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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Keller v. French (04/03/2009) sp-6352
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage,
Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
| REPRESENTATIVE WES KELLER; | ) |
| REPRESENTATIVE MIKE KELLY; | ) Supreme Court No. S- 13296 |
| SENATOR FRED DYSON; | ) |
| SENATOR TOM WAGONER; and | ) Superior Court No. 3AN-08-10489 CI |
| REPRESENTATIVE BOB LYNN, | ) |
| ) O P I N I O N | |
| Appellants, | ) |
| ) No. 6352 April 3, 2009 | |
| v. | ) |
| ) | |
| SENATOR HOLLIS FRENCH; | ) |
| SENATOR KIM ELTON; STEPHEN | ) |
| E. BRANCHFLOWER; ALASKA | ) |
| LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL; | ) |
| SENATOR LYDA GREEN; SENATE | ) |
| JUDICIARY COMMITTEE; DIANNE | ) |
| KIESEL; ANNETTE KREITZER; | ) |
| JANICE MASON; NICKI NEAL; | ) |
| MICHAEL NIZICH; KRISTINA | ) |
| PERRY; and BRAD THOMPSON, | ) |
| ) | |
| Appellees. | ) |
| ) | |
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State
of Alaska, Third Judicial District,
Anchorage, Peter A. Michalski, Judge.
Appearances: Kevin G. Clarkson, Brena, Bell &
Clarkson, P.C., Anchorage, Kelly J.
Shackelford, Hiram S. Sasser III, and Roger
Byron, Liberty Legal Institute, Plano, Texas,
and Scott R. Hoyt, Ashley E. Johnson, and
Malachi O. Boyuls, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher,
Dallas, Texas, for Appellants. Peter J.
Maassen, Ingaldson, Maassen & Fitzgerald,
P.C., Anchorage, for Appellees Senator Hollis
French, Senator Kim Elton, Stephen E.
Branchflower, Alaska Legislative Council,
Senator Lyda Green, and Senate Judiciary
Committee. Wayne Anthony Ross, Ross & Miner,
P.C., Anchorage, for Amicus Curiae Law
Professors and Legal Scholars.
Before: Matthews, Eastaugh, Carpeneti, and
Winfree, Justices. [Fabe, Chief Justice, not
participating.]
EASTAUGH, Justice.
WINFREE, Justice, with whom CARPENETI,
Justice, joins, concurring.
I. INTRODUCTION
Claiming that a legislative investigation into the
governors dismissal of the Public Safety Commissioner violated
the Alaska Constitutions fair and just treatment clause, five
legislators sued two other legislators, a permanent legislative
committee, and the investigator to halt the investigation. The
five legislators argue on appeal that the superior court erred in
denying their motion for a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction, in reasoning that there was no
justiciable dispute, and in dismissing their complaint. We
affirmed in a highly expedited dispositive order issued October
9, 2008. This opinion explains why we did so. We hold that the
five legislators did not have standing to claim in this case that
there was a violation of the fair and just treatment clause.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Governor Sarah Palin dismissed Public Safety
Commissioner Walter Monegan on July 11, 2008. On July 28 the
Alaska Legislative Council, a bipartisan,1 permanent interim
committee of the Alaska Legislature,2 initiated an investigation
into the dismissal. The Legislative Council unanimously passed a
motion approving funds to contract[] for legal services to
investigate the circumstances and events surrounding [Monegans
termination], and potential abuses of power and/or improper
actions by members of the executive branch, and prepare a report.3
The motion also directed that the investigation be professional,
unbiased, independent, objective, and conducted at arms length
from the political process. The full legislature was in session
when the Legislative Council passed its motion on July 28, and
all members of the Legislative Council attended the meeting at
which the motion was passed.
The Legislative Council, chaired by Senator Kim Elton,
chose Senator Hollis French to act as the investigations project
director. Former state prosecutor Stephen Branchflower was
selected as the independent investigator. Branchflower was
originally expected to produce a report to be released on October
31, 2008, but the release date was later changed to October 10.
On August 29 Governor Palin was named as the vice-
presidential running mate to Republican presidential nominee
Senator John McCain.
On September 16 five state legislators4 filed a
superior court complaint against Senator French, Senator Elton,
Branchflower, and the Alaska Legislative Council. We refer to the
plaintiff legislators as the Keller plaintiffs. Their complaint,
filed in Case No. 3AN-08-10489 CI, asserted that the defendants
were conducting a McCarthyistic investigation and sought
declaratory and injunctive relief. The Keller plaintiffs claimed
that the investigation exceeded the legislatures power and
unconstitutionally violated separation of powers principles;
unlawfully exceeded the authority granted to the Legislative
Council by motion; violated the due process clause of the Alaska
Constitution; and violated statutory prohibitions related to
conflicts of interest and unethical conduct.
The defendants responded on September 24 with a motion
to dismiss. On September 25 the Keller plaintiffs moved for a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to stop
the investigation immediately.
Also on September 25, seven state employees who had
been subpoenaed in the investigation to appear before the Senate
Judiciary Committee commenced a separate lawsuit, Case No. 3AN-08-
10780 CI, challenging the validity of their subpoenas.5 We refer
to these plaintiffs as the Kiesel plaintiffs. They sued the
subpoenas in rem and Senator French, Senator Lyda Green, and the
Senate Judiciary Committee.
The superior court consolidated the two lawsuits.
After conducting an October 2 hearing on the Keller
plaintiffs temporary restraining order, the superior court ruled
that the claims of the Keller and Kiesel plaintiffs raised
nonjusticiable political questions, denied the motion for
injunctive relief, and dismissed both complaints.
On October 3 the Keller plaintiffs filed their appeal
in this court and asked us to expedite the appeal. They sought
an appellate decision by October 9, 2008, one day before
Branchflower was then expected to release the results of the
investigation. The Kiesel plaintiffs filed notice with us that
they would not participate in the appeal. The active appellees
in this appeal are Senator French, Senator Elton, Branchflower,
and the Legislative Council (the defendants in the Keller
lawsuit) and Senator Green and the Senate Judiciary Committee
(two of the defendants in the Kiesel lawsuit).6 We refer to the
active appellees collectively as the French defendants.
Also on October 3 we granted the Keller plaintiffs
motion for an expedited appeal. The parties submitted highly
expedited briefs.7 The Keller plaintiffs argued that the
investigation violated the fair and just treatment clause of the
Alaska Constitution.8 They contended that three people involved
with the investigation were or appeared to be biased and that the
investigation violated the legislatures own internal rules. The
Keller plaintiffs asked us to grant a temporary restraining order
and to remand for an evidentiary hearing on their motion for a
preliminary injunction and for a trial on the merits.
We heard oral argument on October 8. On October 9, we
issued a dispositive order stating:
Appellants are six legislators who claim
that the Alaska Legislative Councils
investigation into the dismissal of Public
Safety Commissioner Walter Monegan is
unlawful and should be enjoined. The
superior court denied the appellants Motion
for Temporary Restraining Order and granted
the Motion to Dismiss submitted by the Alaska
Legislative Council and the other defendants.
At the request of the appellants for a
decision no later than today, October 9,
2008, we heard the appeal on an expedited
basis. On consideration of the October 6,
2008 appellants brief, the October 6, 2008
amicus curiae brief, the October 7, 2008
appellees brief, and the oral argument held
on October 8, 2008,
It is Ordered: The order of the superior
court issued on October 2, 2008 granting the
Motion to Dismiss is Affirmed. An opinion
will follow.[9]
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether a party has standing to sue is a question of
law that we review de novo.10
IV. DISCUSSION
The parties have focused on two main issues, either of
which is potentially dispositive: (1) whether the Keller
plaintiffs have standing to bring this suit; and (2) whether, as
the superior court held, the entire dispute is not justiciable.
Our resolution of the standing issue makes it unnecessary to
reach the other issue.
A. Whether the Keller Plaintiffs Have Standing To
Challenge the French Defendants Alleged Constitutional
Violation
Standing is a rule of judicial self-restraint based on
the principle that courts should not resolve abstract questions
or issue advisory opinions.11 The Keller plaintiffs argue that
they have both citizen-taxpayer and interest-injury standing to
file suit. The superior court assumed without deciding that the
Keller plaintiffs had standing.12
1. Citizen-taxpayer standing
1. To establish citizen-taxpayer standing, plaintiffs must show
that the case is of public significance and that they are
appropriate plaintiffs.13 We have held that a plaintiff was not
appropriate when the plaintiff was a sham plaintiff with no true
adversity of interest; when the plaintiff was incapable of
competently advocating his or her position; and when there was
another potential plaintiff more directly affected by the
challenged conduct who had sued or was likely to sue.14
We agree with the Keller plaintiffs that they were not
sham plaintiffs and that they were capable of competently
advocating their positions. And we assume, without deciding,
that an alleged violation of the fair and just treatment clause
is a matter of public significance. But there is nonetheless a
substantial question here as to whether other persons who are
more directly affected have sued or are likely to sue.
The Keller plaintiffs argue that no other potential
plaintiffs who are more directly affected have sued or are likely
to sue. At a minimum, this argument ignores the Kiesel
plaintiffs, who were more directly affected by the investigation
and who actually sued some of the French defendants. As the
subpoenaed witnesses, the Kiesel plaintiffs were among the
classes of persons in this investigation most obviously protected
by the fair and just treatment clause. They did not allege any
violation of the fair and just treatment clause in the superior
court. But had they thought they were being mistreated, they
would have been far more appropriate plaintiffs to make that
claim than the Keller plaintiffs, none of whom self-identified as
either a witness or a target of the investigation. We have held
that an appellant did not have citizen-taxpayer standing when a
more directly affected plaintiff had already filed suit based on
closely related claims, even though the claims were not
identical.15 We likewise reject the Keller plaintiffs argument
that no other plaintiffs more directly affected by the challenged
conduct have sued.
In addition to the subpoenaed plaintiffs, as of
October 9 when we issued our dispositive order there was at least
one other potential plaintiff who was directly affected by the
investigation and who was fully capable of suing. The Keller
plaintiffs concede that Governor Palin was arguably more directly
concerned, but argue that she is unlikely to sue. They argue
that the governor stated that she would cooperate with the
investigation, and that this, along with the fact that she was in
the middle of a national election campaign, indicated that she
was not going to bring suit.16 Their interpretation of the
citizen-taxpayer standing test is too literal. Even if the
governor did not intend to sue, there is no indication that, if
she thought her rights were being violated, she would be unable
to do so. The Keller plaintiffs do not contend that the governor
or any other potential plaintiffs were somehow limited in their
ability to sue. That individuals who are more directly affected
have chosen not to sue despite their ability to do so does not
confer citizen-taxpayer standing on an inappropriate plaintiff.
We have denied citizen-taxpayer standing on similar
grounds before. In Kleven v. Yukon-Koyukuk School District a
former employee who filed a grievance but resigned before it was
resolved sued to challenge his former employers grievance
process.17 We held that the employee lacked citizen-taxpayer
standing because the remaining employees were in a better
position to raise the complaints and because we had no reason to
believe that current . . . employees would be indisposed to press
legitimate grievances.18 That decision did not hinge on the
likelihood that the current employees would sue. Here there is
no reason to believe that any potentially implicated executive
branch officials, including the governor, would be unwilling to
sue if they thought their rights were being violated during the
investigation. We therefore reject the Keller plaintiffs
argument that no other plaintiff more directly affected by the
challenged conduct is likely to sue.
Comparing other potential parties claims with those of
the Keller plaintiffs reveals how indirectly, if at all, the
investigation affected the Keller plaintiffs. The fair and just
treatment clause was written to avoid the excesses which [the
delegates] felt were characterized by the conduct of Senator
Joseph McCarthy, including vilification, character assassination,
and an intimation of guilt by association.19 Witnesses in the
investigation, targets of the investigation, or any executive
branch employee potentially implicated in Monegans dismissal
could have been appropriate plaintiffs in an action to enforce
the constitutions protection.20 Such persons would be in a
position to be vilified, have their characters assassinated, or
be found guilty by association during an investigation that was
not fair and just. But there is no indication the Keller
plaintiffs might personally be exposed to any such abuses of
legislative power; they do not claim that they were potential
witnesses or investigative targets, or that the investigation
would somehow implicate them in Monegans dismissal.
As the French defendants argue, it appears the Keller
plaintiffs are attempting to assert the individual rights of
potential or imaginary third parties. We have never before
allowed citizen-taxpayer standing to be used in this way. The
Keller plaintiffs assert that we did so in State v. Planned
Parenthood of Alaska.21 But we did not discuss citizen-taxpayer
standing in that case. Instead, we held that the plaintiffs had
interest-injury standing and third-party standing, both of which
are distinct from citizen-taxpayer standing.22
As we have noted before, [g]enerally, a litigant lacks
standing to assert the constitutional rights of another.23 We
have recognized third-party standing, but not citizen-taxpayer
standing, as an exception to this rule.24 The Keller plaintiffs
do not rely on third-party standing, but invoke citizen-taxpayer
standing in attempting to achieve the same result. We decline to
allow the use of citizen-taxpayer standing as a substitute for
third-party standing here.
2. Interest-injury standing
The Keller plaintiffs alternatively argue that they had
interest-injury standing to sue. To establish interest-injury
standing plaintiffs must demonstrate that they have a sufficient
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy25 and an interest
which is adversely affected by the complained-of conduct.26 The
degree of the injury need not be great: an identifiable trifle is
sufficient to establish standing to fight out a question of
principle.27 The Keller plaintiffs contend that their complaint
articulates an identifiable trifle sufficient to confer
standing, but they do not specify what their actual injury was.
In a section of their brief unrelated to the issue of
standing, the Keller plaintiffs contend that they and Alaskans
face damaged reputations if the investigation continues. They do
not develop this argument further, and in oral argument on appeal
asserted only that they had citizen-taxpayer standing. It is not
self-evident that the investigation was likely to cause the
Keller plaintiffs any sort of harm, nor was the nature of any
possible harm so self-evident that we must take judicial notice
of it. Any claim of interest-injury standing based on
reputational harm is not adequately briefed and is therefore
waived on appeal.28
The Keller plaintiffs also seem to argue that they have
interest-injury standing because the subpoenaed plaintiffs in the
consolidated case had interest-injury standing. But the standing
of the Kiesel plaintiffs does not confer standing on the Keller
plaintiffs. Each partys standing is evaluated independently, and
one partys standing does not confer standing on another.29
Because the Keller plaintiffs allege no plausible injury to their
own interests, they lack interest-injury standing.
Given the Keller plaintiffs lack of standing to bring
this suit, we do not consider whether it was error for the
superior court to hold that the Keller plaintiffs complaint
raises nonjusticiable political questions.
V. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the superior courts denial of the Keller
plaintiffs motion for a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction, and its grant of the French defendants
motion to dismiss.
WINFREE, Justice, with whom CARPENETI, Justice, joins,
concurring.
I write separately to emphasize two separate but
intertwining aspects of my support for the courts decision.
The constitutional right to fair and just treatment
during a legislative investigation is a personal right. The
court expressly notes that without a basis for third-party
standing, as in this case, a litigant generally lacks standing to
assert the personal constitutional rights of another. This
strongly suggests to me that although the potential violation of
an individuals personal constitutional rights may be a matter of
great interest to the public, at least when the individual is the
governor, it is not a matter of public significance upon which
citizen-taxpayer standing may be grounded. Our cases granting
citizen-taxpayer standing have involved matters affecting rights
and interests beyond a single individual.1 The matters in this
case do not reach the level of public significance justifying
citizen-taxpayer standing for the Keller plaintiffs; that others
are in a better position to bring suit simply confirms my view.
The Keller plaintiffs oblique connection to the
constitutional right to fair and just treatment suggests yet
another reason to deny citizen-taxpayer standing. In contrast to
the Kiesel plaintiffs case, the core of the Keller plaintiffs
case does not really concern the protection of individual rights
it concerns a dispute between legislators, in their official
capacities, about the power and authority of the Legislative
Council and how legislative investigations should be conducted.
This dispute raises legitimate and important questions, but we
have long made clear our aversion to court involvement in
internal disputes of the legislature.2 We have stated that
courts may intervene to protect against the legislatures
infringement of personal rights,3 but common sense suggests that
intervention must be at the instance of one whose individual
rights may be violated, not at the instance of legislators who
oppose their colleagues use of legislative power. Concluding
otherwise and recognizing citizen-taxpayer standing under these
circumstances would allow an exception to swallow our rule of
declining to decide political questions arising from internal
legislative disputes.
_______________________________
1 The Legislative Council consists of seven
representatives and seven senators. Ten are Republicans; four
are Democrats.
2 AS 24.20.010.020.
3 A unanimous vote is a vote in which every voter
concurs. Blacks Law Dictionary 1607 (8th ed. 2004). Either
eleven or twelve of the councils fourteen members voted to
approve the motion. No members voted against it. The two or
three remaining members were present at the meeting but
apparently did not vote.
4 These five legislators are Representatives Wes Keller,
Mike Kelly, and Bob Lynn, and Senators Fred Dyson and Tom
Wagoner. Plaintiffs moved in the superior court to file an
amended complaint that would include Representative Carl Gatto as
a party, but the superior court did not rule on the motion. It
was not clear to the court when we issued our dispositive order
that Representative Gatto should not be treated as an appellant.
Our dispositive order counted Representative Gatto and included
him in the caption. We have corrected the caption here.
5 The seven state employees who sued are Dianne Kiesel,
Annette Kreitzer, Janice Mason, Nicki Neal, Michael Nizich,
Kristina Perry, and Brad Thompson.
6 The Kiesel plaintiffs are automatically classified in
this appeal as appellees per Alaska Appellate Rule 204(g). But
in this opinion we use appellees to refer only to the individuals
and legislative entities sued in personam in the consolidated
cases. The seven employees later filed their own separate
appeal, Case No. S-13322. That appeal is pending.
7 We commend the parties and their counsel for the
excellence of their briefs and arguments, for their procedural
cooperation, and for the assistance they have given this court.
8 Article I, section 7 of the Alaska Constitution
provides: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law. The right of all persons
to fair and just treatment in the course of legislative and
executive investigations shall not be infringed. (Emphasis
added.) The emphasized text is commonly referred to as the fair
and just treatment clause.
9 Keller v. French, 194 P.3d 364 (Alaska 2008).
10 St. Paul Church, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Alaska
Missionary Conference of the United Methodist Church, Inc., 145
P.3d 541, 549-50 (Alaska 2006).
11 Ruckle v. Anchorage Sch. Dist., 85 P.3d 1030, 1034
(Alaska 2004).
12 The Keller plaintiffs state that [t]he superior court
correctly found that Appellants[] have standing to assert[] their
claims. But the superior court actually resolved the case while
[a]ssuming that the plaintiffs have standing to assert such
claims. (Emphasis added.)
13 Trustees for Alaska v. State, 736 P.2d 324, 329 (Alaska
1987).
14 Id. at 329-30.
15 Ruckle, 85 P.3d at 1034-37 (holding that superior court
did not err in concluding plaintiff lacked citizen-taxpayer
standing because another plaintiff more directly affected had
already brought suit raising nearly identical claims).
16 The final brief was submitted October 7 and oral
argument took place October 8. We issued our dispositive order
October 9, 2008. Keller v. French, 194 P.3d 364 (Alaska 2008).
The election took place November 4, 2008.
17 Kleven v. Yukon-Koyukuk Sch. Dist., 853 P.2d 518, 526
(Alaska 1993); see also State v. Lewis, 559 P.2d 630, 635 (Alaska
1977) (holding that party had taxpayer standing in part because
there is no one in a better position to complain of the
constitutional violations alleged here). But see Trustees for
Alaska, 736 P.2d at 330 (holding that party had standing even
though more directly affected potential plaintiff could have sued
because that potential party ha[d] not sued nor [were] there any
indications that he plan[ned] to do so); Baxley v. State, 958
P.2d 422, 429 (Alaska 1998) (The mere possibility that another
party might sue, however, does not necessarily justify a denial
of standing.).
18 Kleven, 853 P.2d at 526.
19 OLeary v. Superior Court, Third Jud. Dist., 816 P.2d
163, 172 (Alaska 1991).
20 Even though the Keller plaintiffs fault the
investigation in part because it fails to identify specific
targets other than the governor, this does not mean, under the
circumstances of this case, that they should have standing. We
assume that any target revealed later during the investigations
course likewise would be fully capable of raising a claim of
constitutional abuse if they thought they were being treated
unfairly and unjustly under article 1, section 7.
21 State v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska, 35 P.3d 30, 34
(Alaska 2001).
22 Id. at 34. We held that physician-plaintiffs had
standing to challenge a statute that required minors seeking
abortions to first obtain parental consent. Id. In addition to
interest-injury standing, the physicians had standing on the
separate universally settled grounds that physicians have
standing to challenge abortion laws on behalf of prospective
patients. Id. We did not use the term third-party standing, but
cited to similar cases that based standing on third-party
standing analysis. Id.
23 State ex rel. Depts of Transp. & Labor v. Enserch
Alaska Constr., Inc., 787 P.2d 624, 630 n.9 (Alaska 1989) (citing
Falcon v. Alaska Pub. Offices Commn, 570 P.2d 469, 475 n.20
(Alaska 1977); Wagstaff v. Superior Court, 535 P.2d 1220, 1225
(Alaska 1975)).
24 Id. at 630 n.9 (citing Bonjour v. Bonjour, 592 P.2d
1233, 1241 n.15 (Alaska 1979) (holding that parent has standing
to assert childs constitutional rights); Falcon, 570 P.2d at 475
(holding that standing may be conferred on third party when
interested partys attempt to vindicate rights would forfeit these
very rights)); see also Gilbert M. v. State, 139 P.3d 581, 587
(Alaska 2006) (stating that we have . . . allowed third party
standing where a special relationship exists between the
plaintiff and the third party (internal citation omitted)).
25 Ruckle v. Anchorage Sch. Dist., 85 P.3d 1030, 1040
(Alaska 2004) (quoting Moore v. State, 553 P.2d 8, 23 (Alaska
1976)).
26 Alaskans for a Common Language, Inc. v. Kritz, 3 P.3d
906, 915 (Alaska 2000) (citing Trustees for Alaska v. State, 736
P.2d 324, 327 (Alaska 1987)).
27 Ruckle, 85 P.3d at 1040-41 (quoting Trustees for
Alaska, 736 P.2d at 327).
28 See Adamson v. Univ. of Alaska, 819 P.2d 886, 899 n.3
(Alaska 1991) ([W]here a point is given only a cursory statement
in the argument portion of a brief, the point will not be
considered on appeal. (internal citations omitted)).
29 See, e.g., State v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska, 35
P.3d 30, 34 (Alaska 2001) (evaluating as separate questions
whether two groups of plaintiffs had standing).
1 See Trustees for Alaska v. State, 736 P.2d 324, 328-29
(Alaska 1987) (and cases discussed therein); Baxley v. State, 958
P.2d 422, 428-29 (Alaska 1998); State v. Enserch Alaska
Construction, Inc., 787 P.2d 624, 630 (Alaska 1989).
2 Malone v. Meekins, 650 P.2d 351, 356, 359 (Alaska 1982)
(declining to intervene in dispute between legislators about
election of house officers, stating, among other things:
(1) although the judicial branch of government has the
constitutionally mandated duty to ensure compliance with the
provisions of the Alaska Constitution, including compliance by
the legislature. . . . we believe that a proper recognition of
the respective roles of the legislature and the judiciary
requires that the latter not intervene [in the internal
organization of the legislature] and (2) that except in
extraordinary circumstances, as where the rights of persons who
are not members of the legislature are involved, it is not the
function of the judiciary to require that the legislature follow
its own rules.); Abood v. Gorsuch, 703 P.2d 1158, 1164 (Alaska
1985) (affirming Malone v. Meekins holding regarding non-
justiciability of claims between legislators about violations of
legislative rules); Abood v. League of Women Voters of Alaska,
743 P.2d 333, 339 (Alaska 1987) (same, but reiterating that non-
justiciability would not bar review of claim that violation of
legislative rules infringed on the rights of a third party).
3 Abood v. League of Women Voters of Alaska, 743 P.2d at
339; Malone, 650 P.2d at 359.
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