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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Anderson v. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. (7/23/2010) sp-6496
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage,
Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
| SHARIN S. ANDERSON, | ) |
| ) Supreme Court No. S- 13367 | |
| Appellant, | ) |
| ) Superior Court No. 3AN-07-12062 CI | |
| v. | ) |
| ) O P I N I O N | |
| ALYESKA PIPELINE SERVICE | ) |
| CO., | ) No. 6496 July 23, 2010 |
| ) | |
| Appellee. | ) |
| ) | |
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State
of Alaska, Third Judicial District,
Anchorage, Craig Stowers, Judge.
Appearances: Richard W. Maki and David H.
Shoup, Tindall Bennett & Shoup, Anchorage,
for Appellant. David A. Devine, Groh Eggers,
LLC, Anchorage, for Appellee.
Before: Carpeneti, Chief Justice, Fabe,
Winfree, and Christen, Justices.
FABE, Justice.
CHRISTEN, Justice, dissenting in part.
I. INTRODUCTION
An employee of Doyon Universal Services sustained a
head injury while working at a pipeline pump station. She
applied for and received workers compensation benefits for the
injury. She also brought a tort suit against Alyeska Pipeline
Service Company, the operator of the pipeline pump station,
alleging that its negligence was a proximate cause of her
injuries. Alyeska sought summary judgment in the lawsuit,
asserting that it was a statutory employer under the Alaska
Workers Compensation Act and thus was immune from suit. The
superior court granted summary judgment to Alyeska and also
awarded it Alaska Civil Rule 68 attorneys fees. Because Alyeska
is a project owner, and immune from suit based on that status, we
affirm the summary judgment order dismissing the lawsuit. But we
reverse the award of Rule 68 attorneys fees because the offer of
judgment was not valid.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Sharin Anderson was injured while working for Doyon
Universal Services at Pump Station 5 on the Trans-Alaska Pipeline
System. Alyeska Pipeline Service Company, which operates the
pipeline, contracted with Doyon to provide security, medical
support, lodging, and catering services for employees who operate
and maintain the pipeline. As part of its contract with Doyon,
Alyeska agreed to provide workers compensation insurance for
Doyons employees.
On July 25, 2007, Anderson was helping the head cook
clean the loading dock area where food was stored. While
Anderson was vacuuming, the head cook moved a heavy duty
industrial cart that was used for food storage from its position
near a wall. A table weighing at least seventy pounds had been
placed in a vertical position behind the cart; the cases of food
on the cart obscured the table from view.
Anderson was squatting while vacuuming. When the head
cook removed the cart, the table, which was unsecured, fell
directly on Anderson, hitting her in the head. According to the
head cook, the force of the table hitting Anderson pushed her ten
to twelve feet from her original position. Anderson was
unconscious for at least three or four minutes after the table
hit her. The head cook reported that Anderson was having severe
convulsions, and he was afraid that she would die. She was
transported to Fairbanks Memorial Hospital by helicopter. She
filed a report of injury with the Alaska Workers Compensation
Board and received more than $72,000 in workers compensation
benefits on the claim.
An investigation by Alyeska concluded that the table,
which belonged to Alyeska, had been propped against the wall for
several months. On December 20, 2007, Anderson filed a
negligence action against Alyeska in superior court, seeking
damages in excess of $500,000. Before Alyeska filed its answer,
it wrote a letter to Andersons attorney, highlighting the 2004
amendments to the exclusive liability provisions of the Alaska
Workers Compensation Act. The exclusive liability provisions
limit an injured workers remedy against the employer for work-
related injuries to workers compensation when the employer
secures payment of compensation.1 Alyeska informed Anderson that
the amendments extended the exclusive liability provisions to
project owners, not just employers. Alyeska contended that it
was a project owner as defined in the amendments and therefore
immune from suit for Andersons injuries.
Alyeska answered Andersons complaint on January 15,
2008, and raised these exclusive liability provisions as an
affirmative defense. A little more than two weeks after its
answer, Alyeska made an offer of judgment to Anderson in the
amount of ten dollars, plus prejudgment interest, costs, and
Alaska Civil Rule 82 attorneys fees. The fax transmittal that
accompanied the offer of judgment stated that Alyeska believe[d]
the exclusive remedy protection of AS 23.30.055 applie[d] to this
case. Anderson did not accept the offer.
Alyeska moved for summary judgment on March 6, 2008; it
asked for a judgment dismissing Andersons suit because Alyeska
was her statutory employer and exempt from suit under AS
23.30.055, the exclusive liability provisions of the Alaska
Workers Compensation Act. Anderson opposed the motion, arguing
that the statute should not be construed to include Alyeska
within its ambit because Alyeska was not a project owner within
the meaning of the statute. Anderson argued that applying the
definition of project owner in AS 23.30.045(f) would create
absurd results and that the court should construe project owner
according to its common usage. She then argued that the pipeline
was not a project, that Alyeska did not own it, and that Alyeska
was therefore not protected by the exclusive liability provisions
of AS 23.30.055. In response, Alyeska disagreed with Andersons
proposed method of statutory construction and maintained that it
fell within the statutory definition of project owner. It argued
in the alternative that maintenance of the pipeline was a project
and that it was a project owner even if the term was construed
according to its common usage.
The superior court granted summary judgment to Alyeska
after oral argument on the motion. The court found that there
were no genuine issues of material fact. It concluded that
Alyeska was a project owner within the statutory definition and
was therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court
specifically limited its holding to the facts of the case because
of the policy arguments Anderson made, noting that there [was]
some power and force to Andersons argument that the statute
should not be construed broadly.
After the superior court entered final judgment,
Alyeska moved for Alaska Civil Rule 68 and 82 attorneys fees in
the amount of $12,409.88. Anderson opposed the motion for Rule
68 attorneys fees, asserting that Alyeskas offer of judgment was
a token offer and should not trigger the provisions of Rule 68.
She did not oppose imposition of Rule 82 attorneys fees. In
response, Alyeska claimed that its offer was made in good faith
and thus it was entitled to Rule 68 fees. Alyeska maintained
that it had good reason to believe when it made its offer that
its exposure was nominal. It pointed out that it had notified
Andersons attorney before it filed its summary judgment motion
that it would be relying on the exclusive liability provisions of
the Alaska Workers Compensation Act. It stated that its offer of
judgment was based upon an honest and good faith assessment of
its potential liability to Anderson.
The superior court granted Alyeskas motion for
attorneys fees. The court disagreed with Andersons argument that
Alyeskas nominal offer of judgment should not trigger a Rule 68
fee award. It found that Alyeskas offer of judgment was a
reasonable, good faith offer and granted Alyeskas attorneys fee
request for Rule 82 fees of $175.50, Rule 68 fees of $12,234.38,
and costs.
Anderson appeals the dismissal of her suit and the
award of Rule 68 attorneys fees.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo.2
Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine factual dispute
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.3
In reviewing summary judgment, we draw all reasonable inferences
in favor of the nonmoving party.4 Interpretation of a statute is
a question of law to which we apply our independent judgment; we
interpret the statute according to reason, practicality, and
common sense, considering the meaning of the statutes language,
its legislative history, and its purpose.5
Whether an offer of judgment complies with Civil Rule
68 is a question of law that we review using the independent
judgment standard.6 The amount of attorneys fees awarded is
reviewed for abuse of discretion.7
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Alyeska Is A Project Owner Under AS 23.30.045.
The first issue presented in this appeal is the narrow
question whether Alyeska is a project owner as defined in AS
23.30.045 and is therefore immune from suit under AS 23.30.055.8
Anderson urges us to construe project owner in AS 23.30.045(f) so
that it applies only to projects, particularly construction
projects, that have a limited duration. Alternatively, she asks
us to determine that because Alyeska does not own the pipeline,
it is not a project owner. Alyeska counters that it falls within
the definition of project owner set out in AS 23.30.045(f)(2) and
is therefore immune from suit for Andersons injuries. It also
points out that it provided the workers compensation insurance
that covered Andersons workers compensation claim, so application
of the exclusive liability provisions of AS 23.30.055 is
particularly appropriate here.
The Alaska Legislature changed the exclusive liability
provisions of the Alaska Workers Compensation Act in 2004.9 The
2004 amendments made project owners potentially liable for
workers compensation benefits to their contractors and
subcontractors employees and expanded the definition of employer
for purposes of the exclusive liability provision of the workers
compensation act.10 Alaska Statute 23.30.045(a) now provides:
An employer is liable for and shall secure
the payment to employees of the compensation
payable under AS 23.30.041, 23.30.050,
23.30.095, 23.30.145, and 23.30.180
23.30.215. If the employer is a
subcontractor and fails to secure the payment
of compensation to its employees, the
contractor is liable for and shall secure the
payment of the compensation to employees of
the subcontractor. If the employer is a
contractor and fails to secure the payment of
compensation to its employees or the
employees of a subcontractor, the project
owner is liable for and shall secure the
payment of the compensation to employees of
the contractor and employees of a
subcontractor, as applicable.
Alaska Statute 23.30.045(f)(1) defines contractor, for
purposes of AS 23.30.045, as a person who undertakes by contract
performance of certain work for another but does not include a
vendor whose primary business is the sale or leasing of tools,
equipment, other goods, or property. Project owner is defined as
a person who, in the course of the persons business, engages the
services of a contractor and who enjoys the beneficial use of the
work.11
The exclusive liability provision of the workers
compensation statute, AS 23.30.055, provides in part:
The liability of an employer prescribed in AS
23.30.045 is exclusive and in place of all
other liability of the employer and any
fellow employee to the employee . . . and
anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages
from the employer or fellow employee at law
or in admiralty on account of the injury or
death. . . . In this section, employer
includes, in addition to the meaning given in
AS 23.30.395, a person who, under AS
23.30.045(a), is liable for or potentially
liable for securing payment of compensation.
1. The statutory definition is controlling.
Anderson asks us to construe the words project and
owner according to common usage and general principles of
statutory construction to determine whether Alyeska is a project
owner for purposes of AS 23.30.045 and .055. She argues that
broad application of the statutory definition would have
unintended consequences, making many businesses potentially
liable for workers compensation benefits when they hire
independent contractors and taking away an employees right to
pursue a negligence action. To minimize these possible results,
she contends that project should be construed to encompass only
construction-type projects of limited duration and that the
legislative history supports this narrow reading.
Alyeska responds that the legislature itself defined
project owner and maintains that the separation of powers
doctrine prohibits Andersons proposed method of construing the
statute. It relies on State v. Jeffery to argue that the canons
of construction on which Anderson bases her argument only apply
when the words in a statute do not have a peculiar meaning, by
virtue of statutory definition.12
Alaska Statute 01.10.040(a) provides, in part,
Technical words and phrases and those which have acquired a
peculiar and appropriate meaning, whether by legislative
definition or otherwise, shall be construed according to the
peculiar and appropriate meaning. With a few narrow exceptions,
we do not construe statutory language according to its common
meaning when the legislature has provided a definition of a word
or phrase, and our statutory construction cases look first to see
if the word or phrase to be construed has a specific definition.13
Andersons proposed construction of project owner does
not fall within the narrow exceptions to this rule. The
definition of project owner is not circular: It does not, for
example, define project owner as a person who owns a project.14
Nor does Anderson argue that the language of the definition is
ambiguous; she does not, for example, argue that her work was not
in the course of Alyeskas business and for that reason should
fall outside the provisions of AS 23.30.045 and .055.15 Instead,
Anderson asks us to construe the term project owner according to
the common usage of project and owner, arguing that application
of the statutory definition would be contrary to the legislative
history.
But even accepting Andersons invitation to examine the
legislative history does not persuade us that Alyeska falls
outside the statutory purview. Anderson argues that the
legislative history shows that the legislature only meant project
owner to apply to construction-type projects, not to all
businesses that use independent contractors. She illustrates her
point by using hypothetical examples where broad application of
the statutory definition might impose liability when a business
owner was not negligent and had little control over the
activities that caused an injury. But our review of the
legislative history does not support Andersons contention that
the statute was meant to apply only in the construction context.
As Alyeska pointed out at oral argument before us, the
legislative history contains at least two hypothetical examples
of project owners that involved the oil and gas industrys use of
contract labor.
Moreover, the policy considerations that prompted the
legislature to enact the 2004 amendments to the workers
compensation act apply outside the construction context. As we
noted in Schiel v. Union Oil Co. of California, the 2004
amendments had the following purposes: to ensure or expand
workers compensation coverage for workers, to increase workplace
safety, to prevent double dipping, and to provide protection from
tort liability to those who are potentially liable for securing
workers compensation coverage.16 Limiting application of the
amendments to the construction field or exempting large employers
with ongoing businesses from the definition of project owner, as
Anderson urges, would undermine some of these goals. If
Andersons limited construction of project owner were adopted, a
grocery store could use contract labor to stock its shelves and
completely avoid workers compensation liability for work-related
injuries to the contract laborers simply because its use of
contract labor was not related to building or construction or
because it used contract labor as part of its day-to-day
operations. We see nothing to suggest that the legislature
intended such a result.
Even though we reject Andersons argument that the term
project owner should be limited to the construction context, we
acknowledge that she has posed difficult hypothetical examples
about the potential workers compensation liability of small
business owners that use contractors to carry out functions
extraneous to their businesses.17 But because we hold that
Alyeska falls within the statutory definition of project owner,
we do not have to decide the questions posed in these
hypothetical examples.
2. Alyeska meets the statutory definition.
Alyeska clearly meets the statutory definition of
project owner in AS 23.30.045(f)(2). In the course of Alyeskas
business, which is operating the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System, it
engaged the services of Doyon Universal Services. No one
contests that Doyon is a contractor. Doyon undertook performance
of work for Alyeska, including catering services for employees
who operate and maintain the pipeline. It is also uncontested
that Alyeska enjoys the beneficial use of Doyons services:
Because of its contract with Doyon, Alyeska does not need to hire
its own employees to perform the work done by Doyon. Because
Alyeska satisfies the definition of project owner in
AS 23.30.045(f)(2), it is covered by the exclusive liability
provisions of AS 23.30.055. The superior court correctly granted
summary judgment to Alyeska and dismissed Andersons lawsuit.
B. It Was Error To Award Alyeska Rule 68 Attorneys Fees.
Anderson also asks us to reverse the award of attorneys
fees under Alaska Civil Rule 68, arguing that Alyeskas ten-dollar
offer of judgment made at the outset of the case was only nominal
and therefore should not have triggered an enhanced attorneys fee
award. We agree with Anderson that our opinion in Beal v.
McGuire18 controls our analysis of this issue.
The superior court issued its order for attorneys fees
before we decided Beal. In Beal, we held that the one-dollar
offers of judgment made at the outset of that case were invalid
as a matter of law and could not trigger application of Rule 68
for awarding attorneys fees.19 We stated that a one-dollar offer
of judgment did not serve the purpose of Rule 68, which is to
encourage settlement and avoid protracted litigation and
characterized such an offer as a tactical demand[] that
plaintiffs dismiss their claims to avoid exposure to Rule 68
fee[] awards.20 We noted that other courts require that an offer
be made in good faith with the goal of settling the case rather
than obtaining a larger fee award.21 We did not explicitly adopt
a good-faith test for offers of judgment in Beal, but we decided
there that given the timing and amount of the offers, they could
not be considered valid offers of settlement or compromise, or
valid attempts to encourage negotiation.22
There is no principled distinction between the ten-
dollar offer that Alyeska made to Anderson at the outset of this
case and the initial one-dollar offer in Beal. Even though the
superior court found here that the offer was a reasonable, good
faith offer, it also acknowledged that Andersons policy arguments
had some power and force. We have no doubt that when Alyeska
made the offer, it believed that it would prevail in the lawsuit.
But there was no objectively reasonable prospect that Anderson
would accept ten dollars to settle her case or that the offer
would even start a dialogue that could lead to settlement at
that stage of the litigation. This was particularly true in
light of the fact that Andersons claim raised an issue of first
impression that involved interpretation of a new statute and
raised difficult policy issues. Moreover, nothing in the record
suggests that Alyeska knew, when it made its offer of judgment,
what legal arguments Anderson might make to counter its reliance
on AS 23.30.055, so it could not assess the strength of those
arguments. Alyeskas offer was in effect an opening, walkaway
offer that had no reasonable chance of acceptance or of fostering
further settlement negotiations. This is precisely the type of
offer that we indicated in Beal could not trigger application of
Rule 68.23
As we noted in Beal, we have not adopted a good-faith
test for offers of judgment, and we do not do so here.24 Our
disapproval of nominal offers made at the outset of a case is due
to their failure to serve the purposes of Rule 68: to encourage
settlement and avoid protracted litigation.25 When nominal offers
are made at the outset of a case and have no prospect of
acceptance or of furthering settlement negotiations, they are
simply attempts to shift the cost of litigation onto the other
party, without regard to the purpose and intent of Rule 68.
We do not mean to suggest that a small offer of
judgment can never be valid or that the validity of the offer of
judgment should be determined simply by comparing the offer to
the amount demanded in the lawsuit. An offer in a case with a
tenuous factual basis or controlling legal precedent may be much
lower than an offer in a case with a novel legal question.26 And
a nominal offer that might be invalid when made at the outset of
a case could trigger application of Rule 68 when made later in
the litigation: During the course of litigation, discovery may
prompt a reassessment of a case, an offer including Alaska Civil
Rule 82 fees and costs may have increased value, or a new court
decision could alter the legal strength of a partys case.27
Although the dissent characterizes Andersons case as
weak, our opinion recognizes that Anderson posed troublesome
policy questions. Moreover, the superior court acknowledged that
Andersons arguments had some power and force and limited its
decision to the facts of the case. From the perspective of
assessing the offer of judgment, though, there is simply no way
that Alyeska could reasonably have assessed the strength or
weakness of Andersons case. Nothing in the record suggests that
Alyeska knew what Andersons legal arguments might be whether she
would be challenging the constitutionality of the statute or
making a fact-based argument peculiar to her case when it made
its offer of judgment. Finally, Andersons case presented a novel
legal question: The new statute had not been definitively
interpreted by any court when she brought her case.
In the context of Andersons case, Alyeskas ten-dollar
offer was made shortly after it filed its answer. Anderson was
seeking $500,000 in damages for an undisputedly serious head
injury caused by a table that belonged to Alyeska. Alyeskas
planned defense relied on a newly enacted statute that had not
been interpreted by the courts. Under these circumstances,
Alyeskas offer did not serve the legitimate purpose of Rule 68
and thus cannot serve as a basis for an award of Rule 68
attorneys fees.28
V. CONCLUSION
Because Alyeska is a project owner as set out in AS
23.30.045, we AFFIRM the superior courts order dismissing
Andersons claims against Alyeska. We REVERSE the superior courts
order awarding Alyeska Rule 68 attorneys fees because Alyeskas
offer of judgment was invalid as a matter of law, and we REMAND
for an award of Rule 82 attorneys fees.
CHRISTEN, Justice, dissenting in part.
I write separately to express my disagreement with the
courts conclusion that the trial court erred by awarding Rule 68
attorneys fees.
The court disapproves of the nominal offer of judgment
Alyeska made at the outset of this case due to its failure to
serve the purpose of Rule 68: to encourage settlement and avoid
protracted litigation. In my view, Alyeskas early attempts to
settle this case combined with the weakness of Andersons legal
claims support the trial courts award of Rule 68 attorneys fees.
I would affirm the superior courts order.
Alyeska responded to Andersons complaint by writing to
explain that the legislatures 2004 amendments to AS 23.30.055
Alaskas Workers Compensation Act extended the statutes exclusive
remedy provisions to Alyeska because Alyeska fell within the
statutes amended definition of project owner. Alyeska actually
forwarded its legislative history research to Andersons counsel
and invited counsel to discuss the law and your dismissal of this
suit prior to any additional fees being incurred. When that
attempt was unsuccessful, Alyeska answered the complaint and
asserted that the suit was barred by the exclusive liability
provisions of AS 23.30.055. Alyeska made an early and
admittedly nominal settlement offer under Rule 68. The offer
was accompanied by a cover sheet reiterating that because the
exclusive remedy protection of AS 23.30.055 applies to this case,
we think it makes sense to try and secure an early dismissal . .
. before incurring costs and attorneys fees. Apart from offering
to pay a significant amount of money despite its lack of
litigation risk, it is hard to identify steps Alyeska could have
taken that would have been more likely to avoid incurring
significant fees, or to foster a constructive dialogue about the
2004 statutory amendments.
The court finds no principled distinction between the
ten-dollar offer Alyeska made to Anderson at the outset of this
case and the initial one-dollar offer in Beal [v. McGuire].1 In
my view, there are several reasons Beal is distinguishable.
First, the defendants in Beal served their individual offers of
judgment before they asserted their counterclaims.2 Under those
circumstances, our court viewed the early one-dollar settlement
offers in Beal to be consistent with tactical demands rather than
a valid attempt[] to encourage negotiation.3 Because the
settlement offers in Beal were conveyed before the counterclaims
had been asserted, the opposing parties had a very limited
ability to assess the merits of the dispute. In contrast,
Alyeska expressly communicated its theory of the case to Anderson
and even forwarded its research on the applicable legislative
history. Alyeskas actions were objectively consistent with an
attempt to settle the case in its earliest stages before
significant fees were incurred.4
The early offers in Beal were also less likely to
result in fruitful settlement discussions because fact discovery
was needed in order to gauge the merits of the parties respective
arguments. Alyeskas defense to Andersons claim was not fact
dependent. In the decision issued today, the court acknowledges
that an offer in a case with a tenuous factual basis or
controlling legal precedent may be much lower than an offer in a
case with a novel legal question. But the court does not
acknowledge that it was not necessary to conduct fact discovery
to assess the merits of Alyeskas defense; it turned on a purely
legal issue of statutory interpretation.
The court seems to place considerable weight on its
view that Andersons case presented a novel legal question because
Alyeska relied on a newly enacted statute that had not been
interpreted by the courts. I agree there was no case law
precedent controlling Andersons claim, but that is because it
relied on a recently enacted statute. Andersons claim was not
based on any ambiguity or circularity in the statute. It was
based on the argument that the superior court should not construe
the term project owner according to its statutory definition. As
the supreme courts decision observes, we do not construe
statutory language according to its common meaning when the
legislature has provided a definition of a word or phrase. The
court goes on to reject Andersons view that the legislative
history of the 2004 amendments supports her position, and
concludes that Alyeska clearly meets the statutory definition of
project owner under AS 23.30.045(f)(2). Yet the court suggests
that nominal offers of judgment should be deemed invalid when a
case presents a novel legal question. Here, the troublesome
policy questions presented by Anderson apply to hypotheticals not
at issue in her case. A novel claim may also be a weak one, and
in my view a party defending against a weak legal claim should be
able to employ Rule 68 to increase the chances of reaching an
early settlement before incurring significant legal fees.
For the same reasons our court concludes that the
statutory definition of project owner so clearly and
unambiguously applies to Alyeska, I conclude that Alyeskas early
and nominal offer, which was accompanied by its legal analysis
and not dependent on factual discovery, was reasonable and valid
under Rule 68. And I respectfully dissent from the portion of
the courts decision that reverses the superior courts Rule 68 fee
award.
_______________________________
1 AS 23.30.055.
2 Parker v. Tomera, 89 P.3d 761, 765 (Alaska 2004).
3 Id.
4 Moore v. Allstate Ins. Co., 995 P.2d 231, 233 (Alaska
2000).
5 Grimm v. Wagoner, 77 P.3d 423, 427 (Alaska 2003)
(citing Native Vill. of Elim v. State, 990 P.2d 1, 5 (Alaska
1999)).
6 Ellison v. Plumbers & Steam Fitters Union Local 375,
118 P.3d 1070, 1073-74 (Alaska 2005) (citing Thomann v. Fouse, 93
P.3d 1048, 1050 (Alaska 2004)).
7 Lowell v. Hayes, 117 P.3d 745, 750-51 (Alaska 2005)
(citing Van Deusen v. Seavy, 53 P.3d 596, 603 n.23 (Alaska
2002)).
8 Neither party has pointed to disputed facts that would
preclude summary judgment.
9 Ch. 80, SLA 2004.
10 Id.
11 AS 23.30.045(f)(2).
12 See 170 P.3d 226, 232 (Alaska 2007) (quoting Div. of
Elections v. Johnstone, 669 P.2d 537, 539 (Alaska 1983)).
13 See, e.g., Ranney v. Whitewater Engg, 122 P.3d 214, 218
(Alaska 2005) (construing wife for purposes of the workers
compensation act according to its common usage because it has not
been defined statutorily and has no technical meaning in the
present context).
14 See Parks Hiway Enters., LLC v. CEM Leasing, Inc., 995
P.2d 657, 661 (Alaska 2000) (construing owner according to common
usage because the statutory definition was circular, defining
owner as in the case of a facility, any person owning . . . the
facility).
15 See Alaska Hous. Fin. Corp. v. Salvucci, 950 P.2d 1116,
1121-22 (Alaska 1997) (examining legislative history to determine
whether reports to a public body in AS 39.90.100 included reports
to an employees own employer).
16 219 P.3d 1025, 1032 (Alaska 2009).
17 She posed one hypothetical example involving a small
law firm that used the services of a courier to deliver papers or
a snow plower in maintaining its building.
18 216 P.3d 1154 (Alaska 2009).
19 Id. at 1176, 1178.
20 Id. at 1178.
21 Id. at 1177 (citing Warr v. Williamson, 195 S.W. 3d
903, 904 (Ark. 2004); Century 21 Today Inc. v. Tarrant, No.
240696, 2003 WL 22443624, at *1 (Mich. App. Oct. 28, 2003)).
22 Id. at 1178.
23 While the dissent attempts to distinguish Beal because
of the timing of the offer, Alyeskas offer, like that in Beal,
was effectively zero in what appears to be a good faith dispute
involving potentially substantial damages. Beal, 216 P.3d at
1178.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 See Deltona House Rentals, Inc. v. Cloer, 734 So. 2d
586, 588 (Fla. App. 1999) (holding that $101 offer of judgment
was valid in a case of zero liability from the outset but noting
that a low offer may not be in good faith when a legal dispute is
novel or complex).
27 Cf. Hartline v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d
713 (Cal. App. 2005) (holding that an offer of judgment to waive
a claim for costs made after summary adjudication of one of two
of the plaintiffs claims was valid).
28 We also note that it was error to award both Rule 68
and Rule 82 attorneys fees to Alyeska. Ellison v. Plumbers &
Steam Fitters Union Local 375, 118 P.3d 1070, 1078 (Alaska 2005).
Although no one raised this issue and our disposition of the
Rule 68 attorneys fees makes it moot, we note the error to
provide guidance in future cases.
1 Beal v. McGuire, 216 P.3d 1154, 1178 (Alaska 2009).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 The court observes that nothing in the record suggests
that Alyeska knew what Andersons legal arguments might be . . .
when it made its offer of judgment. In my view, the salient
point is that Anderson was in a position to assess the merits of
the statutory interpretation question Alyeska gave her its
research and analysis. Alyeska was the only one disadvantaged by
the fact that Anderson had not disclosed her legal argument.
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| Case Law Statutes, Regs & Rules Constitutions Miscellaneous |
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