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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Hallam v. Holland America Line, Inc. (04/18/2008) sp-6252
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage,
Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
| STUART HALLAM, individually | ) |
| and as class representative, | ) Supreme Court Nos. S-12573/12584 |
| ) | |
| Appellant/ | ) Superior Court No. 1JU-96-01734 CI |
| Cross-Appellee, | ) |
| ) O P I N I O N | |
| v. | ) |
| ) No. 6252 April 18, 2008 | |
| HOLLAND AMERICA LINE, INC., | ) |
| HOLLAND AMERICA LINE- | ) |
| WESTOURS, INC., and | ) |
| WESTOURS MOTOR COACHES, | ) |
| INC., | ) |
| ) | |
| Appellees/ | ) |
| Cross-Appellants. | ) |
| ) | |
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State
of Alaska, First Judicial District, Juneau,
Michael A. Thompson, Judge.
Appearances: John E. Casperson and William
D. De Voe, Holmes Weddle & Barcott, Seattle,
Washington, for Appellant and Cross-Appellee.
Stephen M. Rummage and Eric J. Jenkins, Davis
Wright Tremaine LLP, Anchorage, for Appellees
and Cross-Appellants.
Before: Fabe, Chief Justice, Matthews, and
Winfree, Justices. [Eastaugh and Carpeneti,
Justices, not participating.]
FABE, Chief Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
Stuart Hallam, a former employee of the Holland America
Line-Westours Company, appeals the superior courts dismissal of
his class action, maintaining that (1) Holland America Line-
Westours, Holland America Line-USA, and all of the companies
Alaska subsidiaries (Holland America) failed to pay adequate
overtime compensation to employees, and (2) Holland America
failed to timely pay compensation to terminated employees within
three days, as required by AS 23.05.140(b). In light of the
plain language of the statute, the legislatures unambiguous
directives, and the case law, we affirm the superior courts
dismissal of Hallams claims.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
This case comes to us for a second time on appeal.1 We
summarized the facts and proceedings leading to Hallams prior
appeal as follows:
Stuart Hallam was employed as a bus
driver for Holland America Line, Inc. between
May 10 and August 20, 1994. Hallams
employment agreement included an incentive
program that provided a bonus based on the
employees safety record, job performance, and
customer service. Although his last day of
work was August 20, 1994, Hallam did not
receive his final pay check until September
1, and did not receive his incentive bonus
until October 27. As Holland America
concedes, Hallam did not receive his final
paycheck from Holland America within the
three-day time period prescribed by AS
23.05.140(b).
Hallam filed a pro se complaint against
Holland America in superior court on August
19, 1996 alleging (1) failure to pay
overtime; (2) failure to pay for every hour
worked; (3) failure to pay the final paycheck
within three days of termination; (4) breach
of contract for failure to pay overtime
wages; and (5) breach of contract for failure
to pay an incentive bonus as contracted.
Hallam filed a motion to amend his complaint
to allege four new claims on April 25, 1997.
Superior Court Judge Walter L. Carpeneti
denied that motion, holding that the four new
claims were barred by the statute of
limitations because they did not relate back.
Hallam also filed a motion for class
certification. The court denied that motion
because Hallam was not represented by
counsel; the court then transferred
jurisdiction to the district court.
Hallam filed a motion for
reconsideration, arguing that AS 23.10.110(b)
specifically allows pro se litigants to bring
class actions. This motion was denied.
Hallam then filed a motion with the district
court seeking conditional certification of
the class, with certification contingent on
Hallam hiring an attorney. The court never
decided Hallams conditional class
certification motion.
Holland America moved for summary
judgment on Hallams first, second, and fourth
claims for relief, arguing that they were
barred by the two-year statute of
limitations. District Court Judge Peter B.
Froehlich granted Holland Americas motion for
summary judgment over Hallams opposition, and
denied Hallams motion for reconsideration.
Superior Court Judge Larry R. Weeks denied
Hallams petition for review. Hallam then
filed a motion for summary judgment on all of
his claims for relief including those which
had been dismissed reserving only his fifth
claim.
Holland America filed a motion for
summary judgment on Hallams third and fifth
claims, arguing that its failure to pay
Hallam within three days of termination did
not warrant a penalty. Hallams opposition
argued that Holland Americas willful failure
to pay wages within three days of termination
justified a penalty. Holland America also
moved for attorneys fees and costs. Hallam
argued in opposition that the Alaska Wage and
Hour Act did not allow defendants to collect
attorneys fees and costs. Judge Froehlich
granted Holland Americas summary judgment
motion, and awarded Holland America attorneys
fees and costs.[2]
Hallam appealed, and we reversed and remanded the case
to the superior court for consideration of Hallams undecided
motion for class certification conditioned on obtaining counsel.3
We also noted genuine, material fact disputes surrounding Holland
Americas good faith and the amount of [Hallams] performance
bonus.4 Specifically, we determined that further discovery could
be relevant to Hallams claim that Holland America exercised bad
faith by failing to provide Hallam with customer comment cards,
which had affected his bonus.5 Finally, we held that the lower
court should have granted Hallam leave to amend his complaint,
although we took care to express no opinion as to whether the new
claims will relate back.6
On remand, Hallam retained counsel and filed an amended
complaint that named as defendants both Holland America Line-
Westours, Inc., and its parent corporation, Holland America Line,
Inc. In his motion for class certification, Hallam included
several categories of employees at the two companies as well as
at their Alaska subsidiaries. On September 24, 2002, the
superior court granted Hallams motion for class certification and
allowed Hallam to amend his complaint. The superior court
further held that all but one of Hallams claims would relate back
to the date of his original complaint.7
But the superior court denied Hallams application to
apply Judge Weekss 1999 decision on the statutory overtime claim
as the law of the case. Rejecting Hallams pyramiding theory,
Superior Court Judge Michael A. Thompson stated his disagreement
with Judge Weekss interpretation of AS 23.10.060 in an April 16,
2003 memorandum decision. Not long after the superior courts
ruling in this case, we addressed a similar claim brought by
Hallam against another employer, Alaska Travel Adventures.8 In
that case, we held that precedent, legislative direction, agency
interpretation, and policy considerations supported the lower
courts decision rejecting pyramiding.9
On March 18, 2004, the superior court narrowed the
class of employees entitled to seek penalties from Holland
America and its subsidiaries for late payment of final wages.
The court found that only employees who had made a demand for
payment could claim penalties under AS 23.05.140. Otherwise, the
court reasoned, the statutes three-day payment deadline should
not apply since [p]enalties for the failure to depart from
regular established practice, without any request to do so, seem
unjustified and an unlikely design of the Legislature. On August
2, 2004, the superior court granted Holland Americas motion for
summary judgment on Hallams overtime claims.
Hallam and Holland America then reached a settlement,
which resolved Hallams remaining claims, including his
allegations that the company had improperly destroyed records
used to calculate employee bonuses. The settlement agreement
nevertheless permitted Hallam to file this appeal challenging the
superior courts rulings on his overtime and late payment claims.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo a superior courts dismissal of a
complaint on summary judgment.10 We have recognized that the law
of the case doctrine is not an absolute rule of law but rather a
matter of sound judicial policy, and that it falls within the
power of one trial court judge to overrule another, in the proper
exercise of judicial discretion.11 We therefore review a lower
courts decision to apply the law of the case doctrine for abuse
of discretion.12
IV. DISCUSSION
A. The Law of the Case Doctrine Did Not Prevent Judge
Thompson from Ruling Against Hallam on His Claim for
Additional Overtime Pay.
Hallams appeal focuses primarily on the superior courts
rejection of pyramiding13 as the proper basis for calculating
overtime wages in Alaska. Hallam contends that because Holland
America failed to appeal Judge Weekss ruling on the merits of
that claim, Judge Thompson was not permitted to depart from Judge
Weekss analysis without finding that it presented a clear error
constituting a manifest injustice.14
Although Hallam argues to the contrary, the law of the
case doctrine implicates a courts discretion. In our prior
decisions, we have defined the doctrine as a matter of judicial
policy, which describes the practice of courts generally to
refuse to reopen what has been decided, but does not limit their
power to do so.15 And where a judge newly assigned to a case
reverses the ruling of the formerly presiding judge, as Judge
Thompson did in this case, we have determined that the doctrine
of law of the case is inapplicable.16
In any event, several factors justify Judge Thompsons
reversal of Judge Weekss ruling. Hallam cannot point to a single
jurisdiction that has ever adopted his pyramiding theory. The
relevant case law, now and before Judge Thompsons decision,
undermines his theory.17 And the legislature enacted a 1999 law
in the wake of Judge Weekss decision stating its intent to
override the superior courts decision in Hallam v. Holland
America Line, Inc. because the court in that case misinterpreted
the intent of AS 23.10.060(b).18
In Alaska Travel Adventures, we signaled our agreement
with the legislature, explaining that the Alaska Department of
Labors longstanding interpretation of the statute has precluded
pyramiding, and that precedent, legislative direction, agency
interpretation, and policy considerations . . . persuade us that
the superior court did not err when it granted [Alaska Travel
Adventures] summary judgment on the pyramiding claim.19 Hallam
dismisses Alaska Travel Adventures because the case was not
published, has no precedential effect, and may not be cited.
Unpublished decisions may still have persuasive value, however,
and Hallam has failed to demonstrate any grounds that might lead
us to distinguish the rationale for our decision in Alaska Travel
Adventures.20
B. Hallams Contract-Based Claim for Overtime Pay Fails for
the Same Reasons as His Statutory Claim.
Hallam attaches a variation of his overtime claim to
the particular language of Holland Americas employment contract.
Specifically, he argues that even if Judge Thompson correctly
ruled that the overtime statute entitles Hallam to no relief,
language in Holland Americas standard form employment contract,
when construed in favor of Hallam and the class, supports the
pyramiding claim. Holland Americas employment contract states:
I agree by signing this contract, to work for
Westours for the basic wage of $8.00 per
hour. This wage is for straight time for the
first eight (8) hours per day, the first
forty (40) hours of each week. I understand
that my assignments may result in my working
more or less than eight (8) hours per day or
forty (40) hours per week. I will only be
paid for actual hours worked. For any hours
in excess of eight (8) hours in a day or
forty (40) in a week, overtime compensation
will be paid at 1.5 times the basic rate
which will be $12.00 per hour.
Hallam argues that this language clearly and unambiguously
required overtime compensation for any hours in excess of forty
hours in a week.
The same factors that control our analysis of the
statutory overtime provision apply here as well. Hallam
emphasizes the contracts reference to straight time and attempts
to parse the meaning of particular phrases in the contract to
support his claim. But we have held that a court should construe
each part of a contract with every other part to create a
harmonious whole.21 And such a construction, along with the
context and function of Holland Americas employment contract,
leads us to interpret it in the same manner as the overtime
statute whose language it resembles. Hallams alternative
interpretation does not comport with the reasonable expectations
of the thousands of people employed by Westours between 1990 and
1998. And indeed, Hallam gives no indication that any other
Holland America employees read their employment contracts to
promise pyramiding of overtime hours.
C. The Superior Court Correctly Rejected Hallams Claim for
Damages Under AS 23.05.140.
Hallam alleges that Holland America failed to pay
seasonal bonuses to him and other members of the class within the
statutorily prescribed period, thereby entitling them to damages.
He relies on AS 23.05.140 and its directive that employers pay
terminated employees within three working days to support his
claim for damages.22 Hallam argues that Judge Thompson erred in
reading the pay period statute to require that employees make a
demand for wages in order to maintain a claim under the statute.
Alaska Statute 23.05.140 mandates that where an
employer terminates a worker, regardless of the cause for the
termination, payment is due within three working days after the
termination.23 The statute proceeds to define the penalty for an
employer failing to pay within the time required as the amount of
the employees regular wage, salary, or other compensation from
the time of demand to the time of payment, or for 90 working
days, whichever is the lesser amount.24 Hallam argues that
Holland America paid seasonal bonuses to him and to other
employees long after the statutorily mandated three days had
passed.25 Consequently, he seeks damages for a class defined as
employees who did not receive timely final bonus paychecks.
We agree with the superior courts conclusion that
AS 23.05.140 affords Hallam no relief. The superior court ruled
that Hallam and the other class members could not bring claims
under AS 23.05.140 unless they had made a demand, reasoning that
it would be unjustified to penalize Holland America based on the
companys regular established practice of paying bonuses in the
fall and beyond three days after the end of the summer tourist
season absent a demand for earlier payment. Here, it is
important to note that Holland America did not withhold hourly
wages beyond three days after Hallams termination. Instead it
paid a bonus in accordance with a straightforward contractual
term providing for that incentive bonus to be paid by October
31st. That contract term does not implicate the interests that
the legislature sought to protect in enacting AS 23.05.140.
Thus, the trial court did not err in its determination that
Hallam and the class members were required at the least to make a
demand for premature payment of the seasonal bonus.26
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons detailed above, we AFFIRM the judgment
of the superior court.
_______________________________
1 See Hallam v. Holland Am. Line, Inc., 27 P.3d 751
(Alaska 2001).
2 Id. at 752-53 (footnotes omitted).
3 Id. at 752.
4 Id. at 755.
5 Id. at 756.
6 Id. at 755.
7 The superior court held that Hallams challenge to
Holland Americas practice of charging employees a uniform fee did
not relate back to the date of his original complaint but rather
to the date on which Hallam sought to add that claim with his
amended complaint.
8 See Hallam v. Alaska Travel Adventures, Mem. Op. & J.
No. 1173, 2004 WL 1535161 (Alaska, July 7, 2004).
9 Id. at *5.
10 West v. Umialik Ins. Co., 8 P.3d 1135, 1137 (Alaska
2000).
11 West v. Buchanan, 981 P.2d 1065, 1067 (Alaska 1999).
12 See Stepanov v. Gavrilovich, 594 P.2d 30, 36 (Alaska
1979).
13 An example best illustrates Hallams theory. If an
employee works nine hours on Monday, followed by eight hours per
day Tuesday through Friday, for a total of forty-one hours,
Hallam argues that the employee should receive two hours of
overtime pay one for working in excess of eight hours on Monday
plus one for working in excess of forty hours during the week.
Holland America, by contrast, argues that the hour exceeding the
forty hour per week limit is the same as the hour exceeding the
daily eight hour limit, and therefore Hallam is double-counting
the same overtime work. We have previously endorsed Holland
Americas view. See Alaska Travel Adventures, 2004 WL 1535161.
14 Petrolane Inc. v. Robles, 154 P.3d 1014, 1026 (Alaska
2007).
15 Smith v. Cleary, 24 P.3d 1245, 1248 (Alaska 2001)
(quoting West v. Buchanan, 981 P.2d at 1067).
16 Hayes v. Xerox Corp., 718 P.2d 929, 934 (Alaska 1986).
17 See, e.g., Piquniq Mgmt. Corp. v. Reeves, 965 P.2d 732,
733 n.1 (Alaska 1998) (employing overtime computation that does
not rely on pyramiding); Monzon v. Schaefer Ambulance Serv.,
Inc., 273 Cal. Rptr. 615, 627 (Cal. App. 1990) (rejecting
pyramiding under California law because of its absurd
consequence[s]).
18 Ch. 43, 1, SLA 1999.
19 2004 WL 1535161, at *4-5.
20 See Alaska Supreme Court Order No. 1654 (April 15,
2008) (amending Alaska Rule of Appellate Procedure 214(d) and
providing that [i]f a party believes . . . that an unpublished
decision has persuasive value in relation to an issue in the
case, and that there is no published opinion that would serve as
well, the party may cite the unpublished opinion); McCoy v.
State, 80 P.3d 757, 759 (Alaska App. 2002) (noting the
appropriate use of unpublished opinions as persuasive precedent
in addition to such purposes as collateral estoppel, res
judicata, or law of the case).
21 See, e.g., Earthmovers of Fairbanks, Inc. v. State, 644
P.2d 238, 239-40 (Alaska 1982).
22 AS 23.05.140(b) provides:
If the employment is terminated, all
wages, salaries, or other compensation for
labor or services become due immediately and
shall be paid within the time required by
this subsection . . . . If the employment is
terminated by the employer, regardless of the
cause for the termination, payment is due
within three working days after the
termination.
23 Id.
24 AS 23.05.140(d).
25 Holland Americas employment contract with Hallam and
other employees states that [i]ncentive compensation will be paid
by October 31, 1994.
26 Because the parties settled the late payment claims
with respect to those employees who did make a demand, we do not
address those claims.
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