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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Morris v. State, Dept. of Administration, Division of Motor Vehicles (07/03/2008) sp-6283

Morris v. State, Dept. of Administration, Division of Motor Vehicles (07/03/2008) sp-6283, 186 P3d 575

     Notice:   This opinion is subject to correction  before
     publication  in  the  Pacific  Reporter.   Readers  are
     requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
     of  the  Appellate  Courts, 303  K  Street,  Anchorage,
     Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
     e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.

                    
            THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA

RICK MORRIS, )
) Supreme Court No. S- 12279
Appellant, )
) Superior Court No.
v. ) 3KN-05-00074 CI
)
STATE OF ALASKA, DEPART- )
MENT OF ADMINISTRATION, )
DIVISION OF MOTOR VEHICLES, ) O P I N I O N
)
Appellee. ) No. 6283 - July 3, 2008
)
          Appeal  from the Superior Court of the  State
          of  Alaska,  Third Judicial District,  Kenai,
          Harold M. Brown, Judge.

          Appearances:  Peter  F.  Mysing,  Kenai,  for
          Appellant.   Margaret Paton Walsh,  Assistant
          Attorney  General, Anchorage,  and  David  W.
          M rquez,   Attorney  General,   Juneau,   for
          Appellee.

          Before:    Fabe,  Chief  Justice,   Matthews,
          Eastaugh,  and Carpeneti, Justices.  [Bryner,
          Justice, not participating.]

          CARPENETI, Justice.

I.   INTRODUCTION
          Rick  Morris  appeals  the revocation  of  his  drivers
license  following  his arrest for driving under  the  influence.
Morris  claims  that  his chemical breath test   which  showed  a
breath alcohol concentration of .089 percent  was unreliable  and
inaccurate  and  can not serve as a basis for revocation  of  his
license  because  a  later-administered  independent  blood  test
produced  a result of .070 percent.  Morris argues that,  because
the  variance between the two test results is sufficiently large,
the  blood  test failed to verify the breath test and the  breath
test  is therefore invalid.  Because we conclude that the hearing
officers  finding  that it was more likely than not  that  Morris
produced  a  chemical  breath test of .08 percent  or  above   is
supported  by  substantial evidence, we  affirm  the  departments
revocation.
II.  FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
     A.   Facts
          At  3:58 a.m. on June 20, 2004, Soldotna Police Officer
Jessie  Stoneking was driving north on the Sterling Highway  when
she  saw a 2001 Jeep Wrangler leave the driveway of the Riverside
House,  a bar/lounge in Soldotna, and make a wide sweeping  right
turn  into the left northbound highway lane without using a  turn
signal.  Officer Stoneking pulled the vehicle over and approached
the driver.  The driver was identified as Rick Morris.
          Officer Stoneking noted that Morris had red and  glassy
eyes,  slurred  speech,  and  a flushed  face.   Morris  informed
Officer  Stoneking that he had consumed a beer at home  prior  to
going  to the Riverside House, and that he had drunk two rum-and-
cokes  while  at the bar.  Officer Stoneking required  Morris  to
perform  a  number of field sobriety tests, which  she  found  he
executed  poorly.  Morris then submitted to a preliminary  breath
test,  which  indicated that he had a breath alcohol  content  of
.092  percent.  Stoneking arrested Morris for driving  under  the
influence  (DUI) under AS 28.35.030 and transported  him  to  the
Alaska State Trooper station.
          At  4:36  a.m., following a fifteen-minute  observation
period,  Morris  submitted a breath test sample on  a  Datamaster
breath  test  instrument.  The test reflected a  result  of  .089
percent.  Morris then exercised his right to an independent  test
and was transported to the Central Peninsula General Hospital for
blood  work.   At  5:13  a.m.,  thirty-seven  minutes  after  the
chemical  breath test, blood was drawn by a laboratory technician
and   placed  into  evidence  storage  at  the  Soldotna   Police
Department.  Morriss blood sample was tested on August 11,  2004,
by  Providence Alaska Medical Center, and reflected a  result  of
.0701 percent blood alcohol content.1
     B.   Proceedings
          Morris    was    notified   by   the   Department    of
Administration, Division of Motor Vehicles that  it  intended  to
revoke  his  drivers  license based on  a  chemical  breath  test
revealing  an  alcohol  concentration of .08  percent  or  more.2
Morris   requested  administrative  review  of  the   departments
decision,  and  an  administrative hearing was  conducted  before
Hearing  Officer Becky Janik in December 2004 and  early  January
2005.3   Morris  argued  that  the results  of  his  blood  test,
performed  thirty-seven minutes after his breath test, varied  so
greatly  from  the  breath test result that it fell  outside  the
generally  acceptable range of natural alcohol  elimination  from
the  body  and  therefore failed to corroborate his  breath  test
result.   He asserted that the blood test result proved that  the
chemical  breath test, which the department had  relied  upon  to
revoke his drivers license, was therefore inaccurate and that his
          license could not be suspended.
          In  January  2005  the  hearing  officer  affirmed  the
departments  revocation.   She  determined  that  the  Datamaster
breath  test  instrument was working properly  and  that  Morriss
chemical  breath  test  result was valid.   She  found  that  the
evidence  established that Morris was impaired on the morning  in
question  and  affirmed  the departments  revocation  of  Morriss
driving  privileges for breath alcohol concentration  of  .08  or
more.
          Morris  appealed to the superior court.  On  March  10,
2005,  Superior Court Judge Harold M. Brown affirmed the  hearing
officers decision.4  Morris appeals.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
          We  review drivers license revocation hearings under AS
28.15.166(m),  which  provides that the  court  may  reverse  the
departments determination if the court finds that the  department
misinterpreted  the  law,  acted in an arbitrary  and  capricious
manner,  or  made a determination unsupported by the evidence  in
the record.5  Where, as here, the superior court was acting as an
intermediate  court of appeal, we will independently  review  the
hearing officers determination.6
          We  review issues of law not involving agency expertise
under  the  substitution of judgment standard7  and  the  hearing
officers  factual findings under the substantial  evidence  test,
determining  whether the findings are supported by such  evidence
as  a  reasonable  mind  might accept as adequate  to  support  a
conclusion.   8   When  an  agency  chooses  between  conflicting
determinations and there is substantial evidence in the record to
support either conclusion we will affirm the agencys findings.9
IV.  DISCUSSION
          We  have repeatedly recognized that [a] drivers license
is  an important property interest which entitles a driver  to  a
meaningful hearing before the drivers license can be suspended.10
In  order  to  affirm  an  administrative license  revocation,  a
hearing officer must find by a preponderance of the evidence that
a   chemical   test   produced   a   result   described   in   AS
28.35.030(a)(2).11  Alaska Statute 28.35.030(a)(2) provides that a
person  commits the offense of driving while under the  influence
if  the  person  operates a vehicle and if, as  determined  by  a
chemical test taken within four hours after the alleged operating
or driving, there is 0.08 percent or more by weight of alcohol in
the  persons  blood . . . or if there is 0.08 grams  or  more  of
alcohol  per 210 liters of the persons breath.  In this case,  we
must  determine whether substantial evidence supports the hearing
officers decision that a chemical test produced a result  of  .08
percent or more alcohol in Morriss breath or blood.  We are asked
to consider whether the variance between a presumptively accurate
breath  test  and a subsequent blood test that falls outside  the
average  rates of alcohol elimination from the body  proves  that
the  former  is  unreliable for the purpose of  revoking  Morriss
drivers  license. Under the facts of the case presented here,  we
answer in the negative.

     A.   Morriss License Revocation
          
          Alaska  Statute  28.35.033(d)  provides  that  where  a
chemical  analysis of breath or blood was performed according  to
approved  methods  by a person trained according  to  techniques,
methods, and standards of training approved by the Department  of
Public  Safety, there is a presumption that the test results  are
valid and further foundation for introduction of the evidence  is
unnecessary.  But while AS 28.35.033 creates a presumption of the
chemical  tests validity, it does not make those [test]   results
unassailable.12  We have said that the breath test is of  central
importance  in  a  revocation proceeding, and we have  repeatedly
recognized  that  a defendants right to test the reliability  and
accuracy  of  the test is critical to his ability to present  his
case.13  A  driver has the right to challenge the accuracy  of  a
breath  alcohol test, which includes the right to obtain evidence
of  an  independent blood test producing an exculpatory result.14
Indeed, [b]reathalyzer test results, like any other evidence, may
be subject to attack and disproof.15
          Morris  asserts  that  the  hearing  officer  erred  in
relying  upon  his  .089 percent  breath test result  because  he
claims  that the .070 percent blood test result proved  that  the
former was unreliable.16  Looking to the variance between the test
results,   he   asserts  that   that  there  was  no  substantial
evidentiary basis for the hearing officers decision to affirm the
departments revocation.  The department counters that substantial
evidence  supports  the hearing officers determination  that  the
breath test result was valid, that the blood test result does not
prove   that  the  Datamaster  breath  test  was  unreliable   or
inaccurate,  and  that Morriss blood test actually  supports  the
hearing officers finding that Morriss blood alcohol content   was
over the legal limit.
          Evidence  introduced at the revocation hearing revealed
the  following.  Officer Stoneking conducted a preliminary breath
test  on  Morris  at approximately 3:58 a.m., which  reflected  a
breath  alcohol content of .092 percent.  Morriss chemical breath
test,  which produced a result of .089 percent, was conducted  at
4:36  a.m.,  thirty-eight  minutes later.   The  Verification  of
Calibration  Report  for  the Datamaster breath  test  instrument
reflected  that the machine was certified for use and functioning
properly.   The  Datamasters internal self-tests  were  performed
both  before  and after Morriss test.  The hearing  officer  also
reviewed   the  departments  Breath  Alcohol  Supervisor   Manual
discussing  metabolic process and the rates at which  alcohol  is
eliminated  from  the body. The manual reflected  reported  rates
ranging  from,  on average, .012 to .024g/210L  per  hour  breath
units,  with an average elimination rate of .018 per  hour.   The
manual also noted [h]igher rates of metabolism have been reported
and  are  usually  associated with chronic consumption  of  large
quantities of ethanol.
          Morris  testified  at the hearing,  and  his  testimony
confirmed  many  of  the  preliminary  facts  noted  in   Officer
Stonekings police report.  He explained that he made an  improper
turn  in his vehicle on the morning in question because he drives
a dump truck for a living and is accustomed to making wider turns
in  order to avoid the curb.  He confirmed that he requested  and
          obtained an independent blood test and that the result of the
test  was .070 percent.  He also provided a letter from a chemist
at  Providence Hospital, Dr. Eileen Nickoloff, which stated  that
the  generally accepted average elimination is 0.018%  per  hour,
with  a range of .010 to .023%, that the interval between Morriss
chemical breath test and blood test was thirty-seven minutes, and
that  this  normalized to an average decline of  .031  percent,17
which was outside the normally acceptable range for elimination.
          At  the  hearing, Morris did not challenge the type  of
chemical  breath  test device utilized18 or the certification  or
qualifications of the individual administering the test,19 nor did
he  argue  that  the  testing instrument had  not  been  properly
calibrated and verified as required under state law.20  Other than
the  results  of  his blood test and a letter from  the  hospital
chemist,  he  provided  no  evidence calling  into  question  the
reliability or validity of his chemical breath test result.21  The
hearing  officer determined that the breath test  instrument  was
working properly and that the evidence confirmed the validity  of
Morriss chemical breath test result.
     B.   Substantial  Evidence  Supports  the  Hearing  Officers
          Decision To Revoke Morriss Drivers License.
          Where  a  hearing officer administratively  suspends  a
drivers  license, we review the record to determine  whether  the
hearing  officers decision is supported by substantial  evidence.
In  this case, the hearing officers decision was supported by the
results  of  the breath test, by unchallenged evidence  that  the
breath  test  machine  was properly certified  for  use  and  was
functioning properly, by evidence that the machines internal self-
tests  were performed both before and after Morriss test, and  by
the  fact that the blood test result supports the conclusion that
Morris  exceeded the legal limit at the time of his breath  test.
In  addition,  Morriss  admission  that  he  had  been  consuming
alcohol, the evidence of his poor driving, and Officer Stonekings
testimony  as  to his personal condition and his  performance  of
field sobriety tests all supported the hearing officers decision.
Finally,  AS  28.35.033(d)  creates a presumption  that  where  a
chemical breath test was performed according to approved  methods
by  a  person  trained  according  to  techniques,  methods,  and
standards  of  training  approved by  the  Department  of  Public
Safety,  the  test is valid.  In these circumstances,  there  was
substantial   evidence  that  supported  the   hearing   officers
decision.
          Morris  contends  that,  in  order  to  harmonize   the
variance between the blood and breath test, Morris must have  had
a  rate of alcohol elimination of .031 percent per hour.  Because
this rate is significantly above average, Morris argues that  the
variance  reveals that the breath test result was unreliable  and
invalid per se.  But this argument assumes two propositions  that
lack factual or legal support.  We consider each in turn.
          Morris  first assumes that only one chemical test   the
states  breath test showing .089 percent at 4:36 a.m., or Morriss
blood test showing .070 percent at 5:13 a.m.  can be right.   But
the  tests  are not necessarily inconsistent.  Both  tests  could
have been accurate if Morris had in fact eliminated alcohol at  a
          high rate.  While the average person eliminates alcohol at a rate
of  .012 to .024 percent per hour, the hearing officer had before
her the departments Breath Alcohol Supervisor Manual, which noted
that  higher  rates  of  metabolism have been  reported  and  are
usually  associated with chronic consumption of large quantities.
Indeed,  even Morriss clinical chemist was unwilling to say  that
it  was  impossible for both tests to be accurate, only  that  he
would have had to have eliminated alcohol at an unexpectedly high
rate.22
          In  sum,  the  evidence at Morriss hearing  established
that the chemical breath test was presumptively valid, and Morris
did  not directly challenge the testing machine or process in any
way.  His only evidence was not necessarily inconsistent with the
states  evidence.  There was substantial evidence to support  the
hearing  officers  conclusion that Morriss chemical  breath  test
produced  a result described under AS 28.35.030(a)(2):  a  breath
alcohol content at or above .080 percent.
          Morriss second assumption is implied; it is that, if  a
breath  test  and a blood test yield inconsistent results,23  the
breath  test  must  be mistaken because the  blood  test  is  the
superior  method of testing.  Before 1980, such a position  might
have found some support, for Alaska law defined intoxication only
in  terms  of the percent of alcohol found in a drivers  blood.24
But   in   1980   the  legislature  changed  the  definition   of
intoxication   to  include the percent  of  alcohol  found  in  a
drivers  breath.25  It is worth a moment to track the development
of  drunk driving laws in our state and the effect of this change
on Morriss case now.
          Historically  Alaska,  as well as  many  other  states,
defined  the offense of driving while intoxicated as operating  a
vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration above a certain limit.26
Under  these  schemes, an individuals blood alcohol concentration
could  be  measured in a number of ways, but where a breath  test
was   used  it  was  necessary  to  convert  the  breath  alcohol
concentration  to a blood alcohol concentration  by  utilizing  a
partition  ratio  in order to determine whether  the  person  had
violated  the  particular [DUI] statute.27   When  blood  alcohol
content  was the standard defining the offense, defendants  could
raise   the  partition  ratio  defense,  arguing  that  a   given
individuals  actual  ratio was different  from  the  statutorily-
presumed  ratio of 2100:1.  This defense was available where  DUI
laws  defined  the offense based upon a prohibited blood  alcohol
concentration and the defendant was accused of DUI based upon the
results  of a breathalyzer test.  Many states, including  Alaska,
reacted  to  the use of the partition ratio defense  by  amending
their  laws  to  prohibit driving with either a blood  or  breath
alcohol concentration in excess of specific standards.28
          In  a 1979 case, Cooley v. Municipality of Anchorage,29
the  court of appeals noted that the Anchorage DUI ordinance  had
been  recently amended to define the intoxication level in  terms
of alcohol concentrations in both blood and breath.30  Responding
to appellants argument that the breathalyzer test result may have
inaccurately  converted breath alcohol concentration  into  blood
alcohol  concentration  under  the  partition  ratio,  the  court
          concluded that [a]s a practical matter, this source of possible
inaccuracy  may  no  longer arise under the  municipal  ordinance
because   the   amendment  had  expanded   a   determination   of
intoxication  to include intoxication based upon  breath  alcohol
concentration.31
          The  1980  amendments to Alaskas DUI  statutory  scheme
that   added  breath  alcohol  concentration  to  blood   alcohol
concentration as a means of determining intoxication32 thus ended
any  presumption that a blood test is entitled to  preference  or
priority  over  a  breath test in determining intoxication.   The
offense is committed when either the blood alcohol level  or  the
breath alcohol level is at or above .08 percent.
          We  have  seen  that  Alaskas statutes  defining  drunk
driving  do  not give priority or greater weight to a blood  test
over  a breath test.  How, then, should a hearing officer resolve
conflicts  between  two  tests?   We  have  held  that  arguments
challenging  the  reliability or validity of  a  particular  test
generally  go  to  its  weight, rather than its  admissibility.33
Thus,  the  weight given to the breath test is a  factual  matter
properly left to the hearing officer.34  The plain language of AS
28.15.166(g)  provides  that it is within  the  hearing  officers
province  to  determine  whether the  chemical  test  produces  a
proscribed result.
          Finally,   the  hearing  officers  determination   that
Morriss  test results exceeded the legal limit finds  support  in
the  breath test result.  While Morriss blood test result can  be
completely  harmonized  with  his  breath  test  result  only  by
assuming  that he eliminated alcohol at an unusually  high  rate,
the  blood  test  in fact supports the hearing  officers  finding
that  Morriss test results were at .08 percent or above  assuming
only  an  average rate of elimination.  Recall that in  order  to
revoke  a drivers license, AS 28.15.166(g)(2) requires a  hearing
officer  to  find that a chemical breath test produced  a  result
described  under  AS 28.35.030(a)(2), that is, at  or  above  .08
percent alcohol concentration in the persons blood or breath. And
it  is  the test result, rather than a drivers intoxication level
at  the time of driving, that is the critical element:  The focus
of [the hearing officers inquiry under] subsection .166(g)(1)-(3)
is  clearly  on  the result of the test.35  Even if  the  hearing
officer  had  rejected the breath test result  and  assumed  that
Morriss  .070  percent blood test was an accurate measurement  of
Morriss blood alcohol concentration at the time of the test,  she
could  have reasonably concluded that Morris was above the  legal
limit at the time of his breath test even without reconciling the
competing results.  Specifically, had the hearing officer assumed
the  accuracy  of the .070 percent blood test at 5:13  a.m.,  and
extrapolated backwards in time using the average rate of  alcohol
elimination   of  .018  percent  per  hour,  Morriss   level   of
intoxication would have been .081 percent at 4:36 a.m., the  time
of  his  chemical  breath  test.  Thus,  his  blood  test  result
supports  the conclusion that Morris was  in excess of the  legal
limit at the time of his breath test.36
          Moreover, using this same rate of elimination,  Morriss
intoxication  level at the time of driving would have  been  .093
          percent, remarkably in line with his preliminary breath test
result  of  .092 percent.  The blood test therefore supports  the
states  position that Morriss chemical test produced a result  of
.08  percent or more.37  And while this exercise yields a  breath
test  result different from that actually produced (.081  percent
versus .089 percent), it is significant in that it confirms  that
on the morning in question Morris produced a chemical test result
of  at least .08 percent.38  Under these circumstances, we cannot
conclude  that  Morriss independent blood  test  is  sufficiently
exculpatory  that the hearing officer could not have  found  that
Morriss  chemical  test  produced  a  result  in  excess  of  the
statutorily proscribed level.
          While  an  independent  blood  test  result  may   have
significant  bearing  on  the  weight  afforded  a  breath  tests
reliability  in  a  given  case, Morris  has  failed  to  provide
sufficient  support for his proposition that  in  this  case  the
hearing   officers  finding  is  not  supported  by   substantial
evidence.39
V.   CONCLUSION
          Because  we conclude that substantial evidence supports
the  hearing  officers determination, we AFFIRM the  decision  to
revoke Morriss drivers license.

_______________________________
     1     Evidence offered by Morris reflected two tests on  the
blood  sample, the first producing a result of .070  percent  and
the second of .068 percent.

     2     AS 28.15.165 provides for administrative revocation of
a drivers license.

     3     AS 28.15.166 provides for administrative review of the
departments revocation.

     4     In  June  2005 Judge Brown granted Morriss motion  for
stay  of  the  license  revocation during the  pendency  of  this
appeal.

     5    Saltz v. State, Dept of Pub. Safety, 942 P.2d 1151,1152
(Alaska  1997) (holding that supreme court applies same  standard
as superior court).

     6     State, Dept of Pub. Safety v. Shakespeare, 4 P.3d 322,
324 (Alaska 2000).

     7     Snyder v. State, Dept of Pub. Safety, 31 P.3d 770, 774
(Alaska 2001).

     8    Saltz v. State, Dept of Admin., Div. of Motor Vehicles,
126  P.3d 133, 136 (Alaska 2005). (quoting Borrego v. State, Dept
of Pub. Safety, 815 P.2d 360, 363 (Alaska 1991)).

     9     Anderson v. State, Dept of Revenue, 26 P.3d 1106, 1109
(Alaska 2001).

     10     Champion  v. Dept of Pub. Safety, 721 P.2d  131,  133
(Alaska 1986).

     11    AS 28.15.166(g) and (j).

     12     Keel  v.  State,   609 P.2d 555,  557  (Alaska  1980)
(construing former version of AS 28.35.033(d)).

     13    Champion, 721 P.2d at 133.

     14     See  Barcott v. State, Dept of Pub. Safety, 741  P.2d
226, 229 (Alaska 1987).

     15    Cooley v. Municipality of Anchorage, 649 P.2d 251, 254-
55 (Alaska App. 1982).

     16     In  his  reply brief, Morris contends that the  State
mischaracterizes the issue of the validity of the breath test  as
a  finding of fact rather than a conclusion of law. Morris raises
this  argument  for the first time in his reply  brief.   Indeed,
Morris  himself  initially suggested that  the  hearing  officers
determination  was  a  finding of fact: [T]here  was  substantial
evidence  presented . . . that the breath test  .  .  .  was  not
reliable  and it should not have been used as a basis  to  revoke
his  driving privileges.  Because arguments raised for the  first
time  in  a  reply brief will not be considered,  we  decline  to
address  Morriss argument here.  See Sumner v. Eagle Nest  Hotel,
894 P.2d 628, 632 (Alaska 1995).

     17     The letter from Dr. Nickoloff actually refers  to  an
average  decline of 0.31% over a one hour period.   The  superior
courts order affirming the hearing officers decision adopts  this
.31% figure, as does the appellant.  The appellee notes that  Dr.
Nickoloffs  letter  likely contains a  decimal  place  error  and
accordingly  assumes that the actual figure is .031 percent.   We
find  the  appellees  reasoning persuasive  and  adopt  the  .031
percent figure.

     18      See  13  Alaska  Administrative  Code  (AAC)  63.020
(requiring  scientific director of the breath and  blood  alcohol
testing program to approve breath test instrument).

     19     See 13 AAC 63.050 (requiring operators of breath test
instruments be certified).

     20     See  13 AAC 63.100 (requiring testing instruments  be
correctly calibrated and verified).

     21     See  Keel  v. State, 609 P.2d 555, 557 (Alaska  1980)
(noting  that presumption  of validity of test results  means  if
regulations followed, there is sufficient evidence to admit  test
results  into  evidence, but weight given evidence is  a  factual
matter for jury).

     22      Morris  also  relies  on  Best  v.  Municipality  of
Anchorage,  712 P.2d 892 (Alaska App. 1985),  for the proposition
that  the  variance in his test results is sufficiently large  to
refute the  breath tests validity.  Best is inapposite and offers
no   assistance  to  Morris  because  it  involved  a  completely
different situation: the attempt to check a first breath test  by
preserving a second breath sample in a perchlorate tube for later
testing.   There,  checking  of the initial  breath  results  was
impossible  because of improper collection technique utilized  by
insufficiently trained officers [using] inadequately designed and
maintained  adapters  used  for the perchlorate  tube  collection
process.  Id.  at  902.  Thus, the variances  in  Best  were  all
between  breath  samples that were collected at  the  same  time.
Moreover,  Best  involved  a situation where  the  defendant  had
sustained  his burden of showing [] that he was not  furnished  a
reasonable  means of verification, id. at 897 (quoting  State  v.
Kerr,  712  P.2d 400, 406 (Alaska App. 1985)), whereas Morris  of
course  does  not  even  assert  that  he  was  ever  denied   an
opportunity to independently verify his breath test.

     23    As we saw in the immediately preceding discussion, the
results in this case are not necessarily inconsistent.

     24     Former  AS 28.35.033(a) (1978) provided  in  relevant
part:

               [T]he  amount  of  alcohol  in  the
               persons blood  at the time alleged,
               as  shown  by chemical analysis  of
               the persons breath, shall give rise
               to the following presumptions:
               . . . .
               (3)  If there was 0.10 per cent  or
               more  by weight of alcohol  in  the
               persons blood, it shall be presumed
               that  the  person  was  under   the
               influence of intoxicating liquor.

(Emphasis added.)

     25     In  1980  the legislature amended AS 28.35.033(a)  to
provide  that intoxication would depend on the amount of  alcohol
in  the  persons  blood  or  breath.   See  also  Bill  Analysis,
Department  of  Public  Safety, HB 833,  March  6,  1980  (noting
program effects of bill included that [b]reath analysis would  be
added to blood analysis as a method of determining intoxication).
AS 28.35.033(a)(3) currently provides in relevant part:  If there
was  0.08  percent or more by weight of alcohol  in  the  persons
blood  .  . . or 0.08 grams or more of alcohol per 210 liters  of
the  persons  breath, it shall be presumed that  the  person  was
under the influence of an alcoholic beverage.

     26     See  Simpson v. Municipality of Anchorage,  635  P.2d
1197,   1200-01   (Alaska   App.  1981)   (discussing   statutory
presumption  of  intoxication under former AS  28.35.033(a)  that
provided upon proceeding arising out of acts committed by  person
operating  vehicle under the influence the amount of  alcohol  in
the  persons  blood  at the time alleged, as  shown  by  chemical
analysis  of the persons breath, shall give rise to the following
presumptions  .  .  .  . (emphasis added));  see  also  State  v.
Hardesty,  39  P.3d  647,  648-49  (Idaho  App.  2002)  (internal
citations omitted).

     27     Hardesty, 39 P.3d at 648-49.  The partition ratio  is
generally 2100:1, indicating for every molecule of alcohol in the
breath there is considered to be 2100 molecules of alcohol in the
blood.   Id.  at 649.  The partition ratio varies from individual
to  individual. Id. at 649 n.1; see also Haynes v. State, Dept of
Pub.  Safety, 865 P.2d 753, 757 n.1 (Alaska 1993) (Matthews,  J.,
dissenting).

     28    Hardesty, 39 P.3d at 648-49.  See also Meehan v. Kansas
Dept  of Revenue, 959 P.2d 940, 944-45 (Kan. App. 1998); Dept  of
Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Patrick, 895 So.2d 1131,  1134
(Fla.  Dist. App. 2005) (noting either blood alcohol  or  breath-
alcohol test result is expression of the persons alcohol level).

     29    649 P.2d 251 (Alaska App. 1982).

     30    Id. at 253 n.1.

     31    Id. at 254 n.6.

     32      AS  28.35.030;  AS  28.35.033;  see  Bill  Analysis,
Department  of Public Safety, HB 833, March 6, 1980 (noting  that
[b]reath analysis would be added to blood analysis as a method of
determining intoxication). The legislative history of the amended
version  of  AS  28.35.030  that was  introduced  in  1980  is  a
complicated one.  It was summarized in large part in Van Brunt v.
State, 653 P.2d 343, 344 n.2 (Alaska App. 1982).

     33     See Gilbreath v. Municipality of Anchorage, 773  P.2d
218,   222  (Alaska  App.  1989)  (holding  that  once  statutory
requirements  for  admissibility of test results  are  satisfied,
breath  test result is admissible and weight of evidence  is  for
trier of fact).

     34    See Cooley v. Municipality of  Anchorage, 649 P.2d 251,
255  n.8  (Alaska App. 1982) (noting presumption of breath  tests
validity means sufficient evidence to admit results into evidence
but weight given to evidence factual matter for jury).

     35    Javed v. Dept of Pub. Safety, 921 P.2d 620, 625 (Alaska
1996) (noting statute contains very precise limiting language for
the issues that are to be considered).

     36    See Kaufman v. Dir. of Revenue, 193 S.W.3d 300, 302-03
(Mo.   App.  2006)  (noting driver failed to  present  sufficient
evidence   rebutting  states  prima  facie  case  where  evidence
challenges  scientific reliability of test but failed  to  adduce
evidence showing drivers alcohol content below legal limit).

     37    AS 28.35.030(a)(2).

     38      We  do  not address whether or when, under different
facts,  an  unexplained  or unsubstantiated  variance  between  a
chemical  breath test and subsequent independent blood test  will
successfully  impeach the validity of the states chemical  breath
test result.

     39     See  Byrne  v. State, 654 P.2d 795, 796 (Alaska  App.
1982)  (noting defendant confused relevancy of evidence with  its
conclusiveness).

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