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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Sparks v. Sparks (6/25/2010) sp-6486
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage,
Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
| SHEILA BETH SPARKS n/k/a | ) |
| SHEILA BETH VADEN, | ) |
| ) Supreme Court Nos. S- 12935/12955 | |
| Appellant and | ) |
| Cross-Appellee, | ) |
| ) Superior Court No. | |
| v. | ) 3AN-06-08780 CI |
| ) | |
| RICHARD ALAN SPARKS, | ) O P I N I O N |
| ) | |
| Appellee and | ) |
| Cross-Appellant. | ) No. 6486 - June 25, 2010 |
| ) | |
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State
of Alaska, Third Judicial District,
Anchorage, Jack W. Smith, Judge.
Appearances: Robert C. Erwin, Palmier ~
Erwin, LLC, Anchorage, for Appellant and
Cross-Appellee. Paul J. Nangle, Paul J.
Nangle & Associates, Anchorage, for Appellee
and Cross-Appellant.
Before: Fabe, Chief Justice, Carpeneti, and
Winfree, Justices. [Matthews and Eastaugh,
Justices, not participating.]
CARPENETI, Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
I. In this dispute about property division following a
divorce, the wife appeals the trial courts classification of
settlement proceeds as marital property. The husband appeals the
trial courts classification of retirement health benefit as the
wifes separate property and the trial courts division of
property, claiming that he should have been awarded a greater
share due to health problems he suffered. The husband also
appeals findings regarding valuation of various items of marital
property and classifications of various other debts and assets as
marital or separate. Because the evidence supported a finding of
intent to donate the disputed portion of the settlement proceeds
to the marital unit, we affirm the trial courts classification of
the settlement proceeds. We also affirm all of the trial courts
other rulings regarding the classification and valuation of the
marital property, with three exceptions: We remand for further
fact finding and clarification regarding (1) whether agreement
was reached on the value of the parties personal property, (2)
the date on which certain credit card debt was accrued, and (3)
the calculation of the value of necessary repairs to one of the
homes.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Richard Sparks and Sheila Vaden were married on August
15, 1989 in Wasilla, Alaska and separated on June 6, 2006.
Richard was fifty and Sheila was fifty-two at the time the decree
of divorce was issued in November 2007.
Sheila was employed by the state, and her interest in
her Public Employee Retirement System benefits vested in June
1986. She medically retired in 1996 because of complications
from diabetes. In 2001 AETNA, her disability insurance carrier,
discontinued her disability payments. Sheila sued AETNA,
settling in 2004. Section 2.1(A) of that settlement (2.1(A)
annuity) provided for a monthly payment of $4,362 for the lives
of Sheila Sparks and Richard Sparks and provided for reduced
payments to Richard if Sheila predeceased him. Section 2.1(B)
provided for semi-annual payments to Sheila, and 2.1(C) for
additional monthly payments. The agreement designated the 2.1(A)
and (B) payments as damages on account of personal physical
injuries or physical sickness and 2.1(C) as replacement of
disability benefits.
Richards employment history was more complicated. He
did not work in 2005, 2006 and 2007, and reported no earnings to
social security from 1998-2004. In 1994-95 he worked for the
Department of Corrections. During the early 2000s he also ran a
dry-walling business and worked on Sheilas mothers property at
Solo Creek, intending to eventually open a tourist business and
lodge there. Richard testified that he had health problems
including a head injury and knee injury. He indicated that this
would prevent him from being rehired as a corrections officer and
that he could not physically work, but had not sought a
disability determination.
Richard and Sheilas contested marital property
included two homes, one on Caskill Road and one on Phalarope
Road, and eight lots at Birch Hill and personal property at all
three locations. They also disputed a cabin and one acre plot at
Solo Creek owned by Sheilas mother. Miscellaneous debt and
property will be further set out in each relevant section
discussing Richards claims on cross-appeal.
Following trial on division of the marital property in
September 2007, the superior court rendered its oral decision on
the record in October and issued written findings of fact and
conclusions of law in November. The parties each filed motions
for reconsideration but Sheila filed this appeal before the court
had an opportunity to respond to the motions for reconsideration.
After supplemental briefing regarding the superior courts
jurisdiction to address the pending motions, the court in March
2008 issued a recalculated spreadsheet regarding the value of the
Caskill residence and the crediting of negative equity on the
family vehicles. Richard requested clarification of certain
entries on the recalculated spreadsheet, and the court issued a
clarification in April 2008.
Sheila appeals the courts treatment of the personal
injury settlement with her disability benefit insurer. Richard
cross-appeals the courts decision on numerous issues of
characterization, valuation, and division of property.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The division of marital property requires that
property first be characterized as marital or separate, then that
the property be valued, and finally that it be distributed
equitably.1 The determination of whether property is marital or
separate is a mixed question of law and fact.2 Characterization
of proceeds of a settlement is in large part a legal
determination that we review de novo, but we disturb findings of
fact made in determining whether to include the settlement
proceeds in the marital estate only if they are clearly
erroneous.3
Property valuations are factual findings which we
overturn only if clearly erroneous.4 We review the trial courts
conclusions regarding the distribution of property for abuse of
discretion.5
IV. DISCUSSION
A. With One Exception, The Trial Court Did Not Err In
Classifying The Parties Property As Marital Or Separate.
1. The AETNA settlement annuity
1. The designation of damages in a tort settlement does not
control whether the proceeds are marital or separate.6 Under our
decision in Bandow v. Bandow,7 the trial court must carry out an
analysis of what the damages were intended to replace.8
Compensation that replaces post-divorce future earnings is
separate, while compensation for economic loss to the marital
unit is marital.9 Furthermore, compensation for pre-divorce non-
economic damages, such as pain and suffering, is generally
separate property.10
In certain circumstances, separate property may be
transmuted to marital property if the owner intends to convey the
property to the marital unit and the owners conduct demonstrates
that intent.11 We have held that placing separate settlement
proceeds into joint title raised a presumption that the party
intended to donate separate property to the marital unit.12
Here, there were three types of periodic payments set
out in Section 2.1 of Sheilas settlement agreement, in addition
to a lump sum payment that covered the loss of income to the
marital estate before the settlement: 2.1(A) Monthly payments
of $4,362 (increasing annually by two percent) continuing for the
lives of Sheila Sparks and Richard Sparks; 2.1(B) semi-annual
payments of $19,500 payable to Sheila for four years; and 2.1(C)
monthly payments of $1,934.95, payable to Sheila for 191 months.
The superior court held that the payments provided for in 2.1(A)
and 2.1(C) were marital and accordingly awarded them to both
parties (Section 2.1(A) payments were awarded equally to the
parties, while 2.1(C) payments were divided by coverture
fraction). Finding that the 2.1(B) payments were separate
property, and that the parties stipulated that they should be
held for the parties son, the court awarded them all to Sheila.
Sheila argues that the payments in 2.1(A) and (B) are
designated as damages on account of personal physical injuries or
sickness, while the payment in 2.1(C) was intended to replace
future lost income. She asks us to conclude that Sections 2.1(A)
and 2.1(B) were intended to replace personal injury damages and
therefore, under Bandow v. Bandow,13 must be separate property.
Because the court awarded Section 2.1(B) to Sheila as her
separate property, she appeals only the designation of the
annuity in 2.1(A), the payments which were designated to be paid
for the lives of Sheila Sparks and Richard Sparks.
The third provision of the settlement periodic
payments, in Section 2.1(C), was intended to replace disability
benefit payments from the time of the settlement forward. The
trial court awarded Sheila this income in full until she reached
retirement age. Because she would receive these benefits in lieu
of retirement benefits, the court treated these benefits like
retirement benefits earned during the marriage, which are divided
using a coverture fraction based on the length of the marriage.
This is the correct treatment under Conner v. Conner,14 which held
that income replacement such as workers compensation and long-
term disability replaces retirement benefits after the payee
reaches retirement age.15 Therefore, it was proper to treat the
post-retirement portion as imputed retirement payments and apply
the coverture fraction to that payment. Sheila argues that
Conner is inapplicable to 2.1(A) and (B), and we agree. However,
she appears to concede that under Conner, the payments in Section
2.1(C) could be a partial replacement for long-term disability
benefits and thus marital property. In fact, the agreement is
explicit and clear that the Section 2.1(C) payments replace long-
term disability benefits. We therefore agree with the trial
court that the retirement portion is a marital asset under
Conner.
The Section 2.1(A) annuity was designated as a personal
injury payment. However, there were factual disputes regarding
Sheilas intent to convey the settlement to the marital unit.
Given that she may have had such an intent, the issue arose
whether the personal injury money had been transmuted into
marital property.16 The inquiry into whether the property was
transmuted required the court to weigh factual evidence of
conduct showing an intent to make a donation to the marital unit.17
We have held in the past that where an inheriting spouse has
represented that the proceeds of an inheritance would be shared
by the parties, this evidence is not sufficient to overcome the
strong presumption that an inheritance is separate property.18
Similarly, we have concluded that an inheriting spouses belief
and representation that the inherited assets would be available
for [both parties] during the marriage do not suffice to warrant
a finding that the assets were converted to marital property.19 A
spouses statement that separate property will be available to
both spouses must be understood as referring to the period during
which the parties remained married.20 In Sampson, we concluded
that [b]ecause the inheriting [husband] made no promises to [his
wife] upon which she relied, a finding that the husband intended
to transmute his inheritance into marital property was clearly
erroneous.21
The key issue in transmutation cases involving a claim
that the separate property has been transmuted based on a theory
of implied interspousal gift is the presence of donative intent.22
In evaluating and determining the intent of the alleged donor,
[t]he best proof of intent to transmute is . . . an express
statement by the owning spouse that he intended to give the other
spouse an interest in the property.23 The persuasiveness of a
spouses express promise to make a gift of separate property to
the other spouse depends on the context and circumstances of
the promise,24 and [w]here the statement was made with some degree
of formality, it is likely to carry significant weight . . . .25
Here, there was formal documentation of Sheilas
decision to transmute the separate property, and she communicated
that decision to Richard through both words and conduct. Richard
is designated explicitly as a payee in Exhibit A, Addendum 1 to
the settlement for Section 2.1(A) payments, showing an intent to
treat these payments differently from the other portions of the
settlement. The payments are to continue for the lives of Sheila
Sparks and Richard Sparks and for a minimum of 20 years.
Although the settlement empowers Sheila to designate a
beneficiary for the 2.1(A) payments in the event that both she
and Richard died, it prohibits her from selling, encumbering, or
assigning the 2.1(A) payments during her lifetime. Richard
testified at trial that Sheila was counseled that naming Richard
as a payee for the duration of his life would make it
not . . . just her money anymore. He also testified that he and
Sheila decided together to structure that portion of the annuity
as our long term retirement, and deliberately made it payable to
both of them contrary to her attorneys advice.
Sheila argues that she understood her attorney to be
telling her not to put the annuity in his name, but that she
assumed it would be fine to put the payments in both names and
that she could later change the payees. She testified that the
annuity is solely my ownership. But the settlement does not
support that assertion, nor does it give her the power to remove
Richard as payee before his death. Multiple inferences are
possible regarding her intent at the time she signed the
settlement entitling both parties to payment of the 2.1(A)
annuity. The conflicts between Richards testimony and Sheilas
testimony, and between Sheilas testimony and the settlement and
addendum, required the trial court to weigh the evidence of
intent based on the credibility of the two parties to decide
Sheilas intent at the time the settlement was drafted.26 It was
not clear error based on the evidence before the court to find
that Sheila promised Richard he would be entitled to part of the
2.1(A) annuity.
2. Sheilas retiree health insurance benefits
The trial court concluded that Sheilas lifetime health
insurance benefits vested before the marriage and were therefore
pre-marital property. Richard challenges this conclusion,
arguing that Sheila continued to contribute to her retirement
benefits with marital funds during the marriage and pointing to
Sheilas monthly premium statements for support. However, the
monthly premium statements provide no evidence that any portion
of the monthly premium is being applied to anything other than
that months insurance coverage. Sheila responds that the correct
interpretation of the monthly statement is that each employee
payment of a monthly premium constitutes only a contribution to
that months coverage, not to the long term subsidy that the
employer provides.
Sheilas interpretation is better supported by the
evidence in the record. Her expert testified that Richard could
not have acquired an entitlement to post-retirement benefits
unless he was married to Sheila on the date of her retirement
under the states benefit scheme. The expert also considered the
premium payments made during the marriage and testified that no
payment contributed to the value of Sheilas post-retirement
benefit. Finally, the expert also testified that once an
employee vests in the retiree health insurance program, the state
of Alaska pays the subsidy amount for the beneficiarys health
insurance from age of retirement forward. The expert testified
that nothing was added to the value of that subsidy during
Sheilas work during the marriage.
Under our rule in Hansen v. Hansen,27 post-marriage
health insurance benefits acquired with marital funds are marital
property.28 The trial court distinguished Hansen on the ground
that the evidence showed that none of Sheilas work during the
marriage increased or contributed to the value of the health
insurance benefits. Richard presents an alternative
argument: that the entire retirement health insurance benefit
should be seen as transmuted because he was listed as a health
insurance beneficiary. But transmutation does not apply to
retirement benefits, which are usually designated as partly
marital and partly separate based on which portion was earned
during the marriage.29 Here, the evidence did not establish that
any of the value of her post-retirement benefits was earned
during the marriage. Because the factual finding that all of the
value of Sheilas post-retirement health benefits were earned
before marriage is supported by the record and not clearly
erroneous, we affirm the trial courts conclusion that the health
benefits are separate property.
3. Insurance payment for damage to privacy fence at
Caskill home
A privacy fence at the Caskill property was damaged by
wind six months after the parties date of separation. The
Caskill property was a marital asset and the value of the
property was awarded to Richard. The insurance payment for the
damage was paid to Richard. Richard deposited the payment in a
joint account, and then transferred it to his separate account.
The trial court awarded half of that amount to Sheila.
Richard argues that the date of separation is relevant
to when he incurred the expense of the fence repair, and
analogizes the situation to case law holding that debt taken on
after separation to acquire an asset makes the asset separate.30
Richard argues that because he will have to bear the cost of
repairing the fence, while Sheila will have no obligation to do
so, he should have gotten the entire value of the reimbursement.
We disagree.
Richard is not in debt to anyone or under any
obligation to replace the privacy fence. The fence was marital
property when destroyed, and both parties suffered the loss of
the value of the fence. Moreover, the trial court did not
include the fence in the calculation of the value of the home;
the court valued the home using Sheilas appraisers valuation and
Richards list of repairs necessary to bring the home up to code,
which did not include the privacy fence. The privacy fence was
apparently not taken into account in the appraisal of the Caskill
property, because it is not mentioned in the report. The
valuation of the Caskill property occurred on June 28, 2007, more
than a year after separation and therefore apparently long after
the wind damage occurred. And Richard had not repaired the fence
as of the trial on September 7, 2007, so clearly it was not
repaired before the appraisal. Because both parties owned the
fence when it was destroyed, and both shared any resulting loss
in the homes value, it was not error for the trial court to
classify it as part of the marital estate.
4. Refund for marital carpet purchase
During the marriage Richard paid $2,500 for carpets; he
used the marital credit card for this purchase. Then he
transferred the debt onto a card in his own name but apparently
with the same account number. When he received a refund for the
carpet after the separation, it was credited to the card that was
now in his name only. The trial court ruled that the refund was
a marital asset. Richard argues that he retired a marital debt
with a marital asset and should not have owed Sheila any of the
refund. We disagree. Richard incurred a marital debt, the
burden of which Sheila shared and which was part of the balance
of the account that was divided as marital debt. But the refund
was not applied to that debt; rather, it reduced Richards sole
debt on his separate credit card account many months after the
date of separation. It was proper for the court to classify the
refund as a marital asset.
5. Discover card
The trial court did not address the Discover card in
Richards name during its decision on the record or in its
findings of fact. In Richards motion for reconsideration, he
claimed the balance of that card was a marital debt. Sheila
argued that the balance on this card consisted entirely of post-
separation debt and therefore should not have been included in
the marital estate. The trial court stated in denying
reconsideration that it had not included this debt in the marital
estate because it was post-separation debt. However, the
official date of the parties separation in the findings of fact
was June 6, 2006, and the statement for the card reflects
purchases from May 2006 and includes a substantial previous
balance. For that reason, we remand for clarification and
further written findings regarding the pre-separation balance on
this card.
B. The Trial Court Did Not Clearly Err In Its Valuation Of The
Solo Creek Improvements Or The Birch Hill Lots.
A. Richard argues that the trial court erred in valuing his
improvements to the Solo Creek property and in valuing the Birch
Hill lots. He notes that the court rejected his estimates of
value even though a property owners estimate of value is
competent evidence, and he argues that Sheilas expert never set
foot on the property, failed to consider comparable sales, and
developed a ludicrous estimate. Sheila responds that the weight
accorded to each source of evidence is squarely within the
province of the trier of fact.
The trial court weighed Sheilas experts appraisal
testimony and Richards own valuation of the work that he
contributed to the property in valuing the improvements Richard
made to the Solo Creek property. Likewise, the court weighed
Sheilas experts appraisal of the Birch Hill lots against tax
appraisals of these lots. Richard does not now contest the
qualification of the appraiser as an expert, nor did he object at
trial to the appraiser being qualified. He did not submit
competing expert testimony. He did submit tax valuations of the
value of the lots, which he argues are strong evidence of their
actual value. However, we have held that tax assessments
ordinarily are not good evidence of value.31 As Sheila argues,
this leaves the trier of fact to weigh competing evidence, and we
will not overturn the courts findings in these circumstances
absent clear error.32 Because the trial courts valuations were
not clearly erroneous, we affirm them.
C. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Distributing
Assets.
1. Richards health concerns
1. Richard argues that the trial court did not correctly apply
the statutory factors in AS 25.24.16033 because it did not account
for his health or the availability and cost of health insurance
for him. The trial court found that Richard injured his knee,
fell from a horse and injured his back, had twice been kicked in
the head by horses, and had major dental problems associated with
being kicked by the horses. Richard did not present medical
records at trial. Richard argues that a fifty-year-old male with
his health problems cannot obtain affordable health insurance and
that the court should be directed to account for his conditions
and the cost of health insurance.
The trial court assumed in its oral decision on the
record that Richard could obtain his own health benefits from the
state at retirement: The court would note a spouse is entitled to
health benefits through the state retirement system [if] there is
a [QDRO]. Under AS 39.35.535(d), a former spouse who is awarded
a portion of a state employees Public Employee Retirement System
(PERS) benefit under a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO)
is entitled to purchase state major medical coverage. Richard was
awarded a coverture portion of Sheilas PERS account in the
decision on the record, and hence would be entitled under section
.535(d) to obtain health insurance.
Even if this were not the case, we see no abuse of
discretion here. In Martin v. Martin,34 we held that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to award PERS
benefits which would have allowed the husband to obtain coverage
under AS 39.35.535(d) because the husband failed to show that he
had no other means of obtaining his own health insurance.35 We
noted that we would only find an abuse of discretion in this
situation if the superior courts decision produced a clearly
unjust result.36 Sheila argues that the result here is not unjust
because (1) Richard presented inadequate evidence that he could
not work, and (2) Richard had never sought disability benefits
through Social Security that would be an alternate source of
health insurance. The superior court also found that the size of
the estate was such that Richard would be able to obtain health
insurance with his portion of the estate. Even if he were unable
to obtain state coverage, we would not find this to rise to the
level of injustice that would warrant a finding of abuse of
discretion.
2. Sheilas Caskill property taxation payments
Sheila was given a credit for half the amount she paid after
the separation date on the property taxes for the Caskill
property. Richard argues that Sheila made the post-separation
payment of taxes on the Caskill home with marital funds, and that
as a result it was error to give her a credit for them. The
payments were made from the joint account containing the AETNA
settlement part 2.1(A) annuity payments later designated as
marital property; Richard and Sheila were each awarded half these
payments. Therefore he claims that the payments were an exercise
in using marital property to preserve marital property.
In Ramsey v. Ramsey,37 we noted that no fixed rule need be
imposed for crediting a spouse who has used post-separation, non-
marital income to maintain marital property.38 We held that a
court has broad discretion to determine how and whether to credit
such payments, including the discretion to credit the spouse with
all or none of such payments.39 Here, the situation is different
from Ramsey in that payments were made from the 2.1(A) settlement
annuity, the entirety of which the trial court classified as
marital and then divided evenly between Sheila and Richard.
However, as Sheila points out, she was only credited with half of
the tax payments. We conclude that the trial court acted within
his discretion in crediting Sheila with half of the post-
separation tax payments that she made with an account that was
half her property.
D. It Was Error To Accept The List Of Personal Property
Provided By Sheila As The Stipulated Division And Valuation.
On the last day of trial, the parties told the court
that they would meet to divide the personal property by
stipulation. In October 2007 when the parties met for an oral
decision on the record, Sheilas counsel presented the court with
Attachment A-Y, which she said was the stipulated division that
the parties had earlier agreed to in court. The court appeared
to agree with Sheila that the amounts had been agreed to in
court. Richards counsel contested this, said that no
stipulation had been reached, and said he would obtain a
transcript showing that he in fact had only agreed to work later
with Sheila on a written stipulation. He also told the court
that he would file a motion for reconsideration with the
transcript so that the division of the rest of the property could
be ruled on that day. During this exchange, Richards counsel did
not state that his client agreed with Attachment A-Y.
Sheila asserts that Richards attorney agreed to the
settlement in open court, and that Richard did not object, but
Sheila provides no evidence of this assertion beyond citing to
the discussion above, which does not support that assertion.
When Richard filed his motion for reconsideration with the
transcript of the relevant exchange in open court, the transcript
included the courts statement that the parties would meet to
further work out personal property division: [A]ll the parties
are going to get together and see what they can do with the
[property division] . . . . Given that this was the only
discussion of the matter, and that Richard clearly objected at
the October 2007 hearing to the claim that he had entered into a
stipulation, it was error to base judgment on Attachment A-Y.
Richard also points out an unexplained variance between
the experts appraisal of the value of Sheilas personal property
and the amount the court credited her with having received. The
appraisal report itself appears to be the source of the error.
The report consists of columns, one for Sheila and one for
Richard, with the value of each item allocated according to the
property division. At the bottom of each page, there is a total
handwritten at the bottom of the columns. When they are added
together, the total is $28,450. However, the typewritten total
for all the property at the end of the valuation is $12,391.
Sheila offers no explanation of the difference.
We therefore remand for fact-finding regarding whether
the parties ever reached an agreement regarding the personal
property, and, if not, for further proceedings as necessary to
reach an equitable division of the parties personal property.
E. The Trial Courts Post-Trial Reconsideration And
Recalculation Of The Spreadsheet Requires Clarification.
A. Richard argues that the court made an unexplained error in
recalculating the assets awarded to the parties after Richards
motion for reconsideration. Specifically, he alleges that the
trial court changed the figures used to calculate the value of
the Caskill home without explaining the change. In its oral
findings on the record, the court credited Richards testimony
that it would be necessary to make $54,977 in repairs to bring
the house up to code, which would increase the houses value to
$215,000. The court calculated the value in its spreadsheet by
subtracting $54,977 from $215,000. Richard requested
reconsideration on the grounds that the outstanding mortgage debt
of $24,949 should also have been subtracted, leading to a value
for the home of $135,074. The court recalculated the value to
account for the mortgage, but changed the amount necessary to
make repairs to $30,027 instead of the $54,977 it originally
found necessary. In the courts explanation of its calculations,
it is not clear if this change was intentional. The court
stated: The court evaluated the evidence, including the
photographs of the residence and found Mr. Sparkss evidence that
repairs totaling $30,027.63 were necessary to make the appraisal
value accurate were credible by a preponderance of the evidence.
While a reevaluation of the value of the repairs and the use of
an adjusted amount would not necessarily have been an abuse of
discretion, we are unable to determine if the new figure was
based on a reevaluation or a transcription error based on the
language of the order.40 We remand this issue for clarification.
V. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the judgment below in all but three aspects,
which we REMAND to the trial court for further proceedings to
determine: (1) whether agreement was reached on valuing the
parties personal property and, if not, the correct valuation and
division of the property; (2) the classification of the debt on
the Discover account (related to the date on which it was
incurred); and (3) the value of the repairs necessary to bring
the Caskill home up to code.
_______________________________
1 Odom v. Odom, 141 P.3d 324, 330 (Alaska 2006).
2 Id.
3 Hatten v. Hatten, 917 P.2d 667, 672 n.11 (Alaska 1996).
4 Brandal v. Shangin, 36 P.3d 1188, 1191 (Alaska 2001).
5 Id. at 1192.
6 Hatten, 917 P.2d at 672.
7 794 P.2d 1346 (Alaska 1990).
8 Id. at 1348.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 1349.
11 Sampson v. Sampson, 14 P.3d 272, 276 (Alaska 2000).
12 Abood v. Abood, 119 P.3d 980, 984 (Alaska 2005)
(holding that presumption overcome where wife introduced evidence
that intent in placing proceeds in joint account was for
administrative convenience rather than to make donation to
marriage).
13 794 P.2d 1346, 1349 (Alaska 1990) (holding that tort
damages are separate property except where intended to replace
pre-divorce lost earnings).
14 68 P.3d 1232 (Alaska 2003).
15 Id. at 1235.
16 See Hansen v. Hansen, 119 P.3d 1005, 1013 (Alaska 2005)
(holding that separate property may become marital property if
spouse donates it to marital unit with intent at time of donation
that property become marital).
17 See id.; see also Abood, 119 P.3d at 984-85 (placing
property into joint title raises presumption of donative intent,
although presumption may be overcome if evidence of different
intent at time of placement into joint title is produced).
18 Lundquist v. Lundquist, 923 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1996).
19 Sampson v. Sampson, 14 P.3d 272, 275 (Alaska 2000).
20 Id.
21 Id. at 277.
22 1 Brett R. Turner, Equitable Division of Property
5:69, at 664 (3d ed. 2005).
23 Id. at 665.
24 Id. at 667.
25 Id.
26 See Evans v. Evans, 869 P.2d 478, 481 (Alaska 1994)
(holding that it is trial courts function to evaluate witness
credibility and weigh conflicting evidence).
27 119 P.3d 1005 (Alaska 2005).
28 Id. at 1015 (holding that health benefits earned during
marriage are marital asset of insured spouse).
29 Zito v. Zito, 969 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Alaska 1998).
30 See Hunt v. Hunt, 698 P.2d 1168, 1171-72 (Alaska 1985).
31 Harrower v. Harrower, 71 P.3d 854, 862 (Alaska 2003)
(holding that tax appraisals do not reliably measure true value).
32 See Haisley v. Grant, 486 P.2d 367, 370 (Alaska 1971).
33 AS 25.24.160(a) provides in relevant part:
In a judgment in an action for divorce . . .
(4) the division of property must fairly
allocate the economic effect of divorce by
being based on consideration of the following
factors: . . . (B) the age and health of the
parties; (C) the earning capacity of the
parties, including their educational
backgrounds, training, employment skills,
work experiences, length of absence from the
job market . . .; [and] (D) the financial
condition of the parties, including the
availability and cost of health insurance . .
. .
34 52 P.3d 724 (Alaska 2002).
35 Id. at 731.
36 Id.
37 834 P.2d 807 (Alaska 1992).
38 Id. at 809.
39 Id.
40 Because the difference between the original amount that
the court attributed to necessary repairs ($54,977) and the later
amount that the court attributed to repairs ($30,027) is $24,950,
and because this amount is almost exactly the amount of the
outstanding mortgage that Richard said on reconsideration should
have been subtracted from the value of the house, ($24,949), we
are unsure whether the new figure is accurate.
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