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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Smallwood v. Central Peninsula General Hospital, Inc. (4/2/2010) sp-6466
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage,
Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
| PATRICIA SMALLWOOD, as | ) |
| Personal Representative of the | ) Supreme Court No. S-12832 |
| Estate of John L. Smallwood, | ) |
| ) Superior Court No. 3KN-01-00971 CI | |
| Appellant, | ) |
| ) O P I N I O N | |
| v. | ) |
| ) No. 6466 April 2, 2010 | |
| CENTRAL PENINSULA GENERAL | ) |
| HOSPITAL, INC., | ) |
| ) | |
| Appellee. | ) |
| ) | |
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State
of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Kenai,
Charles T. Huguelet and Anna M. Moran,
Judges.
Appearances: Nikole Nelson, Alaska Legal
Services Corporation, Anchorage, for
Appellant. Robert J. Molloy and Kristine A.
Schmidt, Molloy Schmidt LLC, Kenai, for
Appellee.
Before: Carpeneti, Chief Justice, Fabe,
Winfree, and Christen, Justices, and Bolger,
Justice pro tem.*
BOLGER, Justice pro tem.
I. INTRODUCTION
John L. Smallwood obtained an injunction requiring
Central Peninsula General Hospital to discontinue its practice of
balance billing certain Medicaid patients, and the hospital
complied by implementing a new billing system. But when
Smallwood did not dispute the hospitals compliance, the superior
court erroneously concluded that he had abandoned his balance
billing claim. Smallwood appealed the order that was based on
this erroneous conclusion, but he died while this appeal was
pending. The superior court then dismissed this case, even
though supervision and control had been transferred to this
court. We reverse the superior courts finding that Smallwood
abandoned his claim, vacate the superior courts dismissal order,
and remand for a determination of attorneys fees.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Smallwood was a Medicaid recipient whom Central
Peninsula General Hospital treated on multiple occasions.1 The
hospital sent Smallwood bills that included both approved
Medicaid co-payment amounts and unauthorized charges.2 Smallwood
did not pay the bills and sued the hospital, alleging that it
violated state and federal Medicaid law by charging him amounts
exceeding those allowed as co-payments, a practice known as
balance billing.3 He also alleged that the hospital violated the
Alaska Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act (UTPA)
because its billing practices were confusing and misleading.4 He
requested declaratory and injunctive relief for himself and all
of the hospitals Medicaid patients.5 The superior court awarded
the hospital all fees allowed by Medicaid, ordered the hospital
to stop overcharging Smallwood, and concluded that neither party
had prevailed on the issues of injunctive and declaratory
relief.6
Smallwood appealed the decision to this court. We
affirmed the superior courts order requiring the hospital to stop
overcharging Smallwood and the award of the valid co-payment
amounts to the hospital.7 We vacated the order denying
injunctive and declaratory relief on the balance billing and UTPA
claims and remanded the case for reconsideration of those
issues.8
On remand, the superior court held a hearing at which
it ordered the hospital to stop all balance billing. The court
ordered the hospital to provide an affidavit within two weeks
confirming that it was no longer balance billing Medicaid
patients. It instructed Smallwoods attorney to request a hearing
if she was not satisfied with the affidavit. The court also set
a briefing schedule for the UTPA claim.
The hospital submitted a timely affidavit describing
the procedures the hospital had put in place to prevent balance
billing of Medicaid recipients. Smallwood and the hospital both
filed briefs addressing only the UTPA claim.
The superior court issued a memorandum decision
concluding that Smallwood had abandoned his claim for relief from
balance billing because he did not include that issue in his
brief. The court also concluded that the balance billing claim
was moot because Medicaid patients were no longer being balance
billed. It further concluded that the hospitals billing
statements did not violate the UTPA.9
Smallwood filed this appeal from the superior courts
memorandum decision.10 But Smallwood died several months later.
The hospital moved for dismissal in the superior court as a
result of Smallwoods failure to substitute another plaintiff
within ninety days, as required by Alaska Civil Rule 25(a)(1).11
The superior court granted the motion to dismiss, noting that it
had received no opposition.
The hospital also filed a motion to dismiss with this
court. Smallwoods daughter Patricia then filed a motion for
substitution as the personal representative of the estate. We
denied the hospitals motion to dismiss and substituted the estate
as the appellant.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
This case involves purely legal issues.12 We apply our
independent judgment to the superior courts rulings involving
questions of law.13 When we apply our independent judgment, we
adopt the rule of law most persuasive in light of precedent,
reason, and policy.14
B. The Superior Court Had No Jurisdiction To Dismiss the
Underlying Case While This Appeal Was Pending.
The hospital argues that this case is moot because the
superior court granted its motion to dismiss under Civil Rule 25.
Smallwoods estate argues that the superior court had no
jurisdiction to consider the motion to dismiss while this appeal
was pending.
Appellate courts have supervision and control of
proceedings following the filing of a notice of appeal.15 Absent
an express remand order, the superior court cannot then modify
any matters directly or necessarily involved in the matter under
review, although the superior court retains jurisdiction over
collateral matters.16
The proper procedure following the death of a party is
not a collateral matter: The choice of forum can make a
substantial difference in the proceedings. In the trial court,
under Civil Rule 25(a)(1), a motion for substitution must be
filed within ninety days after the death is suggested on the
record or the matter is dismissed, effectively terminating the
action with respect to the deceased party.17 In contrast, under
Appellate Rule 516(a), the death of a party during a civil appeal
does not affect the case, except that certain time deadlines are
extended to allow the proper representatives to be substituted.18
The federal courts do not apply the corresponding
provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a)(1) to cases
on appeal.19 We likewise conclude that, while a case is on
appeal, the superior court lacks jurisdiction to order
substitution of parties or dismissal following the death of a
party. Proceedings relating to the death of a party after an
appeal has been filed must either occur in the appellate court or
in the superior court following a remand.20
Here, the hospital filed a motion to dismiss with the
superior court based on Smallwoods death. But the superior court
lacked jurisdiction to address the matter because this appeal was
then pending. We therefore vacate the superior courts order
dismissing this case.
C. Smallwood Did Not Abandon His Balance Billing Claim.
Smallwoods estate argues that it was clear error for
the superior court to conclude that Smallwood abandoned his claim
for relief from balance billing. The estate argues that he did
not abandon his claim, but rather received the injunctive relief
that he sought.
Failure to argue a point of law constitutes
abandonment.21 But a litigant does not abandon a claim when he
obtains an injunction, then agrees that the other party has
complied.22
The superior court granted Smallwoods request for an
injunction at the hearing on remand when it ordered the hospital
to stop balance billing anyone thats on Medicaid. The hospital
complied with the injunction by filing an affidavit establishing
that the hospital had implemented new billing procedures to
ensure that no Medicaid patients would be balance billed. The
court gave Smallwood the opportunity to contest the adequacy of
the hospitals compliance by filing a request for a hearing, but
Smallwood did not do so. Smallwoods failure to contest that this
new system effectively complied with the injunction did not
constitute abandonment of his claim: Smallwood had already
succeeded by obtaining the injunction he requested.
D. The Estate Has Not Waived Its Attorneys Fees Claim.
The hospital asserts that this case is now moot because
Smallwood has died and the hospital has complied with the
superior courts injunction. But this court will hear an
otherwise moot case to determine who is the prevailing party for
purposes of awarding attorneys fees.23 This case is not moot
because our conclusion that Smallwood did not abandon his claim
may change[] the status of the prevailing party and thus an award
of attorneys fees.24
The prevailing party is the one who succeeds on the
main issue; it does not need to prevail on every issue or obtain
formal judicial relief.25 The court may award attorneys fees to
the Smallwood estate under the catalyst theory if it demonstrates
the following elements: (1) that it achieved the goal of the
litigation by succeeding on any significant issue which achieves
some of the benefit sought in bringing the suit, and (2) that
there is a causal connection between the defendants action
generating relief and the lawsuit.26 Smallwoods implicit
agreement that the hospital had complied with the injunction does
not prevent the superior court from determining that Smallwoods
estate is the prevailing party for the purpose of awarding
attorneys fees.27
We must therefore remand this case to the superior
court for determination of the prevailing party and an award of
attorneys fees.
IV. CONCLUSION
We VACATE the superior courts order of dismissal that
was based on Smallwoods death. We REVERSE the superior courts
conclusion that Smallwood abandoned his balance billing claim.
We REMAND for entry of judgment and an award of attorneys fees.
_______________________________
* Sitting by assignment made pursuant to article IV,
section 16 of the Alaska Constitution.
1 Smallwood v. Cent. Peninsula Gen. Hosp., 151 P.3d 319,
321 (Alaska 2006).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id. at 321, 329.
5 Id. at 321.
6 Id. at 322.
7 Id. at 322, 332.
8 Id. at 332.
9 Smallwoods estate now agrees that the UTPA claim is
likely moot as a result of Smallwoods death.
10 Alaska Civil Rule 58 requires a judgment to be set
forth on a separate document distinct from any . . . opinion[] or
memorandum. In this case, the superior court did not enter a
separate order labeled as a final judgment. Our prior cases
allow us to recognize a decision as a final judgment if the
decision effectively disposes of the entire case, Williams v.
City of Valdez, 603 P.2d 483, 487 (Alaska 1979) (internal
citations omitted), and clearly evidences the judges intent to
presently and finally dispose of the matter. Breese v. Smith,
501 P.2d 159, 163 (Alaska 1972) (quoting In re Mountain View Pub.
Util. Dist. No. 1, 359 P.2d 951, 954 (Alaska 1961)). The
superior courts memorandum decision disposed of all claims and
displayed the courts intent to dispose of the matter. Under the
circumstances of this case, we recognize it as final and subject
to review.
11 Alaska Civil Rule 25(a)(1) provides:
If a party dies and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, the court may order
substitution of the proper parties. . . .
Unless the motion for substitution is made
not later than 90 days after the death . . .
, the action shall be dismissed as to the
deceased party.
12 See Noey v. Bledsoe, 978 P.2d 1264, 1275 (Alaska 1999)
(whether superior court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a
case on appeal is a legal question).
13 Smallwood, 151 P.3d at 322.
14 Jacob v. State, Dept of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of
Childrens Servs., 177 P.3d 1181, 1184 (Alaska 2008) (quoting Guin
v. Ha, 591 P.2d 1281, 1284 n.6 (Alaska 1979)).
15 Alaska R. App. P. 203.
16 Asher v. Alkan Shelter, LLC, 212 P.3d 772, 783 (Alaska
2009) (quoting Heppinstall v. Darnall Kemna & Co., 851 P.2d 78,
79 (Alaska 1993)).
17 See Estate of Lampert Through Thurston v. Estate of
Lampert Through Stauffer, 896 P.2d 214, 217 (Alaska 1995).
18 Alaska Rule of Appellate Procedure 516(a) provides that
[t]he death of a party in a civil action or proceeding shall not
affect any appeal taken or petition for review made, except that
any deadlines may be extended until up to sixty days after the
death of the party to allow time for substitution.
19 See Servidone Constr. Corp. v. Levine, 156 F.3d 414,
416 (2nd Cir. 1998); 7C Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller &
Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure 1951, at 649-50
(3d ed. 2007).
20 See Duriron Co. v. Bakke, 431 P.2d 499, 500-01 (Alaska
1967).
21 See State v. ONeill Investigations, Inc., 609 P.2d 520,
528 (Alaska 1980).
22 See City of Kenai v. Friends of the Recreation Ctr.,
Inc., 129 P.3d 452, 460-61 (Alaska 2006) (holding that plaintiff
was prevailing party for attorneys fee purposes because it
obtained preliminary injunction even though it agreed that claims
were moot).
23 Lamoureaux v. Totem Ocean Trailer Express, Inc., 651
P.2d 839, 840 n.1 (Alaska 1982).
24 Ulmer v. Alaska Rest. & Beverage Assn, 33 P.3d 773, 777
(Alaska 2001) (denying attorneys fees claim of a party who
explicitly stated that it was not seeking any fees).
25 Braun v. Denali Borough, 193 P.3d 719, 727 (Alaska
2008) (internal citations omitted).
26 Progressive Corp. v. Peter ex rel. Peter, 195 P.3d
1083, 1094 (Alaska 2008) (quoting Interior Cabaret, Hotel, Rest.
& Retailers Assn v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 135 P.3d 1000,
1008 (Alaska 2006)).
27 See Friends of the Recreation Ctr., Inc., 129 P.3d at
460-61.
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