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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Adkins v. Stansel (04/10/2009) sp-6360
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage,
Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
| CHET ADKINS, | ) |
| ) Supreme Court No. S- 13114 | |
| Appellant, | ) |
| ) Superior Court No. 3AN-07- 11891 CI | |
| v. | ) |
| ) O P I N I O N | |
| ) | |
| KARL STANSEL, Individually and as | ) No. 6360 - April 10, 2009 |
| Assistant Warden of Florence | ) |
| Correctional Center, | ) |
| ) | |
| Appellee. | ) |
| ) | |
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State
of Alaska, Third Judicial District,
Anchorage, Sharon L. Gleason, Judge.
Appearances: Chet Adkins, Appellant. Craig
S. Howard, Richmond & Quinn, Anchorage, for
Appellee.
Before: Fabe, Chief Justice, Matthews,
Eastaugh, Carpeneti, and Winfree, Justices.
WINFREE, Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
An Alaska prisoner in a private Arizona prison facility
sued a prison official for allegedly violating his constitutional
rights by denying visitation with a relative who had traveled
from Alaska. The superior court dismissed the suit for failure
to state a cause of action upon which relief might be granted,
stating that an isolated incident which prevented visitation due
to an acknowledged oversight by prison officials is not a
Constitutional violation under Alaska law. Because the prisoners
complaint must be read to allege an intentional rather than a
mistaken denial of visitation, it was error to dismiss the suit
on the basis that the prison officials action was mere mistake.
We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Chet Adkins is an Alaska prisoner incarcerated in a
private Arizona correctional facility operated by Corrections
Corporation of America (CCA). In November 2005 Adkinss cousin,
James Guinn, contacted Adkins about visiting the prison during an
upcoming trip Guinn and his wife were making from Bethel to
Denver, Colorado. Guinn then scheduled a visit with Adkins
through CCA employee Karl Stansel, an assistant warden at the
Arizona facility. The Guinns arrived at the prison as scheduled
but were denied access to Adkins, and visitation did not occur.
Adkins wrote a letter to the prison warden complaining
of the incident and asking that: (1) an apology be extended to
the Guinns; (2) the Guinns be reimbursed for their time and
expense in traveling to Arizona for the failed visit; and (3) CCA
[u]ndertake a thorough and unflinching examination of [the
prisons] policies and possible cultural prejudices toward the
family and community ties of prisoner[s]. In reply the warden
apologized to Adkins but stated he was unable to approve the
reimbursement request, characterizing the incident as a
miscommunication . . . between the supervisors and an unfortunate
oversight on our part.
Adkins filed a prison grievance, seeking: (1) monetary
compensation to the Guinns for their time and expenses in
attempting to visit Adkins; and (2) compensatory and punitive
damages to Adkins for violation of his constitutional right to
rehabilitation and for breach of CCAs and Stansels fiduciary
obligations to protect his rights. The State of Alaska,
Department of Corrections (DOC) denied Adkinss grievance,
referring to the unfortunate incident as an oversight and noting
that the warden has apologized . . . for the mistake. The Office
of the Commissioner of DOC upheld the denial of the appeal,
stating that [a]n error was made, apologies have been given, and
assurances have been extended to try to prevent a reoccurrence of
the problem.
Adkins then sued Stansel in his personal and official
capacities, alleging Stansel violated Adkinss right to
rehabilitation, as provided by the Alaska State Constitution and
breached his fiduciary duty to protect Adkinss constitutional
right to rehabilitation. Attached to Adkinss verified complaint
were: (1) his letter to the warden; (2) the wardens response;
(3) his grievance; (4) DOCs denial of his grievance; and (5) the
DOC Commissioners Offices denial of his appeal.
Stansel filed a motion to dismiss, conceding the
incident of failed visitation but arguing that no relief could be
granted. Stansel asserted that he owed Adkins no relevant
fiduciary duty and that one inadvertent isolated incident [of
failed visitation] stemming from a miscommunication does not rise
to the level of a constitutional violation [of the right to
rehabilitation].
In opposition to the dismissal motion, Adkins clarified
that his suit was based solely on his constitutional right to
rehabilitation under article I, section 12 of the Alaska
Constitution.1 Adkins stressed the importance of visitation to a
prisoners rehabilitation efforts, noting that even an isolated
denial of visitation is important when visitation opportunities
are infrequent. Adkins stated that through affidavit testimony
he could establish the denied visitations adverse impact on his
familys willingness to attempt subsequent visitations.
The superior court granted Stansels motion to dismiss
Adkinss suit. The court did not directly address Adkinss
fiduciary duty claim, presumably considering it a part of Adkinss
constitutional claim, but concluded that an isolated incident
which prevented visitation due to an acknowledged oversight by
prison officials is not a Constitutional violation under Alaska
law.
Adkins appeals the dismissal of his constitutional
claim.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo decisions granting or denying motions
to dismiss.2 We have explained that: [i]f, within the framework
of the complaint, evidence may be introduced which will sustain a
grant of relief to the plaintiff, the complaint is sufficient.
We must presume all factual allegations of the complaint to be
true and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-
moving party.3 Because motions to dismiss are disfavored, [a]
complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim
unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no
set of facts that would entitle him or her to relief.4 Even if
the relief demanded is unavailable, the claim should not be
dismissed as long as some relief might be available on the basis
of the alleged facts.5
Pleadings of pro se litigants are held to less stringent
standards than those of lawyers.6 When the essence of a pro se
litigants argument is easily discerned from the briefing, the
trial court should consider that argument when the applicable law
is well established and the opposing party would not be
prejudiced by consideration of the issues raised.7
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Constitutional Background
Article I, section 12 of the Alaska Constitution
provides prisoners a fundamental rehabilitation right.8 In
Brandon v. State, Department of Corrections we recognized that a
prisoners right to visitation is an important component of the
fundamental right to rehabilitation,9 but we declined to define
the required scope or possible limitations of the right to
visitation, leaving that for future adjudications.10 In Larson v.
Cooper we upheld a prisons security-based policy prohibiting
physical contact between prisoners and visitors other than a
short embrace upon initial contact and again upon departure, 11
concluding that reasonable limits on contact visitation for
prisoners were within the sound discretion of prison
administrators and did not violate the constitutional right to
rehabilitation.12 We also held that temporary suspension of
contact visitation as a form of discipline does not violate the
constitutional right to rehabilitation,13 noting that temporary
and non-arbitrary withdrawals of visitation privileges are
accepted methods of prison discipline.14
In Rathke v. Corrections Corp. of America we held that
an Alaska prisoner housed in an Arizona CCA prison had the right
to bring certain constitutional claims against CCA and its
employees.15 Although federal law allows direct tort actions for
some violations of the federal constitution, we have not
recognized a private right of action for damages based on a
violation of the Alaska Constitution.16 We have indicated only
that we will not recognize such a remedy if the constitutional
violation is not flagrant or if alternative remedies exist.17
B. Adkinss Complaint
Adkins alleged in his complaint that: (1) the Guinns
wanted to visit him during a trip from Bethel to Denver; (2)
Stansel approved the visit and the Guinns were on Adkinss
approved visitor list; (3) the Guinns took the time and incurred
the expense to detour through Arizona to visit Adkins; and (4)
the Guinns arrived at the prison to visit Adkins but were turned
away. Adkins alleged that [p]roviding the State and Federal
rights of its detainees is an operating expense that reduces
profits. Adkins also alleged that CCA has complete control over
the circumstances and conditions of confinement at the Arizona
prison. Adkins described his letter to the warden and the
response he received as well as the grievance he filed regarding
the incident; he attached copies of relevant documents to his
complaint.
Adkinss attached letter to the prison warden contained
the following statement:
What compounds this [denial of visitation
rights] is that it is not an isolated
incident. It is only the latest in a string
of events, which taken separately can
reasonably be explained away. Together, I
feel they demonstrate a disturbing
indifference toward the family and community
ties of those in your care and custody.
Adkinss letter also referred to a systemic lack of concern for
prisoners family ties and suggested possible cultural prejudices,
citing as examples the rescheduling of the prisons Native
Potlatch and Black History Month celebrations. Adkinss letter
asserted that moving the celebrations from weekends to weekdays
made relatives participation more difficult. Adkinss letter also
referred to a specific denial of requested contact-visitation
with his son, who was about to be re-deployed to Iraq.
Adkins concluded his complaint by asserting that the
facts sufficiently demonstrated Stansel had violated his
constitutional right to rehabilitation. Adkins requested
compensatory and punitive damages and [o]ther such relief as the
Court deems just and proper.
C. Stansels Dismissal Motion and Arguments on Appeal
In the superior court Stansel acknowledged that
visitation is an important component of a prisoners
constitutional right to rehabilitation. Stansel then pointed out
that limited withdrawal of visitation privileges for disciplinary
purposes is an acceptable limitation on the constitutional right
to rehabilitation and extrapolated that one inadvertent isolated
incident stemming from a miscommunication does not rise to the
level of a constitutional violation.18
Citing Brandon19 for the proposition that visitation is
a critical element of a prisoners constitutional right to
rehabilitation, Adkins argued in his opposition to Stansels
motion to dismiss that: (1) even small amounts of visitation are
important to a prisoners rehabilitation; (2) visitation
opportunities for Alaska prisoners housed in Arizona are
infrequent; and (3) he could establish through affidavit
testimony that the Guinns decided not to make additional trips to
the prison to try to see Adkins because of the incident. Adkins
concluded that any impingement on visitation has a corrosive
effect on the relationships upon which a prisoners success after
release is proven to depend. At no point did Adkins concede the
failed visitation was the result of a mere mistake.
As noted the superior court granted the dismissal
motion, stating that an isolated incident which prevented
visitation due to an acknowledged oversight by prison officials
is not a Constitutional violation under Alaska law.
On appeal Adkins maintains he should be given the
opportunity to prove that Stansels actions were more than mere
negligence and to show a pattern of conduct regarding visitation
denials for Alaska prisoners in the Arizona CCA facility.
Stansel maintains the denial of the Guinns visitation with Adkins
resulted from an admittedly inadvertent miscommunication and that
the single mistaken denial of visitation cannot be the foundation
of a claim that Adkinss constitutional right to rehabilitation
was violated.
D. Disposition of Appeal
Viewing Adkinss complaint (with its attachments20) in
the light most favorable to him, and taking into account that
Adkins is a pro se litigant, we conclude Adkins alleged (1) an
intentional and unjustified denial of visitation motivated by
CCAs concern about costs, and (2) that this denial was part of a
pattern of conduct showing deliberate indifference to the
visitation rights of Adkins and other Alaska prisoners housed in
Arizona. We do not express an opinion on whether these
allegations of intentional misconduct provide a basis for
injunctive, declarative, or monetary relief under the state
constitution this was not raised either in the superior court or
on appeal.21
We do conclude it was error to dismiss Adkinss
constitutional claim at the pleading stage on the rationale that
the failed visitation was the result of mere mistake rather than
of intentional misconduct. Adkins never alleged or conceded that
Stansel made a mistake. Although Adkins attached to his
complaint copies of communications from prison and DOC officials
in which persons other than Stansel stated in conclusory fashion
that the failed visitation was the result of a mistake by
unidentified supervisors, those conclusory and unsupported
statements are insufficient to demonstrate that Stansel actually
made a mistake and cannot be used against Adkins in that manner
to support a motion to dismiss.22
It may be that denial of the Guinns visitation with
Adkins was the result of a mere mistake by Stansel. It may be
that an inadvertent and isolated denial of visitation, even when
visitation is a rare commodity for Alaska prisoners in Arizona
prisons, cannot be a violation of a prisoners constitutional
right to rehabilitation redressable by injunctive, declaratory,
or monetary relief. These conclusions might be reached upon a
summary judgment motion in which Stansel presents sufficient
admissible and uncontradicted evidence to prove he made a mere
mistake that was not part of a pattern of visitation denials to
Alaska prisoners held in the Arizona prison. These conclusions
cannot be reached on Adkinss pleadings alone, and therefore
Stansels motion to dismiss should not have been granted.23
V. CONCLUSION
We REVERSE the superior courts dismissal of Adkinss
constitutional claim and REMAND for proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
_______________________________
1 Article I, 12 provides in relevant part, Criminal
administration shall be based upon the following: the need for
protecting the public, community condemnation of the offender,
the rights of victims of crimes, restitution from the offender,
and the principle of reformation.
2 Varilek v. City of Houston, 104 P.3d 849, 851 (Alaska
2004).
3 Belluomini v. Fred Meyer of Alaska, Inc., 993 P.2d
1009, 1014 (Alaska 1999) (quoting Kollodge v. State, 757 P.2d
1024, 1026 (Alaska 1988) (internal punctuation omitted)).
4 Catholic Bishop of N. Alaska v. Does 1-6, 141 P.3d 719,
722 (Alaska 2006).
5 Miller v. Johnson, 370 P.2d 171, 172 (Alaska 1962).
6 Rathke v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 153 P.3d 303, 308-09
(Alaska 2007).
7 Id. at 309.
8 Abraham v. State, 585 P.2d 526, 531-33 (Alaska 1978).
9 938 P.2d 1029, 1032 n.2 (Alaska 1997).
10 Id.
11 90 P.3d 125, 126 (Alaska 2004).
12 Id. at 133-34.
13 Id. at 135.
14 Id. at 135-36 (citing Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126
(2003)).
15 153 P.3d 303, 309.
16 Lowell v. Hayes, 117 P.3d 745, 753 (Alaska 2005); Thoma
v. Hickel, 947 P.2d 816, 824 n.5 (Alaska 1997) (Direct tort
actions for violation of certain provisions of the federal
constitution have been recognized. The leading case is Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics [403
U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971)]. We have neither
adopted nor rejected the Bivens approach with respect to state
constitutional violations. (citations omitted)).
17 Lowell, 117 P.3d at 753 (quoting Dick Fischer Dev. No.
2 v. State,Dept of Admin., 838 P.2d 263, 268 (Alaska 1992)).
18 Stansel did not suggest that the denial of the Guinns
visit with Adkins was pursuant to a prison policy or for any
purpose legitimate to the proper functioning and administration
of a correctional facility.
19 938 P.2d 1029, 1032 n.2 (stating that visitation
privileges are an important component of a prisoners
constitutional right to rehabilitation).
20 Attachments to a complaint are properly considered a
part of the complaint in connection with a motion to dismiss.
Kaiser v. Umialik Ins., 108 P.3d 876, 878 n.1 (Alaska 2005).
21 We do note that we have consistently stated a plaintiff
would have to show both a flagrant constitutional violation and
the unavailability of other remedies to establish a claim for
damages based on a constitutional violation. Lowell, 117 P.3d at
753 (quoting Dick Fischer Dev. No. 2, 838 P.2d at 268); see also
Peoples v. CCA Det. Ctrs., 422 F.3d 1090, 1101 (10th Cir. 2005)
(en banc) (holding that there is no implied private right of
action for damages under Bivens against employees of a private
prison for alleged constitutional deprivations when alternative
state or federal causes of action for damages are available to
the plaintiff and reasoning that [s]uch a claim is therefore
properly dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6)). Thus, even if Adkins is
able to demonstrate that the denied visitation was not a mere
mistake but was intentional and part of a pattern of conduct, he
still may not have a claim for damages based on a constitutional
violation.
22 Cf. Odom v. Fairbanks Mem. Hosp., 999 P.2d 123, 130-31
(Alaska 2000) (affirming grant of motion to dismiss physicians
defamation claim based on allegedly false report to a medical
data bank when allegations of and attachment to complaint
unequivocally demonstrated facial truth of the report).
23 Our resolution of this appeal does not bar Stansel from
again moving to dismiss Adkinss claims for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, but the motion must be
based on our stated interpretation of Adkinss complaint. Alaska
R. Civ. P. 12(g), (h)(2).
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