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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Olivit v. City & Borough of Juneau (11/23/2007) sp-6206
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage,
Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
| JAKE OLIVIT, SR., | ) |
| ) Supreme Court No. S- 12216 | |
| Appellant, | ) |
| ) Superior Court No. 1JU-05-00573 CI | |
| v. | ) |
| ) O P I N I O N | |
| CITY and BOROUGH OF | ) |
| JUNEAU; JOHN HARTLE; THE | ) No. 6206 November 23, 2007 |
| JUNEAU EMPIRE; and TONY | ) |
| CARROLL, | ) |
| ) | |
| Appellees. | ) |
| ) | |
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State
of Alaska, First Judicial District, Juneau,
Larry R. Weeks, Judge.
Appearances: Jake D. Olivit, Sr., pro se,
Juneau. Eric A. Kueffner, Faulkner Banfield,
P.C., Juneau, for Appellees City and Borough
of Juneau and John Hartle. L. Merrill
Lowden, Simpson, Tillinghast, & Sorensen,
Juneau, for Appellees Juneau Empire and Tony
Carroll.
Before: Fabe, Chief Justice, Matthews,
Eastaugh, Bryner, and Carpeneti, Justices.
EASTAUGH, Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2004 the Juneau Empire published an article with
this headline: City faces fifth lawsuit by man who claims
harassment. The article was largely about Jake Olivit, Sr. Six
months later Olivit sued the Empire, reporter Tony Carroll, the
City and Borough of Juneau, and city attorney John Hartle.
Olivits complaint, which implied that the City and Borough of
Juneau and Hartle had arranged for the articles publication to
retaliate against him, included claims for defamation, invasion
of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The superior court dismissed all of his claims. Olivit appeals,
asserting among other things that his claims should not have been
dismissed, that default should have been entered against the
Empire, and that the defendants should not have been awarded
attorneys fees. We affirm. It was not error to dismiss his
claims. The articles statements either were not defamatory or
were privileged because they concerned matters of public
importance. Olivit was not eligible for a default judgment
because the Empire filed its answer to Olivits complaint before
Olivit sought a default. We also conclude that the court did not
abuse its discretion in awarding the defendants twenty percent of
their attorneys fees as the prevailing parties.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
A. Factual History
This case arises out of a December 3, 2004 Juneau
Empire newspaper article about a lawsuit Jake Olivit, Sr., filed
on December 1, 2004 against the Juneau Police Department (JPD)
and JPD Officer Paul Comolli. Olivit alleged in that lawsuit,
Case No. 1JU-04-907 CI, that the JPD had engaged in a pattern of
harassment against him. Part of Olivits claim in that case was
that Officer Comolli had dropped a set of JPD keys on Olivits
property while carrying out a late-night harassing visit to
Olivits home. In the present case Olivit asserts that someone
claiming to be city attorney John Hartle called Olivit on
December 2, the day after Olivit filed suit against Officer
Comolli and the JPD, and threatened to discredit Olivit on the
front page of the Juneau Empire if Olivit did not return the JPD
keys in his possession. On the following day, December 3, the
Empire printed a story written by reporter Tony Carroll
describing Olivits suit against Officer Comolli and other suits
Olivit had brought against the City and Borough of Juneau. The
present lawsuit arises out of this December 3 article.
B. Procedural History
Olivit filed his complaint in this case against the
City and Borough of Juneau and John Hartle and the Juneau Empire
and Tony Carroll.1 He alleged in it that statements in the
December 3 article are untrue and were written to discredit and
attack him and his family. His complaint claimed [d]efamation of
[c]haracter with actual malice, invasion of privacy (false light)
with actual negligence, discrimination, [and] civil rights
violation of the First Amendment to the Constitution. His
initial complaint also named Gloria Olivit, Olivits wife, as a
plaintiff.
The CBJ moved for dismissal for failure to state a
claim under Alaska Civil Rule 8(a).2 The CBJ supported this
motion with an affidavit from John Hartle. Relying on Hartles
affidavit, the superior court treated the CBJs motion as one for
summary judgment, but held it in abeyance for thirty days because
Olivit was proceeding pro se. Noting the leniency extended to
pro se litigants in Alaska, the courts order explained Rule 8s
pleading rules and ordered Olivit to file a complaint that
satisfied Rule 8 within ten days. The court also ruled that
Olivit could not represent his wife and that she must either
represent herself or find outside counsel.
On August 29 Olivit moved to dismiss Gloria Olivit as a
plaintiff and simultaneously filed an unsworn response that did
not address the courts Rule 8 concerns.3 The CBJ then moved for
summary judgment, arguing that Olivit had failed to satisfy Rule
8, and the Empire, joined by the CBJ, moved under Alaska Civil
Rule 56(b) for summary judgment dismissing Olivits complaint for
failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted.4 On
October 14 Olivit responded to the defendants motions. The CBJ
replied, noting that Olivit had still failed to state a claim.
The court granted the defendants summary judgment motions and
dismissed Olivits pleadings for failure to state a claim. Olivit
appeals.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo.5 It
will be affirmed if there are no genuine issues of material fact
and if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.6 On review, all reasonable inferences of fact are drawn in
favor of the party against whom judgment was entered.7 The
moving party has the initial burden of offering admissible
evidence showing both the absence of any genuine dispute of fact
and the legal right to a judgment.8 Once that burden is
satisfied, the non-moving party, to avoid summary judgment, must
produce admissible evidence reasonably tending to dispute or
contradict the movants evidence.9 The non-moving party may not,
however, rest upon mere allegations, but must set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact.10
In addition, [t]o create a genuine issue of material fact there
must be more than a scintilla of contrary evidence.11 The
evidence in support of, or in opposition to, summary judgment
must be admissible under the Alaska Rules of Evidence.12
We review for abuse of discretion the superior courts
determination of which party is the prevailing party for
purposes of awarding attorneys fees.13
B. Olivit Fails To Make Out a Claim for Defamation Against
the Empire and CBJ Defendants.
1. Defamation, the public interest privilege, and
Olivits claims
Olivit contends that because there were genuine factual
disputes, it was error to dismiss his defamation claims against
the Empire.
To make out a claim for defamation, a plaintiff has to
establish (1) a false and defamatory statement; (2) an
unprivileged publication to a third party; (3) fault amounting at
least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and (4) the
existence of either per se actionability or special harm.14 A
communication is defamatory if it tends to harm the reputation of
another so as to lower him or her in the estimation of the
community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing
with him or her.15
Under the Alaska Constitution, a defamatory statement
may be conditionally privileged if it concerns a matter of public
interest. We have stated that there is a paramount public
interest permitting persons to speak or write freely without
being restrained by the possibility of a defamation action.16
Therefore, speech on matters of public safety is privileged, but
. . . this privilege is conditional and can be lost if the
plaintiff proves that the speaker uttered untruths with actual
malice.17 Unlike the majority of courts, we follow the rule that
the privilege [of public discussion] extends to non-malicious
misstatements of fact.18
Thus, to make out a claim for defamation based on
speech about a matter of public interest, a plaintiff must show
that the false and defamatory statements were made with actual
malice.19 Actual malice exists when it is proved that the
defamatory statement was made with knowledge that it was false or
with a reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.20 We
have applied this standard to both publishers21 and government
speakers.22
Olivit asserts that three passages in the Empires story
defamed him and are actionable: one regarding his history with
the city, another about an incident at the middle school
involving his children, and another regarding his plea of guilty
to a misdemeanor.
History with the city. The article quotes Hartle as
saying that the city was looking into Olivits accusations but
that it was skeptical, based on [Olivits] history with the city.
We assume Olivit is alluding, at least in part, to this statement
when he notes on appeal that the article states that I had a
violent criminal history with the city. In his initial verified
complaint Olivit stated that he maintains no history with the
City of Juneau. (Emphasis in original.)
Olivits children. Olivit states that his children are
not criminals as stated in [the] article. Olivit is apparently
referring to the articles statement that Olivits previous suit
against the city grew out of an April 26 incident at Floyd Dryden
Middle School involving Olivits two sons, the older one taking
money for the younger one, a student there. In his verified
complaint in the case now before us, Olivit stated that [t]he
Olivit children were not involved with any criminal activities.
In his sworn response to the CBJs motion for summary judgment,
Olivit stated that in fact his son was attacked by a school
administrator while engaged in running an errand for his mother
by delivery [of] money to his younger brother who attended Floyd
Dryden.
Misdemeanor guilty plea. The article states that
Olivit pleaded guilty to misdemeanor assault following the
incident at Floyd Dryden Middle School.23 The Empire admits on
appeal that this is incorrect because Olivit entered a guilty
plea to misdemeanor disorderly conduct rather than assault.24
Olivit might be referring to this error when he objects to what
he describes as the articles statement that he had a violent
criminal history with the city. Because Olivit stated in his
verified complaint that he never pled guilty to misdemeanor
assault,25 we assume that Olivit is arguing that he was defamed by
the articles misdescription of the misdemeanor to which he
pleaded guilty.
The article about Olivit generally concerns matters of
public interest. A claim that the JPD was harassing members of
the public, as Olivit asserted in his lawsuit against Officer
Comolli and the JPD, is a matter of public interest because it
raises questions about the propriety of official or ostensibly
official conduct of JPD officers. Furthermore, Olivits repeated
lawsuits adversely affected the city, especially fiscally, and
the financial effect of defense costs is a matter of public
interest. And the city attorneys description of lawsuits against
the city and his description of the plaintiff in those suits is a
matter of public interest. Events at a local middle school that
lead to criminal charges and a civil lawsuit are also matters of
public interest, as are criminal charges and guilty pleas
relating to local events. Therefore, each of the articles three
challenged statements is conditionally privileged and not
actionable unless it was false and defamatory and uttered with
actual malice.26
2. Defamation claims against Tony Carroll and the
Juneau Empire
We therefore consider whether there is a potential
factual dispute about whether Carroll and the Empire acted with
actual malice. Although Olivit asserts that the Empire profited
from publishing the allegedly defamatory article, he does not
explain how. And even if the Empire did profit, that is not
evidence that permissibly implies that the article was published
with actual malice. In his verified complaint, Olivit stated
that the fact that Tony Carroll and the Juneau Empire failed to
confirm anything stated as fact was pure negligence and compounds
the malicious act because they were used by the City and its
representatives. In his verified response to the CBJs request
for summary judgment, Olivit stated that we can only guess the
motivation behind Tony Carrolls actions, they were negligent to
say the least.
Olivit frequently used the word malicious below and
uses the same word in his appellants brief, but he produced no
evidence that Carroll or the Empire acted maliciously. Carroll
swore in his affidavit that he believed everything in the article
to be true. Carroll also explained in his affidavit that he
relied on Alaska Court System records and interviews with four
city officials, including Hartle, in writing the article, and
that he unsuccessfully attempted to contact Olivit. No evidence
rebuts any of these assertions. The record contains no evidence
permitting an inference that Carroll knew or should have known
before publication that any statement in the article was untrue.
We therefore hold that Olivit has not demonstrated that there is
a genuine factual dispute about whether Carroll and the Empire
acted with actual malice as to the article generally or as to the
three passages Olivit discusses on appeal.
Olivit seems to assert on appeal that Hartle conspired
with Carroll to publish false information about Olivit, but he
has pointed to no evidence permitting a reasonable inference of
any such conspiracy. We therefore affirm the summary judgment
entered in favor of Carroll and the Empire.
3. Defamation claims against Hartle and the CBJ
Olivit argues that it was error to dismiss the
defamation claim against Hartle and the CBJ. He contends that
the CBJ defendants deliberately made false statements about
Olivit to interfere with Olivits pending suit against the city
and to cause him economic loss. Olivit made a similar claim in
his initial verified complaint, where he seemed to imply that
Hartle was retaliating against him because Olivit refused, in
response to Hartles demands and threats, to return JPD keys to
the city. He claims that Hartle and the CBJ acted with actual
malice.
We choose to take a different analytical approach in
considering whether, as Olivit contends, it was error to dismiss
the defamation claims against the CBJ and Hartle. Instead of
focusing on the malice issue, we consider whether the challenged
statements were false and defamatory as to Olivit and whether
Hartle was the source of the published information.
Olivits history. In reference to Olivits suit against
Officer Comolli and the JPD, the article quotes Hartle as saying
[w]e are looking into it, but were skeptical, based on [Olivits]
history with the city. Olivit reads the statement as implying he
has a violent criminal history with the city. The context of the
article strongly implies that Hartle was referring to Olivits
history of suing the city, not to any criminal history. The
headline of the article was City faces fifth lawsuit by man who
claims harassment, and Hartles expression of his skepticism was
made in the context of whether Olivits harassment claims in this,
his fifth lawsuit, might be legitimate. Olivit does in fact have
a history of bringing suits against the city, so the quoted
statement is essentially true and is not defamatory. The
statement cannot plausibly be read as implying that the cause of
Hartles expressed skepticism was any violent criminal history
Olivit might have had with the city.
Olivits children. Olivit also seems to imply that
Hartle provided Carroll with false information regarding the
incident with Olivits children at Floyd Dryden Middle School.
Olivit states that the article defamed his family name, and that
the defamation was a malicious act perpetrated by John Hartle and
Tony Carroll. His brief declares, [m]y children are not
criminals as stated in [the] article. He thus seems to imply
that Hartle was the source of allegedly false information about
his children. In a verified pleading he filed in superior court,
Olivit stated that John Hartle was well aware Mr. Olivits
children were not involved in criminal activities at Floyd Dryden
Middle School.
We doubt that the passage is defamatory. The articles
statement that the older one [took] money for the younger one
does not state or necessarily imply that the older boy was
stealing. By Olivits own account, his older son was delivering
money to the younger one. That is the most plausible way to read
the articles words. The article does not suggest that the act of
taking the money caused the older boy to be subject to discipline
or treated as a juvenile offender or that either boy did anything
wrong. The focus of the article was on Olivits own conduct and
the criminal consequences to him.
In any event, the reference to his children did not
defame Olivit himself.27 Olivit himself does not have a
defamation claim based on any alleged defamation of his children,28
and he has not attempted to assert a defamation claim on their
behalf.
Misdemeanor plea. Olivit seems to base his defamation
claim against Hartle and the CBJ relating to the articles
discussion of the guilty plea on his theory that Hartle
intentionally gave erroneous information about the plea to
Carroll, who then published it. Olivit stated in his verified
response to Hartle and the CBJs summary judgment motions that
Hartle knew beyond any doubt Mr. Olivit did not plead guilty to
misdemeanor assault. Olivits statement in his verified response
does not say, but may imply, that Olivit believes Hartle colluded
with Carroll to publish false information regarding Olivits
misdemeanor charge, or at least intentionally gave Carroll
erroneous information about the plea.
But Carroll swore in an affidavit that he believed he
utilized the Alaska Court System records system to learn of the
2002 criminal misdemeanor case . . . in which Mr. Olivit pleaded
guilty to a misdemeanor. Olivit does not rebut Carrolls sworn
statement or assert that Hartle was the source of the erroneous
information; he merely asserts that Hartle knew the information
was false. Olivits statement is consistent with Carrolls
assertion that his information came from the public record, which
lists the crime charged as Assault Physical Menace. Moreover,
Hartle stated in his affidavit that he made the statements
attributed to [him] in the article. The article did not
attribute to Hartle any information about the misdemeanor plea.
Olivits evidence was insufficient to rebut Carrolls
affidavit and preserve a genuine factual dispute material to his
defamation claim against Hartle based on the misdemeanor plea
passage. Absent any evidence permitting a reasonable inference
that Hartle was a source of the incorrect information published
about the guilty plea, the articles discussion of the plea cannot
be the basis of a defamation claim against Hartle and the CBJ.
In short, even assuming Olivits sworn pleadings are
true, none of the allegedly false and defamatory information
Olivit attributes to Hartle can be the basis for the defamation
claim. We therefore affirm the summary judgment entered in favor
of Hartle and the CBJ.
C. Olivit Failed To Preserve His Claim for False Light
Invasion of Privacy.
The article stated that [d]ocuments show the family
settled [a 2002 lawsuit] for $25,000. In his initial verified
complaint Olivit asserted that [t]he Olivit family did not
receive $25,000 for all lawsuits filed. Later, in his unsworn
response to the Empires motion for summary judgment, Olivit
stated that Carroll violate[d] the rights of privacy afforded to
the Olivit family when he printed, disclosed, and divulged
privileged information regarding financial settlements gained on
behalf of Mr. Olivits children. In his brief to this court,
Olivit states that [r]epresentatives of the City promised
explicit confidentiality in the settlement of previous lawsuits
regarding monies received on behalf of our children. (Emphasis
in original.)
In arguing that representatives of the city broke their
promise and they broke a contractual agreement, Olivit implies
that Hartle was the source of the information. The article does
not attribute the statement to Hartle, but rather to court
documents. But assuming Olivit is correct that Hartle divulged
the details of the lawsuit, Olivit has produced no evidence that
the settlement was private or that the CBJ or Hartle owed any
duty to keep it confidential. Additionally, Olivits brief does
not refer to the right to privacy, aside from a passing reference
in a confusing list of issues that includes defamation of
character with actual malice, invasion of privacy (false light)
with actual negligence, discrimination, civil rights violation of
First Amendment and liable per se, IIED, and economic loss. Even
considering the leniency that we grant to pro se litigants,29
Olivits passing reference to privacy in his brief does not
preserve any claim of invasion of privacy or false light invasion
of privacy.30
D. Olivit Did Not Preserve His NIED or IIED Claims.
Olivits list of appellate issues mentions intentional
infliction of emotional distress (IIED). Olivits initial
complaint did not allege IIED, and he did not move to amend the
complaint to add that claim. He first referred to emotional
distress in his October 2005 Plaintiffs Response to Defense
Motion for Summary Dismissal of Tony Carroll and Juneau Empire;
he there stated that Carroll and the Empire were guilty of both
IIED and negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED).
Olivit advanced a similar argument against Hartle and the CBJ in
his Plaintiffs Response to Defense Motion for Summary Dismissal
of John Hartle and CBJ. In neither document did Olivit attempt
to show how Carrolls or Hartles behavior satisfied the
requirements of either IIED or NIED. The superior court did not
address IIED or NIED beyond naming them as new theories of
liability that Olivit had belatedly set out without presenting
claims for which he is entitled to relief. Because Olivit did
not raise his IIED and NIED claims in a timely manner in the
superior court, and because he does no more than mention IIED in
his appellants brief,31 he has not preserved these claims.
E. Other Issues
1. The superior court was not biased against Olivit.
Olivit asserts that the superior courts dismissal and
judgment were prejudiced, discriminative, and unconstitutional.
Our review of the record reveals no indication whatsoever that
Superior Court Judge Larry R. Weeks treated Olivit in anything
less than a fair and impartial manner. The superior court made
exemplary efforts in instructing and advising Olivit, a pro se
litigant, on how to proceed. That the superior court ruled
against Olivit on matters properly before the court, and
ultimately granted summary judgment dismissing his claims, does
not imply partiality or bias.32
2. The superior court did not err in refusing to
enter default judgment against the Empire.
Olivit argues that the superior court erred in refusing
to enter default judgment against the Empire. Olivit requested
an entry of default after the Empire answered its complaint four
days late.
Per Alaska Civil Rule 55, [w]hen a party against whom a
judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to appear
and answer . . . and that fact is shown by affidavit or
otherwise, the clerk shall enter a default.33 After the defendant
has thus been defaulted, the plaintiff may apply for entry of a
default judgment.34 A party may respond to any pleading at any
time before a default is entered.35 Olivit first requested a
default after the Empire answered his complaint. The Empire
filed its answer for itself and Carroll on July 8, 2005, five
days before Olivit requested a default. The Empire therefore did
not fail to appear, and the clerk could not have entered default
against it after it filed its answer. There is no automatic
default, and because the Empire responded to Olivits claim before
a default was even sought, no default was possible.
3. The superior court did not err in granting
attorneys fees to the CBJ and the Empire per Rule
82(b).
The superior court, per Alaska Civil Rule 82(b),
awarded attorneys fees of $2,110.10 to the Empire and attorneys
fees of $1,403.70 to the CBJ. Olivit contests these awards. He
claims that (1) the Empires fees were inflated and fraudulent;
(2) the CBJ did not request fees in a timely manner; (3) the CBJ
and the Empire did not prevail at trial; and (4) fees awards to
the CBJ and the Empire violate the Alaska Constitutions due
process clause.
Alaska Civil Rule 82 provides that the prevailing party
in a civil case shall be awarded attorneys fees.36 If the case
does not go to trial the prevailing party receives 20 percent of
its actual attorneys fees which were necessarily incurred.37 The
defendants are the prevailing parties in this case because the
superior court granted summary judgment in their favor.38 Because
the CBJ and the Empire defendants were the prevailing parties and
because there is no reason to think the total fees they
respectively incurred ($7,018.50 and $10,555.50) are
unreasonable, the superior court did not err in awarding them
twenty percent of the fees they each incurred.
There is likewise no colorable basis for thinking that
awarding the attorneys fees denied Olivit due process of law.
4. Olivit waived any other issues.
Olivits brief also asserts discrimination, civil rights
violation of First Amendment . . . and economic loss against the
CBJ and the Empire. Because Olivit does not support these
contentions factually or legally, they are deemed waived.39
IV. CONCLUSION
We therefore AFFIRM on all issues.
_______________________________
1 Unless context requires greater specificity, we refer
collectively to the City and Borough of Juneau and Hartle as the
CBJ or the CBJ defendants, and to the Juneau Empire and Carroll
as the Empire.
2 Alaska Civil Rule 8 explains the general rules of
pleading and requires a plaintiff to set forth claims for which
he is entitled to relief against each named defendant.
3 Olivits appeal does not contend that he should have
been allowed to represent Gloria Olivit or that she should have
been allowed to proceed as a plaintiff. Jake Olivit, Sr., is the
only appellant.
4 The Empires motion sought summary judgment dismissing
Olivits action for failure to state a claim for which relief may
be granted. This is the standard for dismissal under Alaska
Civil Rule 12(b)(6). Because the superior court granted summary
judgment against Olivit, we apply our usual standard for
reviewing a grant of summary judgment. See Part III.A.
5 Alaska Action Ctr., Inc. v. Municipality of Anchorage,
84 P.3d 989, 991 (Alaska 2004).
6 Norville v. Carr-Gottstein Foods, Co., 84 P.3d 996,
1000 n.1 (Alaska 2004).
7 Crawford v. Kemp, 139 P.3d 1249, 1253 (Alaska 2006).
8 Cikan v. ARCO Alaska, Inc., 125 P.3d 335, 339 (Alaska
2005).
9 Id. (citation omitted).
10 Id. (citation omitted).
11 Id. (citation omitted).
12 Alaska R. Civ. P. 56(e); Murat v. F/V Shelikof Strait,
793 P.2d 69, 74-75 (Alaska 1990).
13 Meidinger v. Koniag, Inc., 31 P.3d 77, 88 (Alaska
2001).
14 French v. Jadon, Inc., 911 P.2d 20, 32 (Alaska 1996).
See also Restatement (Second) of Torts 558 (1977).
15 Briggs v. Newton, 984 P.2d 1113, 1120-21 (Alaska 1999)
(citation and punctuation omitted). See also Restatement
(Second) of Torts 559 (1977).
16 Fairbanks Pub. Co. v. Francisco, 390 P.2d 784, 793
(Alaska 1964).
17 Taranto v. N. Slope Borough, 992 P.2d 1111, 1115
(Alaska 1999).
18 Pearson v. Fairbanks Pub. Co., 413 P.2d 711, 714
(Alaska 1966).
19 Id.
20 Id. at 715.
21 See Pearson, 413 P.2d at 714; Francisco, 390 P.2d at
793.
22 See Taranto, 992 P.2d at 1115.
23 Regarding the incident at Floyd Dryden Middle School,
the article states that Olivit said that after he complained to
police about it, he was arrested . . . . Olivit later pleaded
guilty to misdemeanor assault in an agreement that imposed one
year on probation without any jail time or fine.
24 The criminal judgment states, [t]he defendant was found
and adjudged: GUILTY OF: Disorderly Conduct Challenge To
Fight/Fight.
25 Olivit also asserted in his verified complaint that
[l]awsuits filed in Federal Court were not dismissed in the
fashion printed. The article attributes to Hartle the statement
that [o]ther suits Olivit has filed have gone to federal court
and have been dismissed. Olivit does not mention this discussion
of federal suits in his brief to this court. We therefore deem
any possible claim concerning them waived.
26 Pearson, 413 P.2d at 714.
27 W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts
111, at 778 (5th ed. 1984); see also James D. Ghiardi & John J.
Kircher, Punitive Damages: Law and Practice 13:02, at 13-6 (2d
ed. 2006) (noting that [a]s a general rule, only the person who
is defamed may maintain an action for defamation).
28 Wilson v. Retail Credit Co., 325 F. Supp. 460, 463
(S.D. Miss. 1971) (holding that plaintiff did not have defamation
claim against mercantile agency for reporting that plaintiffs
wife was neurotic, in part because claim was personal to wife
herself).
29 Casciola v. F.S. Air Serv., Inc., 120 P.3d 1059, 1062-
63 (Alaska 2005) (stating that this court applies more lenient
standard to pro se litigants).
30 Wright v. Black, 856 P.2d 477, 480 (Alaska 1993)
(stating that pro se litigant must make good faith efforts to
comply with judicial standards), overruled on other grounds by
B.E.B. v. R.L.B., 979 P.2d 514, 520 n.47 (Alaska 1999).
31 Olivit makes no mention of NIED on appeal.
32 See Wasserman v. Bartholomew, 38 P.3d 1162, 1170-71
(Alaska 2002), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 929 (2002) (noting that
[m]ere evidence that a judge has exercised his judicial
discretion in a particular way is not sufficient to require
disqualification).
33 Alaska R. Civ. P. 55(a)(1).
34 Alaska R. Civ. P. 55(b), (c).
35 Alaska R. Civ. P. 55(d).
36 Alaska R. Civ. P. 82(a).
37 Alaska R. Civ. P. 82(b)(2).
38 See Meidinger v. Koniag, Inc., 31 P.3d 77, 88 (Alaska
2001) (holding that [t]he prevailing party is the one who has
successfully prosecuted or defended against the action, the one
who is successful on the main issue of the action and in whose
favor the decision or verdict is rendered and the judgment
entered (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
39 See Gilbert v. Sperbeck, 126 P.3d 1057, 1062 (Alaska
2005) (noting that even when a pro se litigant is involved, an
argument is considered waived when the party cites no authority
and fails to provide a legal theory for his or her argument
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
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| Case Law Statutes, Regs & Rules Constitutions Miscellaneous |
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