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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Worland v. Worland (09/26/2008) sp-6313
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage,
Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
| CHARLES B. WORLAND, | ) |
| ) Supreme Court No. S- 12746 | |
| Appellant, | ) |
| ) Superior Court No. 3AN-05-05282 CI | |
| v. | ) |
| ) O P I N I O N | |
| JACQUELINE K. WORLAND, | ) |
| ) No. 6313 September 26, 2008 | |
| Appellee. | ) |
| ) | |
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State
of Alaska, Third Judicial District,
Anchorage, Craig F. Stowers, Judge.
Appearances: Herbert A. Viergutz, Law Office
of Herbert A. Viergutz, Anchorage, for
Appellant. Timothy P. Peters, Law Office of
Timothy P. Peters, LLC, Anchorage, for
Appellee.
Before: Fabe, Chief Justice, Matthews,
Eastaugh, Carpeneti, and Winfree, Justices.
FABE, Chief Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
Charles Worland appeals the superior courts enforcement
of his property settlement agreement with his former wife,
Jacqueline Worland. Charles argues that the parties settlement
conference failed to generate an accord and that therefore the
superior court should have granted his request to proceed to
trial. Charles also challenges the superior courts property
distribution and its decision to award attorneys fees to
Jacqueline. Because the parties reached an enforceable
settlement agreement on the division of their property, and
because Charles unreasonably protracted the implementation of
that agreement, we affirm the superior courts rulings in all
respects.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Jacqueline and Charles Worland, both Alaska residents,
married on March 20, 1982 in Herman, Minnesota. They have three
adult children. The Worlands separated on February 17, 2005, the
same day that Jacqueline filed her complaint for divorce. A
month later, Charles wrote an e-mail to Jacqueline from the
Persian Gulf state of Qatar, where he was working as a government
contractor. The e-mail assured Jacqueline that Charles would try
to make every effort to make this process as smooth as possible,
and proposed to split assets and liabilities up 50/50.
On February 24, 2006, the Worlands attended a
settlement conference with Superior Court Judge Craig F. Stowers.
The conference began on the record. The parties then negotiated
off the record for several hours before reconvening to
memorialize the agreement that they had reached.
Charles had traveled from Qatar for the settlement
conference and at the outset he complained that he had not had
the opportunity to look over the house and the property inside.
Charles voiced his suspicion that Jacqueline had made hefty
withdrawals from the joint account maintained by the couple. And
he disagreed with Jacqueline regarding the ownership rights to a
1991 Ford Explorer.
After negotiating off the record for several hours, the
Worlands reached an agreement, which the superior court placed on
the record. According to that agreement, the Worlands agreed to
find a mutually acceptable appraiser for the house. They agreed
that Charles would assume the mortgage and that Jacqueline would
receive sixty percent of the value of the equity in the house.
The Worlands agreed to split their four retirement accounts 50-50
by QDRO.1 Charles consented to [forgo] any claim to repayment
for checks written by Ms. Worland since the date of separation,
as well as payments that he paid on the house up until the time
of the settlement conference. Jacqueline, in turn, agreed to
forgo spousal support and to make mortgage payments until she
would leave the house on May 31, 2006. Finally, Charles agreed
to pay $2,000 of Jacquelines attorneys fees. At the conclusion
of the conference, the superior court told the Worlands:
Now, I want everyone to understand and the
attorneys are going to ask you these
questions but once you agree that this is
your agreement, and you are going to have to
acknowledge that youve given this careful and
deliberate thought, and youve had a chance to
talk to your attorneys and get their counsel
and ask them whatever questions you have.
But once you agree that this is your deal,
this is your deal today, and its your final
deal. One or the other of the lawyers will
agree to prepare the findings and conclusions
that will memorialize the terms. But in the
event that there may be some disagreement
later about what it is that theyve written
down, in terms of the written document that
memorializes the terms the terms that
actually control will be what we put on the
record today.
Both Worlands then gave sworn testimony. Charless endorsement of
the agreement appears unequivocal:
COUNSEL: Okay. And youve heard the
agreement that the judge
restated. Is that your
complete agreement?
CHARLES: Yes.
COUNSEL: As far as settling all
outstanding issues in this
divorce case?
CHARLES: Yes.
COUNSEL: And is there anything else
that wasnt included in that
agreement?
CHARLES: No.
COUNSEL: Okay. Has anyone forced you
into coming into this
agreement?
CHARLES: No.
COUNSEL: Made any threats? Any promises?
CHARLES: No.
COUNSEL: Are you under the influence of
anything that would impair
your ability to make this
decision?
CHARLES: No.
COUNSEL: Do you think this is a fair
and equitable division of your
assets and debts?
CHARLES: Yes.
COUNSEL: And is this something that you
are voluntarily entering into
at this time?
CHARLES: Yes.
Jacqueline similarly testified that the agreement was a fair and
equitable division of their marital property.
After the settlement conference, Charles paid $2,000 of
Jacquelines attorneys fees. As they had agreed to do on the
record, Charles filed proposed findings of fact and conclusions
of law, accompanied by a property division chart. Jacqueline
filed draft QDROs for the four pensions at issue in the divorce.
Weeks after placing the settlement on the record, Charles took
issue with the proposed QDRO of his military pension, and on May
22, 2006, he filed his own proposed version. Jacqueline objected
to the new proposed QDROs saddling her with the entire cost of
creating a survivorship benefit. The Worlands also failed to
agree on who should conduct an appraisal of the marital home, and
they eventually obtained two separate appraisals that differed by
approximately $13,000. On July 11, 2006, Jacqueline moved for a
hearing to resolve these disputes, and the superior court granted
the motion.
On November 7, 2006, the Worlands, both with new
attorneys, appeared again in superior court before Judge Stowers.
On December 27, 2006, with the aid of his new lawyer, Charles
filed a Notice of Misrepresentation by Opposing Counsel, arguing
that Mr. Worland asserted and continues to assert that there was
no settlement and the [superior court] should not execute the
[f]indings, but should order a [t]rial. The superior court
disagreed, however, and on March 10, 2007, it issued a decree of
divorce and its amended findings of fact and conclusions of law.
In its findings, the superior court determined that the Worlands
should use the average value between the two appraisals that they
had commissioned. The superior court also determined that the
Worlands should equally share the cost of creating a survivorship
benefit for the pensions. Finally, the superior court divided
the Worlands credit card debt between them, following the
assignment of that debt outlined in the property division table
previously submitted by Charles.
On May 10, 2007, the superior court issued a Qualifying
Military Order to divide Charless military pension, as well as
QDROs to equally divide the Worlands other pensions, and an order
that Charles refinance the marital home and pay Ms. Worland 60%
of her equity within 45[]days of this order. On May 21 Charles
filed a motion for reconsideration. Among other claims, he
asserted that the superior court had wrongfully included his
Teamster pension in its distribution. On May 31 Jacqueline filed
a response in which she opposed Charless motion for
reconsideration and moved for attorneys fees. On June 4, 2007,
Charles opposed any award of attorneys fees on the ground that
Jacquelines motion for fees was untimely.
The superior court denied Charless motion for
reconsideration and ordered additional briefing on the attorneys
fees issue. After receiving additional briefing from both sides,
the court granted Jacquelines motion for attorneys fees on
December 2. The court found that Charles unreasonably
protracted and added to the litigation following the parties
settlement, because [a]mong other things, Charles unilaterally
retained an appraiser, unreasonably opposed plaintiffs proposed
QDROs, and persists in his argument that there was not [a]
settlement, even though the record could not be any clearer that
both parties entered into a knowing, voluntary settlement. The
superior court awarded Jacqueline $14,790.20, the entirety of her
reasonably and necessarily incurred attorneys fees to enforce the
parties agreement.2
Charles appeals.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing a divorce proceeding, we will reverse an
allocation decision only if the trial court abuses its discretion
in allocating the property, and then only if the allocation is
clearly unjust.3 We review a lower courts decision to enforce a
settlement agreement under the abuse of discretion standard.4 We
review a trial courts award of attorneys fees in a divorce
proceeding under that standard as well,5 meaning that we will
uphold the superior courts decision unless the record as a whole
leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that the trial
court committed a mistake.6
IV. DISCUSSION
A. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Enforcing the Worlands Settlement Agreement.
According to Charles, the agreement he reached with
Jacqueline at the settlement conference omitted material terms.
He also alleges that both parties sought to nullify the agreement
and proceed to trial. Jacqueline defends the agreement and
points out that she only sought trial in the event that the
superior court rejected her challenges to the home appraisal and
the division of Charless military pension. The record supports
this latter version of events.
Charles recites a list of purportedly overlooked items
of property as evidence of the Worlands failure to reach a
settlement. He leads this list with the claim that Jacqueline
extracted funds from the couples joint accounts. But as Charles
points out in his brief, he made known to the superior court his
allegations that Jacqueline had improperly drained marital
assets.7 And after the parties negotiated off the record for
over four hours, Charles agreed under oath to [forgo] any claim
to repayment for checks written by Ms. Worland since the date of
separation, and likewise . . . any claim to repayment for
mortgage payments that he paid on the house from the date of
separation through February 2006, the time of the settlement.
Charles fails to explain how this term of the settlement
agreement does not bar his claim here.
The other items on Charless list of neglected issues
follow the same pattern. For example, he alleges that the
parties had no agreement on a tax credit relating to the equity
distribution. According to the record, however, Jacqueline
agreed to continue paying the mortgage for three months and
therefore planned to take a commensurate interest deduction from
her taxable income the following year.8 Charles testified that
this arrangement, along with the rest of the settlement terms,
represented a fair and equitable division of the marital
property. Charless arguments invoking the Ford Explorer, the
couples joint bank account, and his personal property similarly
fail upon inspection of the record. And Charless allegation that
Ms. Worland failed to pay even one cent on the mortgage despite
agreement to do so identifies a potential failure to comply with
the terms of the settlement but exposes no flaw in the settlement
itself.
Charles also alleges that the parties failed to reach
an agreement on the home valuation and that this failure
necessitates trial. He argues that there is absolutely no
evidence whatsoever that Mr. Worland accepted the $261,500.00
value for the home.9 But the record demonstrates that Charles
did agree to accept the valuation of a mutually acceptable
appraiser. The Worlands never succeeded in choosing such an
appraiser. Instead, Charles contracted with one appraiser, and
Jacqueline contracted with a second appraiser, chosen from a list
that Charles had previously provided after the settlement
conference. Given the Worlands inability to agree upon a single
appraiser, basing the marital homes value on the average of the
two separate appraisals reasonably effectuated the Worlands
intent, avoiding the cost and delay of trial.
Charles argues that a trial was necessary to determine
who should bear the costs of establishing a survivorship benefit
from Charless military pension. But the record of the settlement
conference makes clear that all of the Worlands retirement
accounts were to be split 50-50 by QDRO, and that [t]he military
QDRO shall include, calculated in[,] the survivor benefit cost.
Charles also cites disputes surrounding various credit card
accounts, a cash balance in Ms. Worlands extra credit account,
and a $5,000 debt to the Internal Revenue Service. But the tax
debt of $4,154 arose after the settlement conference; the parties
did not receive notice of the debt until October 10, 2006,
several months after the settlement conference, and according to
Jacqueline, [t]he division of this post-settlement debt . . .
remains to be resolved by agreement of the parties or by the
trial court. With respect to the Worlands credit card debt,
Charless pre-trial property division spreadsheets and his
proposed findings of facts submitted after the settlement
conference indicated that he would assume the credit card debts
he now disputes. Charles appears to concede this point in his
reply brief, admitting that both parties spreadsheets at the time
of the settlement conference evidence that Mr. Worland would pay
the [disputed] credit card debt.
Finally, Charles argues that he succumbed to the
pressure from his counsel and the [superior court] to proceed
with the settlement discussions despite his repeated requests
that they be terminated, in light of his flying in excess of 20
hours to reach the settlement discussions. As a result, he
alleges that the settlement was achieved under coercion and
duress. Charles relies on Gravel v. Alaskan Village, Inc.10 for
the proposition that we should set aside the settlement and
remand the case for trial. But Gravel directly undermines
Charless claim. In that case, we concluded that [t]he record
simply does not support appellants contention that he was
deprived of his free will and induced to settle the case under
coercion and duress.11 As in Gravel, the record in this case
fails to support Charless contention of coercion and duress.
Charless testimony on record leaves little doubt that he fully
engaged in settlement discussions with the assistance of counsel
and accepted the terms on which the two sides agreed. Indeed,
his counsel specifically asked Charles, Has anyone forced you
into coming into this agreement? And Charles testified that no
such coercion had taken place.
Our case law has repeatedly affirmed the strong public
policy in favor of the settlement of disputes.12 Settlements
simplify, shorten and settle litigation without taking up
valuable court resources.13 As contracts, settlement agreements
must be entered into voluntarily and knowingly; they cannot be
the product of coercion, duress, or misrepresentation.14 But the
length of the Worlands settlement negotiations, Charless
assistance by counsel, and the fact that Charles affirmatively
participated in clarifying and defining several of the
settlements terms,15 belie any claim that Charles did not enter
into the agreement voluntarily and of his own free will.
B. The Superior Court Divided the Marital Property in a
Fair and Equitable Manner.
As support for his argument that the superior court
failed to distribute the marital property in an equitable
fashion, Charles recites the same allegations listed in his
argument that the parties failed to reach a settlement. These
allegations fail to advance Charless claims of inequity for the
same reasons that they fail to advance his claim that a
settlement was not reached. In his reply brief, Charles declines
to address Jacquelines contention that the disparity between the
former spouses earning capacities might have justified a more
favorable division for her. According to Jacqueline, she earns
$37,500 as a bus driver in Anchorage, while Charles has earned
over $100,000 annually as a contractor in the Middle East.
Charles argues that the superior court effectively
reversed itself absent [a h]earing and required Mr. Worland in
[the] final division of property to make the mortgage payment
despite its earlier [o]rder requiring Ms. Worland to do so. But
Charles fails to specify which mortgage payments the superior
court wrongfully obliged him to pay. The agreement on record
assigns responsibility to Jacqueline for the March, April, and
May mortgage payments of 2006. The superior courts order did not
alter this term, and thus Charless claim for any relief from
mortgage payments apart from those three months must fail. In a
similar vein, Charles argues that the superior court abused its
discretion by failing to take into account whether credits and
offsets should be given for post-separation mortgage payments,
and by declining to impute the rental value of Ms. Worlands
exclusive use of the marital residence after separation in
dividing the marital estate. But the superior court did not
abuse its discretion; it simply enforced the terms of the parties
mutually agreed upon settlement. Indeed, none of the cases cited
by Charles in support of his argument involved settlement
discussions.16
C. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Awarding Attorneys Fees to Jacqueline.
Charles argues that the superior courts award of
attorneys fees to Jacqueline was an abuse of discretion because
Jacqueline failed to timely file her motion for attorneys fees
and because the underlying award was unreasonable. Charles
points out that Jacqueline filed her motion for attorneys fees on
May 31, 2007, twenty-one days after the superior court issued its
order of May 10, 2007, which required Charles to refinance the
marital home and pay Jacqueline sixty percent of her equity in
the property. Charles reasons that Alaska Rule of Civil
Procedure 82(c)s requirement that a litigant file for attorneys
fees within 10 days after the date shown in the clerks
certificate of distribution on the judgment bars the trial courts
award of attorneys fees.
Charles is correct that Civil Rule 82(c) requires that
a motion for attorneys fees must be filed within ten days of
distribution of the judgment. And our rules direct a litigant to
file a motion for enlargement of time before an applicable
deadline expires. Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)(1) gives a
trial court discretion to enlarge the time period for filing a
motion if request therefor is made before the expiration of the
period originally prescribed or as extended by a previous order.
But even if the litigant fails to file a request for extension
before the deadline expires, a trial court retains some
discretion to grant the request for extension. Alaska Rule of
Civil Procedure 6(b)(2) gives the trial court discretion to
extend most deadlines17 upon motion made after the expiration of
the specified period [for filing]. . . where the failure to act
was the result of excusable neglect.
Thus, ordinarily, a party seeking an enlargement of
time under Civil Rule 6(b) must file the request for extension
before the initial filing deadline. But where a party misses
that deadline, the party must file a request to allow the late
filing, setting forth an explanation of why the untimely filing
resulted from excusable neglect.18 Here, Jacqueline filed no
motion at all: she simply moved for attorneys fees after the ten-
day deadline, failing even to acknowledge the untimeliness of her
request. The trial court should have required Jacqueline to file
a motion for extension that demonstrated excusable neglect or
other good cause for failing to act in a timely manner in filing
her motion for attorneys fees. This procedural error, however,
was harmless. There was good cause for a post-expiration
enlargement of time for filing because a timely motion for
reconsideration was pending when the late-filed fee motion was
filed. And the additional briefing on the attorneys fee issue
ordered by the superior court allowed Charles to inform the court
of any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of the motions
untimeliness.19 We have repeatedly held that the authority to
enlarge the time allowable for an act pursuant to Rule 6(b) is a
function addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.20
The record does not suggest that the trial court abused that
discretion here.
Put simply, nothing in our case law interpreting Rule
82(c) or Rule 6(b) supports adopting the rigid interpretation of
the rule that Charles advocates. Our rules give the trial court
discretion to accept a late-filed motion. Charles fails to
allege any prejudice suffered as a result of the late filing or
to demonstrate that the superior court abused its discretion. We
therefore conclude that the superior court acted within its
authority in granting Jacquelines motion for attorneys fees.
Turning to the substance of the superior courts
attorneys fees award, Charles argues that the superior courts
determination as to attorneys fees was manifestly unreasonable.
The superior court couched its award in no uncertain terms,
reasoning that Charless post-settlement litigation conduct was
unreasonable, vexatious, . . . done in bad faith . . . unfair,
and without basis in fact, law, or equity. Charles, however,
disputes the trial courts finding that he engaged in bad faith or
vexatious litigation as that standard is defined by our holding
in Kowalski v. Kowalski.21
In Kowalski, we reversed an award of full attorneys
fees because the trial court failed to adequately justify its
award.22 Specifically, the trial court in Kowalski based the
award solely on its finding that the party consumed a great deal
more time than necessary [on the witness stand] by attempting to
avoid and evade answers to even the questions posed by his own
attorney. 23 We explained that in making an increased fee award,
the court must first determine what fee award would be
appropriate under the general rule, and only then increase the
award to account for a partys misconduct.24 We also directed the
lower court to make explicit findings of bad faith or vexatious
conduct and clearly explain its reasons for deviating from the
general rule.25
The superior courts analysis in this case complies with
the strictures of Kowalski. The trial court found that the
general rule would operate to award Jacqueline twenty-five
percent of her post-settlement litigation fees. It based this
finding on Charless agreement at settlement to pay $2,000 of
Jacquelines attorneys fees, which the trial court took to signify
an implicit, if not explicit, recognition that the parties
economic circumstances were not equal. But Charless litigation
tactics and his efforts to set aside the settlement agreement led
the superior court to charge him with full reasonable fees
arising out of the post-settlement pleadings:
The court agrees with plaintiffs
arguments that defendant has unreasonably
protracted and added to the litigation
following the parties settlement. Among
other things, defendant unilaterally retained
an appraiser instead of jointly selecting one
as the parties agreed. Defendant
unreasonably opposed plaintiffs proposed
QDROs and the issue of survivor benefits.
Defendant persists in his argument that there
was not settlement, even though the record
could not be any clearer that both parties
entered into a knowing, voluntary settlement.
. . .
. . . If the court was correct in
enforcing the settlement (which it believes
it was), then all of the post-settlement
litigation caused by defendant is
unreasonable and is calculated to
delay/impede/undo/thwart the parties
settlement agreement and plaintiffs rights
thereunder.
Accordingly, the superior court awarded Jacqueline fees of
$14,790.20, which it found were reasonably incurred by plaintiff
in attempting to enforce and receive the benefits of her
settlement agreement with the defendant.
We agree with the superior courts characterization of
Charless litigation conduct. In his motions below and, indeed in
this appeal, Charles has launched a series of unsubstantiated
allegations and legally baseless claims. His arguments regarding
the issues identified by the superior court including appraisal
of the marital home, the cost of the survivor benefits for the
military pension, and the validity of the settlement proceedings
bolster the superior courts judgment that Charles unreasonably
protracted this litigation. Accordingly, we conclude that the
superior court acted within its discretion in awarding attorneys
fees to Jacqueline.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons detailed above, we AFFIRM the judgment
of the superior court.
_______________________________
1 QDROs, or Qualified Domestic Relations Orders, direct a
retirement plan administrator to distribute the benefits of a
retirement plan according to the percentages agreed upon by the
parties and approved by a court. See generally Gale S. Finley,
Assigning Retirement Benefits in Divorce 1-12 (2d ed. 1999).
2 See Alaska R. Civ. P. 82(b)(3).
3 Jones v. Jones, 835 P.2d 1173, 1175 (Alaska 1992).
4 Mullins v. Oates, 179 P.3d 930, 935 (Alaska 2008).
5 Johnson v. Johnson, 564 P.2d 71, 76-77 (Alaska 1977).
6 Hopper v. Hopper, 171 P.3d 124, 128 (Alaska 2007).
7 While the parties were still on record before they
engaged in their off- record negotiations, Charless attorney
explained his concern:
COUNSEL: Because what were saying is
that separate funds were used
to pay off the debt. Separate
funds from Mr. Worland, as he
was depositing money in the
joint bank account after date
of separation. Those funds
were used to pay that debt
down. And he takes . . .
issue with a lot of stuff that
was done with that money that
he was depositing in the
account. . . . So I think he
has a problem with not getting
any credit for some of the
money that he was working hard
to make, being used to pay off
a debt.
COURT: Okay. And I understand
that this is going to be a
point of big contention here.
COUNSEL: Sure.
COURT: And I think that probably
the best way to deal with that
is to do that separately,
because I can see things
getting bogged down . . . .
COUNSEL: Sure.
Later, after several hours of negotiations, Charles agreed on the
record to forgo these claims.
8 Jacquelines lawyer was careful to put this arrangement
on the record:
COURT: Anything else, Ms. Foley?
COUNSEL: Yes. My client is supposed to
be able to stay in the house
until May 31st.
COURT: Yes, I said that, I think.
COUNSEL: And, um, she would be
responsible for the mortgage
and utilities for March, April
and May.
COURT: Yes. March, April and May.
COUNSEL: Which means she should be
able to take that interest
deduction the next year.
COURT: Yes, she can.
Charles raised no objection to this arrangement.
9 Charless property division table nevertheless cites
$261,500 as the value for the home. Charles also erroneously
attributes the 2006 mortgage interest deduction to Jacqueline.
As their agreement makes clear, however, she can claim a
deduction for only the three months that she paid the mortgage.
Jacquelines appendix corrects this oversight.
10 423 P.2d 273 (Alaska 1967).
11 Id. at 277.
12 Mullins v. Oates, 179 P.3d 930, 937 (Alaska 2008)
(quoting Municipality of Anchorage v. Schneider, 685 P.2d 94, 98
(Alaska 1984)); see also Murphy v. Murphy, 812 P.2d 960, 965
(Alaska 1991).
13 Interior Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Bussing, 559 P.2d 104,
106 (Alaska 1977).
14 Mullins, 179 P.3d at 937.
15 Id.; see also Ford v. Ford, 68 P.3d 1258, 1264 (Alaska
2003) (noting that it was proper to conclude that party was bound
by settlement because that party actively participated in the
settlement discussions); Pavek v. Curran,754 P.2d 1125, 1127
(Alaska 1988) (noting that it was proper to conclude that party
was bound by settlement agreement when that party was present at
settlement hearing, made no objection to terms of agreement, and
did not in any way indicate that she did not understand
settlement).
16 Specifically Charles cites Korn v. Korn, 46 P.3d 1021,
1022 (Alaska 2002) (remanding because interim spousal support and
imputed rental value are not actually marital property and trial
court did not explain why it counted them as marital property
after it held a trial on disputed property questions and issued
its final decision dividing the couples marital property); Ramsey
v. Ramsey, 834 P.2d 807, 808 (Alaska 1992) (rejecting trial
courts finding that parties functioned as single economic unit
after separation); and Ogard v. Ogard, 808 P.2d 815 (Alaska 1991)
(no settlement involved).
17 Under the rule, a court may not extend the time for
taking any action under Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(b), and (e) and
(f), and 60(b), except to the extent and under the conditions
stated in them. Alaska R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2).
18 See, e.g., Estate of Lampert Through Thurston v. Estate
of Lampert Through Stauffer, 896 P.2d 214, 218 (Alaska 1995).
19 When affirming a lower courts decision to enlarge the
period for filing, we have cited the appellants failure to
explain how the extension might prejudice him or to discuss
prejudice on appeal. Kaiser v. Sakata, 40 P.3d 800, 806 (Alaska
2002). But we have also held that appellants must show more than
a mere lack of prejudice to justify reversal of a superior courts
decision to deny an extension in the context of Rule 60(b).
Dickerson v. Goodman, 161 P.3d 1205, 1207 (Alaska 2007).
20 Estate of Lampert, 896 P.2d at 218 (quoting State v.
1.163 Acres, More or Less, 449 P.2d 776, 779 (Alaska 1968)).
21 806 P.2d 1368, 1373 (Alaska 1991).
22 Id. at 1372-73.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 1373.
25 Id.
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