| Alaska Supreme Court Opinions made Available byTouch N' Go Systems and Bright Solutions |
|
|
|
| Alaska Supreme Court Opinions made Available byTouch N' Go Systems and Bright Solutions |
|
|
|
|
You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Brotherton v. Warner (10/8/2010) sp-6521
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before publication in the PACIFIC REPORTER.
Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts, 303
K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878, e-mail
corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
DOUGLAS W. BROTHERTON, )
) Supreme Court No. S-13541
Appellant, )
) Superior Court No. 3AN-94-01210 CI
v. )
) O P I N I O N
DOUGLAS WARNER and )
PAMELA J. NEISWANGER, ) No. 6521 - October 8, 2010
)
Appellees. )
)
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third
Judicial District, Anchorage, Mark Rindner, Judge.
Appearances: Douglas Brotherton, pro se, Anchorage,
Appellant. Notice of non-participation filed by Michael
Gershel, Law Office of Michael Gershel, Anchorage, for
Appellees Douglas Warner and Pamela J. Neiswanger.
Before: Fabe, Winfree, Christen, and Stowers, Justices.
[Carpeneti, Chief Justice, not participating.]
CHRISTEN, Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
Douglas Brotherton appeals a superior court order extending his child
support obligation for his 18-year-old son Nicholas through Nicholas's graduation from
high school pursuant to AS 25.24.170(a). Douglas argues that the superior court erred
in interpreting both AS 25.24.170(a) and a stipulation setting out his child support
----------------------- Page 2-----------------------
obligation. He also argues that the superior court committed various procedural errors.
We disagree, and affirm the superior court's order.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Douglas and Tahni Brotherton married on October 1, 1981 and were
divorced on April 18, 1995. They have two children together: Benjamin, born
June 26, 1988, and Nicholas, born October 5, 1990.
In 2005 Nicholas and Benjamin went to stay with Tahni's brother and
sister-in-law, Douglas Warner and Pamela Neiswanger (the Warners).1 In April 2006 the
Warners initiated legal action to attain custody of Nicholas. Douglas and the Warners
subsequently stipulated to entry of an Order for Temporary Placement, Legal Custody
and Child Support Re: Minor Child concerning Nicholas (the stipulation). The
stipulation granted the Warners legal custody of Nicholas, one-half of the monthly
support payments Tahni paid to Douglas,2 and $500 per month from Douglas "for so long
as the [Warners] have legal custody and physical placement of Nicholas." The
stipulation acknowledged that this arrangement was a "temporary placement," called for
Douglas and Nicholas to participate in counseling, and stated that the parties' goal was
"to reunite Nicholas and his father." The stipulation also noted that the "unusual"
circumstances of the case (Benjamin was to reside with his father, and Nicholas was to
1 We adopt the naming convention used in Douglas and Pamela's Opposition
to Douglas Brotherton's Motion for Reconsideration, April 2009.
2 From July 1, 2004, until they went to stay with the Warners, Douglas had
full physical custody of both boys. A November 29, 2004 court order set out Tahni's
obligation to pay Douglas monthly child support. The stipulation provided for one-half
of these payments to go to Warners until Tahni no longer owed support for Benjamin, at
which point Tahni would continue to make support payments directly to whomever
maintained custody of Nicholas.
-2- 6521
----------------------- Page 3-----------------------
reside with the Warners) merited a variance from the calculation of child support under
Alaska Civil Rule 90.3.
On October 5, 2008, Nicholas turned eighteen while enrolled in the twelfth
grade at Service High School. The Warners notified the Child Support Services Division
(CSSD) that Nicholas was still in high school and requested post-majority support. On
October 23, 2008, CSSD responded and notified Douglas that his child support
obligation had been extended through Nicholas's anticipated graduation in May 2009.
Douglas objected, arguing that the terms of the stipulation precluded the grant of post-
majority support. CSSD responded that the parties' stipulation "did not supersede the
original child support," and referred to the court order describing Tahni's support
obligation to Douglas.3 Douglas argued that because the order applied to Tahni, it did
not provide a basis for imposing a child support obligation on him. On
December 31, 2008, CSSD sent Douglas and the Warners a Notice of Intent to Close
Case which stated that "[t]here is no current support order." On January 26, 2009, CSSD
notified Douglas that he had overpaid child support by $844.77 because post-majority
support had been automatically deducted from his paycheck after Nicholas was
"emancipated effective October 31, 2008."4
3 Tahni's support obligation was memorialized on a standardized "Order for
Modification of Child Support" form. The form provides that post-majority support must
continue while an 18-year-old is enrolled in high school unless the parties specifically
opt out of this obligation by checking a box. The box was not checked, so Tahni's
support obligation continued after the boys turned 18.
4 CSSD notified the Warners that they had received the overpayment on
February 4, 2009.
-3- 6521
----------------------- Page 4-----------------------
In February 2009 the Warners filed a Motion to Continue Child Support
Obligation pursuant to AS 25.24.170(a),5 requesting that the superior court order post-
majority support from Douglas through Nicholas's graduation from high school.
Douglas opposed the motion on the grounds of improper venue and misinterpretation of
the stipulation, and also filed a motion for award of judgment requesting that the court
require the Warners to repay the $844.77 overpayment identified by CSSD. The superior
court issued an order on March 20, 2009 extending Douglas's support obligation
"through the month of [Nicholas's] nineteenth (19th) birthday, so long as [he] is
(1) unmarried, (2) actively pursuing a high school diploma or equivalent level of
technical or vocational training, and (3) living as a dependent with . . . [the Warners] or
a designee of the [Warners]." The superior court also issued an order denying Douglas's
motion for judgment. Douglas filed two motions for reconsideration, which were denied.
Douglas appeals the superior court's extension of child support, denial of judgment
against the Warners for $844.77, and denial of his motions for reconsideration.
5 AS 25.24.170(a) provides that:
[A]ny time after judgment the court, upon the motion of
either party, may set aside, alter, or modify so much of the
judgment as may provide for . . . the care, nurture, and
education of unmarried 18-year-old children of the marriage
while they are actively pursuing a high school diploma or an
equivalent level of technical or vocational training and living
as dependents with a parent, guardian, or designee of the
parent or guardian.
-4- 6521
----------------------- Page 5-----------------------
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Interpretation of an agreement between parties is a question of law to which
we apply our independent judgment.6
The interpretation of a statute is also a question of law reviewed according
to our independent judgment and "according to reason, practicality, and common sense,
considering the meaning of the statute's language, its legislative history, and its
purpose."7
We "will not disturb the trial court's factual findings unless those findings
are clearly erroneous."8 We review the superior court's procedural decisions for abuse
of discretion.9 We also review denial of a motion for reconsideration for abuse of
discretion.10 We will find an abuse of discretion "only when, after reviewing the entire
record, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that the lower court erred."11
6 Hixson v. Sarkesian, 66 P.3d 753, 757 (Alaska 2003) (citing Flannery v.
Flannery, 950 P.2d 126, 129 (Alaska 1998)).
7 Parson v. State, Dep't of Revenue, Alaska Hous. Fin. Corp., 189 P.3d 1032,
1036 (Alaska 2008) (citing Grimm v. Wagoner, 77 P.3d 423, 427 (Alaska 2003)).
8 T. Ferguson Const., Inc. v. Sealaska Corp., 820 P.2d 1058, 1062 (Alaska
1991).
9 Rockstad v. Erikson, 113 P.3d 1215, 1220 (Alaska 2005).
10 Smith v. Groleske, 196 P.3d 1102, 1105 (Alaska 2008).
11 Id. at 1105-06.
-5- 6521
----------------------- Page 6-----------------------
IV. DISCUSSION
A. The Superior Court Correctly Granted The Warners' Motion To
Continue Douglas's Child Support Obligation.
The superior court awarded the Warners post-majority support for Nicholas
based upon AS 25.24.170(a) and Scully v. Scully, where we held that "it should be the
exceptional case in which a court declines to extend child support payments beyond the
child's eighteenth birthday where [the] statutory requirements [for AS 25.24.170(a)] have
been met."12 Douglas argues that the superior court erred in granting the motion to
extend because: (1) the parties' stipulation precluded an award of post-majority support;
(2) AS 25.24.170(a) does not apply to the Warners; and (3) the Warners' motion was not
timely.
1. The 2006 stipulation does not preclude post-majority support;
evidence indicates that the parties anticipated support would
continue post-majority.
Douglas argues that the superior court erred by granting post-majority
support because the parties' stipulation precludes such an award. He relies upon the
following language from the stipulation:
Beginning in July, 2006 and lasting for so long as the
Intervenors have legal custody and physical placement of
Nicholas, [Douglas] shall satisfy his child support obligation
to the [Warners] as follows . . . . (Emphasis in Appellant's
Brief.)[13]
12 987 P.2d 743, 747 (Alaska 1999).
13 Douglas also cites to AS 25.20.010, which states that: "A person is
considered to have arrived at majority at the age of 18, and thereafter has control of the
person's own actions and business and has all the rights and is subject to all the liabilities
of citizens of full age, except as otherwise provided by statute."
-6- 6521
----------------------- Page 7-----------------------
The agreement also twice specifies that the Warners' custody of Nicholas was to be
"temporary."
We have explained that:
Our primary goal in contract interpretation is to give effect to
the parties' reasonable expectations. We discern the parties'
reasonable expectations by looking first at the written
agreement and also extrinsic evidence regarding the parties'
intent at the time the contract was made.[14]
The stipulation's plain language makes clear that the parties' originally intended the
custody agreement to be temporary; the stipulation was to expire when Nicholas was
reunited with his father. That said, we see nothing in the text of the stipulation that can
fairly be construed as an agreement by the Warners to forfeit the possibility of post-
majority support if Nicholas did not reunite with his father. We also find nothing in the
record supporting the assertion that Douglas and the Warners consciously bargained for
the provision of post-majority support. The record supports the superior court's finding
that, at the July 26, 2006 settlement proceedings, "it was never suggested that the ending
of child support at age 18 was a quid pro quo for the agreement. To the contrary, the
hearing indicated that while deviation in the amount of child support was considered, the
duration was not."15
14 Van Alfen v. Van Alfen, 909 P.2d 1075, 1077 n.5 (Alaska 1996) (internal
citations omitted).
15 During the settlement proceedings, the parties reviewed the elements of the
stipulation and discussed the ramifications of Douglas's possible job change. But the
parties did not address the end-point of the agreement or the possibility of post-majority
support, and the superior court affirmatively noted that it was not clear that the
stipulation was only for the short-term. At no point during the hearings held on July 20,
23, or 26 did the parties make any statements manifesting an intent to preclude post-
majority support, or acknowledging such preclusion as part of the bargaining process.
-7- 6521
----------------------- Page 8-----------------------
Tahni's support obligation to Douglas reinforces the conclusion that the
parties acknowledged the need for support to continue until Nicholas and Benjamin
completed high school. The order setting out Tahni's support obligation to Douglas
required that her support payments would continue after the boys' 18th birthdays so long
as they were in high school.16 Indeed, Tahni paid Douglas child support for eleven
months after Benjamin's 18th birthday. Tahni's obligation to pay Douglas child support
for Nicholas also continued after Nicholas turned 18. And the stipulation's treatment of
Tahni's obligation indicates that her support payments for the boys would continue
regardless of where they resided. Because the stipulation did not expressly address post-
majority support, and because Tahni's support obligation indicates that the parties clearly
contemplated the need to support both boys after age 18, we conclude that the superior
court correctly decided that the parties' stipulation did not preclude post-majority
support.
2. The superior court correctly applied AS 25.24.170(a) to the
Warners.
Douglas argues that AS 25.24.170(a) does not apply in this case because
"the Warners do not meet the statutory requirement of 'parent, guardian, or designee of
the parent or guardian.' "
In 1984, our court held that AS 25.24.170(a) did not permit courts to award
post-majority support.17 But the legislature changed the entrance age for public
kindergarten in 1988, resulting in a marked increase in the number of children turning
16 The order requires that support continue "while each child is 18 years old
if the child is (1) unmarried, (2) actively pursuing a high school diploma or equivalent
level of technical or vocational training, and (3) living as a dependent with the obligee
parent or guardian or designee of the parent or guardian."
17 Dowling v. Dowling, 679 P.2d 480, 483 (Alaska 1984).
-8- 6521
----------------------- Page 9-----------------------
18 In response, Representative Fran Ulmer
18 before their graduation from high school.
sponsored a bill to amend AS 25.24.170(a) in 1992 to address the fact that, with the
change in school-entrance age, "many Alaska children must complete their final year of
high school without the benefit of financial support from the non-custodial parent," and
many families may thus be forced to resort to public assistance.19 The bill's passage
amended AS 25.24.170(a) to fill this gap, providing support for children who reach the
age of majority but remain enrolled in high school and living in the home of "a parent,
guardian, or designee of the parent or guardian."20
Douglas argues that while the Warners may have been a "designee of the
parent or guardian" before Nicholas turned 18, this status expired when he reached the
age of majority and could no longer be subject to the "legal custody" of another person.
We disagree. Douglas's interpretation of AS 25.24.170(a) renders the statute
meaningless; if support were tied to legal custody, the superior court could never award
child support after a child's 18th birthday. We construe statutes according to the
legislature's intent,21 and the clear intent of the amendment to AS 25.24.170(a) - to
provide support for children who reach the age of 18 while still living as dependents of
their parents or other parties and attending high school - would be frustrated if the
definitions of "parent," "guardian," and "designee" were premised upon the existence of
a legal custody relationship. For this reason, we conclude that the fact that Nicholas was
18 Scully v. Scully, 987 P.2d 743, 744 (Alaska 1999).
19 Id. at 744-45 (quoting Memorandum from Representative Fran Ulmer to
Co-Chairs of House Health, Education and Social Services Committee (Feb. 3, 1992)).
20 Id. at 745 (quoting AS 25.24.170(a)).
21 Nat'l Bank of Alaska v. Ketzler, 71 P.3d 333, 334-35 (Alaska 2003).
-9- 6521
----------------------- Page 10-----------------------
in the custody of third-party "designees," rather than one of his parents, does not affect
application of the statute.
Douglas also argues that the superior court erred by relying on
AS 25.24.170(a) and Scully v. Scully22 because both authorities leave an award of post-
majority support to the discretion of the court and allow that in an "exceptional case"
such support may not be appropriate. The fact that courts have discretion in this area
does not provide any basis for Douglas's assertion of error by the superior court. The
stipulation's acknowledgment that Nicholas's custody arrangement was "an unusual
circumstance" merely characterized the custody situation; it does not, absent additional
facts, indicate that this is an "exceptional case" within the meaning of Scully.
3. The Warners' motion was timely and did not establish a
retroactive child support arrearage.
Douglas argues that the superior court erred by granting the Warners'
motion to extend child support because it was not timely and because, by granting the
motion, the court effectively established a retroactive child support arrearage in violation
of Alaska Civil Rule 90.3(h)(2). The Warners' motion to extend was filed on
February 18, 2009, four months after Nicholas turned 18. The superior court order
extended Douglas's support obligation from the date of Nicholas's 18th birthday.
i. The Warners' motion was timely.
Douglas's assertion that the Warners' motion was not timely rests on our
decision inBennett v. LeBlanc.23 In Bennett, we upheld a superior court decision denying
a party's motion for post-majority support when the party waited to file a request for
22 987 P.2d 743 (Alaska 1999).
23 2002 WL 1998451 (Alaska Aug. 28, 2002). We note that Bennett is a non-
precedential memorandum opinion and thus offers only non-binding guidance in this
case.
-10- 6521
----------------------- Page 11-----------------------
support until after the child had both turned 19 and completed high school.24 Bennett
does indicate that it can be within the discretion of the superior court to deny an untimely
motion for post-majority support, but it does not undermine the superior court's
extension of Douglas's support award. Within weeks of Nicholas's birthday, the
Warners pursued post-majority support through CSSD. And they filed the motion to
extend child support less than a month after CSSD decided that there was no post-
majority support obligation under the existing support order. The situation here is
fundamentally different from that confronted by the superior court in Bennett: it is
undisputed that Douglas had notice of the Warners' request for post-majority support in
the month Nicholas turned 18. It was not an abuse of discretion for the superior court to
treat the motion to extend as timely filed, and to extend child support from the date of
Nicholas's birthday.
ii. The Warners' motion did not establish a retroactive child
support arrearage.
Douglas's assertion that the superior court established a retroactive child
support obligation relies on our decision in State, Department of Revenue, Child Support
Enforcement Division v. McCormick.25 Specifically, Douglas's argument turns on
interpretation of the following paragraph from that decision:
When a support order by its own terms expires upon a child's
eighteenth birthday, a later order providing for post-majority
support does not modify any provision of the original order;
it extends the order to a time period not covered by the
original order. Thus, barring an affirmative provision in the
original support order or in an incorporated agreement
establishing that the issue of post-majority support was
expressly considered and decided, a subsequent motion to
24 Id. at *1-2.
25 3 P.3d 930 (Alaska 2000).
-11- 6521
----------------------- Page 12-----------------------
extend the duration of support is not a motion to modify the
original order and need not allege a change of
circumstances.[26]
Nothing in the parties' stipulation affirmatively establishes any position on post-majority
support. McCormick thus undermines Douglas's argument: because post-majority
support was not expressly addressed in the parties' stipulation, the Warners' motion to
extend child support did not retroactively modify the original support agreement in
violation of Civil Rule 90.3(h)(2).27 The order granting the Warners' motion simply
extended Douglas's support obligation to a time period not addressed by the existing
support order, a practice we have previously affirmed.28
To the extent Douglas argues he did not receive adequate notice of the
extension of his support obligation, he is mistaken. Although the Warners' motion did
not seek modification of the original support agreement, the notice requirements
governing a motion to modify were satisfied here. We have held that "absent good
cause, a modified child support order should be effective from the date the parent
receives notice that a modification is being considered."29 Douglas received notice from
26 Id. at 931 (emphasis added).
27 See also Benson v. Benson, 977 P.2d 88, 92 (Alaska 1999) (holding that the
retroactive application of the child support formula in Civil Rule 90.3 to a period of years
in which there was no existing child support order did not violate Rule 90.3(h)(2)'s
prohibition on retroactive modification of arrears).
28 Id.; see also Vachon v. Pugliese, 931 P.2d 371, 382 (Alaska 1996) (noting
that an award of child support for a past period during which there was no existing
support order does not violate Rule 90.3(h)(2)'s prohibition on retroactive modification
of support arrearages).
29 State, Dep't of Revenue, Child Support Servs. Div. v. Wise, 122 P.3d 212,
214 (Alaska 2005) (discussing State, Dep't of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement Div.
(continued...)
-12- 6521
----------------------- Page 13-----------------------
CSSD that his support obligation was to be extended on October 23, 2008. Because this
notice was given the same month that Nicholas turned 18, the superior court did not err
in ordering that the support obligation continue uninterrupted from Nicholas's birthday.
B. Any Error By The Superior Court In Denying Douglas's Motion For
Judgment Was Harmless Error.
Douglas argues that the superior court erred by denying the motion for a
judgment of $844.77, the amount CSSD determined he had overpaid after Nicholas
reached the age of 18. Douglas raises three arguments on this point: (1) the superior
court exceeded its authority by overturning a CSSD administrative decision; (2) he was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the Warners did not oppose his motion
for judgment; and (3) the CSSD-determined overpayment was an independent obligation
that should have been enforced regardless of the superior court's extension of the support
award.
1. It was harmless error for the superior court to address CSSD's
interpretation of Douglas's child support obligation in its order
denying judgment.
Douglas argues that the superior court overstepped its authority when it
denied his motion for judgment because the court's order "overturn[ed] CSSD's
administrative ruling [interpreting the stipulation]." Douglas specifically objects to the
emphasized portion of the following passage from the superior court's order:
CSSD suggested there was an overpayment of child support
based on their interpretation that support was to end when
Nicholas turned 18. But the court has found that
interpretation to be wrong and has extended the support
obligation. Consequently there is no basis for a judgment.
29(...continued)
v. Dillon, 977 P.2d 118, 119-20 (Alaska 1999)).
-13- 6521
----------------------- Page 14-----------------------
Douglas argues that the superior court exceeded its authority by declaring CSSD's
interpretation "wrong" because CSSD's administrative decision could only be challenged
"in the form of a properly filed appeal."30 But Douglas's characterization of the superior
court's order is erroneous: the court order extending Douglas's support obligation did
not actually conclude that CSSD's administrative decision incorrectly interpreted the
original child support obligation. Rather, the superior court found that extrinsic evidence
indicated that the parties did not expressly address post-majority support in their
stipulation. This is why the superior court was free to extend the child support
obligation. We agree that it was confusing for the superior court's order denying
judgment to have characterized CSSD's interpretation of the stipulation as "wrong," but
this misstatement was harmless error. It is not grounds to overturn or vacate the superior
court's order on the Warners' motion to extend child support.31
2. The superior court did not err by denying Douglas's motion for
judgment, even though the Warners never opposed it.
Douglas argues that the superior court erred by denying his motion for
judgment because the Warners never responded to this motion. Douglas's argument is
legally incorrect. We have consistently held that "[t]he fact that a motion is uncontested
does not mean that it must be granted as a matter of right."32 The superior court was
30 Under AS 25.27.210(a), judicial review of administrative decisions
"establishing or modifying a duty of support or amounts of support due" is permitted
only "by filing a notice of appeal in accordance with the applicable rules of court
governing appeals in civil matters."
31 See Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 61 ("[N]o error or defect in any ruling
or order . . . is ground for . . . disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such
action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice.").
32 Pomeroy v. Rizzo ex rel. C.R., 182 P.3d 1125, 1131 (Alaska 2008) (quoting
Gallagher v. Gallagher, 866 P.2d 123, 124 (Alaska 1994)).
-14- 6521
----------------------- Page 15-----------------------
obligated to consider and decide Douglas's motion on its merits, even though the
Warners never responded. The contention that the motion for judgment should have
been granted because it was unopposed is contrary to Alaska law.
3. There was no over-payment.
Douglas argues that the superior court erred by denying his motion for
judgment because CSSD's determination that he had overpaid his child support
obligation by $844.77 created a distinct legal obligation unrelated to the court's award
of post-majority support.
CSSD issued a notice of overpayment because it determined that Douglas
was not obligated to pay post-majority support for Nicholas, and that he had made two
support payments after Nicholas turned 18. Because we conclude that the superior court
permissibly extended Douglas's support obligation, Douglas was required to pay child
support to the Warners without interruption; there was no overpayment. The superior
court correctly declined to enter judgment in Douglas's favor.
C. The Superior Court Correctly Denied Douglas's Motions For
Reconsideration.
Douglas argues that the superior court erred by denying his motions for
reconsideration33 because the court "failed to address any of the points raised in said
motion[s]." Douglas's motions for reconsideration argued that the superior court:
(1) "overlooked or misconceived" the fact that the stipulation provided for child support
only when the Warners maintained "legal custody" of Nicholas and he remained living
with them; (2) incorrectly applied AS 25.24.170(a) to the Warners, given that they were
no longer Nicholas's legal guardians after he turned 18; (3) retroactively established
33 Douglas filed two separate motions for reconsideration, one addressing the
award of post-majority support and the second addressing denial of his motion for
judgment.
-15- 6521
----------------------- Page 16-----------------------
child support arrears in violation of Civil Rule 90.3(h)(2); and (4) should have granted
his motion for judgment as a matter of law because the Warners never contested CSSD's
interpretation of the existing support agreement or its determination that overpayment
had occurred. The superior court's order denying reconsideration did not directly address
the merits of each of these arguments,34 but the court was not required to do so. With one
exception, the motions for reconsideration reiterated points previously made in motions
that had been considered and correctly denied by the superior court. Douglas's new
argument, that the court should have granted his motion for judgment because it was
unopposed, is both legally incorrect and an improper basis for a motion for
reconsideration.35 The superior court's denial of Douglas's motions for reconsideration,
without further explanation, was not an abuse of discretion.
V. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the superior court's grant of post-majority support to the
Warners and its denial of Douglas's motion for judgment.
34 The superior court's order stated only that, "The court believes that the
court's authority to require child support beyond age 18 if the child remains in school
extends to cases where the child is in the custody of third parties."
35 See Katz v. Murphy, 165 P.3d 649, 661 (Alaska 2007) ("Alaska Civil Rule
77(k), which governs motions for reconsideration, does not allow the moving party to
raise new grounds as a basis for reconsideration; instead the rule only allows
reconsideration of points that were overlooked or misconceived despite having been
properly raised.").
-16- 6521
 |
| Case Law Statutes, Regs & Rules Constitutions Miscellaneous |
|
