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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Bradshaw v. State, Dept. of Administration, Division of Motor Vehicles (1/29/2010) sp-6456
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage,
Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
| JOSEPH L. BRADSHAW, | ) |
| ) Supreme Court No. S- 13262 | |
| Appellant, | ) |
| ) Superior Court No. 3AN-07-8214 CI | |
| v. | ) |
| ) O P I N I O N | |
| STATE OF ALASKA, DEPART- | ) |
| MENT OF ADMINISTRATION, | ) No. 6456 January 29, 2010 |
| DIVISION OF MOTOR VEHICLES, | ) |
| and DUANE BANNOCK, Director, | ) |
| ) | |
| Appellees. | ) |
| ) | |
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State
of Alaska, Third Judicial District,
Anchorage, Craig Stowers, Judge.
Appearances: Joseph L. Bradshaw, pro se,
Anchorage. Krista S. Stearns, Assistant
Attorney General, Anchorage, and Richard A.
Svobodny, Acting Attorney General, Juneau,
for Appellees.
Before: Carpeneti, Chief Justice, Eastaugh,
Fabe, Winfree, and Christen, Justices.
EASTAUGH, Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1995 the Alaska Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV)
suspended Joseph Bradshaws drivers license because he violated
Alaskas mandatory insurance and financial responsibility laws.
When Bradshaw applied for license reinstatement in 2007, DMV told
him that he had to pay a $100 reinstatement fee. Bradshaw sued
the state, arguing that the ten-year statute of limitations
barred DMV from charging him the $100 reinstatement fee. The
superior court granted summary judgment to the state and
dismissed Bradshaws complaint. Alaska Statute 28.15.271(b)(3)(A)
is the authority for a $100 reinstatement fee. Because imposing
the $100 reinstatement fee was not an action within the meaning
of the statute of limitations, and because Bradshaws license had
been suspended within the meaning of AS 28.15.271(b)(3)(A) within
the ten years preceding his reinstatement application, we affirm.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Joseph Bradshaw was involved in a February 1995 motor
vehicle accident that resulted in over $2,000 in property damage.
DMV ordered that Bradshaws drivers license be suspended for
ninety days because he was uninsured at the time of the accident,
a violation of the Alaska Mandatory Automobile Insurance Act.1
Because Bradshaw had also failed to comply with the Motor Vehicle
Safety Responsibility Act,2 DMV ordered that his license be
suspended for three years or until proof of future financial
responsibility is provided.3
In June 1995 the Department of Public Safety held an
administrative hearing to review DMVs decision to suspend
Bradshaws license. The hearing officer affirmed the decision to
suspend Bradshaws license under both the Alaska Mandatory
Automobile Insurance Act and the Motor Vehicle Safety
Responsibility Act. The hearing officer issued written decisions
stating that Bradshaws license would be suspended effective July
15, 1995.
Bradshaws suspension was ostensibly for three years.
But AS 28.20.240, Bradshaws orders of suspension, and the
hearing officers decisions all stated that any suspension would
continue after the initial suspension period until he provided
proof of financial responsibility for the future.4 Most drivers
demonstrate proof of future financial responsibility by
purchasing insurance and an additional special service from their
automobile liability insurer, which agrees to inform DMV if the
insurance lapses. The insurer provides the driver with an SR-22
certificate confirming the purchase of this specialized service.5
Bradshaw was eligible to seek reinstatement of his
drivers license as early as February 1996 because he had
shortened his three-year suspension by paying the other driver
for the damage Bradshaw caused. He took steps to reinstate his
license in 1998, but according to a DMV supervisors affidavit, he
complained about having to purchase SR-22 insurance coverage and
did not complete the reinstatement process.6 Because Bradshaw
failed to provide DMV proof of his future financial
responsibility, his license remained suspended.
In June 2007 Bradshaw formally applied to DMV for
reinstatement. [Exc. 8] He indicated on his certified
application that his license had been suspended and that the
suspension was still in effect. In response, DMV informed
Bradshaw that he had to pay a $100 reinstatement fee in addition
to the customary $15 or $20 renewal fee.
The authority for charging the $100 reinstatement fee
is AS 28.15.271(b)(3)(A), which states that a person who applies
for reinstatement of a drivers license under AS 28.15.211 shall
pay a fee of . . . $100 if the persons drivers license has,
within the 10 years preceding the application, been suspended,
revoked, or limited under the provisions of this chapter . . .
only once. (Emphasis added.)
Bradshaw objected to paying the $100 reinstatement fee
and sued the Department of Administration, DMV, and its director,
Duane Bannock, in superior court. Bradshaw alleged that because
the incident that is involved in this matter happen[ed] over 10
years ago, the reinstatement fee did not apply to him. He also
sought damages of more than $1.5 million.
In March 2008 the superior court granted the states
motion to dismiss Director Bannock from the case because the
complaint did not state a cognizable claim against him.7 In July
2008 the state filed a motion for summary judgment. The superior
court granted the motion and dismissed Bradshaws complaint with
prejudice. The court held that to have his drivers license
reinstated, Bradshaw had to pay both the statutory $100
reinstatement fee and the $20 renewal fee.
Bradshaw appeals.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
We review grants of summary judgment de novo, drawing
all permissible factual inferences in favor of, and viewing the
facts in the light most favorable to, the non-prevailing party.8
We affirm grants of summary judgment if there are no genuine
issues of material fact and the prevailing party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.9
Questions regarding the interpretation and application
of a statute are questions of law to which we apply our
independent judgment.10 Our goal when interpreting a statute is
to give effect to the intent of the law-making body with due
regard for the meaning that the language in the provision conveys
to others.11 We will adopt the rule of law that is most
persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy after
considering the plain meaning of the statute, the legislative
purpose of the statute, and the intent of the statute.12 When
reviewing an agency decision involving statutory interpretation
and determination of legislative intent, we apply the
substitution of judgment standard.13 But we may defer to an
agencys interpretation of a statute if undefined or ambiguous
terms appear in the statute.14
B. Whether the Statute of Limitations Bars Imposing the
$100 Restatement Fee on Bradshaw
This case turns primarily on the statutory
interpretation of AS 28.15.271. But we must first resolve
Bradshaws contention that Alaskas statute of limitations
altogether bars DMV from imposing the reinstatement fee on him.
Bradshaws complaint asserted that [t]he incident that is involved
in this matter happen[ed] over 10 years ago. Bradshaw argues
that the ten-year statute of limitations contained in AS
09.10.100 prevents the state from enforcing the $100
reinstatement fee provision in AS 28.15.271 because this case is
based on information that is over 11 years old. The uninsured
accident and Bradshaws license suspension both occurred in 1995,
more than ten years before he applied for reinstatement in 2007.
It is unclear whether he considers the accident or the suspension
the event that triggered the ten-year statute.
DMV argues that statutes of limitations act as defenses
to causes of action, that DMV has not brought an action against
Bradshaw, and that statutes of limitations do not apply to fees
DMV must charge administratively.
Alaska Statute 09.10.100 is Alaskas general statute of
limitations provision.15 It states that a party must bring,
within ten years, any action for a cause not provided for in
another statute. Statutes of limitations attempt to strike a
balance between ensuring that claimants have enough time to file
claims and protecting persons from due process concerns that
arise from stale charges.16 They do so by barring untimely causes
of actions or, in the words of section .100, action[s] for a
cause.17 A cause of action is a situation or state of facts
which entitles a party to sustain an action and gives him the
right to seek judicial interference in his behalf.18
But a government agency responsible for charging a
fee when an applicant seeks a license is not asserting a cause of
action when it requires the applicant to pay the fee as a
condition of license reinstatement. Nor is it seeking an
affirmative remedy or judicial relief. DMV only imposes the
reinstatement fee when a person applies for a reinstated license.19
DMV could not have filed a lawsuit to force Bradshaw to
affirmatively seek reinstatement. And DMV did not sue Bradshaw
to collect the fee. It was not attempting to obtain judicial
relief against Bradshaw; its administrative attempt to collect
the fee only responded to Bradshaws administrative application
for reinstatement. DMVs attempt to enforce section .271
consequently is not an action subject to the statute of
limitations, and AS 09.10.100 does not prevent DMV from charging
Bradshaw the reinstatement fee.
C. Whether, Within the Meaning of AS 28.15.271(b)(3),
Bradshaws License Had Been Suspended Within the
Previous Ten Years
We next turn to the meaning of AS 28.15.271(b)(3).
Alaska Statute 28.15.271(b)(3)(A) requires a person who applies
for license reinstatement to pay a $100 reinstatement fee if the
applicants drivers license has, within the 10 years preceding the
application, been suspended . . . only once.20
Bradshaw argues that DMVs $100 reinstatement fee does
not apply to him because this case is based on information that
is over 11 years old. Bradshaws argument is very terse, and he
is pro se. We interpret his argument as contending that the $100
reinstatement fee would only apply if he had sought reinstatement
within ten years of the administrative act of suspension.
Because DMV suspended his license on July 15, 1995, more than ten
years before he sought reinstatement in 2007, subsection
.271(b)(3)(A) does not apply to him. Therefore DMV cannot
condition reinstatement on payment of the $100 fee.
DMV argues that the language of the fee statute,
section .271, unambiguously provides that the fee applies if the
persons license was in the state of suspension at any time during
the preceding ten years. It further argues that this
construction is correct because the legislature did not draft
section .271 to make the date of suspension the critical event,
as it did in a comparable statutory provision.21 It also argues
that imposing the fee here does not create an anomalous result.
[T]he threshold question in ascertaining the correct
interpretation of a statute is whether the language of the
statute is clear or arguably ambiguous.22 Read in isolation,
subsection .271(b)(3)(A) does not clearly indicate whether the
statutes use of the phrase been suspended refers to as Bradshaw
implies the act of suspension, or as the state contends the
status of suspension. Suspended could be read to refer to the
initial administrative act of suspending a drivers license. This
would mean the $100 fee would apply only if the first day of
suspension were within the ten-year period before the driver
applied for reinstatement. Under this interpretation, if DMV
suspended a license on January 1, 2000, DMV could not charge the
$100 reinstatement fee if the driver applied for reinstatement on
January 2, 2010.
Alternatively, suspended could be permissibly read to
refer to the status of suspension. If so, the $100 fee would
apply if the drivers license had been in a state of suspension at
any time in the ten years before application, even if the first
day of suspension were more than ten years before. Because the
statute uses the phrase has . . . been suspended, this is
probably the best interpretation of the statutes words.
(Emphasis added.) Nonetheless, both interpretations are
grammatically permissible under a plain reading of the statute,
if its words are read in isolation.
The legislatures use of the phrase has been suspended
in another section of AS 28.15 helps indicate the most likely
meaning of the phrase as it is used in AS 28.15.271. Alaska
Statute 28.15.211(a) states that a person whose drivers license .
. . has been suspended . . . may not apply for a new license . .
. until the expiration of a statutorily defined period.
(Emphasis added.) This subsection implies that it is the state
of suspension that matters. And AS 28.15.211(c), which permits a
suspended driver to seek reinstatement upon payment of fees,
including a reinstatement fee, refers to the period of
suspension, implying that it is the status of suspension, not the
date of suspension, that is important in the context of license
reinstatement. Also, as DMV argues, the legislature demonstrated
when it wrote AS 28.20.150(a) that it knew how to make the date
of suspension the critical event.23 Considered together, AS
28.15.271(b)(3), AS 28.15.211, and AS 28.20.150(a) provide
textual clues that the legislature considered the status of
suspension to be the trigger (or at least one of the triggers)
for imposing a reinstatement fee.
When interpreting a statute, we look to the statutory
purpose. The apparent purpose of the reinstatement provisions
helps convince us that DMVs interpretation of subsection
.271(b)(3) is correct. As we noted above, AS 28.15.211(c)
permits a driver to seek reinstatement upon payment of the proper
fees, including a reinstatement fee. Subsection .271(b)(3)
specifies the applicable reinstatement fee. That subsection
contains four subsections that impose different reinstatement
fees, ranging from $100 to $500.24 For example, AS
28.15.271(b)(3)(A) imposes a $100 reinstatement fee and AS
28.15.271(b)(3)(B) imposes a $250 reinstatement fee.
Nothing in subsection .211(c) or subsection .271(b)(3)
implies that drivers seeking reinstatement of their suspended
drivers licenses may be excused from paying at least the $100
reinstatement fee. Although suspensions can be for varying
lengths of time,25 all suspensions last until the applicant gives
proof of future financial responsibility.26 Interpreting
subsection .271(b)(3)(A)s ten-year period to be a special
administrative statute of limitations that begins running on the
date of DMVs suspending act would therefore mean no reinstatement
fee could be assessed against an entire class of drivers with
suspended licenses, i.e., those drivers whose licenses have been
in suspended status for more than ten years. This result would
appear to be contrary to subsection .211(c), which permits a
suspended driver to seek reinstatement upon payment of fees,
including a reinstatement fee. Subsection .211(c) appears to
require any driver seeking license reinstatement to pay a
reinstatement fee. Nothing in the statutory scheme implies that
anyone seeking reinstatement of a suspended license may avoid
paying the basic reinstatement fee of $100. It is not obvious
why the passage of time would altogether excuse the holder of a
suspended license from paying any reinstatement fee.
Implicit in Bradshaws apparent argument may be the
assumption that subsection .271(b)(3)(A) provides suspended
drivers a ten-year statute of repose, after which the DMV may not
impose the $100 reinstatement fee. In this he may be relying on
the phrase within the 10 years preceding the application,
contained in both subsection .271(b)(3)(A) and subsection
.271(b)(3)(B). To understand the meaning of that phrase, it is
necessary to read the statute carefully. Subsection
.271(b)(3)(A) imposes the $100 fee on drivers whose licenses have
been suspended only once within the past ten years; subsection
.271(b)(3)(B) imposes the $250 fee on drivers whose licenses have
been suspended two or more times within the past ten years.
Assuming a driver with multiple suspensions (necessarily
requiring at least one prior reinstatement) can avoid the
enhanced $250 fee if the prior suspension ended more than ten
years before the current reinstatement application, that driver,
despite the multiple suspensions, pays only the basic $100
reinstatement fee. The phrase within the 10 years preceding the
application in subsection .271(b)(3)(B) sets a time period after
which past suspensions do not trigger the enhanced fee.
Applicants with old suspensions who do not have to pay the $250
fee must still pay the $100 reinstatement fee under subsection
.271(b)(3)(A).
If the legislature had not included the phrase within
the ten years preceding the application in subsection
.271(b)(3)(A), applicants with multiple suspensions who do not
have to pay the $250 fee would also not have to pay the $100 fee
because the driver had not been suspended only once. It appears
that the legislature intended the phrase within the 10 years
preceding the application in subsection .271(b)(3)(A) to ensure
that multiple offenders would have to pay at least $100. The
legislature did not intend to provide for a period of repose for
applicants with suspended licenses to avoid paying the basic $100
reinstatement fee.
We also consider legislative history when we interpret
a statute. But the legislative history of this statute is
essentially neutral. The requirement of a $100 reinstatement fee
in AS 28.15.271(b)(3) was added in 1994 as part of a bill that
provided for the revocation of drivers licenses of minors who
illegally possessed controlled substances or alcohol.27 The
purpose of the bill was deterring teenagers from engaging in the
use and abuse of controlled substances.28 Nothing in the
statutory history shows any legislative intent reflecting what
suspended means in section .271. The history therefore does not
conflict with our interpretation of the statute.
Thus, although DMV and Bradshaw both advance
grammatically permissible interpretations of the statute and AS
28.15.271(b)(3)s meaning is not immediately self-evident, our
analysis shows that DMVs reading best gives effect to the
legislatures apparent intent. Furthermore, we would reach the
same result even if we thought the statute were ambiguous. We
give some deference to the interpretation of an ambiguous statute
by the agency charged with enforcing it.29 DMVs interpretation
and application of subsection .271(b)(3) is plausible, consistent
with the apparent legislative purpose, and grammatically
permissible.
We therefore conclude that section .271 looks to the
status of suspension for the purpose of measuring the ten-year
period for imposing reinstatement fees. If at any time within
the ten years before reinstatement is sought, the license has
been in the status of suspension, the reinstatement fee is
payable. Bradshaw indicated in his application that his
suspension was still in effect as of 2007. The superior court
did not err in concluding that Bradshaw must pay the $100 fee
required by AS 28.15.271(b)(3)(A).
D. Whether AS 28.15.271(b)(3) Applies to Suspensions Under
Chapters 20 or 22
Bradshaws appeal has not raised, even implicitly, any
issue of whether AS 28.15.271(b)(3) actually applies to his
suspension, but an alert reader might wonder whether we are
implicitly holding that it does. Subsection .271(b)(3)(A)
instructs DMV to impose the $100 reinstatement fee if the persons
license has . . . been suspended, revoked, or limited under the
provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis added.) The emphasized
phrase seems to refer to Chapter 15. But Bradshaws license was
suspended because he violated Chapter 20, the Alaska Mandatory
Automobile Insurance Act, and Chapter 22, the Motor Vehicle
Safety Responsibility Act. There is therefore a potential
question whether the phrase under the provisions of this chapter
in AS 18.15.271(b)(3)(A) was satisfied. Possibly other
provisions in Title 28 have the effect of rendering suspensions
under Chapter 20 and 22 as though they are suspensions under the
provisions of Chapter 15. It is also unclear whether the phrase
under the provisions of this chapter modifies all the elements of
the list suspended, revoked, or limited, or applies only to the
immediate antecedent element of the list, limited.30 If it were
the latter, the phrase would not apply to reinstatement of a
suspended license. In any event, these issues were not raised
below and have not been briefed by any party on appeal and are
therefore not properly before us.
IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we AFFIRM.
_______________________________
1 AS 28.22.011-.321. AS 28.22.041 governs administrative
suspension of drivers licenses for failure to provide proof of
insurance. It states in relevant part:
if a person fails to provide proof required
under AS 28.22.021 and 28.22.031, the
department shall suspend the drivers license
of that person for . . . not less than 90
days if, within the preceding 10 years, the
person has not had a drivers license
suspended for violation of AS 28.22.011 or
former AS 28.22.200.
2 AS 28.20.010-.640. The Motor Vehicle Safety
Responsibility Act requires the operator of a motor vehicle
involved in an accident [to] respond for damages and show proof
of financial ability to respond for damages in future accidents
as a prerequisite to the persons exercise of the privilege of
operating a motor vehicle in the state. AS 28.20.010.
3 The Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act states that
DMV will suspend the license of any driver of a motor vehicle
involved in an accident resulting in over $501 in damage to any
one persons property unless that driver has previously furnished
or immediately furnishes security or is otherwise excepted from
furnishing such security. AS 28.20.260. AS 28.20.150(a), which
governs the duration of the resulting suspension, provides that:
[u]nless a suspension is terminated under
other provisions of this chapter, an order of
suspension by the department remains in
effect until terminated and a license may not
be renewed or issued to a person whose
license is suspended until proof of financial
responsibility for the future is provided and
(1) the person deposits or there is
deposited on behalf of the person the
security required under [the Responsibility
Act]; or
(2) three years elapse following the
date of suspension.
4 Likewise, AS 28.20.150(a)(1) states that a suspended
license may not be renewed or issued to a person whose license is
suspended until proof of financial responsibility for the future
is provided and . . . the person deposits . . . the security
required under this chapter.
5 AS 28.20.390-.420 list the ways a driver may provide
proof of financial responsibility for the future.
6 Bradshaw apparently sued DMV in 1998 over the SR-22
requirement, but his complaint was dismissed for lack of
prosecution.
7 Bradshaw does not appeal that ruling.
8 Rockstad v. Erikson, 113 P.3d 1215, 1219 (Alaska 2005)
(citing Ellis v. City of Valdez, 686 P.2d 700, 702 (Alaska
1984)).
9 Id. (citing Witt v. State, Dept of Corr., 75 P.3d 1030,
1033 (Alaska 2003)).
10 State v. Jeffery, 170 P.3d 226, 229 (Alaska 2007)
(citing Catholic Bishop of N. Alaska v. Does 1-6, 141 P.3d 719,
722 (Alaska 2006)).
11 S. Anchorage Concerned Coal., Inc. v. Municipality of
Anchorage Bd. of Adjustment, 172 P.3d 768, 771 (Alaska 2007)
(quoting Marlow v. Municipality of Anchorage, 889 P.2d 599, 602
(Alaska 1995)).
12 Rubey v. Alaska Commn on Postsecondary Educ., 217 P.3d
413, 415 (Alaska 2009) (citing Premera Blue Cross v. State, Dept
of Commerce, Cmty. & Econ. Dev., Div. of Ins., 171 P.3d 1110,
1115 (Alaska 2007)).
13 Alaska Pub. Offices Commn v. Stevens, 205 P.3d 321, 324
(Alaska 2009) (citing Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. State, Dept
of Envtl. Conservation, 145 P.3d 561, 564 (Alaska 2006)).
14 See, e.g., Flisock v. State, Div. of Ret. & Benefits,
818 P.2d 640, 643 n.4 (Alaska 1991).
15 AS 09.10.100 provides that [a]n action for a cause not
otherwise provided for [by another statute] may be commenced
within 10 years after the cause of action has accrued.
16 Brotherton v. Brotherton, 142 P.3d 1187, 1191 n.19
(Alaska 2006); Long v. Holland Am. Line Westours, Inc., 26 P.3d
430, 439 & n.13 (Alaska 2001) (Eastaugh, J., and Fabe, J.,
dissenting); West v. Buchanan, 981 P.2d 1065, 1068 (Alaska 1999)
([T]he purpose of statutes of limitations is to protect
defendants from the injustices that may result from the
prosecution of stale claims.).
17 Roach v. Caudle, 954 P.2d 1039, 1041 (Alaska 1998) (We
have determined that the statute of limitations does not begin to
run until a cause of action accrues.).
18 Fraticelli v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 375 F.2d
186, 188 n.6 (1st Cir. 1967) (emphasis in original) (quoting
Rhodes v. Jones, 351 F.2d 884, 886 (8th Cir. 1965)).
19 AS 28.15.271(b).
20 AS 28.15.271 states in pertinent part:
(b) In addition to the fees under (a) of
this section,
. . . .
(3) a person who applies for
reinstatement of a drivers license under AS
28.15.211 shall pay a fee of
(A) $100 if the persons drivers
license has, within the 10 years preceding
the application, been suspended, revoked, or
limited under the provisions of this chapter
. . . only once;
(B) $250 if the persons drivers
license has, within the 10 years preceding
the application, been suspended, revoked, or
limited under the provisions of this chapter
. . . two or more times . . . .
21 In support, DMV cites AS 28.20.150(a)(2), which
provides that a license may not be renewed or issued to a person
whose license is suspended until proof of financial
responsibility for the future is provided and . . . three years
elapse following the date of suspension. (Emphasis added.)
22 Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 21
P.3d 344, 351 (Alaska 2001) (alteration in original) (quoting K
Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 293 n.4 (1988)).
23 See note 21 above.
24 AS 28.15.271(b)(3).
25 See, e.g., AS 28.15.211(a)(1) (providing for one-month
suspension); AS 28.15.181(g) (providing for suspension until
licensee appears in court or pays fine).
26 See AS 28.20.240, which provides: A period of
suspension . . . continues until proof of financial
responsibility for the future is provided.
27 House Bill (H.B.) 299, 18th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska
1994).
28 An Act relating to revocation of a drivers license for
illegal possession or use of a controlled substance or illegal
possession or consumption of alcohol; and providing for an
effective date: Hearing on H.B. 299 Before the H. Judiciary
Comm., 18th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 1994) (statement of Rep.
Cynthia Toohey).
29 See, e.g., Flisock v. State, Div. of Ret. & Benefits,
818 P.2d 640, 643 n.4 (Alaska 1991) (stating that we may defer to
agencys interpretation of statute where undefined or ambiguous
terms appear in statutory language); Municipality of Anchorage v.
Sisters of Providence in Wash., Inc., 628 P.2d 22, 31 (Alaska
1981) (citing Union Oil of Ca. Co. v. Dept of Revenue, 560 P.2d
21, 25 (Alaska 1977)).
30 The latter reading complies with the last antecedent
rule of statutory construction. See 2A Norman J. Singer & J.D.
Shambie Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction 47.33 (7th
ed. 2007).
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