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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Jarvill v. Porky's Equipment, Inc. (08/01/2008) sp-6294
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage,
Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
| GARY L. JARVILL, | ) |
| ) Supreme Court Nos. S- 12457/12527 | |
| Appellant and, | ) |
| Cross-Appellee, | ) Superior Court No. 1SI-04-00220 CI |
| ) | |
| v. | ) O P I N I O N |
| ) | |
| PORKYS EQUIPMENT, INC., and | ) No. 6294 August 1, 2008 |
| NORMAN T. HAAG, a/k/a TODD | ) |
| HAAG, | ) |
| ) | |
| Appellees and | ) |
| Cross-Appellants. | ) |
| ) | |
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State
of Alaska, First Judicial District, Sitka,
Larry C. Zervos, Judge.
Appearances: Brian E. Hanson, Pearson &
Hanson LLC, Sitka, for Appellant/Cross-
Appellee. Robert S. Spitzfaden, Gruening &
Spitzfaden, APC, Juneau, for Appellees/Cross-
Appellants.
Before: Fabe, Chief Justice, Matthews,
Carpeneti, and Winfree, Justices. [Eastaugh,
Justice, not participating.]
FABE, Chief Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
Gary Jarvill alleges that a design defect in the boat
he purchased from Porkys Equipment, Inc. caused it to sink in its
harbor slip less than three years after purchase. Jarvill
appeals the superior courts ruling that the statute of
limitations bars his product defect and negligence claims.
Because the evidence fails to support the trial courts finding
that Jarvills cause of action accrued and the statute of
limitations began to run before the boat sank, we reverse the
trial courts dismissal on statute of limitations grounds. We
affirm the trial courts holding that Porkys employee, Todd Haag,
acted as the companys agent in contracting to construct the boat
for Jarvill, and the trial courts admission of evidence from
Jarvills marine surveyor regarding the boats allegedly defective
design and construction.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
A. Facts
Gary Jarvill teaches high school and runs a charter
fishing business during his summer vacations. In the fall of
1999 he began looking for a new boat. Jarvill desired an
aluminum Packman style boat of the type built by the Munson
Company of Burlington, Washington. The Munson Company, however,
could not make delivery quickly enough, and Jarvill looked
elsewhere.
Jarvills son, an employee of Porkys, told him that the
company had recently built a boat using a Munson design. Jarvill
went to Porkys and spoke with Todd Haag, a foreman for Porkys.
Haag explained that he had the rights to build two Munson design
boats in exchange for work that his crew had done on a Munson
boat. Haag had completed one of the boats for Porkys president,
Brian Bickar, and Haag showed it to Jarvill. Haag and Jarvill
discussed a list of specifications that Jarvill had written, and
Haag told Jarvill that he could sell him a Munson design boat, on
which he had already begun construction.
In November 1999 Haag and Jarvill agreed that for
$90,000 Haag would build a boat meeting Jarvills specifications.
To finalize the agreement, Jarvill wrote a check out to Todd Haag
for $7,000. In order to secure financing, Jarvill retained Jim
Steffen, a boat surveyor, to verify the boats value as
collateral. Steffen surveyed the boat three times during its
construction and once after construction was complete. Steffen
also performed a damage report after the boat, christened the Sea-
J, sank on January 5, 2003.
Steffen maintains that, from the beginning, he
expressed concern that the 3/16" gauge aluminum sheeting on the
Sea-Js hull was too thin. He testified that during his first
survey he discussed this concern with Haag. This led Steffen to
note in his first report, that [t]hough the hull shell plating is
light for a vessel of this size, the framing schedule has been
tightened up in order to provide what appears to be adequate
stiffness. Steffen repeated this language in his second report.
But as construction on the boat proceeded, it did not include the
internal stiffening work that Steffen thought to be necessary.
In his third report, Steffen wrote that the hull plating is
considered adequate for structural appearances given the presence
of external hull stiffeners.
Steffen testified that, before writing this report, he
told Jarvill and Haag that he thought the boat would need
external stiffeners because of the thin plating. Haag declined
to mount external stiffeners on the boats frame, reasoning that
he had adequately welded the hull for stiffness and that external
stiffeners would rob the performance of the hull. When Steffen
conducted a final in-water survey of the boat, he verified that
the hull plating was adequate for judicious use given the
presence of external hull stiffeners. Steffen testified that he
knew, however, that Haag had not installed any external hull
stiffeners on the boat.
During the night of January 5, 2003, about two and a
half years after its delivery, the Sea-J sank in its harbor slip.
Mr. Steffen surveyed the damage and determined that stress
fractures on the bottom of the hull had caused the boat to sink.
Steffen detected no evidence of an impact in the affected area,
and concluded that the [c]racks are due to light shell plate
thickness and marginal internal framing, fatigued by stresses
encountered during normal vessel operations.
On January 30, 2003, Jarvill sent Porkys president
Brian Bickar notice that the cause of the recent damage to the
vessel Sea-J which sank at the dock has been attributed to a
manufacturing defect. A few days later, Bickar wrote back on
behalf of Porkys to explain that Todd Boats, rather than Porkys,
had constructed the boat, and that Porkys only provided the
location for the boat to be built in. Bickar thus suggested that
Jarvill contact Todd Haag. He also offered to mail Jarvill a
copy of the original survey done by Jim Steffen.
B. Proceedings
On November 17, 2004, Jarvill filed suit in superior
court against Porkys and Haag, claiming product defect,
negligence, breach of implied warranty, unfair trade or business
practices, and breach of contract. After motion practice, claims
of product defect, negligence, and unfair trade practices
remained. Starting on February 7, 2006, Superior Court Judge
Larry C. Zervos held a bench trial. After Jarvill presented his
case, Porkys moved under Alaska Civil Rule 41(b) to dismiss all
counts, arguing that the statute of limitations barred the
product defect and negligence claims and that Jarvill failed to
prove an unfair trade practices violation.
The superior court denied Porkys motion, reasoning that
Jarvill did not know about the defective hull plating on the boat
until it sank. Just before closing arguments, however, Porkys
asked the court to reconsider its ruling on the Rule 41(b)
motion. In the motion for reconsideration, the company presented
the theory that Steffens knowledge of the defective hull should
be imputed to Jarvill because Steffen had inspected the boat as
Jarvills agent. Because Steffen was aware that Haag had not
installed external stiffeners or taken any other measures to
compensate for the thin hull plating, Porkys argued, he had
notice of the boats alleged defect. The court agreed, and after
considering additional briefing on the agency relationship
between Jarvill and Steffen, it reversed its prior ruling and
held that the statute of limitations barred Jarvills negligence
and product defect claims.1
Although the superior court did not reach the merits of
Jarvills tort claims, it found that Mr. Steffen knew that the
boat was defective on June 10, 2000 when he inspected it just
before the boat was turned over to Mr. Jarvill for his use.
Therefore, according to the trial court, the two-year limitations
period on Jarvills tort claims2 expired before the Sea-J sank on
January 5, 2003. Specifically, the trial court held that at the
time of Steffens third inspection of the Sea-J he had information
sufficient to alert a reasonable person to begin an inquiry to
protect his rights.3 The trial court reasoned that Steffen knew
that the boat was defective then, and that the boats eventual
sinking was directly related to the defect and negligent
construction. The trial court concluded that [a]lthough Mr.
Jarvills harm on June 10, 2000 was not as great then as it would
be when the boat sank, his agent had all the information
available then to bring a suit on the theories he eventually
raised in this case. Jarvill appeals.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We uphold a superior courts factual findings unless
they are clearly erroneous, meaning that our review of the record
leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been made.4 In reviewing a lower courts application of law to
undisputed facts, we apply our independent judgment.5 We review
the trial courts admission of opinion testimony under the abuse
of discretion standard.6
IV. DISCUSSION
A. The Superior Court Erred in Holding that the Statute of
Limitations Barred Jarvills Tort Claims.
Jarvill had to file his tort claims of negligence and
product defect within the two-year statute of limitations
provided in AS 09.10.070.7 Jarvills boat sank on January 5,
2003, and he filed suit on November 17, 2004. Under the two-year
limitations statute, Jarvills claim is timely unless it accrued
before November 17, 2002.8 Jarvill maintains that his claims did
not accrue until the Sea-J sank on January 5, 2003. Porkys
defends the superior courts determination that Steffens
inspection of the boat on June 10, 2000 triggered the limitations
period. But because the record indicates that Jarvills tort
claims did not accrue until the boat sank, we reverse.
Steffen claimed at trial that he suspected early on
that Haag was using inappropriately thin sheet metal on the hull.
Steffen testified that he expressed this concern to Jarvill and
possibly to Haag after he performed his April 2000 survey. Haag
reassured Jarvill about the hull, telling him that the external
stiffeners proposed by Steffen were unnecessary and would rob the
performance of the hull. In his next report in June 2000,
Steffen wrote that [h]ull plating, considered light for a vessel
of this size, is considered adequate for structural appearances
given the presence of external hull stiffeners. Steffen declined
to make an express recommendation in the report that Haag install
external stiffeners, even though he knew that Haag had not done
so. In a subsequent survey report, after the boat was in the
water, Steffen again concluded that the hull plating was
considered adequate for judicious use given the presence of hull
stiffeners.
The superior court determined that Mr. Steffen did not
report a defect that should have been reported. It went on to
reason:
Mr. Steffen knew about the problems with the
boat on June 10, 2000, and he knew it was
defective then. The cause of the boats
eventual sinking was directly related to the
defect and negligent construction. Although
Mr. Jarvills harm on June 10, 2000 was not as
great then as it would be when the boat sank,
his agent had all the information available
then to bring a suit on the theories he
eventually raised in this case.
Therefore, the superior court concluded, the statute of
limitations barred Jarvills claims. We disagree.
We have previously observed that the ordinary operation
of the statute of limitations looks to the date on which the
plaintiff incurs injury.9 We have applied this rule literally to
bar any action initiated more than two years after the plaintiff
or his insured property was tortiously damaged.10 And we have
also employed the discovery rule to toll the statute of
limitations until the claimant discovers, or reasonably should
have discovered, the existence of all elements essential to the
cause of action.11 But the discovery rule only extends the
statute of limitations; it does not shorten it.
The superior court chose June 10, 2000 as the date of
Jarvills injury for the purposes of his negligence and product
defect claims. This marked the date of Jim Steffens third survey
of the Sea-J, shortly after Haag completed construction and
before the boat had entered the water. But while Steffens survey
on that date may have triggered the limitations period for a
breach of contract claim, we cannot agree that the underlying
injury alleged in Jarvills product defect and negligence claims
occurred at the time of delivery. Jarvills complaint alleged
that the Sea-J failed to perform as safely as an ordinary
consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably
foreseeable manner. More specifically, it claimed that the boat
failed to perform when the hull bottom surface cracked causing
the boat to sink. Nothing in the record suggests that the cracks
caused by the boats alleged defect, or any other performance
failures, manifested themselves prior to the date that the Sea-J
sank.
To the contrary, the Sea-J performed as Haag promised,
and any tortious injury to Jarvill remained a matter of
speculation. At the end of the boats first summer in the water,
Jarvill collided with a log. Worried that the collision may have
damaged the hull, Jarvill took the boat to Haag for an
inspection. Haag repaired a dent in the hull. He filled the
boat with water to check for leaks. He detected no signs of
inadequacy in the Sea-Js hull plating, and he reported that the
Sea-J didnt have any apparent leaks, and that he had fixed the
dent.
Jarvill further testified that he took the boat out
frequently, but that he never had any indication that the Sea-J
was taking on water. He testified that he took his family out in
the Sea-J over the Christmas holiday immediately prior to the
boats sinking on January 5 and that the Sea-J operated without
any sign of malfunctioning then. Porkys intimates that Jarvill
might have acted earlier to save the boat from sinking on the
night it went down. But the company does not allege that Jarvill
should have discovered the stress fractures developing on the
hull or any other such performance failure during his operation
of the boat in the weeks and months preceding its submersion.
Porkys instead argues that Jarvill suffered the injury
of receiving a defective boat, and that his agent, Steffen, had
notice of that injury. Porkys argues that the discovery rule
governs Jarvills claim, quoting our decision in Johns Heating
Service v. Lamb:12 Injury often occurs simultaneously with the
corresponding act of negligence that causes it. However, when the
injury is not apparent at the time of the negligent act, the
discovery rule applies.13 Porkys contends that Jarvill reasonably
should have discovered14 all of the elements essential to his
negligence and products liability claims, including harm.
According to Porkys, Jarvills harm, as of June 2000, was the boat
was not serviceable which could be remedied by incurring the cost
to add external stiffeners.
Porkys reliance on Johns Heating Service is misplaced.
In that case, homeowners, the Lambs, sued Johns Heating Service
for its alleged negligent failure to repair their furnace or to
warn them that it was leaking dangerous carbon monoxide fumes
into their home.15 Johns Heating Service argued that the statute
of limitations should bar the Lambs suit because they filed it
over two years after the company conducted its service call.16
The trial court rejected the statute of limitations defense. We
remanded, however, for a determination whether the Lambs knew or
should have known that they were being exposed to carbon monoxide
as early as [the date of the service call].17 We reasoned that
summary judgment on the statute of limitations question was not
appropriate because Johns Heating Service had presented evidence
that the Lambs associated the malfunctioning furnace with
headaches that they had been suffering, that after the service
call the furnace continued to blow soot through the house, and
that a fuel smell persisted in the house.18
Porkys attempts to draw a parallel between this
evidence and Steffens misgivings about the thin sheet metal on
the Sea-Js hull. But such an analogy overlooks a more basic
distinction between the cases. Unlike the Lambs, Jarvill was not
harmed by the alleged tortious action in this case until long
after he had completed his purchase. The essence of Porkys
argument then is that Jarvills cause of action accrued before all
of its essential elements had ripened. But our previous
decisions do not suggest such a rule.
Although we have not decided a case precisely like this
one, we have held that the limitations period in AS 09.10.070
ordinarily begins to run on the date on which the plaintiff
incurs injury.19 For example, in Austin v. Fulton Insurance Co.,20
we held that claims against an insurer for negligence in not
issuing a policy covering earthquake loss did not ripen until the
quake had struck. Therefore, the plaintiff had two years from
the time of the earthquake to file under AS 09.10.070.21 More
generally, we have held that [s]tatutes of limitations
prescribing a relatively short period of time, as AS 09.10.070
does, should be construed narrowly.22 And we have recognized that
while the defense of the statute of limitations is a legitimate
one, it is not generally favored by the courts.23 Nothing in
these cases suggests the peculiar rule that Porkys would have us
apply to product defect and negligence claims.
The case law from other jurisdictions further persuades
us that Porkys argument must fail. That jurisprudence makes
clear that for a product defect claim like Jarvills, the statute
[of limitations] starts to run and the cause of action accrues
when the injury or damage is suffered and not at some earlier
time of sale, delivery, construction, installation, etc.24 This
follows from the very nature of the plaintiffs claim, because if
no damage resulted from defendants negligence, then there would
be no right of action.25
Porkys argues that Jarvill did suffer damages following
Steffens June 2000 inspection, in the form of receiving a boat
that was not serviceable. But that argument conflates the
analysis of Jarvills tort claims with that of contract claims
that were resolved by the parties motion practice. The date of
Steffens June 10, 2000 inspection marks little more than Jarvills
acceptance of the boats delivery. Adopting that event as the
trigger for AS 09.10.070 would lead us to the anomalous and
grossly unfair result of the statute being held to have run and
the bar becoming completed even before the hapless plaintiff
suffered injury or damage.26
Thus, the superior court erred in determining that the
statute of limitations for Jarvills tort claims began to run at
the time of Steffens June 10, 2000 survey. Haag addressed
Steffens concerns, assuring Jarvill that the Sea-J did not need
external hull stiffeners, which would merely rob the performance
of the hull. Jarvill proceeded to operate the Sea-J for two and
a half years without any sign of malfunctioning. He did not
bring suit against Haag or Porkys during that time because he had
suffered no harm, at least none that was reasonably discoverable.
Because the record does not support Porkys statute of limitations
defense, we remand for the superior court to decide Jarvills
negligence and product defect claims on the merits. We next turn
to the superior courts determination that any liability attaching
to Haag for his construction of the Sea-J should extend to
Porkys.
B. The Superior Court Did Not Err in Finding that Haag
Acted as Porkys Agent and Bound Porkys to the Contract
with Jarvill.
Porkys challenges the superior courts ruling that Haag
acted as the companys agent when he built Jarvills boat on Porkys
business premises. Porkys maintains that Todd Haag contracted
with Jarvill independently to build his boat, and that Haag acted
with neither actual nor apparent authority to bind Porkys.
Therefore, the company argues, it had no duty to Jarvill that
might serve as the basis for Jarvills tort claims. The record,
however, supports the superior courts determination that Haag had
at least apparent authority to bind Porkys.
In Cummins, Inc. v. Nelson,27 we observed three
considerations in evaluating apparent agency: (1) the
manifestations of the principal to the third party; (2) reliance
on the principals manifestations by the third party; and (3) the
reasonableness of the third partys interpretation of the
principals manifestations and the reasonableness of the third
partys reliance.28 Here, the superior court found that Porkys
purchased the materials, records about the boat were kept at
Porkys, Porkys employees worked on the boat, the boat was built
in its shop, Porkys hoped to make a profit from the boat and
Porkys billed Mr. Jarvill for extra work not covered by the
original price. These and other undisputed facts adequately
support the superior courts finding that Porkys manifestations
led Jarvill to believe that Haag was acting as the companys
agent, and that Jarvill reasonably relied on those
manifestations.
In Cummins, we held that a principals manifestations
may be directly communicated to the third party or may come
through signs, advertising, authorization of an agent to claim
that he is authorized, or continuous employment of the agent.29
In Cummins, boat owners sued the manufacturer and local installer
of an engine for damages arising out of its failure.30 The boat
owners had initially called the manufacturer, which had provided
them with the phone number of the local installer.31 We upheld a
jury award based on apparent authority, noting that we usually
reserve for the trier of fact to decide whether a reasonable
person in the position of the third party would believe that the
agent had the authority or the right to do a particular act.32
Here, the principal directly employed the agent it
seeks to disclaim. Jarvill testified that he believed that he
had contracted with Porkys, rather than Todd Boats or any other
independent company. And this belief seems reasonable given that
Jarvill first discussed the boat with Haag at the Porkys
warehouse, where Haag built the boat with the help of other
Porkys employees.
Porkys points out that Steffens marine surveys list
Todd Boats as the boat builder and that Haag indicated to Steffen
that he was the boat builder of record. Moreover, Jarvill
authorized loan disbursements directly to Haag for the boat,
whereas when he had previously purchased services and supplies
from Porkys,33 he paid the company directly rather than any
individual employee. Finally, Porkys argues that because Jarvill
only discussed the boat contract with Haag, not with Porkys
executives Brian and Oliver Bickar, he cannot claim to have
reasonably relied on the companys manifestations of an agency
relationship. But these factors do not persuade us that the
court committed clear error in finding that Jarvill reasonably
relied on Porkys manifestations that Haag was authorized to act
on its behalf. In short, the undisputed facts, including Haags
use of Porkys facilities and his employment with Porkys, lead us
to affirm the superior courts ruling that Haag had at least
apparent authority. We therefore turn to Porkys contention that
the superior court erroneously admitted expert testimony from Jim
Steffen regarding the Sea-Js alleged negligent design and
construction.
C. The Superior Court Did Not Err in Admitting Testimony
from Steffen that the Boat Was Negligently Constructed.
The superior court never resolved Jarvills negligence
and product defect claims on their merits. Nevertheless, in
disposing of Jarvills unfair trade practices claims, the superior
court remarked that Mr. Haag built a defective boat and his use
of thin hull plating without more stiffening was negligent.
Although this dicta did not affect the outcome below given the
trial courts dismissal of Jarvills claims on statute of
limitations grounds, it indicates that the court relied on
Steffens testimony that Haag negligently constructed the Sea-J.
In its cross-appeal, Porkys argues that the trial court
incorrectly admitted that testimony. We disagree.
Porkys argues that the court erred in admitting expert
testimony from Steffen on the boats negligent construction
because Steffen admitted he was not a naval architect. Steffen
testified that the Sea-J was negligently constructed and
defective. Days after this testimony, Porkys raised an objection,
seeking to clarify that Steffens testimony represented his lay
opinions and not expert opinions because he is qualified for
condition, valuation and cause, but not for construction or
design. The superior court agreed that it let that in as lay
opinion.
As Porkys itself points out, the superior court knew
that Steffen was not qualified as an expert in construction or
design of boats. The superior court ruled that Steffen had the
expertise in damage and repair and causation and evaluation and
condition. And these issues go to the condition. The only thing
that where he gets into . . . boat design is where I found that
he was not an expert.
Porkys argues that the court lacked any expert
testimony for its finding that Haag built a defective boat and
was negligent, because the only other witness to testify on the
design and construction of the Jarvill boat was Todd Haag, who
denied any negligence. While Steffen was not qualified as a
naval architect, who could address whether the boat was
negligently designed, he was able to provide opinion testimony
within his expertise in the area of marine evaluation and
condition, as well as damage and causation issues concerning
boats. Steffens damages report detailed the likely cause of the
boats sinking. He had also voiced his concerns during the
construction phase about the boats hull sheeting. This evidence
was admissible to support Jarvills claim that Haag built a
defective boat. And the superior court did not have to rely on
Steffens opinion as an expert in construction or design to
conclude that Haag negligently used thin hull plating without
additional stiffening. In conclusion, Steffens testimony was
admissible and may be considered by the superior court in
analyzing the merits of Jarvills tort claims on remand.
V. CONCLUSION
We REVERSE the superior courts dismissal of Jarvills
claims as time barred. We AFFIRM the superior courts findings
that Haag acted as Porkys agent and its admission of Steffens
testimony that Haag negligently constructed the boat. We REMAND
for a determination of Jarvills negligence and product defect
claims on the merits.
_______________________________
1 The court dismissed Jarvills unfair trade practices
claim on the merits. Jarvill does not appeal that ruling.
2 See AS 09.10.070.
3 Waage v. Cutter Biological Div. of Miles Labs., Inc.,
926 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Alaska 1996).
4 Johns Heating Serv. v. Lamb, 129 P.3d 919, 922 (Alaska
2006).
5 Id.
6 See Schymanski v. Conventz, 674 P.2d 281, 286-87
(Alaska 1983).
7 Specifically, AS 09.10.070(a) provides:
Except as otherwise provided by law, a person
may not bring an action . . . (2) for
personal injury or death, or injury to the
rights of another not arising on contract and
not specifically provided otherwise . . .
unless the action is commenced within two
years of the accrual of the cause of action.
8 See, e.g., Sopko v. Dowell Schlumberger, Inc., 21 P.3d
1265, 1270 (Alaska 2001).
9 Russell v. Municipality of Anchorage, 743 P.2d 372, 375
(Alaska 1987) (quotations omitted).
10 Gudenau & Co. v. Sweeney Ins., Inc., 736 P.2d 763, 766
(Alaska 1987).
11 Id.
12 46 P.3d 1024 (Alaska 2002).
13 Id. at 1031 n.14.
14 Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Stiles, 756 P.2d 288, 291
(Alaska 1988).
15 46 P.3d at 1028-29.
16 Id. at 1031-32.
17 Id. at 1032-33.
18 Id.
19 Gudenau, 736 P.2d at 766.
20 444 P.2d 536 (Alaska 1968).
21 Id. at 538-40.
22 Goodman v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch. Dist., 39
P.3d 1118, 1120 (Alaska 2001).
23 Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Honeywell, Inc., 639 P.2d
996, 1001 (Alaska 1981).
24 1A Stuart M. Speiser, et al., The American Law of Torts
5:35, at 380-81 (1983); see also Hunter v. Sch. Dist. of Gale-
Ettrick-Trempealeau:
It is the fact and date of injury that sets
in force and operation the factors that
create and establish the basis for a claim of
damages. It is true that, without an act of
negligence, no claim for damages based on
negligence can arise. It is likewise true
that, without the result of injury, no claim
for damages based on negligence can be
asserted, or at least successfully asserted.
Both the act of negligence and the fact of
resultant injury must take place before cause
of action founded on negligence can be said
to have accrued.
293 N.W.2d 515, 519 (Wis. 1980) (quotations and emphases
omitted).
25 West Am. Ins. Co. v. Sal E. Lobianco & Son Co., 370
N.E.2d 804, 807 (Ill. 1977).
26 1A Speiser, et al., supra note 24, 5:35, at 381.
27 115 P.3d 536 (Alaska 2005).
28 Id. at 542.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 539-40.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 544.
33 Jarvill had previously purchased a chain saw from
Porkys and paid for welding work on a boat trailer hitch and a
pickup truck bumper.
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