| Alaska Supreme Court Opinions made Available byTouch N' Go Systems and Bright Solutions |
|
|
|
This site is possible because of the following site sponsors. Please support them with your business.
|
| Alaska Supreme Court Opinions made Available byTouch N' Go Systems and Bright Solutions |
|
|
|
|
|
This site is possible because of the following site sponsors. Please support them with your business.
|
You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Wilson v. MacDonald (10/19/2007) sp-6175
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage,
Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
| MERLE G. WILSON, | ) |
| ) Supreme Court No. S- 11956 | |
| Appellant, | ) |
| ) Superior Court No. | |
| v. | ) 1JU-03-228 CI |
| ) | |
| JUDITH MACDONALD and | ) O P I N I O N |
| JACK RIGGS, | ) |
| ) | |
| Appellees. | ) No. 6175 October 19, 2007 |
| ) | |
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State
of Alaska, First Judicial District, Juneau,
Michael A. Thompson, Judge.
Appearances: Merle G. Wilson, pro se,
Anchorage. Z. Kent Sullivan, Baxter Bruce
Sullivan P.C., Juneau, for Appellee Judith
MacDonald. Jack Riggs, pro se, Anchor Point.
Before: Fabe, Chief Justice, Matthews,
Eastaugh, Bryner, and Carpeneti, Justices.
MATTHEWS, Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
Merle Wilson pled no contest to the criminal charge of
assaulting Judy MacDonald. MacDonald sued Wilson for damages
related to the assault. The superior court held that a defendant
who pleads no contest in a criminal case is precluded from
relitigating the elements of the offense in a subsequent civil
case and therefore granted summary judgment against Wilson on the
elements of assault. After a trial on the issue of damages,
Wilson appealed the grant of summary judgment. We affirm the
superior courts grant of summary judgment.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
This lawsuit resulted from a dispute over whether a
local ordinance prohibited the use of a motorized wheelbarrow on
a road near the City of Tenakee Springs. MacDonald regularly
used the wheelbarrow to haul groceries and supplies up the road,
which provided the only access to her property from a nearby boat
landing. On April 2, 2001, Wilson, who was MacDonalds neighbor,1
tried to impound the wheelbarrow.2 In the course of the
impoundment he assaulted MacDonald, repeatedly striking her with
either a logging chain or a dog leash. MacDonald was diagnosed
with a skull fracture and transferred to Harborview Hospital in
Seattle, where she was released after two days. Wilson claims
that his actions were in self-defense.
Wilson was charged with assault. He pled no contest
and was sentenced to four years in jail all but six months of
which were suspended. MacDonald sued Wilson, alleging assault,
battery, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress.3 Wilson represented himself. Since Wilson
had pled no contest in his criminal case, the superior court
granted summary judgment against him on MacDonalds claims of
assault and battery. After a trial on the issue of damages, the
jury awarded MacDonald $75,000 in damages and $135,000 in
punitive damages (half of which went to the state as required by
AS 09.17.020(j)). The final judgment, including prejudgment
interest, costs, and attorneys fees, awarded $210,720.74 to
MacDonald and $67,500 to the state. Wilson is appealing the
superior courts grant of summary judgment to MacDonald.
III. DISCUSSION
A grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo.4 We
will affirm
if the record contains no genuine issue of
material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
When considering a motion for summary
judgment, all reasonable inferences of fact
from the proffered evidence must be drawn
against the moving party and in favor of the
non-moving party.[5]
Wilson argues that collateral estoppel should not apply
to defendants in civil suits who pled no contest in a criminal
case on the same charge. The superior court relied on Burcina v.
City of Ketchikan, in which this court collaterally estopped a
plaintiff from relitigating the elements of a crime when he had
pled no contest to that charge in a criminal case.6 Wilson
argues that the superior court erroneously extended Burcina to
civil defendants. We recently resolved this issue in Lamb v.
Anderson, which held that
a conviction based on a no contest plea will
collaterally estop the criminal defendant
from denying any element in a subsequent
civil action against him that was necessarily
established by the conviction, as long as the
prior conviction was for a serious criminal
offense and the defendant in fact had the
opportunity for a full and fair hearing.[7]
Thus, under Lamb, Wilson is precluded from relitigating any
elements of assault in the civil case because he pled no contest
to assault in the criminal case. The superior court did not err
in granting summary judgment against Wilson, but instead
correctly predicted the holding in Lamb.
Wilson also states that when he pled no contest he was
not aware of the civil liability consequences of the plea. Lamb
urged trial courts to ensure that criminal defendants understand
the civil ramifications of a no contest plea.8 According to
Lamb, if a trial court accepts a no contest plea the record
should establish the defendants understanding that a no contest
plea will result in a conviction, just as a guilty plea would,
and that this conviction could be used in future cases to
establish that the defendant engaged in the conduct involved in
the charged offense.9 But the question of whether a defendant is
aware of all of the relevant consequences of his or her plea is a
question as to whether the plea itself was knowing and voluntary.10
Since this is a question as to the validity of the plea itself,
it should be resolved through a motion for post-conviction relief
or appeal in the criminal case.11 With respect to his civil case,
as long as his plea stands he is collaterally estopped from
relitigating any elements of the crime for which he was charged.12
IV. CONCLUSION
We hold that Wilsons no contest plea precludes him from
relitigating the elements of assault in a civil case. Therefore
we AFFIRM the superior courts grant of summary judgment.
_______________________________
1 MacDonald v. Riggs, 166 P.3d 12, 14 (Alaska 2007).
2 At the time Wilson was chair of the City of Tenakee
Springs Legal Research Committee, which was formed to investigate
the legality of MacDonalds use of the wheelbarrow and an
excavator on the road.
3 MacDonald brought the same claims against Wilson in his
official capacity as Chairman of the Tenakee Springs Legal
Research Committee; the City of Tenakee Springs; and Jack Riggs.
MacDonald also sued the parties listed above and Mayor Vicki
Wisenbaugh, individually and in her official capacity, for a
violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983. The City of Tenakee Springs, Vicki
Wisenbaugh, and Wilson, in his official capacity only, settled
with MacDonald. MacDonald, 166 P.3d at 15.
Riggs countersued for defamation. At trial the jury
found for Riggs and awarded him $35,000 on the defamation claim.
MacDonalds appeal was unsuccessful. See MacDonald, 166 P.3d 12.
4 DeNardo v. Bax, 147 P.3d 672, 676 (Alaska 2006).
5 Id. at 676-77.
6 902 P.2d 817, 821 (Alaska 1995).
7 147 P.3d 736, 742 (Alaska 2006). This rule is based on
the fact that, unlike most jurisdictions, criminal defendants in
Alaska are allowed to plead no contest as a matter of right. Id.
at 740. In Alaska, then, the nolo plea is for nearly all
purposes the equivalent of a guilty plea. Id. at 740-41.
8 Id. at 742-43.
9 Id. We have not yet addressed the question of whether
this language is mandatory, in that if a trial court fails to
inform the defendant of civil liability consequences the
defendant may withdraw the plea, or merely hortatory.
10 Since pleas of guilty constitute waivers of
constitutional rights . . . they not only must be voluntary but
must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness
of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. Dolchok
v. State, 639 P.2d 277, 288 (Alaska 1982) (quoting Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)).
11 Cf. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486 (1994) (relying
on the hoary principle that civil tort actions are not
appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding
criminal judgments); Brockway v. State, 37 P.3d 427, 429-30
(Alaska App. 2001) (holding that a defendant may not collaterally
attack a no contest plea on the basis that it was not voluntary
and knowing during the sentencing proceedings of a subsequent
criminal case unless he or she was completely denied the right to
counsel, but instead can only bring a petition for post-
conviction relief in the original case).
12 We have repeatedly held that the pendency of an appeal
is irrelevant for the purposes of res judicata and collateral
estoppel. Wyatt v. Wyatt, 65 P.3d 825, 831 (Alaska 2003). If
Wilson is eventually successful in withdrawing his plea in his
criminal case, he may file a motion for relief from judgment
under Civil Rule 60(b)(5), which states in relevant part that the
court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment if a prior
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise
vacated.
 |
| Case Law Statutes, Regs & Rules Constitutions Miscellaneous |
|
