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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Prentzel v. State, Dept. of Public Safety (09/14/2007) sp-6165
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage,
Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
| H. THOMPSON PRENTZEL, III, | ) |
| ) Supreme Court No. S- 12031 | |
| Appellant, | ) |
| ) Superior Court No. 4FA-99-2423 CI | |
| v. | ) |
| ) | |
| STATE OF ALASKA, | ) O P I N I O N |
| DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC | ) |
| SAFETY, TROOPER DANIEL | ) No. 6165 September 14, 2007 |
| SCOTT, TROOPER DANE | ) |
| GILMORE, SERGEANT JOHN | ) |
| PAPASODORA, CAPTAIN | ) |
| WARREN TANNER, and COLONEL | ) |
| GLENN GODFREY, | ) |
| ) | |
| Appellees. | ) |
| ) | |
Appeal from the
Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Fourth
Judicial District, Fairbanks, Mark I. Wood,
Judge.
Appearances: H. Thompson Prentzel, III, pro
se, Fairbanks. Venable Vermont, Jr.,
Anchorage, and Mary Ann Lundquist, Fairbanks,
Assistant Attorneys General, and David W.
M rquez, Attorney General, Juneau, for
Appellees.
Before: Fabe, Chief Justice, Matthews,
Eastaugh, Bryner, and Carpeneti, Justices.
BRYNER, Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1998 Alaska State Troopers arrested H. Thompson
Prentzel, III, without a warrant, for violating conditions of
release imposed under a DWI charge. The troopers relied on the
Alaska Public Safety Information Network (APSIN) and records from
the Fairbanks Correctional Center (FCC) in determining that he
was subject to conditions. There were two problems with this
arrest. First, it was not authorized by the warrantless arrest
statute, AS 12.25.030, which allowed arrests for violations of
conditions of release for some charges, but not a charge of DWI.
In addition, violation of conditions of release was not yet
specifically defined as a criminal offense; the legislature first
made it a crime when AS 11.56.757 went into effect in 2000.
Second, Prentzel was not even subject to conditions of release at
the time of the arrest he had pled no contest four days earlier.
These APSIN and FCC records had not been promptly updated with
Prentzels judgment. Prentzel sued the State of Alaska, the
arresting troopers, and supervising Alaska State Troopers,
asserting state-law tort claims and violations of his civil
rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983. In January 2005, Superior Court
Judge Mark I. Wood granted summary judgment to the state.
Prentzel appeals. We affirm in all respects but one, reversing a
portion of the attorneys fees awarded against Prentzel.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
A. Facts
Many of the relevant facts have previously been set
forth in Prentzel v. State, Department of Public Safety (Prentzel
I).1 In October 1998 Alaska State Troopers Daniel Scott and Dane
Gilmore were dispatched to the Blue Marlin Bar in Fairbanks in
response to a reported disturbance. Near the bar the troopers
saw Prentzel with a bottle of liquor; Prentzel appeared to have
been drinking. The troopers learned Prentzels identity and
called their dispatcher, who informed them that Prentzel was
currently on bail release conditions for a recent charge of
driving while intoxicated (DWI) and that his conditions precluded
him from possessing alcohol. The dispatchers information came
from the computerized records in the Alaska Public Safety
Information Network (APSIN).
Troopers Scott and Gilmore asked the dispatcher to
confirm this information by checking with the Fairbanks
Correctional Center (FCC). FCC confirmed the bail release
conditions of no consumption and no possession of alcohol. The
troopers then asked the dispatcher for a consultation with Alaska
State Trooper Sergeant John Papasodora. Sergeant Papasodora
reviewed the APSIN records, noted the FCCs confirmation of those
records, and directed them to arrest Prentzel for violating
conditions of release.
As it turned out, Prentzel was no longer under
conditions of release because four days before the arrest he had
pled no contest to the DWI charge. The judgment was not
distributed by the court until six days after his arrest by
Troopers Scott and Gilmore.
In October 1999 Prentzel filed a civil action against
the Alaska Department of Public Safety, Troopers Scott and
Gilmore, Captain Warren Tanner, and Colonel Glenn Godfrey2
alleging false arrest, false imprisonment, trespass to chattels,
conversion, and negligence.3 The state defendants denied the
allegations and the state filed an Alaska Civil Rule 12(c) motion
for judgment on the pleadings. Prentzel moved to amend his
complaint to claim civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. 1983,
attorneys fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988, and civil rights violations
under the Alaska Constitution. Prentzel later moved for
permission to file a second amended complaint to add claims
against an unknown Sergeant John Doe, and to allege that the
defendants actions were willful and malicious. Soon after, the
superior court granted the state defendants motion to dismiss the
amended complaint and ruled that the second amended complaint
would not change the outcome of its ruling.
Prentzel appealed. We reversed the dismissal of
Prentzels negligence claims against the state defendants and his
1983 claim against Troopers Scott and Gilmore, Captain Tanner,
and Colonel Godfrey.4 We ruled that Prentzels claims against
Troopers Gilmore and Scott were improperly dismissed on the
ground of official immunity because the troopers would only be
entitled to qualified immunity.5 We noted that Prentzel had
responded to the qualified immunity defense by alleging that the
troopers acted with malice a factual question not suitable for
disposition on the pleadings. We also held that Prentzels
negligence claims against the troopers and Captain Tanner and
Colonel Godfrey were improperly dismissed because the pleadings
did not rule out the possibility of actionable claims for
negligent training and supervision.6 We further held that any
defect in Prentzels pleadings did not require dismissal of the
1983 claims against the individually named officers and troopers.7
Last, we affirmed the dismissal of Prentzels claim based on
alleged violations of the Alaska Constitution because the issue
was inadequately briefed.8
B. Proceedings After Remand
Following remand, trial was scheduled for the week of
December 1, 2003. In a pretrial order dated November 25, 2002,
the superior court ordered that motions to amend the pleadings
were due by February 24, 2003 and dispositive motions were due by
August 1, 2003. In November 2003 Prentzel moved for a
continuance of trial because he did not have sufficient funds to
conduct discovery. The superior court granted the motion and
continued the trial to the week of September 13, 2004. On
November 25, 2003, the superior court informed Prentzel on the
record that no further amendments to the pleadings were
authorized and dispositive motions were due by July 2, 2004; a
pretrial order dated December 16, 2003, confirmed these
deadlines.
In spite of the courts pretrial order, Prentzel moved
to amend his complaint in June 2004. He sought to name Sergeant
John Papasodora in place of Sergeant John Doe and attempted to
clarify that he was suing the troopers in their individual
capacities for money damages. In addition, Prentzel proposed to
add a claim that the Alaska State Troopers are deliberately
indifferent to the inevitable false arrest of persons whose bail
has been exonerated for violation of bail conditions of release.
The court granted Prentzels motion, and the state answered the
third amended complaint on August 19, 2004.
Meanwhile, the state had filed a motion for summary
judgment on July 2, 2004, the deadline for filing dispositive
motions. On August 5 Prentzel indicated that he was not prepared
for trial and requested another continuance. The superior court
granted the request and set the trial for the week of January 17,
2005.
The court further specified that amendments to the
pleadings were due by September 20, 2004, and dispositive motions
were due by October 4, 2004. The court also gave Prentzel until
September 24, 2004, to file his opposition to the states summary
judgment motion.
Prentzel failed to respond to the summary judgment
motion and filed no other pleadings by these newly extended
deadlines. He also failed to appear on November 9, 2004, for
oral argument on the summary judgment motion.
The next day, the superior court issued a notice of
intent to grant the troopers motion for summary judgment unless
Prentzel filed a responsive pleading by November 24, 2004. On
November 23, 2004, Prentzel filed a motion for summary judgment;
a motion for extensions of time to oppose the defendants motion
for summary judgment and to file his own motion for summary
judgment; a motion for a permanent injunction; and a motion to
file a fourth amended complaint to include a contingent cause of
action based on an alleged violation of the Alaska Constitution
that he could pursue if his other causes of action were
dismissed.
The state moved to dismiss Prentzels complaint and to
strike his November 23 motions. It argued that Prentzels
pleadings contained nothing that amounts to a response or
opposition to the defendants motion for summary judgment. It
further contended that many of Prentzels requests were simply
untimely and without good cause. Prentzel opposed the states
motion, countering that his motions were responsive pleadings
within the intention, if not the letter, of the [c]ourts
November 12, 2004 Order.
C. The Superior Courts Orders
1. Order granting summary judgment to the state
defendants
The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of
the state defendants. The court first determined that the state,
Troopers Scott and Gilmore, Captain Tanner, and Colonel Godfrey
were immune in their official capacities from false-arrest and
false-imprisonment claims. The court relied on AS 09.50.250(1)
in determining that the individually named defendants were
statutorily immune in their official capacities from claims based
on the exercise or performance of a discretionary function or
duty, regardless of whether they abused their discretion.9
The court also ruled that Troopers Scott and Gilmore
were immune from suit even though they admittedly misunderstood
the law by failing to recognize that AS 12.25.030 did not
authorize warrantless arrests for violations of misdemeanor DWI
bail conditions. It reasoned that Troopers Scott and Gilmore
were entitled to qualified immunity unless their actions were
corrupt, malicious or otherwise taken in bad faith. The court
reviewed the affidavits of Prentzel, Troopers Scott and Gilmore,
Sergeant Papasodora, and Captain Tanner to determine if any
evidence suggesting malice in the arrest of Prentzel had been
presented. It found no evidence of malice.
The court next determined whether Troopers Scott and
Gilmore were entitled to official immunity from Prentzels 1983
claims, using the framework for official immunity we set out in
Prentzel I.10 The court looked at the troopers affidavits: the
troopers believed that Prentzel was violating the law in their
presence; they consulted with APSIN and the FCC records, which
confirmed that Prentzel was committing an offense they believed
to be subject to a warrantless arrest; they checked with their
sergeant who directed them to arrest Prentzel; and they knew of
no unlawful customs or policies directed against Prentzel. The
court concluded that it was apparent that a reasonable officer in
the same circumstances would have concluded that it was proper to
arrest Prentzel, so Troopers Scott and Gilmore were entitled to
official immunity protection from the 1983 claims.
The court similarly concluded that Colonel Godfrey and
Captain Tanner were entitled to official immunity on the 1983
claim. The court observed that because supervision and training
of troopers are official conduct of supervising officers, this
conduct was covered by immunity under AS 09.50.250(1). In
addition, the court stated that Captain Tanner and Colonel
Godfrey were immune from the claims of negligent supervision and
training because they could not be held liable for immune conduct
of other troopers. The court also noted that even without
official immunity, the state and the individual defendants would
not be liable, because [t]he State does not owe a duty of care to
proceed without error in bringing legal action against a citizen.
Finally, the court determined that Captain Tanner and
Colonel Godfrey were entitled to official immunity from Prentzels
1983 claim alleging that, while acting outside of their official
capacities, they had adopted customs and policies directed at
violating Prentzels civil rights.
2. Order regarding miscellaneous motions
In a separate Order Regarding Miscellaneous Motions,
the superior court clarified some of the reasoning behind its
order granting summary judgment; it also ruled on Prentzels
recent motions. The court stated that it treated Prentzels
November 23, 2004 motion for summary judgment as his opposition
to the states motion for summary judgment. It struck as untimely
Prentzels motion to amend his complaint; it also struck as
untimely his motion for summary judgment but specified that this
ruling applied only to the extent that the motion was
unresponsive to the states summary judgment motion and raised new
matters beyond the third amended complaint.
The court supported this decision by listing the many
continuances Prentzel received and the numerous filing deadlines
he missed:
While the court has considered Prentzels
Motion for Summary Judgment as a responsive
pleading in opposition to the States motion,
[it] will not allow a dispositive motion on
the eve of trial where three deadlines [had]
been ignored by Prentzel, nor will [it] allow
a motion to amend the complaint filed on the
eve of trial that raises new issues requiring
additional discovery and the continuance yet
again of this trial.
The court further explained that it had given Prentzel
every opportunity to litigate his claims. But the rules have
been relaxed long enough. While acknowledging that striking the
late-filed pleadings was indeed a sanction, the court emphasized
that it was not a litigation-ending sanction. Rather, in the
courts view the litigation ended because of the courts order
granting the states summary judgment motion on its merit.
The court later found that the state was the prevailing
party and awarded attorneys fees totaling $13,662.02 under Civil
Rules 68 and 82.
The court then issued an Amended Final Judgment. The
judgment listed each defendant by name and declared that judgment
was entered in the defendants favor. The listed defendants
included Sergeant Papasodora, who had not been expressly granted
immunity in the superior courts order granting summary judgment
to the state defendants.
Prentzel appeals.
III. DISCUSSION
A. The States Motion for Summary Judgment
1. Proper standard for deciding motion for summary
judgment
We independently review an order granting summary
judgment, determining whether there are any genuine issues of
material fact and whether the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.11 We consider the entire record in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party.12 We have held:
The moving party has the entire burden of
proving that it is entitled to summary
judgment. That is, unless the moving party
points to undisputed facts or admissible
evidence establishing a prima facie case
entitling it to summary judgment as a matter
of law, the opposing party has no obligation
to produce evidence supporting its own
position.[13]
Prentzel argues that the superior court applied an
improper standard when considering the states motion for summary
judgment because it failed to look at all of the arguments in his
motion for summary judgment. But the trial court is not bound by
the formal issues framed in the pleadings when deciding a motion
for summary judgment under Rule 56; instead, as we explained in
Jennings v. State,
the court must consider the issues presented
by the other material offered by the parties
on the motion to determine whether the Rule
56 request should be granted. Thus the court
will examine the pleadings to ascertain what
issues of fact they present and then consider
the affidavits, depositions, admissions,
answers to interrogatories and similar
material to determine whether any of these
issues are real and genuine and whether any
of the post-pleading material suggests the
existence of any other triable genuine issues
of material fact.[14]
Prentzel claims that the superior court abused its
discretion under Jennings because it failed to consider two of
his arguments: that the supervising officers violated 1983 by
being deliberately indifferent to the rights of persons recently
exonerated from bail conditions to be free from wrongful arrest;
and that the state failed to inform state troopers of the
temporal gap that existed between actual court dispositions of
criminal cases and the information contained in the APSIN
computer database and FCC records.
But while the superior court did not explicitly address
these arguments, it had no duty to fully explain its summary
judgment decision. Because summary judgment rulings resolve pure
questions of law and are subject to independent review based on
the entire trial court record, the Alaska Rules of Civil
Procedure do not require rulings on motions for summary judgment
to include findings of fact or conclusions of law.15 Here, we
find no indication that the superior court failed to fulfill its
duty to go outside the pleadings to consider the entire setting
of the case to the extent that the material was brought to the
courts attention by the parties on the motion.16 Moreover, the
court stated that it considered Prentzels motion for summary
judgment as an opposition to the states motion to the extent that
it was responsive; it also referred to Prentzels affidavit and
memorandum of law in its order granting summary judgment.
The court further made it clear that it would not
permit Prentzel to raise new issues on the eve of trial that
might require more delay. Prentzels untimely motion for summary
judgment and fourth amended complaint were the first pleadings in
which he asserted a claim that the state failed to adequately
train and warn officers about delays in entering information on
APSIN and at FCC. In support of this new allegation, he
submitted copies of notices of dismissal from his own various
arrests as well as deposition testimony of the troopers. Because
this new evidence was untimely and could easily have resulted in
delaying discovery and trial, the court could justifiably have
declined to consider it in ruling on the pending summary judgment
issues.
2. Claims against Troopers Scott and Gilmore and
Sergeant Papasodora
a. False arrest/false imprisonment and trespass
to chattels claims
Prentzel argues that the superior court should have
granted summary judgment to him on his claims of false arrest17
and trespass to chattels against his arresting officers Troopers
Daniel Scott and Dane Gilmore and Sergeant John Papasodora. A
claim of false arrest is established by showing a restraint upon
the plaintiffs freedom without proper legal authority.18 Prentzel
insists that this claim has been established; he points out that
the troopers arrested him without a warrant and claims that they
lacked authority to make the arrest because a warrantless arrest
was not authorized by statute and his conduct did not amount to a
crime. Trespass to chattels is a lesser form of conversion: it
can be committed when a party intentionally dispossesses another
of the chattel or intentionally uses or interferes with a chattel
in anothers possession.19 Prentzel argues that because the arrest
was unlawful, seizing his property incident to the arrest
necessarily violated the law and resulted in a tortious
deprivation of his property.
The state responds that the troopers are entitled to
qualified immunity because governmental immunity applies to
situations where state officials misinterpret the law and because
the record demonstrated that the troopers acted reasonably
without malice. The state points to the three-step immunity
analysis set out in Aspen Exploration Corp. v. Sheffield,20 which
the superior court applied on remand following Prentzel I.
As we later summarized it in Alpine Industries, Inc. v.
Feyk,21 the Aspen test for official immunity from a state-law tort
claim asks three questions:
First, does the doctrine of official immunity
apply to the state officials conduct?
Second, if it does apply, is the immunity
absolute or qualified? And third, if it is
only a qualified immunity, did the state
official act corruptly, maliciously, or in
bad faith?[22]
Below, we consider each of these questions as they apply to
Prentzels case.
(1) Does the doctrine of official immunity
apply to the troopers conduct?
In answering the Aspen tests first question, we stated
in Alpine Industries that official immunity applies to an
officials conduct if (1) it is within the scope of the officials
authority, and (2) it is a discretionary act.23 Prentzel argues
that these requirements are absent here because his arrest was
for a nonexistent offense; he reasons that his arrest thus
exceeded the troopers authority and that the troopers could not
have had any discretion to decide that probable cause existed for
non-existing crimes.
The state responds that making an arrest is within the
scope of a troopers authority, even if that authority is abused
because an abuse of authority is not synonymous with a lack of
authority.24 The state points to Aspen, where the governor was
alleged to have made defamatory statements in connection with a
matter of public debate.25 We stated that the critical inquiry is
not whether the governor is authorized to make defamatory
remarks, but whether he has the authority to engage in the
underlying conduct out of which the alleged defamation arises.26
We held that it was certainly within the governors scope of
authority to make statements on matters of public interest.27 The
state argues, similarly, that making arrests is certainly within
the scope of authority of the state troopers. The state relies
on AS 18.65.080, which provides that a peace officer may make an
arrest without a warrant for a violation of law committed in
the[ir] presence.28 Likewise, seizing contraband or other items
found on an arrestee falls within the scope of an officers
authority when making an arrest: Search [and seizure] incident to
lawful arrest allows the warrantless search of the area within
[the arrestees] immediate control at the time of the arrest to
ensure officer safety and to preserve evidence related to the
crime.29
We agree that making arrests and seizing property
incident to arrests is conduct that falls within the troopers
usual authority. The legislature had already determined before
Prentzels arrest that officers could make warrantless arrests for
certain violations of conditions of release. The relevant parts
of AS 12.25.030 provided that:
(b) In addition to the authority granted by
(a) of this section, a peace officer
. . . .
(2) without a warrant may arrest a person if
the officer has probable cause to believe the
person has, either in or outside the presence
of the officer,
. . . .
(C) violated a condition of release imposed
under AS 12.30.025[30] or 12.30.027;[31]
(3) without a warrant may arrest a person
when the peace officer has reasonable cause
for believing that the person has
(A) committed a crime under or violated
conditions imposed as part of the persons
release before trial on misdemeanor charges
brought under AS 11.41.270[.][32]
The troopers decision to arrest Prentzel thus
demonstrated their misunderstanding of the specific conduct the
legislature had included in AS 12.25.030. The troopers all
testified that they simply believed that Prentzel was violating
the law. We noted in Aspen that
to separate the activity that constitutes the
wrong from its surrounding context an
otherwise proper exercise of authority would
effectively emasculate the immunity defense.
Once tortious acts are excluded from an
exercise of authority, only innocuous
activity remains to which immunity would be
available. Thus, the defense would apply
only to conduct for which it would not be
needed.[33]
In other words, if immunity only applied to the troopers conduct
when they correctly interpreted the law of arrest, the immunity
defense would never be needed.
(2) Does absolute or qualified immunity
apply to the troopers conduct?
The second question of the Aspen test asks whether the
immunity should be absolute or qualified.34 The state argues that
the troopers are entitled to qualified immunity.
To determine whether immunity is absolute or qualified
we must balance three factors:
(1) The nature and importance of the
function that the officer performed to the
administration of government (i.e. the
importance to the public that this function
be performed; that it be performed correctly;
that it be performed according to the best
judgment of the officer unimpaired by
extraneous matters);
(2) The likelihood that the officer will be
subjected to frequent accusations of wrongful
motives and how easily the officer can defend
against these allegations; and
(3) The availability to the injured party of
other remedies or other forms of relief (i.e.
whether the injured party can obtain some
other kind of judicial review of the
correctness or validity of the officers
action).[35]
On balance, we agree that qualified immunity rather
than absolute immunity should apply to the conduct at issue here
the discretionary act of making arrests and seizing contraband in
the course of arrest.36
First, as the superior court put it, it is of great
societal importance that officers be able to perform their
investigatory and law enforcement duties, without fear of
retribution for mistakes made in good faith. Second, without
immunity, arresting officers could be subject to frequent
accusations of wrongful motives when performing their law
enforcement duties. And third, under qualified immunity relief
would be available to Prentzel if he could show that the troopers
acted corruptly, maliciously, or in bad faith.
(3) Did the troopers act corruptly,
maliciously, or in bad faith?
Prentzel argues that the troopers are not entitled to
immunity, because their conduct was malicious. He rests this
claim on his subjective belief that the troopers enjoyed
arresting him:
Upon information and belief, Scott and
Gilmore were enjoying arresting me. When I
was informed by my criminal attorney that I
was arrested for a nonexistent offense, this
sealed my impression that I was arrested
maliciously by these police officers who
couldnt find a lawful basis to arrest me so
they just manufactured one. I believe that
this is ample evidence of malice and that a
jury should be permitted to hear it.
Prentzel also claimed in an unsworn statement that Trooper Scott
used a gleeful tone of voice when deciding to transport Prentzel
to jail.
Prentzels conclusory statements describing his
subjective impressions do not raise disputed questions of
material fact.37 After we remanded his case in Prentzel I,38
Prentzel had the opportunity to depose Troopers Scott and Gilmore
and to collect other evidence bolstering his personal impression
of the troopers alleged malice. As the superior court correctly
observed, despite this opportunity Prentzel made only vague
conclusory allegations of malice.
In his briefing, Prentzel observes that malice is a
question of fact inappropriate for resolution on a motion for
summary judgment. But this observation misses a crucial point:
before malice can become a disputed question of fact, the record
must contain at least some objective evidence establishing facts
capable of supporting an inference of malice. The need for a non-
conclusory factual basis is especially important when, as here,
the ultimate question involves immunity; as we have emphasized on
other occasions, official immunity shields government officials
not just from liability, but from suit.39 Indeed, we have
stressed that although the existence or absence of malice is
generally a question of fact for the jury, when this question has
been removed from the case by uncontroverted affidavits and/or
depositions, summary judgment may be granted.40
There is ample record evidence that the troopers acted
without malice, and, in fact, did everything they could to ensure
that Prentzels arrest was appropriate. The troopers relied on
APSIN and FCC information about Prentzel being on conditions of
release before arresting him; they believed Prentzel was
violating the law in their presence; they consulted with Sergeant
Papasodora before arresting him; they had not heard of Prentzel
except for the DWI arrest by Trooper Scott two weeks before; they
were unaware of any of his other past arrests; and they had never
heard of any Alaska State Trooper policy aimed at violating
Prentzels rights. Because Prentzels subjective conclusion that
the troopers enjoyed arresting him finds no objective support
from the facts in the record, it fails to raise a genuine issue
of material fact disputing the strong evidence tending to show
that the troopers acted without malice.
In light of the three-factor Aspen analysis, we affirm
the superior courts summary judgment order adopting qualified
immunity as a ground for dismissing Prentzels state-law tort
claims against the troopers.
b. Section 1983 claim against the arresting
troopers
Prentzel argues that the superior court erred in not
awarding him summary judgment on his cause of action alleging
that Troopers Scott and Gilmore and Sergeant Papasodora violated
42 U.S.C. 1983.41 He claims that the troopers violated his civil
rights when, acting under color of state law, they violated his
Fourth Amendment rights by subjecting him to a warrantless arrest
without probable cause and seizing his property incident to the
arrest.
To sustain an action under 1983, Prentzel must show:
(1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person
acting under color of state law and (2) that the conduct deprived
[him] of a [federal] constitutional right.42 Prentzel argues that
he made out a prima facie case under 1983 by showing that the
officers acted under color of state law and deprived him of his
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures by arresting him and seizing his property without
probable cause, without a warrant, and without any circumstances
creating an exception to the warrant requirement. Prentzel
further argues that the officers are not entitled to qualified
immunity under the standards governing 1983 claims. He contends
that, because Alaska law did not authorize his arrest, the arrest
was a per se violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. We
disagree.
Under federal law governing constitutional claims
brought under 1983, a law enforcement officer is entitled to
qualified immunity if, in light of clearly established law and
the information available to the officer at the time, a
reasonable officer could have believed the arrest was lawful.43
The law is clearly established if the contours of the right are
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand
that his actions violate that right.44 The United States Supreme
Court has held that officers must be granted immunity under this
standard when they are reasonably mistaken as to the legality of
their actions.45 In other words, [i]f the law did not put the
officer on notice that his conduct would be clearly unlawful,
summary judgment based on qualified immunity is appropriate.46
Although it is undisputed that the troopers arrested
Prentzel without a warrant and that no provision of Alaska law
specifically authorized the warrantless arrest, we agree with the
superior courts conclusion that the troopers are nonetheless
entitled to qualified immunity from the 1983 claim.
In general, a violation of state law does not lead to
liability under 1983.47 Thus, a violation of AS 12.25.030 the
Alaska arrest statute that limits warrantless misdemeanor arrests
does not by itself establish a per se violation of the federal
constitution. To defeat the troopers claim of qualified
immunity, Prentzel must instead show that the troopers
warrantless arrest amounted to a violation of the Fourth
Amendment under clearly established federal law governing that
amendments meaning and scope. Prentzel fails to make this
showing.
The United States Supreme Courts decision in Atwater v.
City of Lago Vista48 controls the point. There, the claimant,
Atwater, challenged the constitutionality of her arrest for
violating a Texas law by failing to use a seatbelt to protect a
child seated in the right front passenger seat of Atwaters car.
Relying on founding-era common-law rules, Atwater urged the
Supreme Court to hold that the Fourth Amendments prohibition
against unreasonable seizures forbids peace officers from making
warrantless misdemeanor arrests except in cases of breach of the
peace that is, offenses involving or tending toward violence.49
The Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that [i]f an
officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has
committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he
may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.50
In arriving at this conclusion, the Court relied on the
historic common law tradition allowing officers to make
warrantless arrests for minor violations. The Court emphasized
that both the legislative tradition of granting warrantless
misdemeanor arrest authority and the judicial tradition of
sustaining such statutes against constitutional attack are
buttressed by legal commentary that, for more than a century now,
has almost uniformly recognized the constitutionality of
extending warrantless arrest power to misdemeanors without
limitation to breaches of the peace.51
Although the Court in Atwater found that history
convincingly supported the view that a warrantless misdemeanor
arrest does not violate the Fourth Amendment, the Court went on
to consider whether a more modern arrest rule barring this
practice should be adopted.52 In considering this question, the
Court recognized that when Fourth Amendment claims arise from
police conduct that was not definitely unlawful under common law
at the time of the Constitutions framing, courts must decide the
constitutional question by striking a balance between individual
and societal interests.53
Applying this balance to cases involving warrantless
misdemeanor arrests, the Court reasoned that a responsible Fourth
Amendment balance is not well served by standards requiring
sensitive, case-by-case determinations of government need, lest
every discretionary judgment in the field be converted into an
occasion for constitutional review.54 In other words, the court
held, the law has never jelled . . . [in a way suggesting that]
warrantless misdemeanor arrests need constitutional attention.55
Given Atwaters holding that the Fourth Amendment is not
implicated when police make warrantless arrests for minor
offenses, it follows that the troopers failure to comply with
AS 12.25.030 cannot by itself establish that Prentzels arrest
violated the Fourth Amendment.
In addition, even though, at the time of Prentzels
arrest, Alaskas criminal code did not make violations of
conditions of release a punishable offense, the troopers could
reasonably believe that they had probable cause to think a
violation was being committed. The bail provisions of Alaskas
Code of Criminal Procedure required all accused persons released
on conditions before trial to be advised that a warrant for the
persons arrest will be issued immediately upon a violation or
that the person may be arrested without a warrant for a violation
of conditions of release.56 This provision strongly suggests that
the legislature considered all violations of pretrial release
conditions to be conduct that would justify an arrest, regardless
of whether a specific criminal statute required compliance with
the particular condition violated.
Support for this view of the legislatures intent can be
found in a related provision in Alaskas bail statutes, AS
12.30.070. Section .070 states: Nothing in this chapter [Alaska
Statutes, Title 12, Chapter 30, governing bail] shall prevent a
court from exercising its power to punish for contempt.57 Relying
on this provision, the court of appeals has observed:
When a defendant violates the conditions of
release, the court may issue a warrant for
the defendants arrest, the court may revise
the conditions of release to make them more
onerous, and the court can initiate contempt
proceedings against the defendant.[58]
Thus, AS 12.30.070 generally characterizes violations
of conditions of release as conduct punishable as contempt. The
contempt provisions in Alaskas Code of Civil Procedure bear out
this conclusion. Specifically, AS 09.50.010(5) defines contempt
to include disobedience of a lawful judgment, order, or process
of the court.59 Under the provisions existing at the time of
Prentzels arrest, this form of contempt was punishable by a fine
of not more than $100.60
Because the troopers in this case had ample grounds to
believe albeit incorrectly that Prentzel was violating his
conditions of release on a pending DWI charge, and because this
conduct amounted to a contempt under AS 09.50.010(5), the
troopers had probable cause to believe that Prentzel was
committing a violation punishable under Alaska law at the time of
his arrest. Thus, Prentzel is incorrect in asserting that
probable cause could not have arisen because his conduct was not
expressly proscribed.
For present purposes, it is unnecessary to consider
whether Alaska law authorized a warrantless arrest for Prentzels
apparent act of contempt. The crucial point here, and the only
point we decide, is that, under Atwater, the troopers conduct
would not have violated the Fourth Amendment even if Alaska law
did not expressly authorize a warrantless arrest based on
probable cause under these circumstances: If an officer has
probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a
very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without
violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.61
We thus affirm the superior courts ruling that Sergeant
Papasodora and Troopers Scott and Gilmore are entitled to
qualified immunity from Prentzels claim under 1983.
3. Claims against the supervising officers and the
state
a. Section 1983 claim against the supervising
officers
Prentzel argues that Colonel Godfrey and Captain Tanner
violated his rights under 1983 by showing deliberate
indifference to the troopers practice of making unauthorized
arrests for violations of conditions of release and to the
troopers continued reliance on stale APSIN and FCC records in
making those arrests.
To act with deliberate indifference, an official must
be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, must actually draw the
inference, and then must disregard the risk.62 In other words,
Prentzels evidence must show that Tanner and Godfrey were
subjectively aware of the risk of ongoing system-wide problems
and consciously disregarded that risk.63 In Prentzel I, we
observed:
A 1983 claim would lie against Captain
Tanner and Colonel Godfrey if Prentzel could
show that they adopted, outside their
official capacities, the customs or policies
he alleges, causing violations of his civil
rights. This would require evidence of their
personal involvement in a violation of
Prentzels rights, and not simply evidence of
their status as supervisors of Troopers Scott
and Gilmore. A supervisor may be liable
under 1983 only if there exists either (1)
his or her personal involvement in the
constitutional deprivation, or (2) a
sufficient causal connection between the
supervisors wrongful conduct and the
constitutional violation. A sufficient
showing of personal involvement could include
demonstrating that Captain Tanner and Colonel
Godfrey created a policy or custom under
which unconstitutional practices occurred, or
allowed the continuance of such a policy or
custom, or showed deliberate indifference in
supervising Troopers Scott and Gilmore.[64]
Prentzel presented no evidence to the superior court
that Tanner and Godfrey were personally involved in his arrest.
He bases his claim on the failure of the supervising officers to
properly train the line troopers in the law authorizing
warrantless arrests. In addition, Prentzel argues that it was
part of the ordinary course of business that APSIN and FCC
records were not updated for days or weeks following court
dispositions. Prentzel maintains that the troopers continued
reliance on the stale records and the harm caused by their
reliance is so obvious that Tanner and Godfrey are either plainly
incompetent or deliberately indifferent to the constitutional
rights of citizens. He argues that the trier of fact should be
permitted to infer that the supervising officers were
deliberately indifferent based on his evidence.
Prentzels 1983 claims against the supervising officers
fail for several reasons. First, Prentzel has failed to show
that Tanner and Godfrey were personally involved in his arrest or
that they were subjectively aware of and deliberately indifferent
to the risk that his rights would be violated. Prentzel did not
present any evidence concerning policy-level decisions made by
Tanner and Godfrey involving officer training. The closest
Prentzel came to showing the existence or awareness of an ongoing
problem involving warrantless arrests is Captain Tanners
deposition testimony, which acknowledged that Gilmore and Scott
were high producer[s] meaning they made many arrests. But
Prentzel has failed to show what those arrests were for or what
information the troopers relied on in making them. A history of
frequent arrests does not by itself support an inference that
unlawful arrests were routinely occurring, that the troopers
regularly misinterpreted the law, that they often based their
arrests on stale information, that they were improperly trained,
or that their supervisors knew of these problems.
Moreover, the superior court could properly have
declined to consider Prentzels claim of delay in updating the
APSIN and FCC records because the claim was untimely. And even
if it had been timely, it would have failed because Prentzel
offered no evidence that the delays were system-wide or that
Tanner and Godfrey knew that the delays were occurring. Prentzel
simply submitted copies of court dispositions for sixteen of his
own arrests between 1986 and 2002; a stamp at the bottom of each
disposition showed when it was forwarded to the FCC and the
police department. Prentzels case history is insufficient to
support a reasonable inference that Tanner and Godfrey were aware
of and consciously disregarded system-wide recordkeeping delays.
As the superior court put it, [b]ecause Prentzels
allegations towards Tanner and Godfrey are generalized
allegations of their status as supervisors, they are insufficient
to support a claim under 1983.65
b. State-law claims for negligent training and
supervision
Prentzel argues that the state, Captain Tanner, and
Colonel Godfrey owed a duty under Alaska law (1) to adequately
train state troopers so they would not arrest persons without a
warrant for nonexistent offenses, and (2) to adequately train
state troopers concerning the delay in updating the APSIN
computer databases and FCC records regarding conditions of
release. He alleges that the state and the supervising officers
negligently performed these duties and that he is entitled to
summary judgment for negligent supervision and training.66
These arguments fail for the same basic reason that
Prentzels federal supervisory claims failed: Prentzel did not
provide any evidence of system-wide problems involving delayed
recordkeeping resulting in unlawful arrests or of any supervisory
negligence in creating or failing to correct such problems.
In his deposition of Trooper Dane Gilmore, Prentzel did
not question Gilmore about the training he had received regarding
the laws of arrest. Prentzel merely asked Gilmore whether he had
been trained to look to APSIN as a source of information when
making arrests; Gilmore answered that he had been. Prentzel did
not ask Gilmore about any specific training he received from
Captain Tanner or Colonel Godfrey. In Prentzels deposition of
Trooper Daniel Scott, Scott testified that he had been trained to
consider the FCC as a potential source of information regarding
conditions of release. Scott also testified that he had been
trained to rely on FCC and APSIN records when making arrests, but
he did not state that he received this training from Godfrey or
Tanner. Finally, in the deposition of Captain Tanner, Tanner
testified that state troopers receive their initial training in
the public safety academy and that he was responsible for
ensuring that state troopers were annually retrained. Tanner
further testified that during his tenure as captain from 1997 to
1999, he made sure that the troopers under his command, including
Troopers Gilmore and Scott, received this regular retraining.
Apart from this brief deposition testimony, Prentzel
presented no other evidence regarding the training procedures and
policies of the Alaska State Troopers. Furthermore, Prentzel
failed to show that the APSIN and FCC records were so inaccurate
that there was a need to train troopers not to rely on them. To
show that the databases were inaccurate, Prentzel merely
presented copies of the court dispositions for sixteen of his own
arrests between 1986 and 2002. Of the sixteen, one was
transmitted the day after disposition, five were transmitted
within seven days, five were transmitted within one to two weeks,
two were transmitted between two to three weeks, and three after
three weeks. Although there were apparent delays in forwarding
Prentzels records, this isolated evidence does not establish that
the system as a whole was inaccurate and unreliable. And Trooper
Scott testified that he had never been aware of APSIN being
inaccurate and, based on his experience, believed that it was
updated quickly.
In sum, none of the evidence presented by Prentzel
leads to the inference that the defendants breached a duty of
care to properly supervise and train the troopers. By all
accounts, the troopers received regular annual training and
Captain Tanner ensured that this training occurred.
We affirm the superior courts order granting summary
judgment to the state defendants on all of Prentzels claims.
B. Prentzels Late Motions and Fourth Amended Complaint
The superior court struck as untimely Prentzels motion
to file a fourth amended complaint, his motion for an extension
of time, and his motion for summary judgment. Prentzel attempted
to justify his tardy filings by showing that they were late
because of excusable neglect. He asserted below that four days
before the October 4 filing deadline, he was called out for a job
that he could not refuse because it was his first and only
opportunity for substantial gainful employment this year. He
also claimed that he had underestimated the amount of time
required to perform all the work involved in articulating all of
his claims and defenses in a memorandum of law.
The court explained its decision to strike the untimely
motions by stating that [t]he sanction of striking these late-
filed pleadings following two previous continuances of the trial
to allow Prentzel to be prepared is reasonable under the
circumstances and does not alone end this litigation. Moreover,
the court stated that it would consider Prentzels late pleadings
to the extent that they responded to the states pending motion
for summary judgment.
Prentzel argues that the superior court abused its
discretion in striking his motions as untimely. He characterizes
this action as litigation-ending sanctions, which are generally
disfavored and only permitted in extreme circumstances. He also
claims, mistakenly, that the court actually struck the third
amended complaint, rather than just the third motion to amend the
complaint. Under this view, the courts decision ended the
litigation because it had the effect of deciding the [states]
motion for summary judgment without considering plaintiffs
admissible evidence concerning the deficient system relied upon
by the troopers to obtain information about conditions of release
imposed on persons.67
We review procedural decisions of the superior court
for abuse of discretion.68 This includes review of decisions to
deny leave to file an amended complaint,69 to grant or deny an
extension,70 and to deny late dispositive motions.71 We will
reverse a ruling for abuse of discretion only when left with a
definite and firm conviction, after reviewing the whole record,
that the trial court erred in its ruling.72
1. Motion to amend the complaint
In general, in the absence of a motion filed on the eve
of trial, leave to amend is freely granted unless it would result
in an injustice.73 Here, Prentzels motion to amend was filed on
the eve of trial in fact, on the eve of the third scheduled
trial. We are not persuaded that denying Prentzel leave to amend
his complaint again resulted in an injustice. The superior court
pointed to all the continuances it had granted and deadlines
Prentzel had missed, and appropriately concluded that it would
not allow a motion to amend the complaint filed on the eve of
trial that raises new issues requiring additional discovery and
the continuance yet again of this trial. We conclude that the
superior court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant
Prentzel leave to file a fourth amended complaint.
2. Motion for summary judgment
Prentzel argues that striking his other motions
impermissibly ended the litigation because the court decided the
states summary judgment motion without giving adequate
consideration to the admissible materials he had presented with
the rejected motions. In Sandstrom & Sons, Inc. v. State we held
that the superior court improperly assessed litigation-ending
sanctions against a party when it dismissed the case after that
party failed to comply with a discovery order.74 Although the
partys conduct did deserve sanction, we determined that the
superior court should have explored sanctions other than
dismissal.75 The superior court in this case correctly
distinguished Sandstrom & Sons, Inc. from Prentzels situation.
The court indicated that it treated Prentzels motion
for summary judgment as an opposition to the states motion to the
extent that the motion was responsive. Although the court did not
address every issue raised in the third amended complaint, it
stated that it had reviewed all of the pleadings and attached
affidavits, including Plaintiffs most recent opposition to
Defendants motion for summary judgment. The order granting
summary judgment to the troopers directly quotes Prentzels
affidavit and also discusses and distinguishes cases Prentzel
cited in his brief. Moreover, the court itself noted that what
ended the litigation was the courts ruling granting the States
Motion for Summary Judgment on its merit[s].
3. Motion for an extension of time to file motion for
summary judgment
Prentzel also argues that the superior court abused its
discretion in denying his motion for an extension of time to file
a motion for summary judgment. He cites several factors to
support his contention: he filed his motion before the deadline
for opposing the troopers motion for summary judgment and before
the court actually granted summary judgment; he diligently
conducted and provided discovery throughout the action; his
papers clearly established a prima facie case for denial of civil
rights; and economic necessity compelled him to take a job, which
caused his late filing. Prentzel further contends that his
status as a pro se litigant excuses his tardiness, arguing that
the pleadings of pro se litigants should be held to less
stringent standards than those of lawyers, particularly when lack
of familiarity with the rules rather than gross neglect or lack
of good faith underlies litigants errors.
We have held that the superior court must inform a pro
se litigant of the specific defects in his [pleadings] and give
him an opportunity to remedy those defects.76 But there were no
specific defects in Prentzels late-filed motions that required
correction: the motions were simply late. Prentzel cannot and
does not claim that the court failed to notify him of the filing
deadlines; on the contrary, the court continued the trial twice
at Prentzels request and issued new filing deadlines each time.
Whats more, while the court did not grant Prentzel additional
time to refine his motion for summary judgment, it nevertheless
considered the motion that Prentzel actually filed, which
consisted of an affidavit, supporting exhibits, and a lengthy
memorandum.
Ordinarily, pro se litigants who make good faith
efforts to comply with court rules should not be held to strict
procedural requirements.77 But Prentzel does not show that he
made a good faith effort to comply with the superior courts
deadlines. Prentzel claims that he underestimated the amount of
work a motion for summary judgment would require and then
unexpectedly received a job offer that he could not afford to
decline. But while these circumstances may be understandable,
Prentzel made no effort to inform the court of his difficulties
in a timely fashion. He thus fails to provide a persuasive
justification for his untimely filings in the third round of
deadlines provided by the court. This failure, combined with the
superior courts decision to accept the untimely materials as
responsive pleadings, persuades us that the superior court did
not abuse its discretion in denying Prentzels motion for an
extension to file his motion for summary judgment.
C. Request for Deposition
The states pretrial witness list named Randy Olsen. By
the time of Prentzels last scheduled trial, Olsen was a superior
court judge in Fairbanks; but he had previously served as an
assistant attorney general and, in that capacity, had been
assigned to represent the state in opposing Prentzels claims.
While working on the case, Olsen learned that Prentzel had never
been credited for the two days he spent in jail after his October
1998 arrest. Olsen then arranged for him to be released two days
early in a new case for which he was serving a sentence. In
listing Olsen as a witness, the state evidently planned to have
him testify about these efforts to mitigate Prentzels damages.
Before the first scheduled trial date, Prentzel sought
a continuance of trial in order to conduct discovery. In
addition to deposing the named defendants, he sought to depose
Judge Olsen to gain information about this custody-release
arrangement, which Prentzel characterized as an affirmative
defense of the state. The state did not oppose the extension of
time to depose the named defendants but took no position as to
Judge Olsen. The superior court granted Prentzels motion to
extend the deadline for deposing the named defendants, but did
not authorize an extension of time to depose Judge Olsen.
Prentzel nevertheless scheduled Judge Olsens
deposition. The state moved to cancel it, arguing that the court
was authorized under Civil Rule 26(c) to issue an order limiting
discovery in order to protect a party or person from annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense. The state
also pointed out that the court was authorized under Civil
Rule 45(b) to void or modify a subpoena if it was unreasonable
and oppressive. The superior court granted the states order to
quash the subpoena and cancel the deposition.
On appeal Prentzel argues that the superior court
abused its discretion in denying him the opportunity to depose
Judge Olsen because [c]ertainly his testimony was relevant. He
notes that Olsen was on the states witness list, had testimony
regarding the states mitigation of Prentzels damages based on the
early release from custody, and had knowledge of the trooper
practice of making arrests without a warrant. Prentzel also
argues that allowing the deposition to go forward would not have
prejudiced the state and would not have caused undue delay,
because discovery remained open on other issues.
We review discovery orders and sanctions for abuse of
discretion, but review de novo whether the trial court considered
the appropriate factors when issuing a discovery order.78 Under
Civil Rule 26(b)(2), the superior court may limit the use of
discovery methods such as depositions if it determines that
the burden or expense of the proposed
discovery outweighs its likely benefit,
taking into account the needs of the case,
the amount in controversy, the parties
resources, the importance of the issues at
stake in the litigation, and the importance
of the proposed discovery in resolving the
issues.[79]
The court may order that disclosure or discovery not be had when
necessary to protect a party or person from annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.80
We hold that the limit on discovery in this case was
not manifestly unreasonable, and that the superior court did not
abuse its discretion in declining to allow Prentzel to depose
Olsen. Prentzel argues that he needed to depose Olsen because he
had knowledge of the troopers practice of making warrantless
arrests. But Prentzel failed to raise this issue in the superior
court. The only purpose for deposing Olsen he offered below was
to learn about an affirmative defense of the defendants a
purpose that is moot in light of the superior courts summary
judgment ruling. We reject Prentzels newly raised theory of
relevance as waived and find no abuse of discretion in denying
the deposition for the purpose Prentzel advocated below.81
D. Attorneys Fees and Costs
In March 2000 the state made of an offer of judgment
for $1,000, which Prentzel rejected. After granting summary
judgment to the state, the superior court found that the state
was the prevailing party. The court awarded $13,662.02 in
attorneys fees to the state $1,609.42 in pre-offer-of-judgment
fees under Civil Rule 82(b)(2), and $12,052.60 in post-offer fees
enhanced under Civil Rule 68(b)(2). This award was significantly
less than the original amount requested by the state because the
court omitted time related to the 1983 claim and the first
appeal and lowered the states hourly rate to fifty percent of the
amount originally requested by the state. Prentzel challenges
the award.
After the superior court entered the attorneys fee
award in June 2005, we held in Ellison v. Plumbers and Steam
Fitters Union Local 375 that Rule 68(c) allows a party to elect
the greater of Rule 82 or Rule 68 fees, but not both.82 Our
ruling in Ellison is controlling here and precludes the state
from claiming Rule 82 fees in addition to the larger award it
received under Rule 68.
Apart from this error, we find no abuse of discretion
in calculating the award of attorneys fees. Prentzel argues that
the states fee bill was padded. But the state attested that it
eliminated fees for duplicative efforts resulting from the case
getting passed to many attorneys, and did not charge for general
research or general procedures that benefitted the state; in
total, the state requested fees for less than fifty percent of
the total hours that it actually spent in defending the case.
Prentzel also argues that the award of attorneys fees
should have been declined because it could deter other similarly
situated civil-rights litigants from bringing actions in good
faith. But the superior court accounted for Prentzels status as
a pro se indigent litigant by cutting the states hourly billing
rate in half. Moreover, the court ensured that time spent on
Prentzels civil rights claim and on his first appeal was not
included in the award. Considering that the attorneys fee award
will be reduced even more once the Rule 82 fees are eliminated,
we cannot say that the award is manifestly unreasonable. Thus,
although we vacate the fees awarded under Rule 82, we affirm the
award under Rule 68 and remand for entry of a modified judgment
reflecting only that award.
IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we AFFIRM the superior courts order
granting summary judgment and all other rulings encompassed in
its final judgment except the award of attorneys fees under
Rule 82. We VACATE that award and REMAND for entry of an
attorneys fees award consistent with this opinion.
_______________________________
1 Prentzel v. State, Dept of Pub. Safety, 53 P.3d 587
(Alaska 2002) (Prentzel I).
2 Colonel Glenn Godfrey is deceased.
3 Prentzels complaint stated that as a result of the
arrest, he was:
humiliatingly handcuffed in public for more
than 10 min.; detained in an unsanitary cell
without sink or toilet for more than 12
hours; manhandled by officers who falsely
charged [him] with resisting arrest . . .
[and] drug possession, [had] the humiliation
of having these false charges . . . printed
in the local newspaper . . . all resulting in
increased stress.
4 Prentzel I, 53 P.3d at 596.
5 Id. at 591.
6 Id. at 592.
7 Id. at 595-96.
8 Id. at 596.
9 AS 09.50.250(1) provides in relevant part:
[A]n action may not be brought [against the
state under this section] if the claim
(1) . . . is an action for tort, and based
upon the exercise or performance or the
failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function or duty on the part of
a state agency or an employee of the state,
whether or not the discretion involved is
abused[.]
10 In Prentzel I, we noted that
Troopers Scott and Gilmore are entitled to
protection from the 1983 claim on official
immunity grounds if they can establish that a
reasonable officer could have believed that
their conduct was lawful, even if it actually
was not.
Prentzel I, 53 P.3d at 595 n.40.
11 In re Estate of Maldonado, 117 P.3d 720, 722 (Alaska
2005).
12 Olson v. Teck Cominco Alaska, Inc., 144 P.3d 459, 463
(Alaska 2006).
13 B.R. v. State, Dept of Corr., 144 P.3d 431, 433 (Alaska
2006) (citing Barry v. Univ. of Alaska, 85 P.3d 1022, 1025-26
(Alaska 2004)).
14 Jennings v. State, 566 P.2d 1304, 1310 (Alaska 1977)
(quoting 10 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure: Civil 2721, at 475-76 (1973)).
15 See Alaska R. Civ. P. 52(a) (Findings of fact and
conclusions of law are unnecessary on decisions of motions under
Rules 12 or 56 . . . .).
16 Jennings, 566 P.2d at 1310.
17 We refer to Prentzels claim as a false arrest claim
because [f]alse arrest and false imprisonment are not separate
torts. A false arrest is one way to commit false imprisonment;
since an arrest involves restraint, it always involves
imprisonment. Waskey v. Municipality of Anchorage, 909 P.2d 342,
345 (Alaska 1996) (quoting City of Nome v. Ailak, 570 P.2d 162,
168 (Alaska 1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
18 Id.
19 K & K Recycling, Inc. v. Alaska Gold Co., 80 P.3d 702,
717 & n.26 (Alaska 2003) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts
217 (1965)).
20 Aspen Exploration Corp. v. Sheffield, 739 P.2d 150
(Alaska 1987).
21 Alpine Indus., Inc. v. Feyk, 22 P.3d 445 (Alaska 2001).
22 Id. at 447-48 (citations omitted).
23 Id. at 448.
24 Aspen, 739 P.2d at 155 n.11.
25 Id. at 155.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 AS 18.65.080.
29 Crawford v. State, 138 P.3d 254, 258 (Alaska 2006)
(quoting McCoy v. State, 491 P.2d 127, 133 (Alaska 1971)) (second
alteration in original).
30 AS 12.30.025 (release before trial in cases involving
stalking).
31 AS 12.30.027 (release in domestic violence cases).
32 AS 11.41.270 (stalking in the second degree).
33 Aspen, 739 P.2d at 154.
34 Id. at 159.
35 Id. at 159-60.
36 Cf. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (per
curiam) (Even law enforcement officials who reasonably but
mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present are entitled
to immunity.) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641
(1987)).
37 See Keen v. Ruddy, 784 P.2d 653, 656 (Alaska 1989) (The
Keens vague allegations of malice are insufficient, absent some
showing of specific facts, to preclude summary judgment.).
38 Prentzel I, 53 P.3d at 591.
39 See Karen L. v. State, Dept of Health & Soc. Servs.,
Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 953 P.2d 871, 879 (Alaska 1998)
(citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)) (emphasis
in original).
40 Aspen, 739 P.2d at 160 n.24.
41 We note that the superior courts order granting summary
judgment does not mention Sergeant Papasodora he is not
identified as a defendant in the text and does not appear in the
caption. This was apparently an oversight. On July 2, 2004, the
state filed its motion for summary judgment; on August 5, 2004,
the superior court accepted Prentzels third amended complaint,
which identified Sergeant Papasodora by name for the first time
and substituted his name for the John Doe trooper included in
Prentzels earlier complaint. On January 10, 2005, the superior
court issued the order granting summary judgment, but neglected
to reflect the substitution. In an amended final judgment issued
June 24, 2005, however, the superior court entered judgment in
favor of Sergeant Papasodora by name. Because Prentzel advances
no actual or legal basis for concluding that the 1983 immunity
analysis should apply differently to Sergeant Papasodora than it
applies to Troopers Scott and Gilmore, we use the same analysis
of the 1983 claim for all three defendants.
42 Crawford v. Kemp, 139 P.3d 1249, 1255 n.10 (Alaska
2006).
43 Id. at 1255. We stated in Prentzel I:
Troopers Scott and Gilmore are entitled to
protection from the 1983 claim on official
immunity grounds if they can establish that a
reasonable officer could have believed that
their conduct was lawful, even if it actually
was not.
Prentzel I, 53 P.3d at 595 n.40.
44 Crawford, 139 P.3d at 1255 (quoting Van Sandt v. Brown,
944 P.2d 449, 452 (Alaska 1997)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
45 Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001).
46 Id. at 202.
47 Campbell v. Burt, 141 F.3d 927, 930 (9th Cir. 1998)
(citing Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 194 (1984) (Officials
sued for constitutional violations do not lose their qualified
immunity merely because their conduct violates some statutory or
administrative provision.)).
48 Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
49 Id. at 326-27.
50 Id. at 354.
51 For example, the Court cites White v. Kent, 11 Ohio St.
550 (1860), where the state court upheld a municipal ordinance
permitting warrantless arrest of any person found violating any
city ordinance or state law. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 342-45. The
court also cites 1 J. Bishop, New Criminal Procedure 183, at 103
(4th ed. 1895), where the commentator stated that the power of
arrest extends, possibly, to any indictable wrong in [an
officers] presence. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 344.
52 Id. at 345-47.
53 Id. at 346 (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295,
299-300 (1999)).
54 Id. at 346-47.
55 Id. at 351-52.
56 AS 12.30.020(e).
57 AS 12.30.070.
58 Lonis v. State, 998 P.2d 441, 445 (Alaska App. 2000)
(citing AS 12.30.070) (emphasis added).
59 AS 09.50.010 provides in relevant part:
The following acts or omissions with
respect to a court of justice or court
proceedings are contempts of the authority of
the court:
. . . .
(5) disobedience of a lawful judgment,
order, or process of the court[.]
60 See former AS 09.50.020(a) amended by ch. 132, 3, SLA
1998. This fine would have qualified the contempt to be
considered a violation under Alaska Rule of Criminal Procedure
56(f), which defines violation as:
(1) an offense as defined in AS
11.81.900(b)(61);
(2) a traffic infraction as defined in Title
28 of the Alaska Statutes; or
(3) any other offense under state or local
law which is punishable only by a fine.
61 Atwater, 532 U.S. at 354. We note that Atwater
recognized an exception to the general rule that the Fourth
Amendment would not be implicated by warrantless misdemeanor
arrests. Under Atwater, such arrests might violate the Fourth
Amendment if performed in an extraordinary manner causing unusual
harm to physical and privacy interests. Id. at 354-55. But
here, as we have seen, the only potentially extraordinary
circumstance Prentzel alleges is his own subjective conclusion
that the troopers enjoyed performing his arrest; moreover, as we
have already pointed out, Prentzel failed to support this
allegation with any evidence raising a disputed question of fact.
Accordingly, we find no arguable basis here for concluding that
the troopers performed Prentzels arrest in an extraordinary
manner.
62 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
63 Id. at 829.
64 Prentzel I, 53 P.3d at 595-96 (internal quotation marks
and footnotes omitted).
65 See id. at 596 (noting that Prentzels arguments as to
how Godfrey and Tanner acted outside the scope of their official
capacities could well make his 1983 claim vulnerable to an
immunity defense on summary judgment); see also Jeffers v. Gomez,
267 F.3d 895, 916 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that prison director
was entitled to qualified immunity from 1983 failure-to-train
claim because plaintiff failed to show direct involvement in his
injury or deliberate actions at the policy-making level).
66 In his reply brief Prentzel attempts to fashion his
negligent supervision and training claim as a negligent
recordkeeping claim; that is, he argues that in addition to
training the troopers in the limitations of the APSIN and FCC
databases, the state and the supervising officers also owed a
duty to maintain those records adequately. But Prentzel did not
make that argument to the superior court in his motion for
summary judgment. Accordingly, we need not consider it now
because [a]s a rule, a party may not advance new issues or
theories on appeal to secure reversal of a lower court decision.
Clark v. Greater Anchorage, Inc., 780 P.2d 1031, 1035 n.4 (Alaska
1989) (citing Zeman v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 699 P.2d 1274,
1280 (Alaska 1985)).
67 The record shows that the superior court did not strike
the third amended complaint. The court had already granted
Prentzel leave to file a third amended complaint and the state
had already answered. In its Order Regarding Miscellaneous
Motions, the court stated that it was striking the Third Motion
to Amend the Complaint in other words, the motion to file a
fourth amended complaint. The court also stated that it rejected
Prentzels motion for summary judgment to the extent it raise[d]
new matters beyond the Third Amended Complaint.
68 Balough v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 995 P.2d 245, 254
(Alaska 2000).
69 Ruckle v. Anchorage Sch. Dist., 85 P.3d 1030, 1034
(Alaska 2004).
70 Sheehan v. Univ. of Alaska, 700 P.2d 1295, 1297 (Alaska
1985).
71 See Taranto v. N. Slope Borough, 992 P.2d 1111, 1112
(Alaska 1999).
72 Ruckle, 85 P.3d at 1034 (quoting DeSalvo v. Bryant, 42
P.3d 525, 527-28 (Alaska 2002)).
73 Miller v. Safeway, Inc., 102 P.3d 282, 293 (Alaska
2004).
74 Sandstrom & Sons, Inc. v. State, 843 P.2d 645, 648
(Alaska 1992).
75 Id.
76 Collins v. Arctic Builders, 957 P.2d 980, 982 (Alaska
1998).
77 Noey v. Bledsoe, 978 P.2d 1264, 1270 (Alaska 1999).
78 Peter v. Progressive Corp., 986 P.2d 865, 867 (Alaska
1999).
79 Alaska R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(iii).
80 Alaska R. Civ. P. 26(c).
81 Our order affirming the superior courts dismissal of
Prentzels claims also makes it unnecessary to consider Prentzels
conclusory argument that the court erred on denying his request
for an injunction precluding the troopers from arresting Prentzel
in the future. To the extent that the injunctive relief depends
on the merits of Prentzels primary claims, Prentzels request is
moot. To the extent that the relief is unrelated to the merits
of Prentzels principal claims, it is not properly requested in
the context of this action.
82 Ellison v. Plumbers & Steam Fitters Union Local 375,
118 P.3d 1070, 1078 (Alaska 2005).
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