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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Wagner v. Wagner (10/16/2009) sp-6421
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage,
Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
| RICHARD WAGNER, | ) |
| ) Supreme Court No. S- 13055 | |
| Appellant, | ) |
| ) Superior Court No. 4FA-03-00181 CI | |
| v. | ) |
| ) | |
| GREGORY WAGNER, | ) O P I N I O N |
| ) | |
| Appellee. | ) No. 6421 October 16, 2009 |
| ) | |
| ) | |
| RICHARD WAGNER, | ) |
| ) Supreme Court No. S- 13175 | |
| Appellant, | ) |
| ) Superior Court No. 4FA-03-00181 CI | |
| v. | ) |
| ) | |
| GREGORY WAGNER, | ) |
| ) | |
| Appellee. | ) |
| ) | |
Appeal from the
Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Fourth
Judicial District, Mark I. Wood, Judge.
Appearances: S. Jason Crawford, Crawford Law
Offices, LLC, Fairbanks, for Appellant. John
J. Connors, Law Office of John J. Connors,
P.C., Fairbanks, for Appellee.
Before: Fabe, Chief Justice, Eastaugh,
Carpeneti, and Christen, Justices. [Winfree,
Justice, not participating.]
FABE, Chief Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
In exchange for his son Gregory Wagners help obtaining
a loan, Richard Wagner, who had previously filed for bankruptcy
and had many creditors, agreed to give Gregory a portion of the
royalty proceeds from his oil lease holdings. When Richard
failed to honor this agreement, Gregory sued and in 2005 obtained
a judgment for specific performance providing that he would be
entitled to a share of Richards royalties for as long as the
subject oil wells continued producing. In two separate appeals,
Richard contests the superior courts continuing enforcement of
this judgment. Because Richards arguments in both appeals are
either untimely, procedurally barred challenges to the 2005
judgment or otherwise lack merit, we affirm the superior courts
decisions in all respects.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
A. Facts
This is not the first time Richard and Gregory Wagner
have been before us.1 We described the basic facts underlying
their dispute in a recently published opinion:
Richard Wagner filed for bankruptcy in
1988. Richards assets included royalties from
oil and gas leases he possessed. Richards
creditors included Key Bank, whom Richard
owed $2.5 million. The bankruptcy court
issued Richards final bankruptcy plan in
1994. The plan divided Richards oil and gas
lease royalties among his creditors. In 2001
Key Bank offered to settle Richards $2.5
million debt for $1 million if Richard paid
by December 31, 2001. Richard was unable to
raise the money; he therefore asked his son
Gregory Wagner to help him get a loan.
Gregory agreed to co-sign a $1,025,000
loan from Northrim Bank with Richard.
Gregory and his wife put up their home as
collateral and put their personal credit at
risk. In exchange for Gregorys co-signature
on the loan, Richard and Gregory entered into
an oral agreement, which they later reduced
to writing.
The written agreement provided that
income from Richards royalties that had
secured the Key Bank loan would first pay the
Northrim loan. Any remaining royalty income
would be divided as follows: Gregory would
get the first $2,500 per month, Richard would
get the next $7,500 per month, and they would
divide any remaining royalty income equally
between them. The agreement did not take
into account the portions of royalty income
to be paid to other creditors under the
bankruptcy plan.[2]
B. Prior Proceedings
We described the trial court proceedings that underlie
the current appeals in the same recently published opinion:
In 2002 Richard defaulted in his
payments to Gregory, and Gregory sued in
2003. The case went to trial in August 2005.
At the end of trial, the jury returned the
following answers to the following special
interrogatories:
[Q:] Prior to the time the Wagners
signed the loan documents at
Northrim Bank on December 24, 2005,
had they entered into an oral
agreement? [A:] Yes.
[Q:] If yes, what were the terms of
that agreement? [A:] In exchange
for getting a $1,025,000 loan from
Northrim bank to repay Richard
Wagners debt at Key Bank, Greg
Wagner will receive a share of
profits from Richard Wagners oil
royalties.
The jury found breach by Richard and awarded
Gregory past damages of $139,180.39.
In November 2005 the superior court
concluded that specific performance was an
appropriate remedy and ordered Gregory to
prepare a judgment for specific performance.
The court held, contrary to Richards
argument, that the jurys failure to specify
the terms of the oral agreement did not
prevent specific performance. The court
reasoned that the jury must have used the
terms of the written agreement to calculate
its award of past damages, and therefore that
the jury must have found the terms of the
oral agreement consistent with the terms of
the written agreement. The court wrote:
Applying the formula of the
[written] agreement mechanically to
the testimony of . . . [a witness]
and the other evidence of the oil
revenues from Richards shares of
his oil leases introduced at trial,
the past damages would be
calculated at $141,124.00. That is
within $2000.00 of what the jury
actually awarded [$139,180.39].
The jury did not receive a lot of
help from counsel in calculating
past damages and their award to
Greg is within reasonable
mathematical error if they
performed the calculations under
the agreement themselves. . . .
The difference could also be
explained by the jurys
determination that there were
insufficient royalties to meet the
complete payout of the agreement on
one or more months.
The trial court said it would order
Richard to pay Gregory according to the
formula in the written agreement. The trial
court also said it would calculate Gregorys
payments without deducting amounts owed to
creditors other than Northrim Bank, including
the Weeks Foundation. In December 2005 the
superior court entered judgment for specific
performance against Richard.[3]
The superior courts partial final judgment for specific
performance in December 2005 provided that Richards future
royalty income would be received in escrow and then distributed
to Gregory, Richards various creditors, and Richard according to
detailed instructions described in the judgment. The superior
court ordered that
[t]he allocation and distribution of the
[royalty] income subject to this judgment
shall continue as long as there is production
from the oil and gas wells in which Richard
Wagner holds royalty interests subject to
this judgment.
As Gregory notes, because Richard promised to pay Greg
out of funds he had previously promised to . . . other creditors,
the judgment for specific performance prescribed one formula for
determining Gregorys monthly royalty entitlement (under which
Richards debts to pre-existing creditors other than Northrim Bank
were not factored in because Richards agreement with Gregory had
not taken them into account), and a different formula for
actually distributing the monthly royalties (under which Richards
pre-existing creditors were paid first because their rights were
prior in time to Gregorys). Gregory describes the result as a
monthly amount accrued [against Richard] in Gregs favor which
could not be paid contemporaneously.
Richard appealed the 2005 judgment for specific
performance in January 2006, and we later described the issues
raised in that appeal as follows:
Richard challenged a number of the superior
courts conclusions of fact and law. He
generally did not state any legal grounds for
those challenges, merely stating that the
superior court erred in entering them. He
challenged the superior courts conclusion of
law that [t]he contract between Richard and
Greg is sufficiently clear and definite that
the Court is able to enforce it without
having to supply essential terms that the
parties did not agree to. He also challenged
the superior courts decision to order
specific performance into the future, as well
as the superior courts order that all
Richards royalty income be paid directly into
an escrow account and directly disbursed from
the escrow account, without ever passing
through Richards control.[4]
We ultimately dismissed Richards January 2006 appeal
for lack of prosecution.5
In April 2006 Gregory appealed the superior courts
award of attorneys fees on the December 2005 judgment for
specific performance, arguing that his fees had been calculated
improperly.6 We affirmed the fee award.7
In March 2007 the superior court issued a writ of
execution against Richard for arrears owed to Gregory under the
judgment for specific performance, and Richard appealed from the
issuance of that writ in April 2007.8 Richard argued that (1)
the trial court deviated from the jury award when it entered the
2005 judgment for specific performance, (2) the trial court erred
in ordering specific performance rather than a lump sum judgment,
and (3) the trial court miscalculated the amount of arrears
Richard owed when it issued its March 2007 writ of execution.9
We affirmed the superior courts decision to issue the writ,
holding that Richards first two arguments were time-barred
challenges to the 2005 specific performance judgment that were
covered by his earlier dismissed appeal, and that his third
argument lacked merit.10
C. Current Proceedings
1. Appeal S-13055
Upon Gregorys motion, the superior court convened in
January 2008 to determine the arrears Richard owed Gregory for
the year 2007 under the judgment for specific performance. In
February 2008 Superior Court Judge Mark I. Wood issued an order
concluding that the arrears for 2007 totaled $393,688.30 and
confirming that Gregory would be able to obtain a writ of
execution in that amount. Richard now appeals from this February
2008 order, arguing that the order violates Richards Chapter 11
bankruptcy plan and is inconsistent with the jurys verdict and
the judgment for specific performance.
2. Appeal S-13175
In May 2008 Richard filed a motion for return of funds,
requesting that the superior court order Gregory to pay him
$67,779.54 that he alleged had been improperly paid over to
Gregory by the clerk of court, who was acting as the escrow agent
distributing Richards royalty income under the judgment for
specific performance. Richard argued that certain royalty
disbursements that he was owed as assignee of the claims of two
of his bankruptcy creditors should have been paid to him by the
clerk of court without being intercepted by Gregorys writ of
execution for arrears. Richard contended that by paying those
funds to Gregory under Gregorys writ of execution, the clerk of
court violated the judgment for specific performance because that
judgment provided that Richard was to receive those funds.
Gregory countered that there was no reason why the
disbursements due Richard as assignee of those bankruptcy
creditors claims would be exempt from Gregorys writ of execution
and that Richards motion was untimely because Gregory had been
executing on those disbursements for more than a year before
Richard objected. Judge Wood agreed with Gregory and denied
Richards motion in late May 2008, noting that there is no
statutory or case law which supports Richard Wagners untimely
request for an additional exemption from execution. Richard now
appeals from the denial of his motion.
III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
We review questions of law de novo[,] questions of fact
for clear error, and awards of specific performance for abuse of
discretion.11
IV. DISCUSSION
To the extent that Richards arguments substantively
challenge the 2005 judgment for specific performance, they are
untimely and procedurally barred. In Wagner II we declined to
consider two out of three of Richards points on appeal for this
very reason they were untimely, procedurally barred challenges
to the 2005 judgment for specific performance that Richard has
long since lost the opportunity to appeal.12 The thirty-day
deadline for appeal of the 2005 judgment passed more than two
years before Richard filed current appeals S-13055 and S-13175 in
2008.13 Though execution on the judgment has occurred continually
since its entry, [e]xecution does not give a party a second
chance to appeal the merits more than thirty days after the entry
of final judgment.14 Moreover, as we also noted in Wagner II, a
party has only one appeal as of right, which Richard used when he
filed the 2006 appeal (S-12205) that we dismissed for lack of
prosecution.15
Thus, while Richard may argue that the judgment for
specific performance is being improperly or inaccurately
enforced, he may not substantively challenge the judgment. And
if he wishes to attack the judgment on the basis that it is void
ab initio because the trial court was without proper authority
and jurisdiction in entering it, the proper vehicle for his
argument would be a Civil Rule 60(b)(4) motion for relief from
the judgment,16 rather than an appeal from the superior courts
actions in enforcing the judgment. Accordingly, we decline to
consider the merits of any of Richards arguments that challenge
the 2005 judgment for specific performance.
A. The Superior Court Did Not Err in Determining that
Richard Owed Gregory $393,688.30 in Arrears on the
Specific Performance Judgment for the Year 2007 (Appeal
S-13055).
Richard appeals the superior courts February 2008 order
determining that he owed Gregory $393,688.30 in arrears for the
year 2007 under the 2005 judgment for specific performance. He
argues (1) that the order effectively changed the material terms
of the Chapter 11 [bankruptcy] plan . . . without obtaining
permission from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Alaska, (2) that the jury verdict that formed the
basis for the 2005 judgment for specific performance was not
precise enough to support that judgment, and (3) that the
superior court used the wrong formula in calculating Richards
arrears by failing to deduct payments to Richard Wagners pre-
existing creditors.
1. The superior court did not err in failing to
obtain leave or permission to act outside of the
Chapter 11 bankruptcy plan.
Richard asserts that the superior court issued an order
which effectively changed the material terms of the Chapter 11
plan and . . . directed the reallocation of income used for plan
payments (i.e., royalty from oil and gas well leases) without
obtaining permission from the United States Bankruptcy Court
. . . . But Richard provides no explanation as to how the
superior court effectively changed the material terms of the
bankruptcy plan.
If Richard intends to argue that the superior courts
February 2008 order impermissibly changed the bankruptcy plan,
his argument is waived due to inadequate briefing.17 As Gregory
points out, Richard does not explain or cite any provision of his
Fifth Amended Bankruptcy Plan that is or was in any way offended,
or impaired . . . . Nor does he in any way, reference any
specific bankruptcy laws that were offended. And as Gregory
further notes, the Trial Court took great pains not to vary the
bankruptcy payment stream to Richards creditors in any way and
all of the bankruptcy creditors received the royalty payments due
them, on time and in accordance with the plan. (Emphasis in
original.)
This appeal is not the proper context for an argument
that the underlying 2005 judgment for specific performance
impermissibly changed the bankruptcy plan. As discussed above,
the time has long since passed for Richard to attack the 2005
judgment for specific performance on the merits. And if Richard
wishes to challenge it on the basis that it is void because the
trial court was without proper authority and jurisdiction in
entering it, the proper vehicle for his argument would be a Civil
Rule 60(b)(4) motion for relief from the judgment.18
Accordingly, we decline to consider Richards argument
that the superior court erred in failing to obtain leave or
permission to act outside of the Chapter 11 bankruptcy plan.
2. The superior court did not err in failing to enter
an order setting forth definite terms for the
duration and conclusion of specific performance.
Richard next argues that the jury verdict at trial left
an ambiguous term, without any specific amounts for economic
damages, and that the superior court erroneously assumed the role
of fact finder when it ordered specific performance in 2005 based
on a formula to which the jury made no reference. He also
contends that [b]y requiring specific performance indefinitely,
instead of determining a specific amount for damages, the trial
court has caused a manifest injustice to Richard Wagner by
preventing him from knowing what the ramifications of any future
conveyance of rights might be.
But these arguments inescapably constitute an untimely,
procedurally barred challenge to the 2005 judgment for specific
performance. Moreover, they are very similar to arguments
Richard made in Wagner II. In Wagner II we rejected these
arguments as time-barred and barred by our dismissal of
[Richards] appeal from the 2005 judgment for failure to
prosecute.19 We now reject them once again for the same reasons.
3. The superior court did not err in failing to
deduct payments to Richard Wagners pre-existing
creditors.
Finally, Richard appears to argue that the superior
courts February 2008 order enforcing the 2005 judgment was
inconsistent with that judgment.20 He asserts that the Courts
decision change[s] the formula the Court initially outlined in
its Rule 54(b) Partial Final Judgment and that the decision to
distribute funds using a formula which first sets out the
payments between the parties then credits payments to other
creditors directly from Richards share of the proceeds[] was
error. He complains that payments to his creditor Weeks should
not have been deducted from his share of the royalty proceeds in
the calculations underlying the February 2008 order. He argues
that the superior court should have first set aside the monies
payable under the terms of the Chapter 11 plan, then calculated
the division of remaining royalty funds between the parties. He
further asserts that, having settled accounts with several of his
bankruptcy creditors, he should be entitled, as successor in
interest for [those] creditors, to keep those funds paid
according to the formula set forth in the bankruptcy plan, and
then divide the remaining funds according to the trial courts
formula adopted in its order on specific performance.
But this argument, made here in the context of Richards
opposition to the superior courts February 2008 order, is simply
a revival of an argument Richard made in Wagner II regarding the
superior courts issuance of Gregorys 2007 writ of execution. In
Wagner II Richard asserted, using some of the same language he
uses here, that the superior court erred by declining to deduct
payments to Richard Wagners pre-existing creditors prior to
determining Gregory Wagners share when it took the creditor
payments (Weeks) from Richards share of the royalties, instead of
allocating payments to the creditors first and then following its
previous calculations to distribute the remainder. We analyzed
this argument in Wagner II and rejected it because the trial
courts calculation mirrored the jurys findings and because the
trial court plainly stated, in both its November and December
2005 orders, that it would calculate amounts due Gregory without
regard for the Weeks Foundations claims.21 We concluded that
calculating the amount due Gregory without deducting amounts owed
to Richards bankruptcy creditors, particularly the Weeks
Foundation is not inconsistent with the judgment for specific
performance.22 Thus, because we have already considered and
decided this issue, albeit in the context of Richards appeal from
a different superior court order, Richards argument in this
regard is barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion, or
collateral estoppel.23
But even if Richards argument were not collaterally
estopped, it would nonetheless fail. Richard complains that the
royalty income should have been allocated to his creditors first
(including, he argues, to him, seeing as he has bought out
several of his creditors), with only the remainder then allocated
between him and Gregory. But that is simply not what the 2005
judgment for specific performance requires. The superior court
explicitly found that the agreement between Richard and Gregory
did not take into account the claims of Richards creditors other
than Northrim Bank. The superior court thus ordered that the
amount Richard owed Gregory each month would be determined based
upon the total monthly royalty income minus only Richards
obligation to Northrim Bank. The superior court followed this
formula in determining Richards arrears for the February 2008
order.
Accordingly, we affirm the superior courts February
2008 order.
B. The Superior Court Did Not Err in Denying Richards
Motion for Return of Funds (Appeal S-13175).
Richard also appeals from the May 2008 order denying
his motion for return of funds. Richard contends that the clerk
of court, who was acting as the escrow agent distributing
Richards royalty income according to the 2005 judgment for
specific performance, should have paid him the funds allocated to
him as the assignee of the claims of two of his bankruptcy
creditors instead of paying those funds directly to Gregory under
Gregorys writ of execution. He thus contends that the superior
court should have granted his motion requesting the return of
those funds.
Richard makes three arguments as to why the clerk of
court should not have honored Gregorys writ of execution: (1) at
the time the writ of execution was served, the clerk [of court]
was not in possession of money belonging to Richard, nor was the
clerk of court indebted to Richard, meaning that the writ of
execution did not obligate the clerk of court to pay the funds to
Gregory under AS 09.40.040 (emphasis omitted); (2) the clerk of
court had a conflict of interest in acting both as an escrow
agent and in issuing writs of execution on the same funds over
which the [c]lerk was charged with a fiduciary duty to protect
and distribute according to the Courts final judgment; and (3)
the superior court effectively changed the material terms of the
Chapter 11 [bankruptcy] plan . . . without obtaining permission
from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Alaska.
The last of these three arguments duplicates precisely
the inadequately briefed and procedurally barred argument
discussed above in our treatment of appeal S-13055. We dispose
of it in the same manner. Richards other two arguments lack
merit. As the superior court noted in denying Richards motion,
there is no statutory or case law which supports Richard Wagners
untimely request for an additional exemption from execution.
1. It was proper for the clerk of court to pay
Gregory, under Gregorys writ of execution, royalty
distributions allocated to Richard.
Richards bankruptcy plan provided for the payment of
Richards debts to various creditors. Richard has since settled
with some of these creditors, meaning that the royalty
distributions owed to them under the bankruptcy plan were
assigned to Richard. In crafting its 2005 judgment for specific
performance, the superior court did not disturb this arrangement,
providing that Richard would be allocated and paid the
distributions owed to the bankruptcy creditors whose claims he
had purchased.
But Richard owed Gregory a substantial sum in back
payments on their contract under both the initial damages
judgment and the judgment for specific performance. Gregory
obtained successive writs of execution for the arrears he was
owed. Pursuant to one of Gregorys writs, the clerk of court, who
had received Richards royalties as the escrow agent under the
judgment for specific performance, distributed to Gregory the
share of the royalties that Richard was owed as the assignee of
two of his bankruptcy creditors claims. Richard now argues that
by distributing those funds to Gregory rather than Richard, the
clerk of court violated the obligation to obey the 2005 judgment
for specific performance.
Alaska Statute 09.40.040 requires that [a]ll persons
having in their possession personal property belonging to the
[debtor] or owing a debt to the [debtor] must honor a creditors
writ of execution.24 Richard contends that at the time the writ
of execution was served the clerk of court was not in possession
of money belonging to Richard Wagner, and was not indebted to
Richard (emphasis omitted). He argues that this means that
pursuant to AS 09.40.040 the clerk was not under any duty to pay
Gregory Wagner under the writ of execution. Richards position
thus seems to be that his interest in the royalties flowing into
the escrow account managed by the clerk of court was not subject
to execution by Gregory and should have been paid to Richard.
But the single case Richard cites undermines his
position. In von Gemmingen v. First National Bank of Anchorage
we rejected the argument that a debtors interest in certain
escrow accounts was not property subject to execution because no
proceeds were held in the accounts at the time of levy.25 We held
that property liable to execution includes not only funds within
named escrow accounts, but also the rights of and duties owed to
judgment debtors pursuant to the terms of those accounts, and
that [f]unds deposited in escrow accounts then subject to a valid
levy are encumbered at the time of deposit.26 Thus any interest
Richard held in the royalties flowing into the escrow account
managed by the clerk of court was subject to Gregorys writ of
execution, and the clerk of court acted properly under AS
09.40.040 in honoring that writ and paying the funds to Gregory
rather than Richard.
2. The clerk of court did not have an impermissible
conflict of interest.
Richard also argues that the clerk of court had a
conflict of interest in acting both as an escrow agent and in
issuing writs of execution on the same funds over which the
[c]lerk was charged with a fiduciary duty to protect and
distribute according to the Courts final judgment. But this
argument is inadequately briefed, as it is contained in a single
conclusory sentence, without citation to any authority.27
Moreover, it was not raised in his pleadings below, and [a]s a
general rule, an issue that was not raised in the trial court
will not be considered on appeal.28
Accordingly, we affirm the superior courts May 2008
denial of Richards motion for return of funds.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the superior
courts decisions in all respects in both appeals.
_______________________________
1 See Wagner v. Wagner (Wagner II), 205 P.3d 306 (Alaska
2009); Wagner v. Wagner (Wagner I), 183 P.3d 1265 (Alaska 2008).
2 Wagner II, 205 P.3d at 308 (footnote omitted).
3 Id. at 308-09 (footnote omitted and alterations in
original).
4 Id. at 309 (alteration in original).
5 Id.
6 Wagner I, 183 P.3d at 1266-67.
7 Id. at 1268.
8 Wagner II, 205 P.3d at 309.
9 Id. at 307.
10 Id. at 309-10.
11 Id. at 309 (citing Guin v. Ha, 591 P.2d 1281, 1284 n.6
(Alaska 1979); Moran v. Holman, 501 P.2d 769, 771 (Alaska 1972)).
12 205 P.3d at 309-10.
13 See Alaska R. App. P. 204.
14 Wagner II, 205 P.3d at 310.
15 Id. at 309.
16 Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) provides in
relevant part:
On motion and upon such terms as are just,
the court may relieve a party or a partys
legal representative from a final judgment,
order, or proceeding for the following
reasons:
. . . .
(4) the judgment is void . . . .
17 See A.H. v. W.P., 896 P.2d 240, 243-44 (Alaska 1995)
([S]uperficial briefing and the lack of citations to any
authority constitutes abandonment of the point on appeal.).
18 See supra note 16.
19 205 P.3d at 307.
20 It is possible Richard actually intends to challenge
the underlying 2005 judgment for specific performance. But as
discussed above, to whatever extent Richard intends to challenge
the 2005 judgment for specific performance, his arguments are
untimely and procedurally barred.
21 205 P.3d at 310.
22 Id.
23 See McElroy v. Kennedy, 74 P.3d 903, 907 (Alaska 2003)
([I]ssue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, renders an issue of
fact or law which has already been decided by a court of
competent jurisdiction conclusive in a subsequent action between
the same parties, whether on the same or a different claim.).
24 AS 09.40.040 provides:
All persons having in their possession
personal property belonging to the defendant
or owing a debt to the defendant at the time
of service upon them of the writ and notice
shall deliver, transfer, or pay the property
or debts to the peace officer, or be liable
to the plaintiff for the amount of the
property or debts until the attachment is
discharged or a judgment recovered by
plaintiff is satisfied. Debts and other
personal property may be delivered,
transferred, or paid to the peace officer
without suit, and the receipt of the officer
is a sufficient discharge.
See also von Gemmingen v. First Natl Bank of Anchorage, 789 P.2d
353, 354 n.2 (Alaska 1990) (Alaska Statute 09.40.040, which
defines third party liability for improperly resisting
attachment, . . . applies to writs of execution.).
25 Id. at 354.
26 Id. at 355-56.
27 See supra note 17.
28 Pierce v. Pierce, 949 P.2d 498, 500 (Alaska 1997).
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