| Alaska Supreme Court Opinions made Available byTouch N' Go Systems and Bright Solutions |
|
|
|
This site is possible because of the following site sponsors. Please support them with your business.
|
| Alaska Supreme Court Opinions made Available byTouch N' Go Systems and Bright Solutions |
|
|
|
|
|
This site is possible because of the following site sponsors. Please support them with your business.
|
You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Valentine v. State (08/28/2009) sp-6405
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage,
Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
| DOUGLAS LEROY VALENTINE, | ) |
| ) Supreme Court No. S- 12692 | |
| Petitioner, | ) |
| ) Court of Appeals No. A-9491 | |
| v. | ) Superior Court No. 4FA-05-01998 CR |
| ) | |
| STATE OF ALASKA, | ) O P I N I O N |
| ) | |
| Respondent. | ) No. 6405 August 28, 2009 |
| ) | |
Petition from the
Court of Appeals of the State of Alaska, on
Appeal from the District Court, Fourth
Judicial District, Fairbanks, Winston S.
Burbank and Donald D. Hopwood, Judges.
Appearances: Robert John, Law Office of
Robert John, and Lawrence F. Reger, McConahy,
Zimmerman & Wallace, Fairbanks, for
Petitioner. Eric A. Ringsmuth, Assistant
Attorney General, Office of Special
Prosecutions and Appeals, Anchorage, and
Talis J. Colberg, Attorney General, Juneau,
for Respondent.
Before: Fabe, Chief Justice, Eastaugh,
Carpeneti, Winfree, and Christen, Justices.
FABE, Chief Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2004 the Alaska Legislature made two significant
changes to the driving under the influence (DUI) law. First, the
legislature amended subsection (a)(2) of AS 28.35.030 to provide
that a person commits a DUI offense if the person takes a
chemical test within four hours of driving that detects a blood
alcohol level of at least 0.08 percent, regardless of the persons
blood alcohol at the time of driving. This is known as the blood-
alcohol-level theory of DUI. Second, the legislature barred
defendants charged with DUI from presenting a delayed-absorption
defense claiming that the results of their post-arrest chemical
tests did not accurately indicate their blood alcohol level at
the time they were driving. These two amendments did not revise
the language of subsection (a)(1) of AS 28.35.030, which makes it
a crime to drive while under the influence of alcohol, regardless
of blood alcohol, and is known as the under-the-influence DUI
theory.
Douglas Valentine was convicted under the amended DUI
law in a general verdict that did not specify whether he was
convicted under the blood-alcohol-level theory, the under-the-
influence theory, or both. The court of appeals affirmed his
conviction upon concluding that the 2004 amendments survived all
of Valentines constitutional challenges. But Judge David
Mannheimer dissented in part, concluding that defendants are
denied due process of law when they are barred from offering
delayed-absorption evidence in prosecutions that rely on chemical
test results and are brought under the under-the-influence
theory. He reasoned that because DUI convictions under this
theory continue to require proof that the defendants were under
the influence at the time of driving, the evidentiary prohibition
codified in AS 28.35.030(s) violates a defendants right to due
process of law.1
We granted Valentines petition for hearing. We
conclude that the legislature properly exercised its broad
authority to redefine the blood-alcohol-level theory of the DUI
offense. But we agree with Judge Mannheimer that defendants are
denied due process if they are barred from presenting delayed-
absorption evidence in prosecutions relying on chemical test
results to prove that they are guilty of a DUI offense under
subsection (a)(1)s under-the-influence theory. Because the jurys
general verdict did not specify which theory provided the basis
for Valentines conviction, we reverse the conviction and remand
for a new trial.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
On June 18, 2005, at about 8:45 p.m., Fairbanks Police
Sergeant Dan Welborn stopped Douglas Valentine for speeding.2 He
noticed that Valentine had a moderate odor of alcohol and that
his eyes were watery and bloodshot. Sergeant Welborn
administered three field sobriety tests, which Valentine failed,
and then placed Valentine under arrest. At the station at
9:20 p.m., Valentine submitted to a breath test, which showed a
blood alcohol level of 0.099 percent. Valentine requested an
independent test, which he obtained at 9:45 p.m. That blood test
showed a blood alcohol level of 0.119 percent. The State charged
Valentine under both AS 28.35.030 theories for committing a DUI
offense: it alleged that Valentine was under the influence at the
time of driving under subsection (a)(1) and that a chemical test
showed that Valentines blood alcohol level was above the legal
limit under subsection (a)(2).
Before trial, Valentine filed a motion to dismiss,
challenging the constitutionality of the 2004 amendments to the
DUI law. District Court Judge Winston S. Burbank denied the
motion to dismiss. In his decision, Judge Burbank incorporated
by reference an earlier ruling by District Court Judge
Raymond Funk rejecting the same constitutional claims in a
consolidated Fairbanks case, State v. Baxley, Marshall & Tyler.3
The effect of the district courts ruling was to prohibit
Valentine from offering evidence to show that even though his
blood alcohol level was above the legal limit at the time of his
two chemical tests, he was not guilty of driving while under the
influence under either theory because at the time he drove the
alcohol he had consumed had not yet been fully absorbed into his
bloodstream.
Valentines case then proceeded to trial before Superior
Court Judge Donald D. Hopwood, who was sitting pro tem for the
district court. At trial, Valentine argued that he had consumed
two beers, that people absorb alcohol at different rates, that
there was ample evidence that he was not impaired at the time he
performed the field sobriety tests, and that the State had no
evidence of his actual blood alcohol level at the time of
driving. The jury convicted Valentine using a general verdict
form that did not specify whether he was convicted under
subsection (a)(1), subsection (a)(2), or both.
Valentine appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss.
The court of appeals affirmed Valentines conviction, concluding
that the amendments to the DUI law withstood all of Valentines
constitutional challenges.4 The court of appeals determined that
(1) the amendments are not unconstitutionally vague; (2) the
amendments are not unconstitutionally overbroad; (3) the
amendments do not impose criminal liability without any proof of
mens rea; (4) the amendments do not violate Valentines right to
due process by creating impermissible presumptions; (5) the
amendments do not deny Valentines right to an independent test;
(6) the amendments do not violate the Alaska Constitutions
guarantee of equal protection; and (7) the amendments do not
unconstitutionally infringe on our rule-making power.5 Judge
David Mannheimer dissented in part.6 Judge Mannheimer
conclude[d] that the evidentiary prohibition codified in AS
28.35.030(s) violates a defendants right to due process of law
when the defendant is prosecuted for DUI under AS 28.35.030(a)(1)
and the government relies on the result of a post-driving
chemical test.7 We granted Valentines petition for hearing.8
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We apply our independent judgment to questions
involving the constitutionality of a statute and will adopt the
rule of law which is most persuasive in light of precedent,
reason, and policy.9
IV. DISCUSSION
A. The 2004 Amendments to the DUI Law
The Alaska Legislature amended AS 28.35.030 in 200410 in
response to the court of appeals decision in Conrad v. State,
which held that former AS 28.35.030(a)(2) required the government
to prove that the defendants blood alcohol level was 0.08 percent
or higher at the time that the defendant was operating or
controlling a motor vehicle.11 In Conrad, the defendant presented
a delayed-absorption defense, claiming that the results of his
post-arrest chemical tests did not accurately indicate his blood
alcohol at the time that he was driving.12 Charles Conrad alleged
that he had quickly consumed two beers just before he drove and
that his bloodstream had not fully absorbed the alcohol from
those beers at the time that he was driving.13 Conrad maintained
that his blood alcohol was below the allowable level while he was
driving even though his post-arrest chemical test results were
above the legal limit.14 The trial court, however, instructed the
jury that Conrads guilt under the pre-amendment version of
AS 28.35.030(a)(2) hinged on whether the government had proved
that a properly administered chemical test had yielded a result
that was above the legal limit.15 The jury convicted Conrad.16
The court of appeals reversed the conviction and ruled
that Conrad was entitled to a new trial, conclud[ing] that a
defendants guilt under [former] AS 28.35.030(a)(2) hinges on the
defendants blood alcohol content at the time the defendant
operated or controlled a motor vehicle.17 The court of appeals
reasoned that the legislature had not intended to define the
offense in terms of the defendants blood alcohol at the time of
the chemical test but noted that it appeared that the legislature
had the authority to do so, as other state legislatures had
explicitly done.18 In addition, the court of appeals interpreted
AS 28.33.033 as authorizing the government to rely on the
rebuttable presumption that the defendants blood alcohol content
while driving was at least as high as the result of a properly
administered chemical test.19 The court of appeals held that this
presumption was sufficient to support a conviction.20
The effect of the court of appeals decision was to
permit a defendant to present a delayed-absorption defense to
show that a chemical test result was not an accurate indicator of
the defendants blood alcohol at the time the defendant was
driving. According to the experts who testified at the
evidentiary hearing before District Court Judge Funk,21 there is a
delay between a persons consumption of alcohol and the absorption
of alcohol into the persons bloodstream. Typically within an
hour after a person has stopped drinking, the persons body has
absorbed much of the alcohol consumed and is eliminating alcohol
from the bloodstream faster than it is absorbing it that is, the
point of peak blood alcohol level has passed. But in some people
this peak point may not be reached for up to four hours after
drinking because the rate at which the body absorbs alcohol
depends on a variety of factors, including consumption of food,
having an upset stomach, and the type of alcohol consumed.
Therefore, it is possible that a persons blood alcohol at the
time of driving was lower than at the time the person took a post-
arrest chemical test. In offering a delayed-absorption defense,
a defendant could argue that even though a post-arrest chemical
test result was illegally high, the defendants blood alcohol
level when the defendant was stopped was below the allowable
limit.
In response to Conrad, the Alaska Legislature made two
significant changes to AS 28.35.030.22 First, the legislature
amended subsection (a)(2) to redefine the blood-alcohol-level
theory of the DUI offense in terms of a defendants blood alcohol
at the time that the defendant took a properly administered
chemical test rather than at the time of driving.23 Now, a person
violates subsection (a)(2) if the person takes a chemical test
within four hours of operating or driving a motor vehicle that
yields a result of a blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent or
higher, regardless of the persons blood alcohol at the time of
driving.
But in amending subsection (a)(2)s blood-alcohol-level
theory of the DUI offense, the legislature did not revise
subsection (a)(1)s under-the-influence theory, which makes it a
DUI offense to drive or operate a motor vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol or controlled substances.
Second, the legislature added a new subsection to the
DUI law that prohibits defendants from raising delayed-absorption
defenses to DUI charges.24 Under AS 28.35.030(s), defendants are
permitted to rebut the results of chemical tests by introducing
evidence concerning the quantity of alcohol consumed before or
after driving but the consumption of alcohol before operating or
driving may not be used as a defense that the chemical test did
not measure the blood alcohol at the time of the operating or
driving. Deputy Attorney General Parkes explained that the
intent of adding subsection (s) in conjunction with amending
subsection (a) was to do away with [the delayed-absorption]
defense and overturn a case called Conrad.25 Senator Hollis
French voiced his support for the changes to AS 28.35.030,
remarking that he totally support[ed] the intent of the
amendment, that being to keep someone from saying they had four
shots of whiskey and drove home before the alcohol had any
effect.26
As the court of appeals discussed, the dual purposes of
the amendments to the DUI law were to make a chemical test result
determinative of a defendants guilt under subsection (a)(2) and
to eliminate the delayed-absorption defense to prosecutions under
both subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2):
This legislative history, and the plain
language of the amended statutes, indicate
that the legislature intended to accomplish
two things through this legislation. First,
it intended to hinge a defendants guilt in a
driving while under the influence prosecution
under subsection (a)(2) on the result of a
chemical test properly administered within
four hours of driving (if the test result is
attributable to alcohol ingested before or
during the operation of a motor vehicle).
And, second, it intended to eliminate a
delayed absorption defense to any prosecution
under subsection (a)(1) or (a)(2) that relies
in whole or in part on the result of a
chemical test, so that defendants may not
argue based on alcohol absorption rates that
the result of their chemical test did not
reflect their actual alcohol level at the
time of driving.[27]
Thus, as subsection (s) is applied to a subsection
(a)(2) blood-alcohol-level prosecution, the question whether a
drivers blood alcohol while driving was above the legal limit is
immaterial because the driver violates the subsection by taking a
properly administered chemical test after driving that yields a
result of at least 0.08 percent.
But the delayed-absorption defense is still relevant to
prosecutions under subsection (a)(1). A defendants guilt in a
DUI prosecution under this subsection turns on whether the
defendant was under the influence while operating or driving a
motor vehicle. If the government offers evidence of the result
of a properly administered chemical test after the defendant was
stopped, this evidence does not directly prove that the defendant
was impaired while driving because the chemical test result shows
the percentage of alcohol in the defendants bloodstream at the
time that the test was administered. Yet under AS 28.35.033, the
statutory provision concerning presumptions arising from chemical
tests, a result of 0.08 percent or higher creates a rebuttable
presumption that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol
at the time of driving.28 The statute provides that this
presumption may be rebutted by any other competent evidence
bearing upon whether the person was impaired. Moreover, Alaska
Rule of Evidence 303(a)(1) provides that the trial court must
instruct the jury that it may, but is not required to, infer the
existence of the presumed fact. Thus, the government may rest
its case against a defendant solely on evidence of a chemical
test result of at least 0.08 percent, though the jury need not
infer that the chemical test result accurately reflects the
defendants blood alcohol content at the time of driving. But the
adoption of subsection (s) created an exception to the rule that
competent evidence may be introduced to rebut the presumption and
bars evidence of the consumption of alcohol before operating or
driving that is introduced by the defendant as a defense that the
chemical test did not measure the blood alcohol at the time of
the operating or driving.
B. Alaska Statute 28.35.030(s)s Exclusion of Delayed-
Absorption Evidence in a Prosecution Under AS
28.35.030(a)(1) that Relies on a Chemical Test Result
Violates a Drivers Right to Due Process.
Under the United States and Alaska Constitutions, a
defendant has the right to present relevant exculpatory evidence
in a criminal trial.29 The United States Supreme Court has
recognized that criminal defendants are guaranteed a meaningful
opportunity to present a complete defense by the United States
Constitution, [w]hether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment or in the Compulsory Process or
Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth Amendment.30 Similarly, we
have held that a defendants right to present a defense is a
fundamental element of due process.31 This right, however, is not
absolute because it is properly limited by other considerations,
such as relevance and Alaska Evidence Rule 403s balancing test.32
As the United States Supreme Court has explained, the need to
accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial
process gives legislators broad latitude under the Constitution
to establish rules excluding evidence from criminal trials.33 But
a defendants due process rights are denied when a legislative
enactment substantially limits the right to present a defense.34
In addressing whether the Due Process Clause was
violated by Montanas statutory prohibition on presenting evidence
of voluntary intoxication to determine whether the defendant had
the necessary mental state to commit the offense, Justice
Ginsburg framed the issue as a question of characterization:
If [the Montana statute] is simply a rule
designed to keep out relevant, exculpatory
evidence, [as] Justice OConnor maintains,
Montanas law offends due process. If it is,
instead, a redefinition of the mental-state
element of the offense, on the other hand,
Justice OConnors due process concern would
not be at issue, for [a] state legislature
certainly has the authority to identify the
elements of the offenses it wishes to punish,
and to exclude evidence irrelevant to the
crime it has defined.[35]
Justice Ginsburg cast the deciding vote to hold that the Montana
statute did not violate due process when she concluded in her
concurring opinion that the statute was not merely an evidentiary
prescription but the judgment that two people are equally
culpable where one commits an act stone sober[] and the other
engages in the same conduct after his voluntary intoxication has
reduced his capacity for self-control.36
The Alaska Legislature properly used its broad
discretion to redefine the elements of the blood-alcohol-level
theory of the DUI offense when it amended subsection (a)(2).37
The legislative amendment to subsection (a)(2) changed the
conduct necessary to commit a DUI offense under the blood-alcohol-
level theory. Under the prior version of subsection (a)(2), a
driver committed a DUI offense if the drivers blood alcohol level
was 0.08 percent or higher at the time of driving. Now, a driver
violates subsection (a)(2) if the drivers chemical test result is
0.08 percent or higher within four hours of driving. In a House
Judiciary Committee discussion of the House version of the bill
amending subsection (a)(2), Representative Les Gara recognized
that the amendment to subsection (a)(2) changed what behavior is
punishable: were changing the substance of the crime . . . ; were
changing policy here.38 The redefinition of the conduct element
of the blood-alcohol-level theory rendered a defendants blood
alcohol at the time of driving irrelevant and thus inadmissible.
For this reason, subsection (s)s exclusion of delayed-absorption
evidence does not infringe upon the defendants right to present
relevant exculpatory evidence in a DUI prosecution under
subsection (a)(2).
But the 2004 amendments to the DUI law left the
substance of the subsection (a)(1) crime unchanged. To prove a
DUI charge using the under-the-influence theory, the prosecution
must demonstrate that the driver was impaired at the time of
driving. Whether a chemical test result accurately indicates a
drivers blood alcohol content at the time of driving continues to
be relevant to prosecutions under subsection (a)(1) if they rely
on chemical test results. Yet under subsection (s), defendants
are denied the opportunity to present delayed-absorption evidence
to show that even though their chemical test result was above the
legal limit they were not impaired when they drove. As Judge
Mannheimer concluded, subsection (s)s prohibition on delayed-
absorption evidence in prosecutions under subsection (a)(1) that
rely on chemical test results unjustifiably prevents defendants
from introducing evidence that is both scientifically valid and
directly relevant to the question of whether the defendant was
impaired by alcohol at the time of driving.39
At Valentines trial, the jury was instructed that he
could be found guilty of driving under the influence under
subsection (a)(1)s under-the-influence theory or subsection
(a)(2)s blood-alcohol-level theory. Because the jury convicted
Valentine using a general verdict form, it is not known whether
he was found guilty under subsection (a)(1), subsection (a)(2),
or both. As we concluded in Williford v. State,40 we must
therefore reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial.
V. CONCLUSION
Because a DUI conviction under subsection (a)(1) of AS
28.35.030 continues to require proof that the defendant was under
the influence at the time of driving, subsection (s)s exclusion
of delayed-absorption evidence in prosecutions under subsection
(a)(1) that rely on chemical test results violates the defendants
right to due process. Accordingly, we REVERSE Valentines
conviction and REMAND for a new trial.
_______________________________
1 Valentine v. State, 155 P.3d 331, 352 (Alaska App.
2007) (Mannheimer, J., dissenting).
2 This description of the facts and proceedings is
largely drawn from the court of appeals decision in this case.
See id. at 335-36 (majority opinion).
3 4FA-04-770 CR, 4FA-04-2284 CR, and 4FA-04-2695 CR,
respectively.
4 Valentine, 155 P.3d at 335, 348.
5 Id. at 339-48.
6 Id. at 348 (Mannheimer, J., dissenting).
7 Id. at 352.
8 Valentine petitioned for hearing on all of the court of
appeals holdings except for its decision concerning our rule-
making power, and the parties briefed each of these issues. We
conclude that the petition for hearing was improvidently granted
on each issue except for the question whether a defendant is
denied due process of law by subsection (s)s exclusion of
delayed-absorption evidence in a prosecution under subsection
(a)(1) that relies on a chemical test result.
9 State v. Murtagh, 169 P.3d 602, 606 (Alaska 2007)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
10 Ch. 124, 25, 27, SLA 2004.
11 54 P.3d 313, 313 (Alaska App. 2002), superseded by
statute, ch. 124, 25, 27, SLA 2004, as recognized in Valentine,
155 P.3d at 337. AS 28.35.030(a)(2) defines the offense using
three metrics. Under this subsection, a person commits the DUI
offense when a properly administered chemical test yields a
result of (1) 0.08 percent or more by weight of alcohol in the
persons blood, (2) 80 milligrams or more of alcohol per 100
milliliters of blood, or (3) 0.08 grams or more of alcohol per
210 liters of the persons breath. References to a result of at
least 0.08 percent blood alcohol content incorporate the other
two metrics by which the subsection (a)(2) offense is defined.
12 54 P.3d at 314. In Conrad and the 2004 legislative
hearings, this defense was described as the big gulp defense,
which was a reference to the possibility that a driver had
quickly drunk a large quantity of alcohol shortly before being
stopped by the police. See, e.g., id.; Minutes, H. Finance Comm.
Hearing on S.B. 170, 23d Leg., 2d Sess. 8 (May 5, 2004)
(statement of Susan Parkes, Deputy Atty Gen., Criminal Div., Dept
of Law); Minutes, S. Judiciary Comm. Hearing on S.B. 170, 23d
Leg., 2d Sess. 26 (March 24, 2004) (statement of Susan Parkes,
Deputy Atty Gen., Criminal Div., Dept of Law). But delayed
absorption is a better description of the defense because the
critical element of the defense is that the absorption of alcohol
in the drivers bloodstream was delayed for one of many possible
reasons, including taking a big gulp, eating a large meal, and
being ill. Valentine, 155 P.3d at 349 n.1 (Mannheimer, J.,
dissenting).
13 Conrad, 54 P.3d at 314.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 315.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 The court of appeals permitted the record in this case
to be supplemented with the expert testimony presented in Judge
Funks consolidated case, State v. Baxley. Valentine v. State,
155 P.3d 331, 336 (Alaska App. 2007).
22 Ch. 124, 25, 27, SLA 2004.
23 Chapter 124, section 25 of SLA 2004 amended AS
28.35.030(a) by adding the underlined text and deleting the text
in brackets:
(a) A person commits the crime of
driving while under the influence of an
alcoholic beverage, inhalant, or controlled
substance if the person operates or drives a
motor vehicle or operates an aircraft or a
watercraft
(1) while under the influence of
an alcoholic beverage, intoxicating liquor,
inhalant, or any controlled substance, singly
or in combination; or
(2) and if [WHEN], as determined
by a chemical test taken within four hours
after the alleged operating or driving
[OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED], there is 0.08
percent or more by weight of alcohol in the
persons blood or 80 milligrams or 08 more of
alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood, or if
[WHEN] there is 0.08 grams or more of alcohol
per 210 liters of the persons breath [; OR
(3) WHILE THE PERSON IS UNDER THE
COMBINED INFLUENCE OF AN ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE,
AN INTOXICATING LIQUOR, AN INHALANT, AND A
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE].
24 Chapter 124, section 27 of SLA 2004 amended AS
28.35.030 by adding a new subsection (s), which provides:
(s) In a prosecution under (a) of this
section, a person may introduce evidence on
the amount of alcohol consumed before or
after operating or driving the motor vehicle,
aircraft, or watercraft to rebut or explain
the results of a chemical test, but the
consumption of alcohol before operating or
driving may not be used as a defense that the
chemical test did not measure the blood
alcohol at the time of the operating or
driving. Consumption of alcohol after
operating or driving the motor vehicle,
aircraft, or watercraft may be used to raise
such a defense.
In recognition of this new subsection, chapter 124, section 29 of
SLA 2004 added the underlined text and deleted the text in
brackets in AS 28.35.033(c):
(c) Except as provided in AS
28.35.030(s), the [THE] provisions of (a) of
this section may not be construed to limit
the introduction of any other competent
evidence bearing upon the question of whether
the person was or was not under the influence
of intoxicating liquor.
25 Minutes, S. Judiciary Comm. Hearing on S.B. 170, 23d
Leg., 2d Sess. 26 (March 24, 2004) (statement of Susan Parkes,
Deputy Atty Gen., Criminal Div., Dept of Law) (typeface altered
and internal quotation marks omitted); accord Minutes, H.
Judiciary Comm. Hearing on H.B. 244, 23d Leg., 2d Sess. 9 (April
2, 2004) (statement of Dean J. Guaneli, Chief Assistant Atty
Gen., Legal Servs. Section-Juneau, Criminal Div., Dept of Law)
(The intent of these entire provisions [is] to prevent the big
gulp defense, so to speak, and that arose as a result of [an]
Alaska Court of Appeals opinion. (alterations in original)).
26 Minutes, S. Judiciary Comm. Hearing on S.B. 170, 23d
Leg., 2d Sess. 22 (March 31, 2004) (statement of Sen. Hollis
French).
27 Valentine v. State, 155 P.3d 331, 339 (Alaska App.
2007).
28 See AS 28.35.033(a)(3) (providing that at the time
alleged that the person violated the DUI statute it shall be
presumed that the person was under the influence of an alcoholic
beverage if the persons blood alcohol content was at least 0.08
percent); see also Doyle v. State, 633 P.2d 306, 307, 310 (Alaska
App. 1981) (explaining that the presumptions of AS 28.35.033
apply to the time that the defendant was allegedly driving under
the influence in violation of AS 28.35.030).
29 See, e.g., Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324
(2006) (Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment or in the Compulsory Process or
Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution
guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to
present a complete defense. (internal quotation marks omitted));
United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998) (discussing
the limits imposed on an accuseds right to present a defense);
Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 42-43 (1996) (plurality
opinion) ([T]o say that the right to introduce relevant evidence
is not absolute is not to say that the Due Process Clause places
no limits upon restriction of that right. (emphasis in
original)); Smithart v. State, 988 P.2d 583, 586 (Alaska 1999)
([A] defendants right to present a defense is a fundamental
element of due process.); Keith v. State, 612 P.2d 977, 982-83
(Alaska 1980) (noting that if the courts exclusion of evidence
substantially limit[ed] the defendants opportunities to prove his
innocence affirmatively, the due process right to a fair trial
would have been denied him).
30 Holmes, 547 U.S. at 324 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
31 Smithart, 988 P.2d at 586.
32 Id. at 586 & n.7.
33 Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 308.
34 Cf. Smithart, 988 P.2d at 568 (When a trial courts
evidentiary rulings substantially infringe upon the right to
present a defense, the court necessarily violates the defendants
due process rights.); Keith, 612 P.2d at 982-83 (If the superior
courts refusal to admit the journal did, in fact, substantially
limit Keiths opportunities to prove his innocence affirmatively,
the due process right to a fair trial would have been denied
him.).
35 Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 56-57 (1996)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
36 Id. at 57.
37 See Abruska v. State, 705 P.2d 1261, 1265-66 (Alaska
App. 1985) (holding that it was within the legislatures
prerogative to define the element of knowledge of the proscribed
conduct or relevant circumstances necessary for unlawful activity
to exclude consideration of intoxication); Neitzel v. State, 655
P.2d 325, 334-35 (Alaska App. 1982) (We do not consider the
legislative judgment to preclude consideration of intoxication in
determining recklessness so irrational that it violates due
process.).
38 Minutes, H. Judiciary Comm. Hearing on H.B. 244, 23d
Leg., 2d Sess. 13-14 (April 2, 2004) (statement of Rep. Les
Gara).
39 Valentine v. State, 155 P.3d 331, 351 (Alaska App.
2007) (Mannheimer, J., dissenting).
40 674 P.2d 1329, 1332 (Alaska 1983) (remanding for a new
trial to determine whether the defendant was convicted under AS
28.35.030(a)(1) when it could not be ascertained whether the
defendant was convicted under this provision or
AS 28.35.030(a)(3), which was held to be unconstitutionally
vague).
 |
| Case Law Statutes, Regs & Rules Constitutions Miscellaneous |
|
