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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. State v. Jacob (08/28/2009) sp-6402
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage,
Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
| STATE OF ALASKA; MARCIA | ) |
| KENNAI, in her official capacity | ) Supreme Court No. S-13226 |
| as Deputy Commissioner of the Office | ) |
| of Childrens Services of the | ) Superior Court No. 3AN-04- 04957 CI |
| Alaska Department of Health and | ) |
| Social Services; and the OFFICE OF | ) O P I N I O N |
| CHILDRENS SERVICES of the | ) |
| Alaska Department of Health and | ) No. 6402 - August 28, 2009 |
| Social Services, | ) |
| ) | |
| Appellants, | ) |
| ) | |
| v. | ) |
| ) | |
| DAVID and JOYCE JACOB, | ) |
| ) | |
| Appellees. | ) |
| ) | |
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State
of Alaska, Third Judicial District,
Anchorage, Jack W. Smith, Judge.
Appearances: Joanne M. Grace, Assistant
Attorney General, Anchorage, Talis J.
Colberg, Attorney General, and Richard A.
Svobodny, Acting Attorney General, Juneau,
for the Appellants. Daniel G. Rodgers,
Alaska Immigration Justice Project,
Anchorage, for the Appellees.
Before: Fabe, Chief Justice, Eastaugh,
Carpeneti, Winfree, and Christen, Justices.
CHRISTEN, Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
David and Joyce Jacob sued the State of Alaska, Office
of Childrens Services (OCS) in March 2004 for declaratory and
injunctive relief regarding OCSs failure to provide them notice
of their grandchildrens CINA and permanency proceedings. The
superior court dismissed the suit, but this court reversed and
remanded for entry of declaratory judgment on one of the Jacobs
claims. After the declaratory judgment was entered, the Jacobs
filed a motion for full attorneys fees under AS 09.60.010(c) for
prevailing on a constitutional claim, or, in the alternative, for
enhanced fees under Alaska Civil Rule 82. The superior court
awarded the Jacobs full fees or, as an alternative, half of their
total fees under Rule 82(b)(3). OCS appeals. We affirm the
prevailing party determination, reverse the award of full fees,
and affirm the alternative award of enhanced Rule 82 fees.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
We described the facts underlying this case in Jacob v.
State, Department of Health and Social Services, Office of
Childrens Services (Jacob I)1:
Minors A.K., D.L., and E.H. are the
grandchildren of David and Joyce Jacob.
The mother of the three children
struggled with drug dependency and as a
result the Jacobs often assumed care of
their grandchildren. In 1997 a
Washington state court granted the
Jacobs joint custody of the children
with their mother. In 1999 the Jacobs
agreed that the children could move to
Alaska with their mother because she had
been sober for quite some time. But in
2000 the mother relapsed, and in October
2000 the children were taken into
custody by the Office of Childrens
Services (OCS).
When the Jacobs learned from the
childrens mother in December 2000 that
OCS had custody of the children, they
immediately sent a letter to OCS stating
that they were the childrens
grandparents, had joint custody, and
wanted OCS to place the children in
their care. OCS did not respond to the
letter and the children remained in
foster care. Between December 2000 and
March 2004 the Jacobs made dozens of
attempts to communicate with OCS,
including leaving messages for the
caseworker and the caseworkers
supervisor, Tim Fox. On one occasion,
Fox allegedly told the Jacobs that they
were too old to care for the children.
Over the next three and one-half
years OCS never sent the Jacobs notice
of any court hearings regarding their
grandchildrens CINA proceedings,
including those that occurred after the
September 2001 effective date of
amendments to the CINA statutes
requiring grandparent notice. During
that time period the Jacobs never filed
a motion to formally intervene in their
grandchildrens CINA cases and never
filed a petition requesting that the
children be placed in their care.[2]
The Jacobs filed a complaint in the superior court in
March 2004, alleging these facts and requesting declaratory and
injunctive relief. They sought a declaration that OCS violated
their rights by failing to place their grandchildren with them
and by failing to give them notice of hearings in their
grandchildrens CINA hearings. They also sought an injunction
compelling OCS to provide to the Jacobs and all other
grandparents similarly situated written notice of and the
opportunity to be heard at CINA hearings, as well as immediate
placement of the Jacobs grandchildren with the Jacobs until and
unless [OCS] show[s] by clear and convincing evidence that
placement of the children with [the Jacobs] will result in
physical or mental injury to the children.
OCS filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the
superior court lacked jurisdiction because the court presiding
over the CINA proceedings had exclusive jurisdiction over the
claims presented. OCS also argued for dismissal for failure to
state a claim for which relief may be granted, reasoning that the
Washington state custody order on which the Jacobs relied was not
entitled to full faith and credit because it had not been
registered in Alaska. Finally, OCS argued that the Jacobs
chosen venue was improper.
The Jacobs filed a cross-motion for partial summary
judgment. They contested OCSs arguments for dismissal and asked
the superior court to enter judgment on the issue of whether OCS
violated their rights under AS 47.10.030(d), AS 47.10.080(f), and
AS 47.14.100(e).3 The Jacobs argued that there was no factual
dispute regarding OCSs failure to comply with the statutory
notice requirements and that those rights trigger due process
concerns. They then described the information they contended OCS
needed to include in its written notice to comply with due
process.
In response, OCS argued that because AS 47.10.030(d)
did not go into effect until September 23, 2001, after the
adjudication and disposition orders were entered in the
grandchildrens CINA case, prior failures to send notice to the
Jacobs did not violate that statute. OCS conceded that AS
47.10.080(f) was in effect when the permanency hearings for the
Jacobs grandchildren occurred but argued that the proper remedy
for violation of that provision was intervention in the existing
CINA proceeding. Regarding the Jacobs due process argument, OCS
responded that [a]ny due process issues are covered by the
[notice] statute, so there was no basis for expand[ing] the
obligation of the Department beyond what is mandated by the
statute.
In August 2004 Superior Court Judge John Reese
dismissed the Jacobs case.4 Judge Reese observed that the
departments failure to give them notice is a serious oversight,
but concluded that the Jacobs due process rights have not been
violated, since . . . they may request placement in the CINA
case.
The Jacobs intervened in their grandchildrens CINA
cases, but they also appealed Judge Reeses ruling to this court.5
We held in Jacob I that the Jacobs were entitled to declaratory
relief.6 We vacated the order dismissing the Jacobs complaint
and remanded for entry of a declaration of the Jacobs statutory
rights,7 holding that [a] declaratory judgment from the superior
court that acknowledges the failure of OCS to meet its statutory
duty to the Jacobs and that specifically recognizes the Jacobs
rights to receive notice of future OCS hearings relating to their
grandchildren will materially benefit the Jacobs.8 We noted that
the Jacobs never sought a declaration specifically regarding
their due process rights and so we decline[d] to comment on this
issue extensively, but we nevertheless observed that notice of
proceedings and a meaningful right to be heard are essential to
due process.9 We held that three of the Jacobs other requests
for injunctive relief on their own behalf were moot.10 By
intervening in their grandchildrens CINA proceedings, the Jacobs
received the first two categories of injunctive relief that they
sought: notice of CINA proceedings and an opportunity to be heard
at permanency hearings.11 Regarding the third category, placement
of the children, the Jacobs decided not to continue to pursue
full custody of two of the children and they were in a position
to be heard regarding placement of the third.12 We decline[d] to
address the Jacobs request for injunctive relief on behalf of
similarly situated grandparents because the Jacobs had not filed
a class action lawsuit and because at oral argument they appeared
to retreat from this position to some degree.13
After our Jacob I opinion was published, Superior Court
Judge Jack W. Smith entered declaratory judgment on behalf of the
Jacobs. The declaration read, in its entirety:
Plaintiff[s] right to notice of
Child in Need of Aid (CINA) proceedings
concerning their grandchildren was
violated by the Office of Childrens
Services (OCS). In September 2001
amendments to AS 47.10.030(d) required
notice to grandparents with Plaintiff[s]
status. That notice was not provided to
Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs have a right and are
entitled to notice under AS 47.10.030(b)
and (d) of any current and future CINA
proceedings involving their
grandchildren.
In April 2008 the Jacobs filed a motion for attorneys
fees.14 The Jacobs argued they were the prevailing parties
because they had won and obtained a judgment in their favor.
They asserted that they were entitled to full fees under AS
09.60.010(c), which they contended provides for an award of full
fees in cases concerning a constitutional right. They claimed
that this case was in that category, quoting this courts
statements in Jacob I about due process, as well as other cases
discussing grandparents due process rights. In the alternative,
they argued that they were entitled to enhanced Civil Rule 82
fees because
this case was very complex (Civil Rule
82(b)(3)(A)); the amount of attorney time,
the number of attorney[s] used, and Alaska
Legal Services minimizing of fees was
remarkable (Civil Rule 82(b)(3)(C) (E)[)];
plaintiffs claims were reasonable (Civil Rule
82(b)(3)(F)[)]; the matters at stake were
significant (Civil Rule 82(b)(3)(H)); a fee
award will not be onerous to [the] State
(Civil Rule 82(b)(3)(I)); and equity suggests
a fee enhancement is appropriate (since the
plaintiffs pursued this claim, despite their
age and infirmities, on behalf of all future
grandparents so that they would not
experience what the Jacobs had to endure[)]
(Civil Rule 82(b)(3)(K)[)].
The Jacobs asserted that the requested hourly rates were
reasonable and calculated that a full award would be in the
amount of $96,940. Attached to the motion were time records for
each of the Jacobs attorneys.
OCS opposed the Jacobs motion arguing that the Jacobs
were not the prevailing parties because they only prevailed on
the question of whether they were entitled to a declaration that
they should have received notice of the CINA proceedings, a
statutory right that was never in dispute and that was not the
main issue in the case. OCS argued that the Jacobs were not
entitled to fees under AS 09.60.010(c) because they did not bring
an action to establish, protect, or enforce a constitutional
right and had not raised or established a due process violation.
OCS also contended that some of the Jacobs attorneys billing
entries were inappropriately included, making the $96,940 figure
too high.15 OCS further argued that because merely restat[ing]
nearly every enhancement factor constitutes failure to adequately
brief the issue of enhanced fees, the Jacobs waived their request
for an award under Rule 82(b)(3) and so were entitled to at most
twenty percent of their actual reasonable fees.
The Jacobs replied, reasserting their substantive
arguments but conceding that some of the billing entries should
not have been included. They recalculated their recoverable fees
and reduced their request to $27,334.
In June 2008 Judge Smith granted the motion for
attorneys fees and awarded full fees in the revised amount of
$27,334. In the alternative, even if there were no special
statutory fee provision for constitutional cases, Judge Smith
wrote that he would award the Jacobs enhanced fees in the amount
of $13,667fifty percent of the fees requestedbecause of various
factors supporting enhancement, such as the complexity of the
case, the amount of time the attorneys spent on it, the number of
attorneys used, the extent to which Alaska Legal Services
minimized its fees, the reasonableness of plaintiffs claims, the
significance of the matters at stake, and the fact that a fee
award will not be onerous to [the] State.
OCS appeals the award of attorneys fees.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We exercise our independent judgment in reviewing
whether a trial court has applied the appropriate legal standard
in making its prevailing party determination.16 But we review a
superior courts determination of prevailing party status and
attorneys fees for abuse of discretion17 and will overturn such
determinations only if they are manifestly unreasonable.18 The
decision to award enhanced fees is also reviewed for abuse of
discretion.19
As to reviewing an award under AS 09.60.010(c), [t]he
independent standard of review . . . applies to considering
whether the trial court properly applied the law when awarding
attorneys fees.20
We use independent judgment when determining whether an
issue has been waived below due to inadequate briefing.21
IV. DISCUSSION
A. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by
Ruling that the Jacobs Prevailed in this Case.
For the Jacobs to have been eligible for an award of
attorneys fees under either AS 09.60.010(c) or Alaska Civil Rule
82, the superior court must have appropriately declared them to
be the prevailing party in this case.22
OCS argues that the Jacobs were not the prevailing
parties because the ground on which the Jacobs prevailedthe right
to notice of CINA proceedingswas something that was never in
dispute. OCS also contends that it prevailed on the main issue
because the Jacobs were unable to obtain a declaration that
applied to all grandparents. OCS reasons that such a declaration
must have been central to the Jacobs case or they would not have
(1) filed a suit separate from their grandchildrens CINA
proceedings, or (2) emphasized in their briefing the systemic
nature of OCSs failure to provide notice to grandparents.
But the Jacobs argue that they prevailed on the main
issue, which was the opportunity to be heard, and cite our
holding in Jacob I that they were entitled to declarations that
OCS had violated their statutory notice right and that they had a
right to notice in future CINA proceedings. The Jacobs concede
that no order was issued compelling OCS to follow the law with
respect to other grandparents but reassert that they obtained
their first objective, an order pertaining to their own
grandchildren.23 And they point out that this court has already
held that a declaratory judgment would materially benefit the
Jacobs.
The superior court did not make any statement regarding
prevailing party status in its attorneys fees order, but it is
implicit in the courts award that the court considered the Jacobs
to be the prevailing parties.24 As noted above, [d]esignation of
the prevailing party is committed to the broad discretion of the
trial court 25 and so will be overturned only if . . . manifestly
unreasonable.26
It is firmly established that [t]he prevailing party is
the one who has successfully prosecuted or defended against the
action, the one who is successful on the main issue of the action
and in whose favor the decision or verdict is rendered and the
judgment entered. 27 Furthermore, [a] plaintiff may prevail even
if he or she fails to recover all the relief prayed for.28
OCS disregarded its statutory obligation to provide notice
to the Jacobs, and we held in Jacob I that the Jacobs were
entitled to redress for that violation.29 It is reasonable to
conclude that the failure to provide notice to the Jacobs
regarding their grandchildrens CINA proceedings was the main
issue in the case. As noted above, the Jacobs need not have
prevailed on all of their claims to be the prevailing parties.30
Though OCS now argues that this issue was never in dispute, it
chose to litigate this case for years. OCS did not concede until
oral argument preceding our 2008 opinion in Jacob I that
declaratory relief based on the 2001 notice statute was
appropriate.31 That argument took place at least seven years
after OCS initiated CINA proceedings, almost four years after the
Jacobs filed their complaint, and at least three years after the
superior court called the failure to provide notice a serious
oversight. It is not an abuse of discretion to conclude that the
Jacobs prevailed in this matter.
B. The Jacobs Are Not Entitled to Fees Under AS
09.60.010(c).
Because we affirm the determination that the Jacobs
were entitled to fees as the prevailing parties, we next review
the superior courts award, beginning with its grant of full fees
under AS 09.60.010(c).32 That statute reads, in relevant part:
In a civil action or appeal
concerning the establishment,
protection, or enforcement of a right
under the United States Constitution or
the Constitution of the State of Alaska,
the court
(1) shall award, subject to
(d) and (e) of this section, full
reasonable attorney fees and costs
to a claimant, who, as plaintiff,
counterclaimant, cross claimant, or
third-party plaintiff in the action
or on appeal, has prevailed in
asserting the right.
OCS argues that the Jacobs did not prevail in asserting
a constitutional right because they did not make a due process
claim in their complaint. Though OCS acknowledges that the
Jacobs raised the suggestion of due process concerns in seeking
partial summary judgment, OCS argues that the contents of that
suggestion were not sufficient to establish a constitutional
right. OCS asserts that this court did not reach the due process
issue in Jacob I and that our comment on the constitutional issue
is not sufficient for an AS 09.60.010(c) award. The Jacobs
believe that [f]ull reasonable fees under AS 09.60.010(c) are
. . . appropriate because they made arguments regarding due
process in their summary judgment motion, to which OCS responded
and on which the superior court ruled. The Jacobs characterize
our opinion in Jacob I as taking the due process issues into
account when ruling in favor of the Jacobs on the statutory
declaratory judgment issue.
We agree with OCS. Jacob I made clear that we took
seriously the due process concerns implicated by OCSs failure to
provide notice to the Jacobs,33 but we declined to rule on those
issues because the Jacobs had not raised them.34 Where no party
has properly raised a constitutional claim, an award of fees
under AS 09.60.010(c) is not appropriate.
C. The Jacobs Are Entitled to the Alternative Award of
Enhanced Rule 82 Fees.
In cases in which the prevailing party recovers no
money judgment, Alaska Civil Rule 82(b)(2) provides for the
recovery of thirty percent of the prevailing partys reasonable
actual attorneys fees which were necessarily incurred if the case
was resolved at trial, and twenty percent if the case did not go
to trial. As an alternative to its award of full fees, the
superior court granted fifty percent of the Jacobs requested fees
based on the enhancement factors in Alaska Civil Rule 82(b)(3).
That rule reads:
(3) The court may vary an attorneys
fee award calculated under subparagraph
(b)(1) or (2) of this rule if, upon
consideration of the factors listed
below, the court determines a variation
is warranted:
(A) the complexity of the litigation;
(B) the length of trial;
(C) the reasonableness
of the attorneys hourly rates
and the number of hours
expended;
(D) the reasonableness
of the number of attorneys
used;
(E) the attorneys
efforts to minimize fees;
(F) the reasonableness
of the claims and defenses
pursued by each side;
(G) vexatious or bad
faith conduct;
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(I) the extent to which
a given fee award may be so
onerous to the non-prevailing
party that it would deter
similarly situated litigants
from the voluntary use of the
courts;
(J) the extent to which
the fees incurred by the
prevailing party suggest that
they had been influenced by
considerations apart from the
case at bar, such as a desire
to discourage claims by others
against the prevailing party
or its insurer; and
(K) other equitable
factors deemed relevant.
If the court varies an award, the court
shall explain the reasons for the
variation.
1. The Jacobs did not waive their right to enhanced
fees.
OCS cites Sidney v. Allstate Insurance Co.35 and argues
that the Jacobs waived the argument for enhanced fees by
fail[ing] to make any argument [for enhanced fees] until their
reply brief to the superior court. OCS is concerned that
accepting the Jacobs initial argument for enhanced fees would
allow any party who merely cited those factors to inappropriately
shift the burden to the nonmoving party to argue against enhanced
fees even though no presumption for fees should exist. The
Jacobs concede that their argument in their opening brief is
short, but they contend that it sufficiently raised the fee
enhancement issue, in contrast to the situation in Sidney.
The superior court granted enhanced fees and thus
necessarily concluded the Jacobs had not inadequately requested
them. Waiver is a legal issue that this court reviews de novo,36
so we need not have the superior courts reasoning before us to
rule on this question.
We conclude that the Jacobs did not so thoroughly fail
to argue for enhanced fees that they waived the claim. Sidney is
distinguishable. In that case, we rejected a partys contention
that she should receive full fees because the party had provided
no justification for varying the presumptive fee award, offered
no authority in support of her argument, and pointed to no
authority in support of her request.37 Here, though we believe
the Jacobs could and probably should have more thoroughly briefed
their arguments for enhanced fees, the Jacobs did point to
specific Rule 82(b)(3) factors they contended apply and OCS
responded. On this record, we do not conclude that the Jacobs
waived their claim for enhanced fees. Thus, we reach the merits
of the enhanced fee award.
2. The superior court did not abuse its discretion in
awarding enhanced fees to the Jacobs.
OCS contends that none of the Rule 82(b)(3) enhancement
factors applies here. The Jacobs argue that the superior court
was correct to find that several factors support an award of
enhanced fees. We will overturn an award of enhanced fees only
where the trial court has abused its discretion.38 We do not
believe the superior courts alternative award here was
unreasonable because two enhancement factors weigh strongly in
favor of the courts ruling.
First, we believe factor (H), the relationship between
the amount of work performed and the significance of the matters
at stake, applies. The superior court relied on this factor,
writing that the matters at stake were significant. We agree
that the notice issue the Jacobs raised is important. The
placement of children and the involvement of grandparents in
their grandchildrens lives are not matters to be taken lightly.
Neither is a state agencys failure to comply with a legislative
mandate. The $27,334 in fees that the Jacobs requested after
years of pursuing litigation against OCS to enforce their
statutory right is reasonable in light of the significance of the
case.
Second, factor (F), the reasonableness of the claims
and defenses pursued by each side, is relevant here. Reliance on
this factor is appropriate where the nonprevailing party has made
unreasonable arguments.39 The defenses on which OCS relied in
responding to the Jacobs complaintincluding that the Washington
state custody order should not receive full faith and credit and
that the Jacobs had chosen improper venuewere unreasonable. OCS
clearly failed to comply with a statutory requirement in a manner
that impacted the Jacobs involvement in their grandchildrens
lives. It is uncontested that the Jacobs called this fact to
OCSs attention dozens of times.40 Rather than correcting its
error, OCS took seven years to concede that the Jacobs were
entitled to the notice the legislature mandated in 2001. The
superior court did not articulate this rationale for relying on
factor (F), but we believe it is clear that the record supports
reliance on this factor.41
Because we hold that the superior court did not abuse
its discretion in awarding enhanced fees, we affirm its
alternative award of fifty percent of the Jacobs attorneys fees.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, we AFFIRM the superior
courts finding that the Jacobs were the prevailing parties,
VACATE the portion of its order granting full fees under
AS 09.60.010(c), and AFFIRM the award of enhanced Rule 82 fees.
_______________________________
1 177 P.3d 1181 (Alaska 2008).
2 Id. at 1183 (footnotes omitted). We noted that the
facts as recited were taken largely from the Jacobs complaint.
Id. at 1183 n.1. These facts are not contested here.
3 AS 47.10.030(d), which went into effect on September
23, 2001, ch. 43, 1-6, SLA 2001, requires notice to grandparents
of CINA proceedings if they request it or if OCS knows the child
has a grandparent and has the grandparents address. AS
47.10.080(f) states that grandparents entitled to notice under AS
47.10.030(d) are also entitled to notice of permanency hearings.
The version of AS 47.14.100(e) in place while the Jacobs
grandchildrens CINA cases were proceeding prohibited OCS from
placing a child in a foster home if a relative requested
placement of the child unless there was sufficient evidence that
such a placement would be unsafe or otherwise inappropriate.
Former AS 47.14.100(e) (2004).
4 The superior court ruled that the Jacobs summary
judgment motion was moot because the court was granting OCSs
motion to dismiss.
5 See Jacob I, 177 P.3d at 1184 (noting the Jacobs
intervention in the CINA proceedings).
6 Id. at 1184, 1186.
7 Id. at 1188. Our analysis did not name the statutes to
which we referred, but our facts section cited and quoted AS
47.10.030(d). See id. at 1183-86.
8 Id. at 1186.
9 Id. at 1185.
10 Id. at 1186.
11 Id. at 1187.
12 Id.
13 Id. We also decline[d] to address . . . hypothetical
claims about damages. Id. at 1187-88.
14 The Jacobs were represented by the Alaska Legal
Services Corporation before this motion, but the Alaska
Immigration Justice Project represented them in this request for
fees.
15 Some of the entries were related to work done after the
dismissal of the trial court case, work beyond the parameters of
the case, work that need not have been done by attorneys, and
work listed without any description.
16 Halloran v. State, Div. of Elections, 115 P.3d 547, 550
(Alaska 2005) (citing Shepherd v. State, Dept of Fish & Game, 897
P.2d 33, 44 (Alaska 1995)).
17 Braun v. Denali Borough, 193 P.3d 719, 726 (Alaska
2008) (citing Bromley v. Mitchell, 902 P.2d 797, 804 (Alaska
1995)); see also Hickel v. Se. Conference, 868 P.2d 919, 927-28
(Alaska 1994) (Both the award of attorneys fees to the prevailing
party and the determination of prevailing party status are within
the broad discretion of the trial court. (citing Adoption of
V.M.C., 528 P.2d 788, 795 (Alaska 1974))).
18 Braun, 193 P.3d at 726 (citing Bromley, 902 P.2d at
804).
19 See Ware v. Ware, 161 P.3d 1188, 1198 (Alaska 2007).
20 Denardo v. Cutler, 167 P.3d 674, 677 (Alaska 2007)
(quoting Ellison v. Plumbers & Steam Fitters Union Local 375, 118
P.3d 1070, 1073 (Alaska 2005)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
21 Lauth v. State, 12 P.3d 181, 184 (Alaska 2000) (citing
Wilkerson v. State, Dept of Health & Soc. Servs., Div. of Family
& Youth Servs., 993 P.2d 1018, 1021 (Alaska 1999)).
22 See AS 09.60.010(c) ([T]he court (1) shall award . . .
full reasonable attorney fees and costs to a claimant, who, as
plaintiff . . . has prevailed in asserting the [state or federal
constitutional] right . . . . (emphasis added)); Alaska R. Civ.
P. 82(b)(2) (In cases in which the prevailing party recovers no
money judgment, the court . . . shall award the prevailing party
in a case resolved without trial 20 percent of its actual
attorneys fees which were necessarily incurred. (emphasis
added)).
23 As to their third original objective, the Jacobs reason
that [t]he fact that the Jacobs successfully intervened in their
grandchildrens CINA cases and reached agreement with OCS [that
included placement of the children outside of their home] does
not mean that they did not prevail in this case.
24 Trial courts should make findings explaining their
prevailing party determinations when the issue is in dispute. It
is difficult to effectively review a trial courts decision
without understanding its reasoning. Cf. Curran v. Hastreiter,
579 P.2d 524, 531 (Alaska 1978) (remanding to the trial court
where it did not make a prevailing party determination and
relying on a prior case also remanding because [w]e are
confronted with the difficulty of not knowing whether the court
denied the fee in the exercise of its discretion or under the
mistaken belief that Cooper was not the prevailing party (quoting
Cooper v. Carlson, 511 P.2d 1305, 1311 (Alaska 1973) (internal
quotation marks omitted))). In this case, we need not remand
because the reason Judge Smith found the Jacobs to be the
prevailing parties is clear: we directed the trial court to
enter declaratory relief in their favor. Jacob v. State, Dept
of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Childrens Servs., 177 P.3d
1181, 1184, 1186 (Alaska 2008).
25 Hillman v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 855 P.2d
1321, 1326 (Alaska 1993) (quoting Apex Control Sys., Inc. v.
Alaska Mech., Inc., 776 P.2d 310, 314 (Alaska 1989)).
26 Progressive Corp. v. Peter ex rel. Peter, 195 P.3d
1083, 1092 (Alaska 2008) (citing Interior Cabaret, Hotel, Rest. &
Retailers Assn v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 135 P.3d 1000, 1002
(Alaska 2006)).
27 Progressive Corp., 195 P.3d at 1092 (quoting Hillman,
855 P.2d at 1327); see also Blumenshine v. Baptiste, 869 P.2d
470, 474 (Alaska 1994) (citing seven cases to support the
statement that [w]e have consistently held that the prevailing
party is the one who prevailed on the main issues).
28 Progressive Corp., 195 P.3d at 1092 (citing
Blumenshine, 869 P.2d at 474).
29 See Jacob I, 177 P.3d at 1186.
30 Cf. Progressive Corp., 195 P.3d at 1093 (The fact the
Peters only recovered on one claim is not controlling. . . . Even
if a party prevails on only one of the main issues, it is not
necessarily ineligible for being considered the prevailing
party.) (footnote omitted); cf. Blumenshine, 869 P.2d at 474
(Although Baptiste did not prevail on every issue in this case,
he succeeded in obtaining the full damages requested for . . . .
the main issues [and therefore] Baptiste was the prevailing party
for the purpose of awarding attorneys fees.).
31 See Jacob I, 177 P.3d at 1184.
32 The superior court did not include in its order an
explanation of the basis on which it awarded full fees, but the
parties understanding of the basis for the award is logical; the
court appears to have applied AS 09.60.010(c).
33 See Jacob I, 177 P.3d at 1185 (declin[ing] to comment
on due process extensively but noting that notice of proceedings
and a meaningful right to be heard are essential to due process
and there are situations in which the right to intervene in the
late stages of a CINA case will be insufficient to cure the
prejudice of the initial due process violation).
34 See id. at 1185-86 (declaring that [b]ecause the Jacobs
never sought a declaration specifically regarding their due
process rights, we decline to comment on this issue extensively
and discussing the entry of declaratory judgment that OCS failed
to meet its statutory duty).
35 187 P.3d 443, 456 (Alaska 2008).
36 Lauth v. State, 12 P.3d 181, 184 (Alaska 2000) (We
. . . apply our independent judgment when determining whether an
issue has been waived below due to inadequate briefing. (citing
Wilkerson v. State, Dept of Health & Soc. Servs., Div. of Family
& Youth Servs., 993 P.2d 1018, 1021 (Alaska 1999))).
37 Sidney, 187 P.3d at 456 (citing State Farm Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Lawrence, 26 P.3d 1074, 1076 (Alaska 2001)).
38 See Ware v. Ware, 161 P.3d 1188, 1199 (Alaska 2007)
(The superior courts award will not be reversed unless we find
that there has been a clear abuse of discretion, and the courts
determination is manifestly unreasonable. )
39 See Reid v. Williams, 964 P.2d 453, 463 (Alaska 1998)
(noting that Rule 82 provides protection for the winning litigant
who is forced to respond to an opponents excessive efforts or bad
faith litigation tactics and citing factors (F) and (G)); see
also Cole, 4 P.3d at 960 (holding that the superior court did not
abuse its discretion by enhancing Rule 82 fees in part on the
finding that the claims and defenses of the party made to pay the
fees were not reasonable and the record supported that finding).
40 See Jacob v. State, Dept of Health & Soc. Servs.,
Office of Childrens Servs., 177 P.3d 1181, 1183 (Alaska 2008).
41 We rely here on the settled rule that a trial courts
actions may be affirmed when an alternative ground, not
necessarily relied upon by the trial court, appears in the
record. N. Lights Motel, Inc. v. Sweaney, 563 P.2d 256, 257
(Alaska 1977) (citing Firemans Fund Am. Ins. Cos. v. Gomes, 544
P.2d 1013, 1017 n.12 (Alaska 1976); Ransom v. Haner, 362 P.2d
282, 285 (Alaska 1961)).
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