non-existence of a contract is a question of fact . . . ."
Earthmovers of Fairbanks, Inc. v. Pac. Ins. Co., 614 P.2d 781, 782 (Alaska 1980). An
implied-in-fact contract "arises where the court finds from the surrounding facts and
circumstances that the parties intended to make a contract but failed to articulate their
promises and the court merely implies what it feels the parties really intended." Martens
v. Metzgar, 524 P.2d 666, 672 (Alaska 1974) (quoting Hill v. Waxberg, 237 F.2d 936,
939 (9th Cir. 1956)).
35 It is unclear how the vendor exception should be interpreted with respect
to the vendor's "primary business." See AS 23.30.045(f)(1) (defining "contractor" as
someone "who undertakes by contract performance of certain work for another but does
not include a vendor whose primary business is the sale or leasing of tools, equipment,
other goods, or property" (emphasis added)). Is "primary business" related to the
alleged vendor's entire business or its business in the context of the contract in question?
Given the undeveloped facts of this case - including a lack of evidence about Alaska
Frontier's various activities and related income streams - we decline to render a
hypothetical and abstract interpretation of the statute.
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contract Alaska Frontier was required to carry out - what specific contractual duties
36
Alaska Frontier assumed from the Nanuq-Caelus contract.
But there is no written
subcontract, only conclusory statements in affidavits about general agreements and
understandings and a course of business by all involved "to get jobs done."
Evidence was presented that (1) Nanuq's contract with Caelus required
written notification to Caelus of any subcontractors so that Caelus could obtain
appropriate indemnity agreements, but this did not happen with respect to Alaska
Frontier; and (2) Nanuq had a union labor agreement for work on the ice road project and
Alaska Frontier did not, even though Alaska Frontier had other labor agreements at the
time of the ice road project. Nanuq and Alaska Frontier argue that failure to comply with
third-party contractual requirements does not mean there was no contractor-
subcontractor relationship, but they fail to recognize that at the summary judgment stage
this evidence creates a reasonable inference that there was no such relationship. Nanuq
and Alaska Frontier may attempt to establish their contractual relationships at trial.
Unless the superior court had sufficient evidence before it to determine
exactly what portion of the main contract was subcontracted to Alaska Frontier, the court
could not determine whether Alaska Frontier actually was a subcontractor rather than a
vendor. The court did not have that evidence before it; it was error to speculate that a
contractor-subcontractor relationship existed between Nanuq and Alaska Frontier, then
rely on that to further speculate about the relationship between Alaska Frontier and
Northern Construction.
4. Northern Construction's subcontractor status
Theevidentiarypresentationsabout NorthernConstruction'ssubcontractor
status also are unclear. Without knowing what the putative subcontract between Nanuq
36
See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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and Alaska Frontier actually covered regarding Nanuq's contract with Caelus, it is
impossible to determine what portions of Alaska Frontier's supposed subcontract could
have been sub-subcontracted to Northern Construction. Other than some general
observations that Northern Construction was hired to perform equipment maintenance,
apparently on equipment Alaska Frontier leased to Nanuq; that Northern Construction's
employees were at times called to work at locations away from Deadhorse to fill "gaps";
and that Nanuq paid Alaska Frontier and Alaska Frontier paid Northern Construction,
the evidentiary presentations tell us nothing about the actual contractual arrangements
between Alaska Frontier and Northern Construction. It was error to speculate that a
putative subcontractor relationship existed between Alaska Frontier and Northern
Construction.
V. CONCLUSION
WeREVERSEthesuperiorcourt'sgrantsofsummaryjudgment, VACATE
the judgment entered against James, and REMAND for further proceedings.
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