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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric Institute (09/21/2007) sp-6166
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage,
Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
| ROSLYN WETHERHORN, | ) |
| ) Supreme Court No. S- 12249 | |
| Appellant, | ) |
| ) Superior Court No. | |
| v. | ) 3AN-05-459 PR |
| ) | |
| ALASKA PSYCHIATRIC INSTITUTE, | ) O P I N I O N |
| ) | |
| Appellee. | ) No. 6166 September 21, 2007 |
| ) | |
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State
of Alaska, Third Judicial District,
Anchorage, Patrick J. McKay, Judge.
Appearances: James B. Gottstein, Law Project
for Psychiatric Rights, Inc., Anchorage, for
Appellant. Elizabeth Russo, Assistant
Attorney General, Anchorage, David W.
M rquez, Attorney General, Juneau, for
Appellee.
Before: Fabe, Chief Justice, Matthews,
Eastaugh, Bryner, and Carpeneti, Justices.
MATTHEWS, Justice.
The main question in this case is whether attorneys
fees under Alaska Civil Rule 82 may be awarded in civil
commitment proceedings. We answer in the negative based on an
analogous decision with respect to child-in-need-of-aid
proceedings.
On April 5, 2005, Alaska Psychiatric Institute (API)
filed a petition under AS 47.30.730 in superior court to have
Roslyn Wetherhorn involuntarily committed for thirty days.1 API
filed the petition on the grounds that Wetherhorn was likely to
cause harm to herself or others and that she was gravely
disabled. The petition stated that Wetherhorn was in a manic
state, was homeless, had no insight, and was non med compliant x
3 months.
Subsequently, API filed a petition under AS 47.30.839
to involuntarily medicate Wetherhorn during the thirty-day
commitment.2 That petition stated that Wetherhorn was incapable
of providing or withholding informed consent to medication and
that she has or may have crises requiring immediate medication.
On April 15, 2005, the superior court held a hearing on
both petitions. Wetherhorn was represented by the Alaska Public
Defender Agency. At the hearing, an API doctor testified that
Wetherhorn was bipolar, gravely disabled, and suffering from
agitation, confusion, and insomnia. API also presented evidence
that Wetherhorn was unable to provide or withhold informed
consent to commitment or medication. On April 27, 2005, the
superior court granted both petitions.3
The same day that the superior court granted both
petitions, API filed a petition to commit Wetherhorn for an
additional ninety days under AS 47.30.7404 and to continue her
forced medication during this period under AS 47.30.839.5 By the
time API filed this second round of petitions Wetherhorn had
substituted the Law Project for Psychiatric Rights (PsychRights)
as her counsel. Upon APIs filing of petitions for ninety-day
commitment and continued medication, PsychRights filed a motion
with the superior court to have the hearing in a court room, open
to the public, with a jury, and without Wetherhorn being
medicated.6
On May 9, 2005, API released Wetherhorn and later filed
a motion to dismiss without prejudice its petitions for ninety-
day commitment and continued forced medication. Wetherhorn
responded to the motion, arguing that the dismissal should be
with prejudice. The superior court granted APIs motion without
prejudice against a new petition pursuant to AS 47.30.730.
Wetherhorn then moved for attorneys fees under Civil
Rule 82, stating that she was the prevailing party in the second
commitment proceeding because API had voluntarily dismissed its
petitions and that API had engaged in a wide range of vexatious
and bad faith conduct. She also moved for attorneys fees under
Alaska Civil Rules 11 and 95(a), arguing that API had
misrepresented legal authority. The superior court held that
Rule 82 does not apply to civil commitment proceedings, stating
that attorneys fee awards in such proceedings would be
inconsistent with their unique character and purpose. The court
also held that Wetherhorn was not the prevailing party for
purposes of Rule 82. It did not address Wetherhorns request for
attorneys fees under Rules 11 and 95(a).
Wetherhorn now appeals the denial of attorneys fees
under Rules 11, 82, and 95(a).
We review the interpretation and application of court
rules de novo.7 We review a trial courts determination whether a
litigant violated Rule 11 for abuse of discretion.8
The Alaska Probate Rules set forth the procedures for
probate proceedings, including civil commitment hearings.9
Probate Rule 1(e) states that where the Probate Rules do not
address a procedural issue, courts may apply the Alaska Civil
Rules unless their application would be inconsistent with the
proceedings purpose and character. One such Alaska Civil Rule is
Rule 82, which requires courts to award partial attorneys fees to
the prevailing party in litigation.
The superior court held that Probate Rule 1(e)
prohibited application of Rule 82 in civil commitment
proceedings. It determined that Rule 82 was inconsistent with
the purpose and character of such proceedings. Wetherhorn now
argues that the superior court erred in making this
determination.
We agree with the superior court. Civil commitment is
a unique procedure:
Unlike civil or criminal proceedings, the
interests of the parties to a civil
commitment proceeding are not entirely
adverse. The states concerns are to provide
care to those whose mental disorders render
them unable to care for themselves and to
protect both the community and the
individuals themselves from dangerous
manifestations of their mental illness.[10]
In Cooper v. State we held that Rule 82 is inapplicable
in child-in-need-of-aid (CINA) cases.11 We reasoned that applying
Rule 82 in CINA cases would chill the states willingness to
perform a public function serving the welfare of children by
burdening it with additional costs of litigation.12 We concluded
that application of Rule 82 would be inconsistent with the
purpose and character of CINA proceedings.13 Civil commitments
are analogous to CINA cases in that they are designed to protect
the welfare of at-risk people. Application of Rule 82 in civil
commitment hearings could similarly deter the state from engaging
in needed protective litigation. Thus, as in Cooper, we hold
that Rule 82 is inconsistent with the character and purpose of
civil commitment proceedings.
Wetherhorn relies on Crittell v. Bingo14 for the
proposition that Rule 82 is applicable in probate proceedings.
In Crittell, we applied Rule 82 in a will contest.15 We stated
that in probate proceedings, Civil Rule 82 governs the award of
fees unless a specific provision of the Probate Rules applies.16
Wetherhorn argues that Crittell stands for the blanket
proposition that Rule 82 does apply to Probate Court Proceedings.
Wetherhorns reading of Crittell is too broad. Her
interpretation would eliminate that part of Probate Rule 1(e)
that requires an inquiry as to whether the application of a Civil
Rule would be inconsistent or interfere with the unique character
of a given probate proceeding. Rule 82 survived this inquiry in
Crittell but not in Cooper because of a fundamental difference
between will contests and CINA cases. Will contests comprise
disputes between private litigants. A litigant in a will contest
usually litigates only to increase his own share of a will,
regardless of the effect this has on society generally. In
contrast, the state in a CINA case litigates to protect a childs,
and societys, interests. This distinction between beneficent and
self-interested litigation supports the result here.
Wetherhorn also argues that API mischaracterized legal
authority and brought the civil commitment proceedings against
her in bad faith. She accordingly requests that we penalize API
with Civil Rule 95(a) fees for its alleged violation of Civil
Rule 11.17 However, our review of the record convinces us that no
Rule 11 violation occurred. We thus summarily resolve
Wetherhorns Rule 11 claim against her.
The decision of the superior court is AFFIRMED.
_______________________________
1 AS 47.30.730 provides a procedure by which a mentally
ill person may be involuntarily committed for a thirty-day period
of treatment and evaluation following a petition and hearing.
The petition must be signed by two mental health professionals
and must allege that the respondent is mentally ill and as a
result is likely to cause harm to self or others or is gravely
disabled. AS 47.30.730(a)(1).
2 AS 47.30.839 allows a treatment or evaluation facility
to involuntarily medicate a mentally ill person following a
petition and hearing. The petition must state that either (1)
there have been or likely will be crises requiring immediate
medication or (2) the patient is incapable of providing or
withholding informed consent. AS 47.30.839(a).
3 In a separate appeal to this court, Wetherhorn
challenged the superior courts grant of both petitions.
Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 156 P.3d 371, 373 (Alaska
2007). On appeal we vacated without reversing the superior
courts order for thirty-day commitment and vacated its order for
forced medication, holding that the superior court did not follow
the required procedure for ordering such medication. Id. at 373-
74.
4 AS 47.30.740 provides that during a thirty-day
commitment, a person in charge of the committed person may file a
petition and request a hearing for a further ninety-day period of
commitment.
5 AS 47.30.839(h) allows a treatment or evaluation
facility to petition for continued involuntary medication of a
committed person during an additional ninety-day commitment.
6 AS 47.30.725(e) allows the respondent in a thirty-day
civil commitment hearing to be free from the effects of
medication before the hearing. AS 47.30.735(b) allows the
respondent in a hearing for thirty-day commitment to elect a
hearing in a court room, open to the public. AS 47.30.745(a)
provides the respondent in a ninety-day commitment hearing with
the same rights provided in thirty-day commitment hearings. AS
47.30.745(c) allows a respondent in a ninety-day commitment
hearing to have a jury trial.
7 Crittell v. Bingo, 83 P.3d 532, 535 n.10 (Alaska 2004).
8 See Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 834 P.2d
1220, 1227 & n.4 (Alaska 1992) (holding that this court normally
reviews the award of sanctions under Rule 11 for abuse of
discretion (citing Keen v. Ruddy, 784 P.2d 653, 658 (Alaska
1989))).
9 Alaska R. Prob. P. 1(b).
10 Goetz v. Crosson, 967 F.2d 29, 34-35 (2d Cir. 1992).
11 638 P.2d 174, 178 (Alaska 1981).
12 Id. (Exposing the state to costs and attorneys fees
when a child is ultimately determined not to be in need of aid
would significantly chill the states willingness to commence
protective proceedings for children.).
13 Id.
14 83 P.3d 532 (Alaska 2004).
15 Id.
16 Id. at 536.
17 Civil Rule 11 provides that arguments made in signed
pleadings must be warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law. Civil Rule 95(a) allows a court to assess attorneys fees
for violations of any other rule, including Rule 11. See Luedtke
v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 834 P.2d 1220, 1227 n.4 (Alaska
1992) (assuming that Rule 11 violations could give rise to awards
under Rule 95(a)).
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