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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Randall G. Jackson v. Borough of Haines, Joshua Knorr, Jason F. Rettinger, Adam Patterson, Simon Ford, Gary Lowe, Darsie Calbeck a/k/a Culbeck, Mark Earnest, Amy Williams, and James Scott (5/24/2019) sp-7365
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before publication in the P ACIFIC REPORTER.
Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts,
303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878, email
corrections@akcourts.us.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
RANDELL G. JACKSON, )
)
Supreme Court No. S-16991
Appellant, )
)
Superior Court No. 1JU-14-00839 CI
v. )
)
O P I N I O N
BOROUGH OF HAINES, JOSHUA
)
KNORR, JASON F. RETTINGER,
) No. 7365 - May 24, 2019
ADAM PATTERSON, SIMON FORD,
)
GARY LOWE, DARSIE CALBECK,
)
a/k/a CULBECK, MARK EARNEST,
)
AMY WILLIAMS, and JAMES
)
SCOTT, )
)
Appellees. )
)
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, First
Judicial District, Juneau, Louis J. Menendez, Judge.
Appearances: Randell G. Jackson, pro se, Haines, Appellant.
Ruth Botstein, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
Anchorage,and JahnaLindemuth,Attorney General,Juneau,
for Appellees Amy Williams and James Scott. No
appearances by Borough of Haines, Joshua Knorr, Jason F.
Rettinger, Adam Patterson, Simon Ford, Gary Lowe, Darsie
Calbeck, a/k/a Culbeck, or Mark Earnest.
Before: Bolger, Chief Justice, Stowers, Maassen, and
Carney, Justices. [Winfree, Justice, not participating.]
BOLGER, Chief Justice.
----------------------- Page 2-----------------------
I. INTRODUCTION
An individual brought civil claims against the prosecutors who secured his
convictions for assault and resisting arrest, alleging that they committed various torts and
violated his constitutional right to due process. The superior court dismissed his state
and federal claims, concluding that the prosecutors enjoyed absolute immunity. We
agree that the prosecutors are protected by absolute immunity from both the state and
federal claims because they were acting in their official capacity as advocates for the
State when they committed the acts that gave rise to the complaint. Accordingly we
affirm the superior court's dismissal of the claims against them.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
RandellJacksonwascharged withdisorderly conduct, assault, and resisting
arrest after a 2012 interaction with three police officers in Haines. Amy Williams, an
assistant district attorney, first prosecuted Jackson on these charges, but her efforts
resulted in a mistrial. James Scott, the Juneau district attorney, oversaw the second
round of proceedings against Jackson, which led to his conviction and sentencing.
Jackson appealed his convictions in March 2016 to the superior court, which reversed
his conviction for disorderly conduct but affirmed his assault and resisting arrest
convictions.
On September 4, 2014, Jackson1 filed a civil complaint against Scott,
Williams, various police officers and state employees involved in his arrest and
prosecution, and theBorough ofHaines.2 He brought several constitutional claims under
1 Jackson has been self-represented at all stages of this litigation.
2 Jackson did not name the Borough in the case caption, but identified it as
a party in the body of his original complaint. The superior court later granted Jackson
leave to amend his complaint to include the Borough in the caption.
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3
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and tort claims under state law. He alleged that the arresting officers
provided false testimony at his trial, that Scott and Williams refused or neglected to
prevent the presentation of this false testimony, that they knowingly or recklessly used
this false testimony to convict Jackson, that Williams "made an illegal request for a
bench warrant to be issued against [a] defense witness," that Williams "advised and
strategized" with the police department regarding Jackson's prosecution, and that Scott
"made misrepresentative statement[s] using ethos, speculation and experimentation
instead of evidence to wrongfully convict Jackson." Jackson sought recovery for
malicious prosecution, malicious abuse of process, conspiracy, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and the
violation of various rights established by the federal constitution.
Jackson then moved to stay his civil case until his criminal appeal was
resolved. While the court was considering the stay motion, Scott and Williams moved
4 They
to dismiss Jackson's claims against them under Alaska Civil Rule 12(b)(6).
argued that "[i]t is well-settled that absolute immunity bars claims for monetary damages
against prosecutors when acting in their roles as advocates" and that the conduct
challenged in Jackson's complaint "fall[s] squarely within the scope of . . . Scott's and
. . . Williams' absolute immunity as prosecutors."
The superior court granted both Jackson's and the prosecutors' motions in
September 2015. Regarding the motion to dismiss, it explained that "all of Mr. Jackson's
3 This statute creates a civil cause of action against any "person who, under
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws."
4 Alaska Civil Rule 12(b)(6) allows a party to move for dismissal of the
claims against them for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."
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claims against . . . Scott and . . . Williams arose after the criminal complaint was filed as
part of his criminal prosecution. Thus Mr. Jackson's allegations against [them] involve
activities intimately associated with the judicial phase of Mr. Jackson's criminal
prosecution." Accordingly the superior court found that Scott and Williams were
"entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity."
Jackson's criminal appeal concluded in March 2016, and the superior court
dissolved the stay in his civil action in September 2017. In October Jackson moved to
continue the stay until he had exhausted all of his post-conviction remedies, but the
superior court eventually denied this motion. Upon the motion of the prosecutors, the
5 in
superior court entered judgment in their favor under Alaska Civil Rule 54(b)
December 2017.6 The superior court also awarded the prosecutors an attorney's fee
7 8
Jackson appeals.
award of $4,311.87, calculated under Alaska Civil Rule 82(b)(2).
5 Alaska Civil Rule 54(b) provides:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action
. . . the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only
upon an express determination that there is no just reason for
delay and upon an express direction for the entry of
judgment.
6 Only Jackson's claims against the prosecutors were dismissed, and his
claims against the remaining defendants were allowed to continue.
7 Alaska Civil Rule 82(b)(2) provides that "the court . . . shall award the
prevailing party in a case resolved without trial 20 percent of its actual attorney's fees
which were necessarily incurred" when that party does not also recover a money
judgment.
8 Jackson originally filed a petition for review in February 2018. A month
later, we converted that petition into an appeal by right, pursuant to Alaska Appellate
Rule 202.
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III. DISCUSSION
Jackson raises a number of issues on appeal. He challenges the superior
court's dismissal of his claims against the prosecutors under Rule 12(b)(6) and the
attorney's fees awarded to them. Jackson also argues that the superior court erred by
denying his motion to continue the stay of his civil case and by denying his motion for
default judgment against the Borough of Haines. Finally, Jackson challenges thevalidity
of his underlying criminal convictions.
A. It Was Not Error For The Superior Court To Dismiss Jackson's
Claims On The Basis Of Absolute Immunity.
"A complaint is subject to dismissal under Civil Rule 12(b)(6) 'when its
allegations indicate the existence of an affirmative defense, but the defense must clearly
appear on the face of the pleading.' "9
Jackson's complaint asserted claims for relief
under both federal and Alaska law. The superior court applied the same reasoning to
Jackson's state and federal claims: that prosecutors are entitled to an affirmative defense
of absolute immunity for "acts intimately associated with the judicial phase of the
criminal process," and that the conduct that gave rise to Jackson's complaint occurred
within that phase. "We review decisions granting or denying motions to dismiss
9 Martin v. Mears , 602 P.2d 421, 428 (Alaska 1979) (quoting 5 C. W RIGHT
& A. M ILLER, F EDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: Civil § 1357, at 605-06 (1969 &
Supp. 1979)); see also Douglas Indian Ass'n v. Cent. Council of Tlingit &Haida Indian
Tribes of Alaska, 403 P.3d 1172, 1177 n.17 (Alaska 2017) ("Affirmative defenses may
be raised in a preanswer motion under Civil Rule 12(b)(6) as long as the defense 'clearly
appear[s] on the face of the pleading.' " (alteration in original) (quoting Mears, 602 P.2d
at 428)).
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10
de novo." "The applicability of both state and federal immunity are questions of law
11
that are also subject to de novo review."
1. The affirmative defense of absolute prosecutorial immunity is
available under both federal and state law.
The United States Supreme Court has long held that prosecutors enjoy
absolute immunity from claims brought under § 1983, the statute which authorized
Jackson's federal claims, when performing acts "intimately associated with the judicial
12
phase of the criminal process." But we have not yet decided whether prosecutors may
assert an absolute immunity defense against state-law causes of action, like Jackson's
13
malicious prosecution and conspiracy claims.
In Imbler v. Pachtman, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that prosecutors
14
were entitled to absolute immunity from § 1983 claims. The Court determined that the
nature of the prosecutor's role requires the "exercise [of] his best judgment both in
10 Hahn v. GEICO Choice Ins. Co. , 420 P.3d 1160, 1166 (Alaska 2018)
(quoting Varilek v. City of Houston , 104 P.3d 849, 851 (Alaska 2004)).
11 Hill v. Giani, 296 P.3d 14, 20 (Alaska 2013).
12 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427, 430 (1976); see also State, Dep't
of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs. v. Doherty, 167 P.3d 64, 70 (Alaska
2007) (noting that "defenses to a federal cause of action are defined by federal law"
(quoting Van Sandt v. Brown, 944 P.2d 449, 452 n.5 (Alaska 1997))).
13 See Kurka v. State, No. S-14522, 2012 WL 5883277, at *2 (Alaska
Nov. 21, 2012) (declining to consider whether prosecutors were entitled to absolute
immunity when superior court dismissed claims against them on grounds of qualified
immunity); cf. Schug v. Moore, 233 P.3d 1114, 1117 (Alaska 2010) ("We do not decide
whether [an assistant attorney general] was protected by absolute or qualified immunity
when she represented [the Alaska Department of Corrections] in the underlying
litigation.").
14 424 U.S. 409, 427-28 (1976).
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deciding which suits to bring and in conducting them in court" and that "[t]he public
trust of the prosecutor's office would suffer if he were constrained in making every
decision by the consequences in terms of his own potential liability in a suit for
15 The Court also reasoned that, absent absolute immunity, suits for damages
damages."
"could be expected with some frequency," which would divert the prosecutor's "energy
and attention . . . from the pressing duty of enforcing the criminal law."16 The Court
concluded that these considerations outweighed the fact that absolute prosecutorial
immunity would "leave the genuinely wronged defendant without civil redress."17
We find this reasoning persuasive. Prosecutors perform an indispensable
role in the administration of justice and the maintenance of public safety. Their job
requires them to make decisions about how and when to prosecute, and which cases to
bring in order to best serve the public good. Exposure to civil liability for their decisions
could affect prosecutors' judgment, erodingpublic trust in the office and hampering their
18
ability to pursue cases in the public's interest.
Moreover, liability in tort for claims like malicious prosecution would
require an inquiry into a prosecutor's motives.19 This is a question of fact, the
15 Id . at 424-25.
16 Id. at 425.
17 Id. at 427.
18 Cf. Aspen Expl. Corp. v. Sheffield, 739 P.2d 150, 160 (Alaska 1987) ("To
allow the governor's motives to be questioned at every turn, by every disappointed
applicant for a mining lease, or a land grant, or oil rights, would effectively undermine
the governor's ability to govern.").
19 See Greywolf v. Carroll, 151 P.3d 1234, 1241 (Alaska 2007) (identifying
(continued...)
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20
determination of which would likely require a trial. Even if such claims were relatively
infrequent, the burden of defending them in what could be lengthy or complex
proceedings would detract from the prosecutor's ability to fulfill the duties of his or her
21
office.
A rule of absolute prosecutorial immunity may leave injured parties with
no meaningful alternative remedies or avenues for relief. But the importance of the
office and threat that its efficacy will be eroded by defensive litigation outweigh this
concern.
Jackson questions whether "a certain class of people" should be "above the
constitutional rules of law." But he does not argue that a different analysis of the
immunity defense should be applied as a matter of state law.
22 in
We thus join the U.S. Supreme Court and the majority of other states
19 (...continued)
" 'malice' or a primary purpose other than that of bringing an offender to justice" as an
element of malicious prosecution (quoting Stephens v. State, Dep't of Revenue, 746 P.2d
908, 911 (Alaska 1987))).
20 See id. at 1241-42.
21 Cf. Aspen Expl. Corp., 739 P.2d at 161 (reasoning that a trial to determine
the governor's motives when rejecting permit applications would be lengthy, require a
jury to review policy decisions, and prove "more costly to the public good than the
possibility of actual malice or wrongful motive").
22 See e.g., Knapper v. Connick, 681 So. 2d 944, 946, 950 (La. 1996)
(explaining that "[t]he overwhelming majority of courts in other states have extended
absolute immunity to prosecutors when they are acting within their traditional roles as
advocates for the state" before adopting the defense itself); but see Simms v. Seaman,
69 A.3d 880, 891 (Conn. 2013) (noting that absolute immunity does not bar malicious
prosecution claims under Connecticut law).
-8- 7365
----------------------- Page 9-----------------------
holding that prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity from tort claims when acting
in their role as advocates for the State.
2. The prosecutors are entitled to assert absolute immunity
because they were acting in their roles as advocates of the State.
Having determined that absolute immunity is available to the prosecutors
as an affirmative defense to state-law claims, we must now decide whether they are
entitled to assert it in this case. The focus of this inquiry is on the nature of the conduct
that gave rise to Jackson's claims. Prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity when
23
performing acts "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process."
The U.S. Supreme Court has explained that absolute immunity protects actions taken in
24
the capacity of an advocate, but not necessarily "investigative or administrative tasks."
The superior court found that Scott and Williams were entitled to an
absolute immunity defense because all of Jackson's claims challenged conduct that
"arose after the criminal complaint was filed as part of his criminal prosecution."
Because of this it determined that the prosecutors' actions were "intimately associated
with the judicial phase ofMr. Jackson's criminal prosecution." Jackson argues on appeal
that Scott and Williams each acted negligently in an administrative capacity, prior to
occupying the role of advocate. We disagree, and conclude that the prosecutors are
entitled to absolute immunity from all of Jackson's claims.
Jackson argues that by supervising Williams's prosecution of the first trial,
Scott acted in an administrative capacity, and did not assume the role of an advocate until
he presided over the second trial himself. The U.S. Supreme Court has expressly
rejected this argument. In Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, the Court held that absolute
23 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976).
24 Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 342 (2009).
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prosecutorial immunity extends to certain office-wide supervisory practices, like the
25
training of new prosecutors.
The Court concluded this was an administrative
26
function. But in reaching this decision, the U.S. Supreme Court first discussed a
hypothetical case, in which a plaintiff sought "damages not only fromthe trial prosecutor
27
but also from a supervisory prosecutor or from the trial prosecutor's colleagues." It
reasoned that in such a scenario "all these prosecutors would enjoy absolute immunity"
because their "behavior, taken individually or separately, would involve '[p]reparation
. . . for . . . trial,' and would be 'intimately associated with the judicial phase of the
28
criminal process.' "
The U.S. Supreme Court's hypothetical case, which it described as
29
"involv[ing] supervisory . . . prosecutors but . . . not . . . administration," maps perfectly
onto Jackson's argument about Scott. Scott was not acting in an administrative capacity
when he supervised Williams's prosecution of Jackson, but rather as an advocate
30
himself. We thus reject Jackson's argument that Scott was acting as an administrator
"prior to and throughout the first trial."
25 Id. at 339, 344-49.
26 Id. at 344-46.
27 Id. at 345.
28 Id. (alteration and omissions in original) (internal citation omitted) (quoting
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n.33, 430).
29 Id.
30 See id. ("Decisions about indictment or trial prosecution will often involve
more than one prosecutor within an office.").
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Turning to Williams, Jackson argues that she acted in an administrative
capacity when participating in pretrial calendar calls. He contends that there is some
period after the initiation of criminal proceedings, but before the trial, in which the
prosecutor's role is administrative and investigative. He also claims that Williams was
not acting as an advocate "when she defended the convictions secured by Mr. Scott on
appeal."
But again, the U.S. Supreme Court has squarely rejected these arguments.
It recognized in Imbler that "the duties of the prosecutor in his role as advocate for the
State involve actions preliminary to the initiation of a prosecution and actions apart from
31 And it reasoned in Burns v. Reed that "pretrial court appearances by
the courtroom."
the prosecutor in support of taking criminal action against a suspect" must give rise to
32 A prosecutor assumes the role of advocate for the State when he
absolute immunity.
or she appears at a calendar call, and makes that pretrial appearance "in support of taking
33 So, too, a prosecutor continues to act as an advocate
criminal action against a suspect."
for the State when he or she defends a conviction on appeal.
We conclude that the prosecutors were acting in an advocacy role when
they took the actions that gave rise to Jackson's claims. We therefore hold that they were
entitled to assert the defense of absolute immunity against all of Jackson's claims, both
31 424 U.S. at 431 n.33.
32 500 U.S. 478, 492 (1991) (holding that a prosecutor's "appearance in court
in support of an application for a search warrant and the presentation of evidence at that
hearing are protected by absolute immunity").
33 Id.
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state and federal, and that it was not error for the superior court to grant their motion to
dismiss on such grounds. 34
B. It Was Not Error To Award The Prosecutors Attorney's Fees.
The superior court awarded the prosecutors $4,311.87 in attorney's fees
under Civil Rule 82(b)(2). On appeal Jackson argues that the fee award was improper.
"We review an award for attorney's fees for abuse of discretion and will not reverse it
35
unless it is manifestly unreasonable."
Civil Rule 82(b)(2) applies when the prevailing party in a case does not
receive a money judgment. It provides that the superior court "shall award the prevailing
party in a case resolved without trial 20 percent of its actual attorney's fees which were
36
Under Rule 82(b)(3), the court may deviate from this formula
necessarily incurred."
upon consideration of a number of factors, but "[a]pplication of Rule 82(b)(3) factors is
37
discretionary, not mandatory."
The superior court specifically requested briefing from Jackson on the
Rule 82(b)(3) factors, explaining that it was "hesitant to assess thousands of dollars of
34 The prosecutors argue on appeal that Heck v. Humphrey provides an
additional bar to Jackson's § 1983 claims. In that case, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
"in order to recover damages . . . , a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or
sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared
invalid by a state tribunal . . . , or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus." Heck v. Humphrey , 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). Having
determined that the prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity, we decline to address
this argument.
35 Greene v. Tinker, 332 P.3d 21, 41 (Alaska 2014).
36 Alaska R. Civ. P. 82(b)(2).
37 Greene, 332 P.3d at 41 (alteration in original) (quoting Rhodes v. Erion,
189 P.3d 1051, 1055 (Alaska 2008)).
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----------------------- Page 13-----------------------
fees against a pro se litigant like Mr. Jackson without at least first considering whether
there is reason to deviate from the 20% benchmark" set by Rule 82(b)(2). Jackson
complied, arguing that fees should not be awarded because he was indigent and self-
represented, and because a fee award would deter other similarly situated litigants from
pressing their claims. The superior court considered each of these arguments, but
eventually decided not to depart from the Rule 82(b)(2) fee schedule. It explained that
Jackson had presented no evidence to prove his indigence. It also noted that our
38 The
precedent does not forbid trial courts fromawarding fees against indigent litigants.
court also disagreed with Jackson's argument that a fee award would deter future
litigants, noting that he stood "to make enormous financial gains if successful" with his
suit. Accordingly the superior court ordered Jackson to pay the full $4,311.87 requested
by the prosecutors.
Jacksonarguesthat thesuperior court abused its discretionbyawarding any
attorney's fees to the prosecutors. He again contends that the fee award would have a
chilling effect on future litigants, and would "emphasize 'a desire (of the superior court)
to discourage claims by others against the prevailing party (the State and unscrupulous
prosecutors) or its insurer.' "39
The superior court discussed in its order whether the fee award would have
a chilling effect on future litigants. It reasoned "that if an individual is arrested
improperly and, subsequently, maliciously prosecuted, they will not be deterred from
litigating their case just because there is some risk that they could . . . be forced to pay
38 See David S. v. Jared H. , 308 P.3d 862, 874-75 (Alaska 2013) (affirming
an award of attorney's fees against an allegedly indigent litigant); see also Prentzel v.
State, Dep't. of Public Safety , 169 P.3d 573, 595 (Alaska 2007) (same).
39 See Alaska R. Civ. P. 82(b)(3)(I), (J).
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out just over $4,000 in fees." The superior court also distinguished our decision in David
S. v. Jared H., where we affirmed a reduced fee award against a biological father
40 It explained that unlike
contesting the adoption of his children without his consent.
parties in adoption cases who face "only . . . the very real risk of significant financial loss
and no chance at financial gain," Jackson had requested millions of dollars in actual and
punitive damages. It concluded that "any chilling effect is all but eliminated when the
litigant stands to reap millions of dollars in damages, like Mr. Jackson does, if successful
in their suit."
Jackson's argument that the superior court's fee award was designed to
discouragefutureclaimsagainst"unscrupulous prosecutors"seems to misunderstand the
factor he quotes. Under Rule 82(b)(3)(J), a superior court may consider "the extent to
which the fees incurred by the prevailing party suggest that they had been influenced by
considerations apart from the case at bar, such as a desire to discourage claims by others
against the prevailing party or its insurer." This factor asks whether the prevailing party
intentionally inflated its legal fees in order to secure a fee award that would discourage
future litigation. But Jackson seems to be arguing that the superior court awarded the
prevailing party fees in order to discourage future litigation. There is no indication in the
record that the prosecutors inflated their legal fees to discourage litigation. Moreover,
there is no evidence in the record that the superior court had an improper motive in
granting the fee award. The court's request for briefing from Jackson, and its thorough
analysis of his arguments, indicate that it was especially sensitive to Jackson's position,
not hostile to it.
40
308 P.3d at 874-75. The father in David S. also argued his indigence
militated against the award of attorney's fees. Id. at 874.
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The superior court's order contained a well-reasoned analysis of our
previous decisions addressing fee awards and the relevant factors under Civil
Rule 82(b)(3). We conclude that the superior court did not abuse its discretion when it
awarded the prosecutors attorney's fees.
Jackson also argues in his reply brief that it is not "proper to make a person
pay the State of Alaska legal fees where the person has filed a complaint based on
deprivation of constitutional rights." Although he cited no authority, this argument
seems to rely on AS 09.60.010(c)(2), which prohibits the assessment of attorney's fees
against a party asserting constitutional protections if the claim "was not frivolous, and
the claimant did not have sufficient economic incentive to bring the action or appeal
regardless of the constitutional claims involved." The superior court found that
AS 09.60.010(c)(2) did not apply in this case, because Jackson stood to gain "money
damages numbering in the millions" if his claim succeeded. Jackson does not dispute
this finding in his briefing. Since he raises it for the first time in his reply brief, cites no
authority for support, and does not challenge the determinative finding, we conclude that
Jackson has waived this argument. 41
C. The Remaining Issues Presented In Jackson's Briefing Are Not
Properly Before Us.
Jacksonmakes severalarguments that wemaynotconsider onappeal. Two
of these concern his civil case: that the superior court erred when it denied his motion
to continue the stay of his case, and that it erred when it denied his motion for default
41 SeeKollander v. Kollander,400 P.3d91, 94 n.3(Alaska2017)(considering
an argument that is only raised cursorily and without citation to authority to be waived);
Barnett v. Barnett , 238 P.3d 594, 603 (Alaska 2010) ("[W]e deemwaived any arguments
raised for the first time in a reply brief . . . .").
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judgment against the Borough of Haines. Neither order is a final judgment from which
Jackson can properly appeal. 42
Jackson also challenges his underlying criminal convictions. We do not
have jurisdiction to directly review Jackson's criminal convictions as a part of his civil
appeal.43 We therefore cannot consider the remainder of Jackson's arguments.
IV. CONCLUSION
The superior court's orders granting the prosecutors' motion to dismiss and
awarding attorney's fees are AFFIRMED.
42 See Alaska R. App. P. 202 (allowing parties to appeal from "a final
judgment entered by the superior court"). "We have defined 'final judgment' as one that
'ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the
judgment.' " Wagner v. Wagner , 205 P.3d 306, 310 (Alaska 2009) (quoting Greater
Anchorage Area Borough v. City of Anchorage , 504 P.2d 1027, 1030 (Alaska 1972),
overruled on other grounds by City & Borough of Juneau v. Thibodeau , 494 P.2d 626
(Alaska 1979)). Neither an order denying a motion to continue a stay nor an order
denying a motion for default judgment is an appealable final judgment because neither
terminates the litigation on the merits.
43 See AS 22.05.010(b) ("Appeal to the supreme court is a matter of right only
in those actions and proceedings from which there is no right of appeal to the court of
appeals . . . or to the superior court . . . ."). Jackson was convicted in the Haines district
court, and under AS 22.07.020(c) and AS 22.15.240(b) he had a right of appeal to the
court of appeals or superior court. He may not appeal his criminal convictions to this
court as a matter of right.
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