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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Matanuska Electric Association, Inc. v. Municipality of Anchorage (05/23/2008) sp-6269
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage,
Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
| MATANUSKA ELECTRIC | ) |
| ASSOCIATION, INC., | ) Supreme Court No. S- 12568 |
| ) | |
| Appellant, | ) Superior Court No. 3AN-05-04745 CI |
| ) | |
| v. | ) O P I N I O N |
| ) | |
| MUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE, | ) No. 6269 May 23, 2008 |
| d/b/a MUNICIPAL LIGHT & | ) |
| POWER, and GOLDEN VALLEY | ) |
| ELECTRIC ASSOCIATION, INC., | ) |
| ) | |
| Appellees. | ) |
| ) | |
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State
of Alaska, Third Judicial District,
Anchorage, Sen K. Tan, Judge.
Appearances: Kyle W. Parker, David J.
Mayberry, and Rebecca S. Copeland, Patton
Boggs LLP, Anchorage, for Appellant. Dean D.
Thompson and Paul J. Jones, Kemppel, Huffman,
and Ellis, P.C., Anchorage, for Appellee
Municipality of Anchorage, d/b/a Municipal
Light & Power. Kirk H. Gibson, Ater Wynne
LLP, Portland, Oregon, for Appellee Golden
Valley Electric Association, Inc.
Before: Fabe, Chief Justice, Eastaugh,
Carpeneti, and Winfree, Justices. [Matthews,
Justice, not participating.]
FABE, Chief Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
Matanuska Electric Association, Inc. (MEA) appeals a
ruling from the Regulatory Commission of Alaska. MEA contends
that the Commission acted outside its jurisdiction when it
ordered MEA to continue operating its transmission line at a
voltage that exceeds the lines designed maximum, and that the
Commission committed reversible error when it denied MEA
permission to cross-examine a witness. Because substantial
evidence aside from the challenged testimony supports the
Commissions decision, we affirm.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
This appeal concerns twenty miles of transmission line
(the Line) owned and operated by MEA. The Line runs northward
from a location outside of Wasilla to MEAs Douglas Substation in
the community of Willow. It functions as part of the Alaska
Intertie, most of which was constructed with state funds by the
Alaska Energy Authority (the Authority)1 in the early 1980s to
provide a means of transmitting energy from a planned
hydroelectric facility, the Susitna project, to northern and
southern electric utilities. The Susitna project never came to
pass, but the Intertie continues to serve an important role as
the exclusive link between electric utilities from Fairbanks to
the Kenai Peninsula.
The Authority incorporated the Line into the Intertie
in order to speed construction, minimize costs, and avoid
duplicating facilities. The Authority entered into a
Transmission Services Agreement with MEA on December 18, 1986.
Under that agreement, MEA retains ownership of the Line; but the
Line operates as part of the Intertie under the control of the
Intertie Operating Committee.
The Transmission Services Agreement contemplates an
operational voltage of 138 kilovolts (kV) for the Line. This
voltage equals that of adjoining sections of the Intertie.
Unlike those facilities, however, the Line was designed to be
energized at only 115kV. MEA maintains that conversion of [the
Line] to 138kV operation was always intended as a temporary
situation. Nevertheless, 138kV has remained the operational
voltage for the Line since the Authority entered into the
Transmission Services Agreement with MEA in 1986. The Authority
and MEA set the Transmission Services Agreement to expire on July
1, 2004. On May 9, 2003, MEA General Manager Wayne Carmony wrote
to notify the Authority of MEAs intent to discontinue the parties
arrangement. He cited MEAs need for the flexibility of operating
[the Line] in the manner of our choosing, in either a single or
double circuit configuration. He did not mention concerns about
safety hazards or performance failures linked to energizing the
Line at 138kV. MEA maintains, however, that its decision to
terminate the [Transmission Services Agreement] was motivated by
its desire to return [the Line] to 115kV operation in order to
minimize the costly operational impacts which had arisen during
the term of the [Transmission Services Agreement].
MEA invited the Authority to negotiate a new agreement,
but the two sides failed to reach an accord. MEA also attempted
to strike separate bargains with the individual utilities that
wheel power across the Line, but these efforts failed to advance
beyond the initial stages of talks.2
On October 30, 2003, the Intertie Participants, a
collection of utilities3 that distribute electricity across the
Intertie and the Line, applied to the Commission for continued
joint use of the Line. Pending proceedings before the
Commission, MEA agreed to allow the Intertie Participants to
continue using the Line under similar terms until December 31,
2004. The Commission requested that the parties pre-file
testimony and held a two-day hearing beginning on October 28,
2004. The Intertie Participants presented testimony from two
Golden Valley officers and a consultant. MEA presented the
testimony of three of its officers as well as that of its own
consultant.
Much of the evidence before the Commission concerned
whether the Line could operate at 138kV in a safe and reliable
manner. The Commission noted that some thirty flashover outages
had occurred along the Line after it began operating at the
higher voltage in 1986. The parties disputed the significance
and cause of these outages, with MEA asserting that conversion of
the Line to 138kV had rendered the Line unreliable and dangerous.
The parties disagreed whether the voltage differential posed a
safety threat.4
The parties presented the testimony of several
witnesses to the Commission, with that of Golden Valley officer
Steven Haagenson bearing particular relevance to this appeal.
Like the other witnesses, Haagenson was made available for cross-
examination during the hearing, but MEA indicated that it had no
questions for him. The two commissioners in attendance followed
suit, also declining to ask Haagenson any questions. The next
day, however, Chairman Giard recalled Haagenson to the stand and
solicited information about the costs of reverting the Line to
115kV. Haagenson testified as to the construction expense and
downtime associated with installing a transformer.
At the conclusion of that testimony, MEAs counsel
requested permission to cross-examine Haagenson. The hearing
examiner denied MEAs request, explaining: ordinarily I only allow
examination for any questions that exceed the scope of your
[earlier cross] examination and since there was none I dont
really have a whole lot of options there. Counsel for MEA
responded, All right. MEA made no representation or offer of
proof at the hearing regarding the testimony it proposed to
elicit on cross-examination. But on appeal MEA alleges that its
cross-examination would have demonstrated that reverting the Line
to 115kV would require at most two hours of downtime, not the six
months to a year that Haagenson indicated in his testimony.
The Commission ruled that the Line should continue
operating at 138kV, reasoning that evidence presented on three
design parameters, which vary according to a transmission lines
voltage level ground clearance, insulation, and phase spacing
failed to demonstrate significant safety or operational hazards.
First, the Commission noted that the Lines ground
clearance conformed to standards set under the National
Electrical Safety Code for 115kV transmission lines constructed
over cultivated fields. This means that MEA maintains its
transmission line at least 20.2 feet above the ground, ostensibly
to accommodate farm machinery that may cross beneath the Line.
By way of comparison, a 138kV transmission line must clear
cultivated fields by 20.4 feet. The Commission deemed this
height differential to be de minimis, and further noted that
[t]here are no cultivated fields under [the Line,] therefore, the
ground clearance should be more than adequate to accommodate the
increased voltage on the [L]ine.
The alleged inadequacy of the insulation and phase
spacing along the Line similarly failed to impress the
Commission. Insulation, in the form of porcelain bells fixed
along a transmission line, protects against flashovers, in which
electric energy arcs from the wire conductor to the structure
bearing the Line. Flashovers cause service outages and create
carbon deposits that cause more frequent flashovers. The
Commission noted the Rural Utilities Services requirement that
138kV transmission lines carry eight porcelain insulator bells
between structures, one more bell than that recommended for 115kV
lines. The Commission, however, found no persuasive evidence
that installing the additional bell will markedly improve the
reliability of that line, and determined that in any event,
nothing prevented MEA from exercising the option to install the
additional insulator bell since the [L]ine was converted to 138kV
usage 17 years ago.
Similarly, the Commission implicitly dismissed MEA
concerns that inadequate phase spacing could account for service
interruptions along the Line. Phase spacing refers to the
horizontal distance between transmission lines. It prevents
electric energy from arcing between adjacent wires and other
electric conductors, thereby causing the circuit breakers to open
and de-energize a line, interrupting service. The Commission
pointed out that the standard for phase spacing is greater for a
138kV line than a 115kV line. The Commission declined to give
further treatment to the phase- spacing issue in its decision but
concluded generally that although MEA argued that the flashover
outages it has experienced on [the Line] are the result of
operating the [L]ine at the higher voltage, the utility did not
submit persuasive evidence that the outages were caused by
flashovers. Rather, the Commission found persuasive evidence
that the flashovers would be continual if they were the result of
operating the [L]ine at a higher voltage.
In addition to finding that the Line could operate
safely and reliably at 138kV, the Commission pointed out that
returning the Line to 115kV operation would entail its own costs:
Conversion of the line [to] 115kV usage at
this time would require approximately $1
million to install a transformer. There is no
persuasive evidence that the expenditure is
necessary. In addition, the line would not
be operational for approximately six months
to one year while a transformer was
installed.[5] There are no redundant
facilities to transport power during the
interim. Any benefits of such conversion are
not outweighed by the costs.
On January 31, 2005, MEA appealed the Commissions order
to the superior court and at the same time filed a motion to
require further testimony from Haagenson. Superior Court Judge
Sen K. Tan denied MEAs motion for supplemental testimony. After
hearing oral argument, the superior court affirmed the
Commissions decision. As a preliminary matter, Judge Tan
rejected MEAs claim that the case presented a jurisdictional
question, ruling that the issue surrounding the Lines operation
at 138kV posed a question of fact, not a question of law. Judge
Tan went on to find substantial evidence supporting the
Commissions conclusions that the Line could operate safely and
reliably at 138kV. Judge Tan held that the Commission had not
abused its discretion in refusing to allow MEAs cross-examination
of Haagenson because MEA failed to make an offer of proof, and
the request to ask a question on clarification was not evident
from the context of the question. Finally, Judge Tan reasoned
that any error that did occur was harmless. MEA appeals.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We directly review the Commissions action at issue in
an administrative appeal.6 We uphold the Commissions
determinations of fact if review shows substantial evidence or
relevant evidence that a reasonable person might accept as
adequate to support them.7 We review decisions to admit or
exclude evidence for abuse of discretion and will uphold an
evidentiary ruling unless it erroneously affected the substantial
rights of a party.8
IV. DISCUSSION
MEA argues first that the Commission lacks the
authority to order operation of the Line at 138kV because doing
so violates national safety codes incorporated by Alaska law.
MEA emphasizes that no other electric line in the state is
operated above its design voltage. MEA contends that the
Commission ignored the substantial cost of operating at 138kV, in
contravention of its mandate to regulate utilities in the best
interests of the public. Second, MEA argues that the hearing
examiner erred in barring further questioning of Haagenson,
contending that this led the Commission to make an erroneous
finding on the disconnection time associated with reverting the
Lines operation to 115kV. MEA maintains that the Commissions
order demonstrates that the alleged misunderstanding had a
material effect on the outcome of the case.
A. The Commission Did Not Err in Ruling that the Line Must
Continue To Operate at 138kV.
Alaska Statute 42.05.321 governs scenarios in which
public utilities, such as MEA and the Intertie Participants,
fail[] to agree upon the joint use or interconnection of
facilities or the condition or compensation for joint use or
interconnections. The statute instructs the Commission to
prescribe reasonable conditions . . . for joint use where it
finds that public convenience and necessity require the joint use
or connection, and that the use or connection will not result in
substantial injury to the owner utility or its customers, or in
substantial detriment to the services furnished by the owner
utility, or in the creation of safety hazards.9 As the
Commission noted in its decision, the crux of this controversy
concerns not whether public convenience and necessity require
joint use of the Line, but whether that use must continue at
138kV. That inquiry turns on whether operation at 138kV creates
safety hazards or significantly affects the reliability of MEAs
services, and it presents a question of fact.10 Because
substantial evidence in the record supports the Commissions
conclusion that the Line can be operated safely and reliably at
138kV, we affirm its decision.
The Commission based its decision on the design of the
Line, the past performance of the Line at 138kV, and the costs of
reverting the Line to 115kV operation. MEA argues that these
factors counsel against operating the Line at 138kV. MEA invokes
two statutes in support of its claim. The first, AS 10.25.440,
mandates that construction of electric lines . . . shall, as a
minimum requirement, comply with the standards of the National
Electrical Safety Code in effect at the time of construction.
The second, AS 18.60.580, provides that the Department of Labor
and Workforce Development may, by regulation, adopt the most
recent [National Electrical Safety Code] to constitute the
minimum electrical safety standards of the state.11 MEA contends
that the Commissions decision forces the utility to operate in
violation of the National Electrical Safety Code.
But MEA fails to cite a specific code violation that
arises out of the Lines operation at 138kV. MEA simply points
out, as the parties concede, that the Line was neither
constructed nor modified to operate at 138kV. Since the Line was
constructed to operate at 115kV, MEA reasons that transmitting
138kV across it without modification must violate the
construction requirements of AS 10.25.440 and, by extension, the
National Electrical Safety Code.
The Commission recognized that the Line was designed to
operate at 115kV but nevertheless found the line can be safely
operated at 138kV if it is properly maintained. MEA fails to
directly challenge that ruling. For example, the Commission
noted that the Rural Electrification Administration recommends an
additional insulator bell for 138kV lines, as compared to 115kV
lines. But MEA does not clarify whether having one fewer bell
rises to the level of a safety code violation, or if any other
aspect of the Line, as it operates today, fails to comport with
the National Electrical Safety Codes and Alaska laws minimum
standards.12 Delbert LaRue, the design engineer of the Line,
testified that he provided for a margin of safety in the Lines
design that permits safe operation at a greater voltage. LaRue
did not know where the upper end of the permissibly higher
voltage might lie, but he assured the Commission that as it is
right now, the Line can continue to operate in a safe and
reliable manner at 138kV. MEAs own director of operations,
Robert Drake, made no indication that operation of the Line at
138kV violated the National Electrical Safety Code, testifying
that he was not aware of any code violation on the Line.
MEAs expert engineering witness, Michael Moore,
testified that he considered reliability, safety and liability
issues arising from . . . continued operation of the Line at
138kV. Moore concluded that several problems related to
operating [the Line] at 138kV, including insulation, vertical
clearance and phase spacing requirements . . . result in
increased public safety and reliability risks. As MEA itself
points out, however, Moore did not address whether [the Line]
complies with applicable safety code requirements. And indeed,
Moore appears to have considered the voltage issue in the
abstract, without taking into account any facts specific to the
Line.
Moore testified, for example, that the approximate half-
foot of additional vertical clearance required for a 138kV line
as compared to a 115kV line . . . is quite significant. But he
did not review whether the vertical clearance of the Line falls
short of any applicable height requirements for 138kV
transmission lines. Similarly, Moore explained how phase spacing
and insulation standards increase with voltage. But his
testimony stops short of any assertion that the Line fails to
comply with requirements under the law for those parameters.
Moore reached only the general conclusion that increasing the
Line voltage leads to increased outages, lower service
reliability to [MEA] members, additional safety risks, litigation
defense costs, and an increased exposure to liability on [MEA]s
part. This relationship may exist, but neither Moores testimony
nor that of any other witness demonstrated a causal relationship
of sufficient significance to claim that the Commissions findings
are not supported by substantial evidence.
In contrast, testimony from LaRue directly supports the
Commissions finding that operation of [the Line] at 138kV should
not result in substantial injury to MEA or its customers, in the
substantial detriment to the services furnished by MEA, or in the
creation of safety hazards. LaRue dismissed Moores testimony,
explaining that [a] cursory review of the parameters noted by Mr.
Moore, compared to the actual design, reveals that operating the
[Line] at 138kV does not necessarily violate the three parameters
questioned by Mr. Moore. In his testimony, LaRue confirmed the
adequacy of the Lines phase spacing and insulation for operation
at 138kV, noting that if an excess of voltage caused the
flashovers on the Line, he would anticipate that it would be a
continual problem. He conceded that he could not confirm whether
anyone has filled in the ground under [the Line] to reduce
clearance, but he pointed out that [s]uch activities should have
been noted by [MEA], and cited the ground clearance parameter in
particular as reflecting the conservatism in the Lines design.
Finally, in response to cross-examination by MEA, LaRue
maintained that the Line is an appropriate line to be energized
at 138kV.
MEA points out that LaRue has not walked the Line since
1977 and that he fails to take into account the rapid growth of
the Matanuska Susitna Borough over the past thirty years. But
while MEA has operated the Line at 138kV across the Matanuska
Susitna Borough for two decades, it warns only of an incremental
increase in safety hazards wrought by operation at 138kV. MEA
argues that the Line at 115kV posed a negligible risk to a
snowmobiler crossing beneath it, while the Line at 138kV poses a
greater risk. But MEA fails to invoke the National Electrical
Safety Code or any other objective standard to assert that this
risk was not sufficiently abated by the conservatism built into
the Lines design parameters.
Finally, MEA presents insufficient evidence to overcome
the Commissions conclusions regarding the link between the
outages that occurred along the Line to its operation at 138kV.
Robert Drake, MEAs Director of Engineering, pointed out that
flashovers and outages occurred on the Line at a much higher
rate, and he blamed most of these outages of unknown cause on
inadequate insulation. But Haagenson disputed Drakes assertion,
testifying that theres lots of causes for outages. And LaRue
testified that an excess of voltage would cause continual
flashovers rather than the sporadic problems experienced along
the Line. Finally, MEA fails to challenge the Commissions
assertion that approximately 30 outages over a 17-year period are
not excessive, and the revenue loss associated with such outages
is more than offset by the wheeling revenues generated by the
joint use and interconnection.
In conclusion, we are convinced that the Commission
examined the evidence presented by the parties, including the
testimony of experts in the field, and on the basis of that
evidence decided that the Line could be operated safely and
reliably at 138kV. Because substantial evidence supports it, we
affirm the Commissions decision.
B. Any Error Made by the Hearing Commissioner in Denying
MEAs Request for Further Questioning of Haagenson Was
Harmless.
MEA argues that the Commission committed reversible
error when it denied its request to cross-examine Golden Valley
officer Steven Haagenson. Although MEA had previously declined
to cross-examine Haagenson, Commission Chairman Giard recalled
Haagenson for further questioning that went beyond the scope of
his pre-filed testimony. After being recalled to the stand,
Haagenson testified about the costs of reverting the Line to
115kV operation, including approximately one million dollars to
install a transformer. He then continued:
HAAGENSON: Theres also the ancillary cost as
well as being disconnected to be modified.
You cant get power from Fairbanks to
Anchorage either.
CHAIRMAN GIARD: How long do you think that
would take, the disconnection, is it weeks or
days or . . .
HAAGENSON: Youve got to build a substation
and pad and breakers to connect it together
so Id say youre six months to a year, I dont
know.
Counsel for MEA sought a clarification at the close of Haagensons
testimony:
MEAS COUNSEL: Your honor, no wait, we have no
questions for Mr. Haagenson originally, but I
do have one question that is prompted by
Commissioner Giards, a clarification prompted
by her question that I would like to ask Mr.
Haagenson.
But the hearing examiner refused to permit cross-examination of
Haagensons testimony because MEA had failed to cross-examine
Haagenson on his initial testimony:
HEARING EXAMINER CLARK: Well, ordinarily I
only allow examination for any questions that
exceed the scope of examination and since
there was none I dont really have a whole lot
of options there.
MEAS COUNSEL: All right.
MEAs counsel said nothing further to apprise the hearing examiner
of what specific issue she wished to clarify when seeking
permission for additional questioning.
As Alaska Evidence Rule 103 makes clear, we will not
reverse a ruling to exclude evidence unless a substantial right
of the party is affected, and the substance of the evidence was
made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the context
within which questions were asked. MEAs appeal falls short of
meeting all of these requirements.
We agree with the superior court that by failing to
make an offer of proof, MEA waived its claim of error on appeal.
Nothing in the context of MEAs request to ask a clarification
question makes apparent that it sought to challenge Haagensons
testimony on the potential downtime associated with reverting the
Line to 115kV operation. The transcript shows that MEAs counsel
made only a vague reference to Chairman Giards question, failing
to indicate which of the many questions asked by Chairman Giard
gave rise to an answer from Haagenson that affected one of MEAs
substantial rights.
MEA argues that the Alaska Rules of Evidence do not
apply to this case because the Alaska Administrative Code does
not bind hearing officers to follow the rules of evidence.13 But
MEA confuses this grant of discretion to administrative officers
with its own obligations for preserving its rights on appeal. We
have held in the context of other administrative appeals that a
partys failure to make an offer of proof acts as a waiver of any
claim of error regarding the exclusion of unspecified evidence.14
That rule applies here to exclude MEAs claim of error regarding
the exclusion of further testimony from Haagenson.
Second, assuming that the hearing commissioner
committed error by denying MEAs request for further questioning,15
MEA must still show that the alleged error bore a substantial
influence on the outcome of the case.16 MEA maintains that the
Commission misunderstood Haagensons testimony. Haagenson
testified that construction of a substation and pad and breakers
to connect [the Line and the Intertie] together could take six
months to a year. The Commission based its decision in part on
its observation that the [L]ine would not be operational for
approximately six months to one year while a transformer was
installed. Golden Valley concedes that the Commission erred in
this factual determination. Construction of the facilities
necessary to revert the Line to 115kV operation could extend up
to a year, but the disconnection time associated with the voltage
shift apparently would take at most 1-2 hours.
We do not view this possible factual error as a
substantial influence on the outcome of the case. The
Commissions decision primarily addresses the safety and
reliability of operating the Line at 138kV, rather than the cost
of operating the Line at 115kV. After having dismissed the
safety and reliability concerns raised by MEA, the Commissions
decision notes that [c]onversion of the [L]ine to 115kV usage at
this time would require approximately $1 million to install a
transformer. There is no persuasive evidence that the
expenditure is necessary. Only after reaching this conclusion
did the Commission make its alleged misstatement that [i]n
addition, the [L]ine would not be operational for approximately
six months to one year. If the evidence failed to convince the
Commission that the conversion would justify the million dollar
cost of a transformer, the additional costs of disconnection are
unlikely to have influenced the outcome. The Commissions
decision gives little indication that the downtime associated
with reversion drove its analysis.
V. CONCLUSION
Because substantial evidence supports the Commissions
determination that the Line can operate safely and reliably at
138kV, and because any error in refusing MEAs request for cross-
examination was harmless, we AFFIRM.
_______________________________
1 The Alaska Energy Authoritys predecessor, the Alaska
Power Authority, managed the construction.
2 According to MEA, Golden Valley Electric Association,
Inc. (Golden Valley) expressed interest in these negotiations but
refused to enter into a routine confidentiality agreement.
3 Specifically, Golden Valley; Municipality of Anchorage
d/b/a Municipal Light and Power (ML&P); Chugach Electric
Association, Inc.; and City of Seward, d/b/a Seward Electric
System filed applications with the Commission.
4 The parties also presented evidence to the Commission
in support of rival wheeling rates the compensation that MEA
receives for the joint use and interconnection of the Line.
5 Golden Valley concedes that the Commission erred in
this factual determination. Construction of the facilities
necessary to revert the Line to 115kV operation could extend up
to a year; however, the disconnection time associated with the
voltage shift apparently would take at most 1-2 hours.
6 Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. DeShong, 77 P.3d 1227,
1231 (Alaska 2003).
7 Amerada Hess Pipeline Corp. v. Regulatory Commn of
Alaska, 176 P.3d 667 (Alaska 2008).
8 Fleegel v. Estate of Boyles, 61 P.3d 1267, 1270 (Alaska
2002).
9 AS 42.05.321.
10 MEA argues that the issue whether the Commission erred
in requiring the Line to operate at 138kV is a question of law
going to the Commissions jurisdiction under the provisions of its
enabling act, AS 42.05.141. But MEAs claim that the Commission
acted outside of its jurisdiction hinges on complex factual
assessments of the proper safety parameters for the Line. MEA
misplaces its reliance on Homer Electric Assn, Inc. v. City of
Kenai, 816 P.2d 182, 184 (Alaska 1991), in which we adopted the
substitution of judgment test to review a lower courts ruling
that the Alaska Public Utilities Commission lacked jurisdiction
to decide a dispute.
11 The Department of Labor has promulgated regulations
implementing AS 18.60.580. See 8 Alaska Administrative Code
(AAC) 70.025(b) (adopting the 2002 Edition of the National
Electrical Safety Code by reference as the minimum electrical
safety standards of the state).
12 MEA does not contend that Alaska law compels utilities
to follow the Rural Electrification Administration standards or
any other standards apart from the National Electrical Safety
Code.
13 See 3 AAC 48.154(a).
14 AT&T Alascom v. Orchitt, 161 P.3d 1232, 1245 (Alaska
2007) (citing Adamson v. Univ. of Alaska, 819 P.2d 886, 889-90
(Alaska 1991)).
15 We are inclined to agree with MEA that the hearing
commissioner erred in refusing the request for cross-examination.
16 Coulson v. Marsh & McLennan, Inc., 973 P.2d 1142, 1146
(Alaska 1999).
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