| Alaska Supreme Court Opinions made Available byTouch N' Go Systems and Bright Solutions |
|
|
|
| Alaska Supreme Court Opinions made Available byTouch N' Go Systems and Bright Solutions |
|
|
|
|
You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Larson v. State, Dept. of Corrections (8/31/2012) sp-6703
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before publication in the PACIFIC REPORTER .
Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts,
303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878, email
corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
LOREN J. LARSON, JR., )
) Supreme Court Nos. S-14110/14129
Appellant, ) (Consolidated)
)
v. ) Superior Court No. 3AN-09-07540 CI
)
STATE OF ALASKA, ) O P I N I O N
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, )
)
No. 6703 - August 31, 2012
Appellee. )
)
)
LOREN J. LARSON, JR., )
)
Appellant, ) Superior Court No. 3AN-10-09348 CI
)
v. )
)
CRAIG TURNBULL, )
)
Appellee. )
_______________________________ )
Appeal in File No. S-14110 from the Superior Court of the
State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Peter A.
Michalski, Judge. Appeal in File No. S-14129 from the
Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District,
Anchorage, Eric A. Aarseth, Judge.
Appearances: Loren. J. Larson, Jr., pro se, Seward,
Appellant. Marilyn J. Kamm, Assistant Attorney General,
and John J. Burns, Attorney General, Juneau, for Appellees.
----------------------- Page 2-----------------------
Before: Fabe, Winfree, and Stowers, Justices. [Carpeneti,
Chief Justice, and Christen, Justice, not participating.]
STOWERS, Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
Loren J. Larson, Jr. is incarcerated at the Spring Creek Correctional Center
in Seward. Acting pro se, he filed two separate complaints alleging violations of his
constitutional rights. His first complaint alleged that he suffers from paruresis, a
condition that makes it impossible for him to urinate in the presence of others, and the
correctional facility had violated state and federal constitutional prohibitions against
cruel and unusual punishment by failing to accommodate his condition with alternative
urinalysis testing procedures. His second complaint alleged that the correctional
facility's revised visitor application form for minors violates his state constitutional right
to rehabilitation because it is more restrictive than the administrative regulation
governing visitation rights. Both complaints were dismissed for failure to state a claim
under Alaska Civil Rule 12(b)(6).
We consolidated these two appeals to address an issue common to both -
the procedure for properly evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the complaint
of a pro se prisoner alleging constitutional violations. We take this opportunity to
emphasize that a complaint must be liberally construed and a motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(6) is viewed with disfavor and should rarely be granted. Because both of
Larson's complaints alleged facts which, if proven, are sufficient to entitle him to some
form of relief, and we find no merit in the arguments that Larson lacks standing or is
otherwise barred from bringing a direct cause of action for these alleged constitutional
violations, we reverse the dismissal of both of Larson's complaints.
-2- 6703
----------------------- Page 3-----------------------
II. FACTS
A. Cruel And Unusual Punishment Claims
In May 2009 Larson filed a civil complaint against the Alaska Department
of Corrections alleging violations of the state and federal constitutional prohibitions
against cruel and unusual punishment. Although Larson named Joe Schmidt, the
Commissioner of the Department of Corrections, in his summons, his complaint named
only the Department of Corrections as a defendant.
Specifically, Larson alleged that he suffers from paruresis, a condition that
makes it physically impossible for him to urinate while another person is watching, and
that he is required to provide a urine sample for random urinalysis testing every three to
four months. He alleged that in order to provide a sample while an officer is watching,
he "must drink water until the volume of urine makes the bladder so intensely painful,
urination becomes an involuntary function," and this process amounts to "physical
torture." Larson requested: (1) a declaratory judgment that forcing him to urinate in
front of an officer violates his constitutional rights under the Eighth Amendment to the
1
federal constitution and article I, section 12 of the state constitution; (2) an injunction
preventing the Department of Corrections from forcing him to urinate in the presence of
another person; and (3) "all costs associated with the filing of this complaint, and any
other as deemed by the Court."
Larson attached several documents to his complaint, including letters,
correspondence with correctional facility staff, and affidavits. His attachments showed
that he had repeatedly brought this issue to the attention of correctional officers, medical
staff, and the superintendent, requesting permission to either drink as much water as he
1 Both article I, section 12 of the Alaska Constitution and the Eighth
Amendment to the federal constitution provide: "Excessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
-3- 6703
----------------------- Page 4-----------------------
needed to provide a urine sample, substitute blood or saliva testing for urinalysis, or be
placed in a dry cell by himself to provide a urine sample. He also filed a formal
grievance. Medical staff responded, "[T]his is a security issue (not a medical issue), as
security does your UA's." A correctional officer granted Larson's request to drink as
much water as he needed to provide a urine sample, but when Larson subsequently
attempted to drink two glasses of water before urinalysis testing another officer ordered
him to pour the second glass out. A third officer denied Larson's request to substitute
blood testing for urinalysis, stating, "[T]here is no record in your medical file to support
this request." Larson's formal grievance and subsequent appeals were also denied.
The State filed a motion to dismiss Larson's complaint under Civil Rule
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, arguing Larson's
constitutional claims were essentially 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims and an individual cannot
bring a direct cause of action against the State under that statute. Larson filed a motion
for summary judgment and a motion for a preliminary injunction, attaching the same
documents that he had attached to his complaint. The State opposed Larson's motions,
again arguing that he could not bring a direct cause of action against the State under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Larson argued in reply that he had filed his complaint against
Commissioner Schmidt and requested an opportunity to correct his filings if they were
incorrect in some way.
In a single order, the superior court granted the State's motion to dismiss
and denied Larson's motion for summary judgment. The court first granted the State's
motion on the grounds that Larson's federal constitutional claim was properly
characterized as a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit and Larson had improperly named the State,
rather than an individual, as the defendant in his complaint. The court reasoned that even
if Larson had correctly named Commissioner Schmidt in his complaint, as he had in his
summons, his federal constitutional claims did not have merit. The court then proceeded
-4- 6703
----------------------- Page 5-----------------------
to analyze Larson's summary judgment motion and ruled that Larson had failed to
establish a constitutional violation under either the federal or state constitutions. Finally,
the court denied Larson's application for a preliminary injunction, ruling he had failed
to show probable success on the merits of his claims.
The superior court later clarified that it had dismissed Larson's federal
constitutional claim only, because the State had moved to dismiss on the grounds that the
State was not a proper defendant in a § 1983 suit and this argument provided no basis for
dismissing Larson's state constitutional claim. The State then filed a motion to dismiss
Larson's state constitutional claim, relying on Hertz v. Beach2 to argue that Larson had
failed to state a claim for relief because there is no private cause of action under the
Alaska Constitution. The court granted the State's motion and dismissed Larson's
remaining state constitutional claim.
B. Right To Rehabilitation Claim
In June 2010 Larson filed a separate complaint against Craig Turnbull, the
superintendent of the Spring Creek Correctional Center, alleging a violation of his
constitutional right to rehabilitation under article I, section 12 of the state constitution.
Specifically, his complaint alleged that the correctional center had revised its visitor
application form in March 2010 and the revised application form violated his
constitutional right to rehabilitation by being more restrictive than 22 AAC 05.130, the
administrative regulation governing visitation. Larson also alleged that he had filed a
grievance regarding this issue, which was rejected and his appeal denied. He requested:
(1) a declaratory judgment that Superintendent Turnbull had violated his constitutional
right to rehabilitation by implementing a visitor application form that is more restrictive
than the governing administrative regulation; (2) an injunction ordering Superintendent
2 211 P.3d 677 (Alaska 2009).
-5- 6703
----------------------- Page 6-----------------------
Turnbull to implement a visitor application form that is not more restrictive than the
governing administrative regulation; (3) $15,000 in punitive damages; and (4) $15,000
in compensatory damages.
Larson attached several documents to his complaint, including a letter that
he had sent to Sergeant Tiffany Stillers in March 2009 requesting several revisions to the
revised application form. In the letter, Larson objected to the requirement that minors
and their custodial parent or legal guardian must be on a prisoner's approved visitation
list before being allowed to visit, and the provision that a minor would automatically be
removed from the visitation list on his or her 18th birthday without prior notice. He
argued that family members were also allowed to accompany minor children, even if the
3
child's parent or legal guardian was not on the inmate's approved visitation list, and that
there should be a process for pre-approving minors for visitation as adults one month
prior to their 18th birthday to avoid gaps in their ability to visit. Larson expressed
concern that this revised application form would affect his son, who was turning 18 in
June 2010. Larson also attached to his complaint the grievance that he had filed with the
correctional facility. He also attached a superior court order from a 2009 case in which
he had complained of an inconsistency between two regulations affecting the visitation
procedure for his minor daughter when accompanied by a non-parent family member;
in the 2009 order, the superior court ruled that Larson's complaint had been resolved
because the Department of Corrections had agreed to amend the regulations.4
3 See 22 AAC 05.130(d)(7) ("A visitor may be excluded for any of the
following reasons: . . . being under the age of 18, unless the visitor is a family member
of the prisoner escorted by an adult family member . . . .") (emphasis added).
4 Larson v. State, Dep't of Corr. , No. 3AN-09-10280 CI (Alaska Super.,
May 17, 2010).
-6- 6703
----------------------- Page 7-----------------------
Superintendent Turnbull filed a motion to dismiss Larson's complaint under
Civil Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. He
relied on Hertz to argue there is no private cause of action under the Alaska Constitution,
and also argued that Larson had failed to allege his right to rehabilitation was actually
impacted by the revised visitor application form. Larson opposed the State's motion and
attached the correctional facility's visitor application form to his opposition brief. The
State filed a reply brief and attached several documents as well, including an April 2010
memorandum notifying inmates that previously approved visitors would not be required
to submit a new visitor application, an affidavit from Sergeant Stillers stating she had
personally sent two approval forms to Larson's son before his 18th birthday to prevent
any interruption in his visits with his father, and a May 2009 note from Superintendent
Turnbull to Larson giving permission for Larson's mother to accompany his minor
children on visitations.
The superior court granted the State's motion to dismiss, ruling: "Plaintiff
has failed to state a claim for relief. There is no private cause of action under the Alaska
Constitution. The alleged failure to comply with an administrative regulation is an issue
of administrative law, not constitutional law. This case is dismissed with prejudice."
Larson appeals the dismissal of both of his complaints.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a superior court's dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a
claim under Alaska Civil Rule 12(b)(6) de novo.5 The complaint must be liberally
construed and we treat all factual allegations as true.6 "[A] motion to dismiss under
5 Guerrero v. Alaska Hous. Fin. Corp., 6 P.3d 250, 253 (Alaska 2000)
(citing Kollodge v. State , 757 P.2d 1024, 1026 n.4 (Alaska 1988)).
6 Clemensen v. Providence Alaska Med. Ctr., 203 P.3d 1148, 1151
(continued...)
-7- 6703
----------------------- Page 8-----------------------
Rule 12(b)(6) is viewed with disfavor and should rarely be granted."7 To survive a
motion to dismiss, a complaint "need only allege a set of facts consistent with and
appropriate to some enforceable cause of action."8 A complaint should not be dismissed
"unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of
his claim" that would entitle him to some form of relief, even if the plaintiff requests a
type of relief he is not entitled to obtain.9
In reviewing a motion to dismiss, we generally do not consider matters
outside the complaint,10 although we may consider attachments to the complaint.11 When
6(...continued)
(Alaska 2009) (citing Jacob v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's
Servs., 177 P.3d 1181, 1184 (Alaska 2008)); Guerrero, 6 P.3d at 253 (citing Kollodge ,
757 P.2d at 1026).
7 Guerrero, 6 P.3d at 253 (citing Kollodge , 757 P.2d at 1026); see also
Clemensen, 203 P.3d at 1151 (quoting Jacob , 177 P.3d at 1184) ("[Rule 12(b)(6)]
dismissals are viewed with disfavor and should only be granted on the rare occasion
where it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of
the claims that would entitle the plaintiff to relief.").
8 Guerrero, 6 P.3d at 253-54 (quoting Odom v. Fairbanks Mem'l Hosp., 999
P.2d 123, 128 (Alaska 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
9 Id. at 254 (quoting Martin v. Mears , 602 P.2d 421, 429 (Alaska 1979)); see
also Shooshanian v. Wagner, 672 P.2d 455, 461 n.5 (Alaska 1983) (citing Miller v.
Johnson , 370 P.2d 171, 172 (Alaska 1962)) ("[G]ranting the Rule 12(b)(6) motion would
be improper if the [plaintiff's] complaint states a claim upon which some relief may be
granted, although the relief demanded may not be the kind to which the party is in fact
entitled to obtain.").
10 Dworkin v. First Nat'l Bank of Fairbanks , 444 P.2d 777, 779-80
(Alaska 1968).
11 Adkins v. Stansel , 204 P.3d 1031, 1035 n.20 (Alaska 2009) (citing Kaiser
v. Umialik Ins., 108 P.3d 876, 878 n.1 (Alaska 2005)) ("Attachments to a complaint are
(continued...)
-8- 6703
----------------------- Page 9-----------------------
parties present additional materials outside of the pleadings in connection with a motion
to dismiss, the superior court must expressly exclude the materials or convert the motion
into a motion for summary judgment under Alaska Civil Rule 56 and allow all parties a
reasonable opportunity to submit materials pertinent to such a motion.12 When the
superior court does neither, but instead decides the motion under Rule 12(b)(6) without
stating whether it considered materials outside the pleadings, we have three options: we
may elect to reverse and remand for proper consideration; we may review the superior
court's decision as if the motion for dismissal had been granted after exclusion of outside
materials; or we may review the decision as if summary judgment had been granted after
conversion of the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment.13
11(...continued)
properly considered a part of the complaint in connection with a motion to dismiss.");
see also Ahwinona v. State, 922 P.2d 884, 886 (Alaska 1996) (stating the trial court could
properly rely on documents attached to the plaintiff's complaint without converting the
defendant's motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment).
12 See Alaska R. Civ. P. 12(b) ("If, on a motion . . . to dismiss for failure of
the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the
pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as
one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall
be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion
by Rule 56."); see also Kaiser, 108 P.3d at 879.
13 See Kaiser, 108 P.3d at 879 (quoting Reed v. Municipality of Anchorage ,
741 P.2d 1181, 1184 (Alaska 1987)); see also Phillips v. Gieringer, 108 P.3d 889, 892-
93 (Alaska 2005) (electing to review a motion to dismiss as a motion for summary
judgment). For example where parties had a reasonable opportunity to present
evidentiary material pertinent to a summary judgment motion, we have reviewed a
superior court's ruling as an entry of summary judgment. See Brice v. State, Div. of
Forest, Land & Water Mgmt. , 669 P.2d 1311, 1314 (Alaska 1983). Where parties did
not have sufficient notice or an adequate opportunity to respond prior to dismissal as
required for summary judgment motions under Rule 56, we have treated the superior
(continued...)
-9- 6703
----------------------- Page 10-----------------------
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Cruel And Unusual Punishment Claims
1. The State's motion to dismiss Larson's federal constitutional
claim for failure to name the proper defendant under § 1983
Larson challenges the dismissal of his complaint against the Department of
Corrections, arguing the superior court erred by failing to give him an opportunity to
amend his complaint and by ruling that his federal and state constitutional claims lacked
merit. The State initially moved to dismiss Larson's complaint on the grounds that he
had incorrectly named the State as the defendant in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit. The statute
provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . . ,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress . . . .[14]
We have stated that "neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are
'persons' under § 1983."15 The superior court agreed that Larson's federal
constitutional claim was properly characterized as a § 1983 claim and that Larson had
incorrectly named the State as a defendant.
13(...continued)
court's decision as a dismissal for failure to state a claim and declined to review materials
outside the pleadings. See Shooshanian, 672 P.2d at 460-61.
14 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
15 Prentzel v. State, Dep't of Pub. Safety , 53 P.3d 587, 594 n.30 (Alaska 2002)
(quoting Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)).
-10- 6703
----------------------- Page 11-----------------------
However, a state official may be sued for injunctive relief under § 1983.16
Larson stated in the briefing supporting his summary judgment motion that he believed
he had filed his complaint against Commissioner Schmidt and specifically requested an
opportunity to correct his filings if necessary. The pleadings of pro se litigants are "held
to less stringent standards than those of lawyers," and the superior court must "inform
a pro se litigant of the proper procedure for the action he or she is obviously attempting
to accomplish."17 But the superior court did not give Larson an opportunity to amend his
complaint because the court concluded that even if Larson had properly named
Commissioner Schmidt in his complaint as well as his summons, his federal
constitutional claim failed on its merits.
The Eighth Amendment's prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishment"
imposes a duty on prison officials to provide "humane conditions of confinement," which
includes ensuring that inmates receive adequate medical care.18 A prison official's
"deliberate indifference" to an inmate's "serious medical needs" violates the Eighth
Amendment.19 To prevail on a deliberate indifference claim, an inmate must first show
a serious medical need by demonstrating that failure to treat the condition could result
16 Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n.10 (quoting Kentucky v. Graham , 473 U.S. 159,
167 n.14 (1985)) ("Of course a state official in his or her official capacity, when sued for
injunctive relief, would be a person under § 1983 because 'official-capacity actions for
prospective relief are not treated as actions against the State.' ").
17 Capolicchio v. Levy, 194 P.3d 373, 378 (Alaska 2008) (quoting Breck v.
Ulmer, 745 P.2d 66, 75 (Alaska 1987)).
18 Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994).
19 Hertz v. Beach , 211 P.3d 668, 677 (Alaska 2009) (quoting Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828, 835.
-11- 6703
----------------------- Page 12-----------------------
in "further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain."20 The
inmate must then show that a prison official was deliberately indifferent to that need,
meaning the official "knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and
safety."21 Here, the superior court concluded: "Even assuming that Larson's alleged
paruresis constitutes a serious medical need, it is clear from the filings that the prison
officials did not exhibit deliberate indifference to his condition." This conclusion is
problematic for several reasons.
First, the State never challenged the substance of Larson's allegations or
argued that his allegations were insufficient to support his federal constitutional claim.
As the superior court observed, the State's first motion to dismiss was based solely on
the grounds that Larson had named the wrong defendant for a § 1983 claim. But naming
the wrong defendant is an insufficient basis for dismissing Larson's complaint. As a pro
se plaintiff, Larson must be informed of the proper procedure for the action he was
obviously attempting to accomplish.22 Therefore, he should have been allowed to amend
his complaint to name a proper defendant.23
20 Hertz , 211 P.3d at 677-78 (quoting Jett v. Penner , 439 F.3d 1091, 1096
(9th Cir. 2006)) (emphasis added).
21 Id . at 678 (quoting Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004)).
22 See Capolicchio, 194 P.3d at 378 (quoting Breck , 744 P.2d at 75).
23 We also note that to prevail on a deliberate indifference claim, Larson must
name as a defendant a prison official who was aware of his alleged condition and
disregarded his requests for alternative testing procedures. See Hertz, 211 P.3d at 678-79
("For deliberate indifference, the prison official must not only be aware of facts from
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, but that
person must also draw the inference. Deliberate indifference to medical needs may be
shown by circumstantial evidence when the facts are sufficient to demonstrate that a
defendant actually knew of a risk of harm. When the facts do not demonstrate that the
(continued...)
-12- 6703
----------------------- Page 13-----------------------
But the superior court did not deny the State's motion and allow Larson to
amend his complaint. Instead, the court relied on the materials that Larson submitted
with his complaint and summary judgment motion to conclude that Larson's federal
constitutional claim lacked merit, even though the State raised only a procedural
argument and made no attempt to challenge the substance of Larson's claims, and
Larson, a pro se litigant, was given no opportunity to respond to such a challenge.
Finally, we disagree with the superior court's conclusion that, assuming
Larson suffers from paruresis and experiences pain when providing urine samples for
urinalysis, his pleadings and attachments demonstrate that prison officials were not
deliberately indifferent to his condition. The court reasoned: "Larson's own exhibits
show that he was examined by various mental health professionals numerous times.
Their conclusions are unclear, but the fact that the examinations took place shows that
officials were not deliberately indifferent to Larson's complaints." The State relies on
Chapman v. Raemisch24 to argue that the fact the examinations took place, combined
with correspondence between Larson and prison officials about his condition,
demonstrates the officials were not deliberately indifferent to his condition. In Raemisch ,
prison officials accommodated an inmate's paruresis by implementing a modified
urinalysis testing procedure (allowing him to provide a sample in a closed bathroom stall
with an officer standing quietly outside the door), and provided the inmate with a number
of treatment options to help alleviate his condition.25 The district court rejected the
23(...continued)
defendants had this knowledge, however, a deliberate indifference claim must fail.")
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
24 No. 05-C-1254, 2009 WL 425813 (E.D. Wis., Feb. 20, 2009).
25 Id . at *3, 6.
-13- 6703
----------------------- Page 14-----------------------
inmate's argument that he should be allowed to use an alternate form of drug testing,
such as blood or saliva testing, holding, "even if plaintiff would prefer a form of testing
that did not include urinalysis, it does not follow that any urinalysis test constitutes
deliberate indifference to his [condition]."26 Unlike Raemisch , Larson's allegations and
exhibits show that prison officials were aware of his complaint and did nothing to
accommodate his condition. Assuming Larson suffers from paruresis and experiences
extreme pain when providing urinalysis samples, as we must for purposes of a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss,27 the mere fact that medical staff examined Larson is
insufficient to conclusively establish that prison officials were not deliberately indifferent
to his condition.
2. The State's motion to dismiss Larson's state constitutional claim
under Hertz v. Beach
For Larson's state constitutional claim, the State filed a second
Rule 12(b)(6) motion relying on Hertz to argue that "[t]here is no private cause of action
under the Alaska Constitution." The superior court agreed and granted the State's
motion.
26 Id . at *6.
27 We note that Larson submitted no evidence of a medical diagnosis, and his
own affidavits are insufficient to establish that he actually suffers from paruresis.
Larson's attachments show that he met with mental health clinicians and medical staff
at the correctional facility, although, as the superior court observed, "[t]heir conclusions
are unclear." The record shows that Larson submitted a discovery request to the State
attempting to obtain all information documenting or associated with these meetings, but
the State failed to provide him with the requested documents. At oral argument the State
admitted that the requested documents were never produced. If the State fails to respond
to Larson's discovery requests, Larson should file a motion to compel discovery under
Civil Rule 37.
-14- 6703
----------------------- Page 15-----------------------
In Hertz , an inmate filed a civil suit against prison medical staff, alleging
he had received inadequate dental treatment in violation of his state and federal
constitutional rights and seeking both damages and injunctive relief.28 At the time of
appeal, the inmate had received the dental procedure he requested, which "mooted his
request for injunctive relief, leaving only his claim for damages."29 We construed the
inmate's deliberate indifference claim as a federal constitutional claim, observing that
his parallel claim for damages under the Alaska Constitution would not be viable: "[W]e
will not imply a private cause of action for damages under the Alaska Constitution
'except in cases of flagrant constitutional violations where little or no alternative
remedies are available.' Medical malpractice and federal constitutional law provide
adequate remedies to redress inadequate dental treatment."30
Hertz and the cases it relies on stem from the Supreme Court's decision in
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics31 allowing a
plaintiff to claim monetary damages against federal agents based on a violation of his
rights under the Fourth Amendment to the federal constitution.32 Hertz did not address
28 211 P.3d 668, 672-74 (Alaska 2009).
29 Id . at 674 n.1.
30 Id. at 677 n.12 (quoting Lowell v. Hayes , 117 P.3d 745, 753 (Alaska 2005))
(internal citations omitted).
31 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
32 Id . at 397; see Lowell, 117 P.3d at 753-54 ("We have never recognized a
Bivens-type private right of action for constitutional torts under the Alaska Constitution.
We have stated that we will not allow a constitutional claim for damages, except in cases
of flagrant constitutional violations where little or no alternative remedies are available.")
(internal quotations marks omitted); Dick Fischer Dev. No. 2, Inc. v. State, Dep't of
Admin. , 838 P.2d 263, 268 (Alaska 1992) (observing "federal courts have been reluctant
(continued...)
-15- 6703
----------------------- Page 16-----------------------
or restrict claims for injunctive relief based on constitutional violations. We have
previously recognized that injunctive relief is an "available and appropriate remedy" for
violations under the state constitution, even where a Bivens claim for damages is
unavailable.33 And we have previously affirmed the right of a prison inmate to sue the
State and prison officials for violations of the inmate's constitutional rights.34
Here, Larson requested declaratory and injunctive relief and "all costs
associated in the filing of this complaint." Larson did not actually request damages;
therefore Hertz does not apply. Even if Larson had requested some form of relief that
he was not entitled to obtain, his complaint should not have been dismissed under
Rule 12(b)(6) unless it appeared that he could prove no set of facts in support of his
claim that would entitle him to some other form of relief.35
(...continued)
to extend the Bivens decision where alternative remedies are available" and holding
"[w]e are also hesitant to extend the Bivens decision, and will not allow a claim for
damages except in cases of flagrant constitutional violations where little or no alternative
remedies are available").
33 See Herrick's Aero-Auto-Aqua Repair Serv. v. State, Dep't of Transp. &
Pub. Serv. , 754 P.2d 1111, 1116 (Alaska 1988) ("[U]nlike Bivens , injunctive relief is an
available and appropriate remedy for righting any wrong done to the [plaintiffs]. As a
result, we hold the Bivens remedy of damages inapplicable to the case at bar.").
34 See Rathke v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 153 P.3d 303, 309 (Alaska 2007) (citing
Ferguson v. State, Dep't of Corr. , 816 P.2d 134 (Alaska 1991)).
35 See Guerrero v. Alaska Hous. Fin. Corp., 6 P.3d 250, 254 (Alaska 2000)
(quoting Martin v. Mears , 602 P.2d 421, 429 (Alaska 1979)); Shooshanian v. Wagner,
672 P.2d 455, 461 n.5 (Alaska 1983) (citing Miller v. Johnson , 370 P.2d 171, 172
(Alaska 1962)) ("[G]ranting the Rule 12(b)(6) motion would be improper if the
[plaintiff's] complaint states a claim upon which some relief may be granted, although
the relief demanded may not be the kind to which the party is in fact entitled to obtain.").
-16- 6703
----------------------- Page 17-----------------------
For these reasons, we reverse the superior court's rulings under
Rule 12(b)(6) dismissing Larson's federal and state constitutional claims and remand for
further proceedings, including allowing Larson to file an amended complaint. If the
State wishes to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting Larson's claims, the
State can file a summary judgment motion and Larson will have an adequate opportunity
to respond, including obtaining appropriate discovery in support of his claims.
Larson also challenges the superior court's denial of his motion for a
preliminary injunction. In denying Larson's motion, the superior court ruled that Larson
had failed to make a clear showing of probable success on the merits, given the court's
previous ruling that his claims lacked merit. Because we disagree with the court's
analysis, we also reverse the court's ruling on Larson's preliminary injunction motion
and remand for the court to reconsider whether Larson demonstrated probable success
on the merits.
B. Right To Rehabilitation Claim Under The State Constitution
1. Motion to dismiss and trial court order
Larson also challenges the dismissal of his complaint against
Superintendent Turnbull under Rule 12(b)(6). In his motion to dismiss, Superintendent
Turnbull argued that: (1) under Hertz there is no private cause of action under the
Alaska Constitution; (2) the correctional facility's alleged failure to follow an
administrative regulation was an issue of administrative law, not constitutional law; and
(3) Larson failed to allege he was actually harmed by the adoption of the revised
visitation form. The superior court agreed, ruling: "There is no private cause of action
under the Alaska Constitution. The alleged failure to comply with an administrative
regulation is an issue of administrative law, not constitutional law."
As discussed above, Hertz restricts a Bivens claim for damages under the
Alaska Constitution to "cases of flagrant constitutional violations where little or no
-17- 6703
----------------------- Page 18-----------------------
alternative remedies are available."36 Before dismissing Larson's claims for punitive and
compensatory damages, the superior court was required to determine whether Larson had
alleged a "flagrant" constitutional violation and whether alternative remedies were
available to him. Larson also requested injunctive and declaratory relief. As discussed
above, Hertz does not apply to such claims. Furthermore, Superintendent Turnbull
correctly conceded at oral argument that Larson's claims for declaratory and injunctive
relief were not barred by Hertz , and that whether the revised visitation application form
violated Larson's right to rehabilitation under the state constitution was an issue of
constitutional law, not administrative law. However, Superintendent Turnbull urges us
to affirm the superior court's ruling dismissing Larson's complaint on alternative
grounds, arguing that Larson lacks standing and his claims are barred by collateral
estoppel.
2. Standing
Superintendent Turnbull argues that Larson has not demonstrated a
sufficient personal stake in this litigation because he failed to allege that his visitation
rights have actually been impacted by the revised visitor application form. We disagree.
Superintendent Turnbull relies on the attachments submitted with his
briefing to the superior court in support of his motion to dismiss to argue that the
correctional facility has taken steps to ensure Larson's visitation with his minor children
has not been interrupted since the adoption of the revised visitation form. Such materials
were not properly before the superior court on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, and the
superior court did not expressly convert Superintendent Turnbull's motion into a motion
36 Hertz v. Beach , 211 P.3d 668, 677 n.12 (Alaska 2009) (quoting Lowell , 117
P.3d at 753).
-18- 6703
----------------------- Page 19-----------------------
for summary judgment. 37 "The terms of Rule 12(b) make conversion mandatory
whenever matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court."38
Although we could elect to review the superior court's decision as an order granting
summary judgment,39 we decline to do so when there is no indication that the superior
court considered these materials in granting Superintendent Turnbull's motion.40
Furthermore, we have interpreted the concept of standing broadly,
"favoring increased accessibility to judicial forums."41 We have identified two types of
standing: interest-injury and taxpayer-citizen standing.42 To establish interest-injury
standing, a party must demonstrate "a sufficient personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy to ensure the requisite adversity."43 However, the degree of injury to interest
37 See Alaska R. Civ. P. 12(b); Kaiser v. Umialik Ins. , 108 P.3d 876, 879
(Alaska 2005); Dworkin v. First Nat'l Bank of Fairbanks , 444 P.2d 777, 779-80
(Alaska 1968).
38 Martin v. Mears, 602 P.2d 421, 426 (Alaska 1979) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
39 See Kaiser, 108 P.3d at 879 (quoting Reed v. Municipality of Anchorage ,
741 P.2d 1181, 1184 (Alaska 1987)).
40 See Kaiser, 108 P.3d at 879 (noting the superior court's order indicated the
court had reviewed the motion as a summary judgment motion); Shooshanian, 672 P.2d
at 460-61 (noting it was clear from the superior court's order that court had considered
matters outside the pleadings).
41 See Bowers Office Prods., Inc. v. Univ. of Alaska, 755 P.2d 1095, 1097
(Alaska 1988) (quoting Trustees for Alaska v. State, Dep't of Natural Res., 736 P.2d 324,
327 (Alaska 1987)).
42 Kleven v. Yukon-Koyukuk Sch. Dist. , 853 P.2d 518, 526 (Alaska 1993).
43 Id . (quoting Hoblit v. Comm'r of Natural Res. , 678 P.2d 1337, 1340
(Alaska 1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
-19- 6703
----------------------- Page 20-----------------------
need not be great: "an identifiable trifle is enough for standing to fight out a question of
principle."44
Similarly, AS 44.62.300 provides that "[a]n interested person may get a
judicial declaration on the validity of a regulation by bringing an action for declaratory
relief in the superior court." In Bowers Office Products, Inc. v. University of Alaska ,45
we held that a company challenging the university's grievance process after the
university rejected the company's bid in favor of another supplier was an "interested
person" under this statute, even though the company requested prospective declaratory
relief only, reasoning that "as a continuing bidder to the University, [the company] will
continue to be subjected to the rules it seeks to have reviewed."46 In contrast, in Kleven
v. Yukon-Koyukuk School District,47 we held that an employee who had started a
grievance process and then subsequently resigned from the school district did not have
standing to challenge the school district's grievance procedure because he was no longer
an employee and, therefore, was no longer subject to the contested grievance procedures
or threatened by the alleged safety violations.48
Here, Larson's complaint alleged that the correctional facility's revised
visitor application form violates his right to rehabilitation under the state constitution
because it is more restrictive than the administrative regulation governing visitation. The
attachments to Larson's complaint show that he was concerned this revision would
44 Bowers , 755 P.2d at 1097 (quoting Trustees for Alaska, 736 P.2d at 327).
45 755 P.2d 1095 (Alaska 1988).
46
Id . at 1098.
47 853 P.2d 518 (Alaska 1993).
48 Id . at 526 (comparing Bowers , 755 P.2d at 1098 with Rutter v. State , 668
P.2d 1343, 1346 (Alaska 1983)).
-20- 6703
----------------------- Page 21-----------------------
impact his visitation with his son, and that he had previously filed a complaint alleging
violations of his visitation rights with his minor daughter.49 As an inmate with minor
children who continues to be subject to the contested visitation form, Larson has
demonstrated a "sufficient personal stake in the outcome of the controversy" to establish
standing under our broad standing principles.
3. Collateral estoppel
Finally, Superintendent Turnbull argues that Larson is collaterally estopped
from claiming damages under the Alaska Constitution by Larson v. State, Department
of Corrections,50 the earlier superior court case in which Larson complained of an
inconsistency between two regulations affecting the visitation procedure for his minor
daughter when accompanied by a non-parent family member, because in that case the
superior court also dismissed Larson's claim for monetary damages based on an alleged
violation of his constitutional right to rehabilitation. Collateral estoppel applies where:
"(1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication was precisely the same as that presented
in the action in question; (2) the prior litigation must have resulted in a final judgment
on the merits; and (3) there must be 'mutuality' of parties."51 Larson's prior case was
based on a visitation incident with his minor daughter that occurred in 2009. His present
49 We may consider the attachments to Larson's complaint because such
attachments "are properly considered a part of a complaint in connection with a motion
to dismiss." Adkins v. Stansel , 204 P.3d 1031, 1035 n.20 (Alaska 2009). We do not
consider the attachments that Superintendent Turnbull submitted with his motion to
dismiss because such attachments are materials outside the pleadings and, therefore, were
not properly before the superior court on a motion to dismiss. See Alaska R. Civ. P.
12(b); Dworkin v. First Nat'l Bank of Fairbanks , 444 P.2d 777, 779-80 (Alaska 1968).
50 No. 3AN-09-10280 CI (Alaska Super., May 17, 2010).
51 Snyder v. State, Dep't of Pub. Safety, Div. of Motor Vehicles, 31 P.3d 770,
774 n.17 (Alaska 2001) (quoting Briggs v. State, Dep't of Pub. Safety, Div. of Motor
Vehicles, 732 P.2d 1078, 1081 (Alaska 1987)) (emphasis added).
-21- 6703
----------------------- Page 22-----------------------
complaint is based on a 2010 revision to the correctional facility's visitor application
form. The issues are not identical and collateral estoppel does not apply. However, we
reiterate that Larson is only entitled to damages under the Alaska Constitution if the
superior court finds that Larson's present allegations amount to a flagrant constitutional
violation and there are no alternative remedies available.52
V. CONCLUSION
We REVERSE both of the superior court orders dismissing Larson's
complaints for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), and REMAND for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
52 See Hertz v. Beach, 211 P.3d 668, 677 n.12 (Alaska 2009).
-22- 6703
 |
| Case Law Statutes, Regs & Rules Constitutions Miscellaneous |
|
