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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Lara S. v. State, Dept. of Health & Social Services, Office of Children's Services (06/05/2009) sp-6377
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage,
Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
| LARA S., | ) |
| ) Supreme Court No. S- 13209 | |
| Appellant, | ) |
| ) Superior Court Nos. | |
| v. | ) 3AN-05- 00068/00069/00182 CN |
| ) | |
| STATE OF ALASKA, | ) O P I N I O N |
| DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & | ) |
| SOCIAL SERVICES, OFFICE OF | ) No. 6377 June 5, 2009 |
| CHILDRENS SERVICES, | ) |
| ) | |
| Appellee. | ) |
| ) | |
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State
of Alaska, Third Judicial District,
Anchorage, Jack W. Smith, Judge.
Appearances: Jill Wittenbrader, Assistant
Public Defender, and Quinlan Steiner, Public
Defender, Anchorage, for Appellant. Laura C.
Bottger, Assistant Attorney General,
Anchorage, and Talis J. Colberg, Attorney
General, Juneau, for Appellee. Dianne Olsen,
Law Office of Dianne Olsen, Anchorage,
Guardian Ad Litem.
Before: Fabe, Chief Justice, Eastaugh,
Carpeneti, Winfree, and Christen, Justices.
FABE, Chief Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
After struggling with her drug problem, failing in two
inpatient treatment programs, and experiencing difficulty working
on her Office of Childrens Services case plan, a mother of three
boys voluntarily relinquished her parental rights. But when the
trial court vacated its order placing the children with
relatives, the mother requested a review hearing to rescind the
termination of her parental rights. The mother initially argued
that the placement change entitled her to a hearing, but she
eventually pointed to recent steps taken to secure a full-time
job and to attend one or two narcotics or alcoholics anonymous
meetings a week. The trial court denied the mothers motion for a
review hearing, reasoning that she was not entitled to a hearing
because her affidavit failed to establish the three statutory
requirements: (1) that it was in the childrens best interests
that her parental rights be reinstated, (2) that she had
successfully addressed her substance abuse problem, and (3) that
she was capable of caring for her children. Because the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the mother
failed to make a sufficient showing of good cause to entitle her
to a hearing under AS 47.10.089(h), we affirm.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
A. Facts
Lara is the mother of three boys, Earl, Herb, and Roan.1
Earl, born in 1999, did not have a relationship with his
biological father, Don, until child in need of aid (CINA)
proceedings were initiated in 2005. Ron is the biological father
of both Herb, born in 2003, and Roan, born in 2005.
In January 2005 the Office of Childrens Services (OCS)
received a report that Lara was abusing substances while she was
pregnant with Roan and caring for Earl and Herb. After having
tested positive for cocaine, Lara admitted to using cocaine and
agreed to follow a care and safety plan to ensure her childrens
safety and to prevent their removal from her home. Under the
plan, Lara agreed to receive a substance abuse assessment, follow
through with treatment recommendations, undergo random urinalysis
testing twice a week, attend all doctor appointments, and apply
for financial assistance.
Lara tested positive for cocaine again in late February
2005 after she had failed to make two appointments for urinalysis
tests earlier that month. According to OCS, it made repeated
attempts through telephone calls and home visits to contact Lara
to discuss her positive urinalysis test and her care and safety
plan. On March 21, 2005, a social worker visited the home of
Lara and Ron, who both appeared to be under the influence of
drugs. Lara admitted to using cocaine and OxyContin. That day
OCS took emergency custody of Earl and Herb and immediately filed
an emergency petition for adjudication of the children as in need
of aid and for temporary placement. A case plan was established
for Lara, requiring (1) substance abuse assessment/treatment, (2)
[urinalysis] testing, (3) mental health evaluation and treatment,
and (4) parenting classes. The plan also provided that Lara
would have visitation with her children.
Lara completed a substance abuse assessment with the
Salvation Armys Clitheroe Center on March 29, 2005. The
assessment recommended that Lara participate in ninety days of
inpatient treatment with the Clitheroe Centers Reflections
program while she waited for an opening at another treatment
facility, Dena A Coy. Lara tested positive for cocaine on April
1 and was admitted to detox at the Clitheroe Center. Lara
entered Reflections residential treatment program on April 18 but
left after four days. The discharge recommendation was that Lara
complete a ninety-day inpatient treatment program. On April 27
Lara was assessed by Dena A Coy and she entered into an intensive
outpatient treatment program. During the month of April Lara
took three urinalysis tests, two of which were positive, and
failed to make seven other appointments for urinalysis tests.
Lara failed to take any urinalysis tests in May.
Laras third son, Roan, was premature when he was born
on June 19, 2005. After Roan tested positive for cocaine and
opiates, Lara acknowledged using cocaine and OxyContin just
before Roan was born. Roan was administered morphine and
phenobarbital to manage his withdrawal symptoms and to avoid
seizures. OCS took emergency custody of Roan on June 20 and the
next day filed an emergency petition for adjudication of Roan as
in need of aid and for temporary placement. After spending six
weeks in a neonatal intensive care unit, Roan was discharged to a
medical foster home in early August. Although Lara was permitted
to spend unlimited time with Roan while he was in the hospital,
her visits were infrequent and short. But Lara attended most of
her OCS-supervised visits after Roan was placed in a foster home.
Dena A Coy reported on June 28, 2005, that Lara had
failed to comply with her treatment program but that she had re-
engaged in the previous week. Lara had two negative urinalysis
tests on June 22 and July 18 but again tested positive for
cocaine on July 28. Lara failed to take any urinalysis tests in
August, and on August 17 OCS received a report that Lara was
using crystal meth. Lara took one urinalysis test in September,
which was positive for opiates. Lara missed 67 of her 102
appointments for urinalysis tests between late April and early
September. Due to lack of attendance and compliance, Lara was
discharged from Dena A Coys outpatient program in early
September.
Lara took two urinalysis tests in October and twice
tested positive for opiates. Lara failed to make any of her
appointments for urinalysis tests from November to mid-December.
Lara completed an assessment with Cook Inlet Tribal
Councils First Step program in late November 2005. Lara did not
sign a release for OCS to receive information concerning her
participation in the program and it is undisputed that she was
not truthful during the assessment, maintaining that she was
compliant with her urinalysis testing and that she had not abused
substances since June 19, 2005, the day she gave birth to Roan.
Perhaps because of Laras lack of candor during the assessment,
Cook Inlet Tribal Councils recommendation differed from the two
earlier recommendations for ninety days of inpatient treatment
and only advised that she participate in intensive outpatient
treatment.
Guardian ad litem Shirley Perry expressed concern over
Laras lack of progress during the first year of treatment under
her case plan in a February 17, 2006 disposition report:
It is extremely concerning that [Lara]
has not effectively engaged in treatment in
the year since the first case plan. She
waited four months to get an assessment,
entered and left Clither[oe] treatment,
entered Dena [A] Coy out-patient, refused a
bed for inpatient treatment (where she could
have had her son placed with her), and missed
half of the sessions over the next six
months. She has continued to test positive
for cocaine and opiates about once per month.
Now she has completed another assessment at
[Cook Inlet Tribal Council] for treatment but
lied to the assessors and has not been
forthcoming with the providers about her true
compliance. [Lara] has never complied in a
consistent manner with [urinalysis] testing
or treatment.
Perry also noted that Lara has a history of depression and mental
health issues, which have not been addressed. With regard to the
parenting component of Laras case plan, Perry reported that
although Lara had attended some parenting classes at Dena A Coy,
she had missed a significant number of sessions. Lara had also
participated in Cook Inlet Tribal Councils parenting classes.
All of Laras three children have struggled with
developmental problems. Earl, the oldest, was transferred to an
acute care facility in Georgia when his father, Don, reported
that his behavior was unmanageable. Upon his return to
Anchorage, Earl was placed in a therapeutic foster home to
provide him with a higher level of care to address his
significant psychological needs relating to his aggressive
behavior, incidents of isolating himself, and diagnosis of post-
traumatic stress disorder. Laras second son, Herb, has displayed
anger outbursts and aggressive behaviors, and it was recommended
that he enroll in day care to help him socialize. Roan, the
youngest, suffered drug withdrawal symptoms when he was born
premature, and he has some physical motor delays.
B. Proceedings
A day after OCS took emergency custody of Earl and Herb
on March 21, 2005, it filed an emergency petition for
adjudication of the children as in need of aid and for temporary
placement. Following a hearing on March 30, the superior court
found that there was probable cause to believe that Earl and Herb
were children in need of aid. OCS took emergency custody of Roan
on June 20 and filed an emergency petition for adjudication of
Roan as in need of aid and for temporary placement on June 21.
In mid-July the parties stipulated that Roan was a child in need
of aid and the superior court adopted the stipulation.
The CINA cases for all three children were consolidated
in August 2006. In October the parties stipulated that the
children were in need of aid and the superior court adopted the
stipulation.
In March 2006 OCS reported that as a result of a recent
permanency planning conference, it had changed its goal for all
of the children from reunification to adoption and that it
intended to file a petition for termination of parental rights.
In April the superior court found that the children continued to
be in need of aid and noted that [t]he permanent plan for these
children is adoption. In July OCS filed a petition to terminate
the parental rights of Lara, Don, and Ron.2
Lara requested a placement review hearing in December
2006, seeking placement of her children in the home of Herb and
Roans paternal aunt, Tessa, and Tessas boyfriend, Jim. The State
opposed this placement for a number of reasons, including Jims
problem with alcohol and criminal history. Following a placement
hearing on April 18 and 19, 2007, the superior court granted
Laras request to place the children together in the home of Tessa
and Jim as expeditiously as possible following a transition
process determined to be appropriate for each child, and it
ordered OCS to work with the childrens current foster parents to
facilitate the transition and to establish a plan to implement
the ultimate placement. The superior court also ordered as a
condition of the placement that Jim undergo alcohol treatment and
that Tessa and Jim complete a parenting class program. The State
moved for reconsideration, pointing to the 0.29 result of a
portable alcohol breath test administered to Jim during the
placement hearing. The superior court found that the result of
Jims breath test would not have affected its order given that it
required Jim to complete alcohol treatment before the children
were placed in the home he shared with Tessa. The court denied
the States motion for reconsideration in May 2007.
The next month, June 2007, Lara filed a relinquishment
of her parental rights. In her relinquishment, Lara referred to
the plan to place her children with Tessa and Jim and
acknowledged that [t]he department must receive a positive home
study and the children must be in [Tessa and Jims] adoptive home
for 6 months before the department can consent to adoption of my
children by [Tessa and Jim]. Her relinquishment also asserted
that [i]f [Tessa and Jim] become unable to care for my children
for any reason, I retain the privilege to be notified that the
placement is no longer available. Finally, her relinquishment
requested that [i]f the placement [with Tessa and Jim] is no
longer available, the department will send me a letter by regular
and certified mail to tell me that the placement is no longer
available. The superior court incorporated these provisions into
its order terminating Laras parental rights.
Unfortunately, the placement of the children with Tessa
and Jim failed. According to the childrens guardian ad litem,
Jim was in denial about his substance abuse problem and had not
addressed it. Thus, in April 2008, about a year after the
superior courts order placing the children with Tessa and Jim was
entered, the court granted OCSs motion to vacate the order.
As provided in her relinquishment, Lara was informed
that the childrens placement with Tessa and Jim had failed. Lara
then requested a review hearing to vacate the termination of her
parental rights. She argued that in light of the change in the
proposed permanent placement for the children it is no longer
equitable that the termination judgment be enforced by the court
and claimed that her decision to relinquish her rights was made
with the expectation that the children would ultimately be placed
with the relatives as anticipated by the courts order. Lara also
claimed that she is presently capable of parenting her children
and requested that the termination of her parental rights be
vacated. In this filing, Lara did not provide any explanation of
the basis for her contention that she was capable of caring for
her children. In an affidavit filed with her reply to the States
opposition to her request for a review hearing, Lara for the
first time set out the basis for her claim of rehabilitation and
ability to parent her children:
1. I have been attend[ing] NA and AA
meetings for a little over three months. I
usually attend meetings at the Alano Club. I
usually attend one or two times per week.
2. I am employed at a Holiday gas
station on Tudor. Ive been working there
over 2 weeks. This is a full time job.
3. Prior to that job I was a barista
at the Dimond mall. I worked there from
February to May of this year.
4. Prior to this job I was working
temporary jobs, for example a seasonal job at
Sears.
5. I have become a more responsible
person since June 2007. I am getting my
bills paid off. I have lived in the same
apartment for eight months.
6. Ive been taking care of some health
issues on a more regular basis. I have been
trying to get regular medical coverage. I
should be gett[ing] medical coverage with my
job shortly.
7. I feel I have better emotional
regulation than I did in [the] past. My
meetings are helping me with this issue. I
have more of a support system and have people
I can call on for sober support.
8. I am requesting a hearing so that I
can testify to the above facts and
demonstrate my current ability to care for my
children.
The superior court denied Laras motion for a review
hearing in an order that did not include any factual findings or
legal conclusions. Lara appealed, arguing that a remand was
necessary for the superior court to make specific findings
supporting its denial and that she had demonstrated good cause
for a review hearing. Apparently agreeing with Lara that the
superior courts lack of findings presented a problem, OCS and the
guardian ad litem filed a joint motion asking us to remand the
case to the superior court to issue written findings and
conclusions on which its denial order was based. We granted this
motion, and on remand the superior court entered factual findings
and legal conclusions to support its order denying Laras motion
for a review hearing.
The superior court discussed Laras history of substance
abuse, her lack of compliance with her case plan, the childrens
placements and particular needs, and the CINA proceedings. The
superior court concluded that even if it accepted Laras affidavit
as completely factual, it would not provide good cause for an
evidentiary hearing, reasoning that Laras affidavit failed to
establish that Lara had treated her substance abuse problem or
that good cause existed to review the termination of her parental
rights despite her recent short term positive steps. The
superior court further noted that Lara had failed to submit any
evidence showing that her substance abuse had ceased and that she
had provided no evidence by even a preponderance that she is
currently capable of caring for the moral, emotional, mental, and
physical welfare of her children. Addressing the childrens best
interests, the superior court determined that they require a
finalization of these proceedings and would be best served by
placement together. The superior court concluded that any
further delay in finalizing the placement of the children in a
permanent home would be detrimental to their best interests.
Before us in this appeal is the question whether the
superior court abused its discretion in determining that Lara
failed to show that there was good cause to hold a review
hearing.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a trial courts decision to deny a review
hearing for failure to show good cause under AS 47.10.089(h) for
abuse of discretion.3 A trial court abuses its discretion only
if its decision arises from an improper motive or is arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly unreasonable.4
IV. DISCUSSION
Alaska Statute 47.10.089 governs voluntary
relinquishment of parental rights and addresses reinstatement of
voluntarily relinquished parental rights in subsection (h). This
subsection provides in full:
After a termination order is entered and
before the entry of an adoption or legal
guardianship decree, a person who voluntarily
relinquished parental rights to a child under
this section may request a review hearing,
upon a showing of good cause, to vacate the
termination order and reinstate parental
rights relating to that child. A court shall
vacate a termination order if the person
shows, by clear and convincing evidence, that
reinstatement of parental rights is in the
best interest of the child and that the
person is rehabilitated and capable of
providing the care and guidance that will
serve the moral, emotional, mental, and
physical welfare of the child.
Because a good cause showing necessarily relates to the grounds
for vacating a termination order and reinstating parental rights
under AS 47.10.089, in order to obtain a review hearing a person
must make a prima facie showing that: (1) it is in the childs
best interest that the persons parental rights be reinstated, (2)
the person is rehabilitated, and (3) the person is capable of
caring for the childs moral, emotional, mental, and physical
welfare.
Laras opening memorandum supporting her request for a
review hearing provided only a scant showing on these statutory
requirements. Lara simply claimed in a conclusory manner that
she is presently capable of parenting her children, and she did
not explain the basis for her contention. Lara instead rested
her request for a review hearing primarily on her argument that
it was no longer equitable that the termination judgment be
enforced by the court because her decision to relinquish her
rights was made with the expectation that the children would
ultimately be placed with [Tessa and Jim] as anticipated by the
courts order, which had been vacated. Yet in Laras
relinquishment of her parental rights, she acknowledged that the
plan to place her children with Tessa and Jim might fall through:
The department has decided to place my
children for adoption with [Tessa and Jim] in
accordance with the permanency plan. The
department must receive a positive home study
and the children must be in the adoptive home
for 6 months before the department can
consent to adoption of my children by [Tessa
and Jim]. If [Tessa and Jim] become unable
to care for my children for any reason, I
retain the privilege to be notified that the
placement is no longer available. If the
placement is no longer available, the
department will send me a letter by regular
and certified mail to tell me that the
placement is no longer available.
From this we can infer that Lara fully contemplated the
possibility that the placement of her children with Tessa and Jim
might fail. Yet Lara did not condition the relinquishment of her
parental rights on her children being placed with them.
It was not until Lara filed a reply to the States
opposition to her request for a review hearing that she attempted
to offer any evidence addressing the statutory requirements for
showing good cause. Lara stated in an affidavit filed with the
reply that she had been attending narcotics or alcoholics
anonymous meetings one or two times a week for just over three
months; that she had been working full-time for about two weeks,
starting just a few days before she filed her request for a
review hearing; that she believed that she had become more
responsible and had better emotional regulation; and that she was
addressing some of her health issues. Laras affidavit indicated
commendable but limited progress toward rehabilitation and it
barely scratched the surface of what was needed to show that Lara
was rehabilitated and capable of caring for her childrens
welfare. As the guardian ad litem noted, [w]hat Lara did NOT say
is telling: She did not claim she was no longer using substances;
she did not claim she had participated in any kind of substance
abuse treatment, whether residential or outpatient; she did not
claim she had a lengthy history of negative urinalysis results.
And Lara never addressed the best interests of her children. As
the trial court concluded, even if Laras affidavit were accepted
as completely factual, it would not provide good cause for an
evidentiary hearing.
Even before AS 47.10.089 was enacted in 2005,5 we had
addressed whether parents could attempt to reinstate their
parental rights before their children had been adopted and what
showing would be required to establish good cause to hold a
review hearing.6 In Rita T. v. State, a mother whose parental
rights had been involuntarily terminated sought a hearing to
review the termination.7 We held that parents are entitled to a
review of the order terminating their parental rights upon a
showing of good cause for the hearing.8 We further determined
that [g]ood cause could be established if the parents showed that
it would be in the best interests of the child to resume living
with them because they have sufficiently rehabilitated themselves
so that they can provide proper guidance and care for the child.9
We ruled in Rita T. that the mother had made a sufficient showing
of good cause by declaring in her application for a hearing that
as a result of a fourteen-month rehabilitation program she ha[d]
overcome the problems that led to the termination of her parental
rights and that professional counselors, social workers and
others would be able to establish that she is now capable of
providing a warm and loving home for her daughter.10
In Alden H. v. State, Office of Childrens Services, a
father who voluntarily relinquished his parental rights sought a
hearing to review his relinquishment.11 Although we declined to
answer the question whether parents who voluntarily relinquished
their parental rights could seek a review hearing upon a showing
of good cause under Rita T., we held that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in finding that the father failed to show
good cause and in denying the review hearing.12 We reasoned that
the evidence offered by the father to demonstrate his
rehabilitation was weak because although the father offered
evidence indicating that he had completed one aspect of his case
plan, his evidence for satisfying the three other aspects of his
plan was flimsy.13 We explained that the only evidence in the
record of the fathers efforts to satisfy these three other
aspects of his case plan attending twelve-step meetings on a
regular basis, completing a parenting class, and obtaining an
anger management assessment and the resulting recommended
treatment was a letter from an associate director of an
outpatient clinic.14 We determined that the letter was scant
evidence of the fathers rehabilitation because it failed to
address the scope of the programs that the father attended and
whether the father continued to seek treatment upon completing
the programs.15 Moreover, we determined that the trial court
reasonably discounted the credibility of the letter.16 We further
reasoned that the trial courts finding that the father lacked the
parenting abilities to address his childrens special needs was
well supported by the record, which included reports of the
childrens therapists and that there was no reasonable
psychological probability that the father could meet his
childrens needs.17
This case is much closer to Alden H. than Rita T. In
concluding that the father failed to show good cause for a review
hearing in Alden H., we reviewed each aspect of the fathers case
plan and the progress that he had made on each of its
requirements.18 Here, Laras case plan required: (1) a substance
abuse assessment and compliance with the recommended treatment
that Lara complete a 90-day residential program,19 (2) urinalysis
testing, (3) a mental health evaluation and treatment, and (4)
parenting classes. The single piece of evidence that Lara
presented in support of having completed any of these
requirements was her mention that she was attending one or two
narcotics or alcoholics anonymous meetings a week. She did not
state that she had participated in or completed the required
inpatient treatment program nor did she indicate that she had
successfully complied with urinalysis testing. We can contrast
Laras assertion with Rita T., where we found that the mother had
shown good cause having declared in her application for a review
hearing that as a result of a fourteen-month rehabilitation
program she ha[d] overcome the problems that led to the
termination of her parental rights.20 Similarly, though Laras
affidavit also mentioned that she had been taking care of some
health issues on a more regular basis and that she had been
trying to get regular medical coverage, which she expected to
receive through her job shortly, she did not state that she had
addressed her mental health issues. (Emphasis added.)
Lara argues that the trial court failed to consider the
record as a whole and that it limited [its] consideration of good
cause to Laras affidavit in deciding that her substance abuse had
not been rehabilitated. But the trial court provided detailed
factual findings concerning Laras sporadic participation in
substance abuse treatment in the past, and it concluded that her
attendance at narcotics and alcoholics anonymous meetings for
just over three months did not come close to establishing she has
addressed her substance abuse issues. It was reasonable for the
trial court to consider Laras progress in treating her substance
abuse problem within the context of her prior drug abuse and her
history of failure in residential drug-treatment programs. The
trial court recognized that Lara had missed 67 of her 102
appointments for urinalysis tests between late April and early
September 2005, that she had repeatedly tested positive for
cocaine and opiates, and that she had failed to complete several
rehabilitation programs for her substance abuse. In light of
these findings, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
concluding that Lara had failed to establish that she had
overcome her substance abuse problem despite her recent short
term positive steps.
Lara also asserts on appeal that the record contains
evidence that reuniting her with her children would serve their
best interests. But she utterly failed to address this point in
her request for a review hearing in the trial court. And the
trial courts determination that her children require a
finalization of these proceedings and would be best served by
placement together and that further delay in finalizing their
placement in a permanent home would be detrimental to their best
interests is well supported by the record. There was evidence
provided during the CINA proceedings by the guardian ad litem,
OCS social workers, and the childrens foster parents detailing
the many years that the children have been in foster care, Earls
difficulty in transitioning to a new home, Earls desire to be
permanently placed with his brothers, and Herb and Roans foster
parents interest in adopting all three children. We therefore
agree that it was in the childrens best interests to finalize the
CINA proceedings.21
V. CONCLUSION
Because the superior court did not abuse its discretion
in denying Laras motion for a review hearing to vacate her
voluntary relinquishment of her parental rights, we AFFIRM the
superior courts order.
_______________________________
1 We adopt the pseudonyms used by the parties to protect
the family members privacy.
2 Both Don and Ron relinquished their parental rights in
June 2007. The termination of their parental rights is not at
issue in this case.
3 See Alden H. v. State, Office of Childrens Servs., 108
P.3d 224, 228 (Alaska 2005) (A finding that a party failed to
show good cause that a [Rita T. v. State, 623 P.2d 344 (Alaska
1981)] hearing should be held is reviewed for abuse of
discretion.); C.L. v. P.C.S., 17 P.3d 769, 772 (Alaska 2001)
(reviewing the superior courts finding of good cause to deviate
from the placement preferences of the Indian Child Welfare Act
for abuse of discretion).
4 Monzingo v. Alaska Air Group, Inc., 112 P.3d 655, 659
(Alaska 2005).
5 Ch. 64, 17, 67, SLA 2005. The statute took effect
immediately on June 30, 2005. Id.
6 Alden H., 108 P.3d 224; Rita T., 623 P.2d 344.
7 623 P.2d at 345-46.
8 Id. at 347.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 108 P.3d at 226.
12 Id. at 231.
13 Id. at 232-33.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 233.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 232.
18 Id. at 232-33.
19 Although Cook Inlet Tribal Council recommended only
intensive outpatient treatment, in contrast to the two prior
recommendations that Lara complete ninety days of residential
treatment, it is undisputed that Lara was not truthful about her
prior drug use during Cook Inlet Tribal Councils assessment.
20 623 P.2d 344, 347 (Alaska 1981).
21 Lara further asserts that providing a hearing is
[a]rguably . . . the minimal due process that the legislature
intended when drafting AS 47.10.089(h) and that it would not have
been burdensome for the trial court to afford her a hearing. But
in adopting AS 47.10.089(h), the legislature unambiguously
conveyed its intention that a review hearing be held only upon a
showing of good cause. Lara did not make that showing.
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