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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. State, Dept. of Health & Social Services, Office of Children's Services v. Sullivan (09/14/2007) sp-6163

State, Dept. of Health & Social Services, Office of Children's Services v. Sullivan (09/14/2007) sp-6163, 167 P3d 64

     Notice:   This opinion is subject to correction  before
     publication  in  the  Pacific  Reporter.   Readers  are
     requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
     of  the  Appellate  Courts, 303  K  Street,  Anchorage,
     Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
     e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.


            THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA

STATE OF ALASKA, )
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & ) Supreme Court Nos. S- 12157/12277
SOCIAL SERVICES, OFFICE OF )
CHILDRENS SERVICES, LYNN ) Superior Court No.
ELDRIDGE, and PATRICK ) 4FA-04-02521 Civil
OCTUCK, )
) O P I N I O N
Petitioners, )
) No. 6163 - September 14, 2007
v. )
)
KELLY SULLIVAN DOHERTY )
and SHANNON SULLIVAN, )
)
Respondents. )
)

          Petitions for Review from the Superior  Court
          of  the  State  of  Alaska,  Fourth  Judicial
          District, Fairbanks, Mark I. Wood, Judge.

          Appearances:    Megan  R.   Webb,   Assistant
          Attorney  General, Anchorage,  and  David  W.
          M rquez   and  Talis  J.  Colberg,  Attorneys
          General, Juneau, for Petitioners.  Michael C.
          Kramer, Borgeson & Burns, PC, Fairbanks,  for
          Respondents.

          Before:    Fabe,  Chief  Justice,   Matthews,
          Eastaugh, Bryner, and Carpeneti, Justices.

          FABE, Chief Justice.

I.   INTRODUCTION
          Lynn  Eldridge,  a  social worker  being  sued  in  her
individual capacity, petitions us to reverse the superior  courts
orders  (1)  determining that she was not entitled  to  qualified
immunity  from a number of claims brought pursuant to  42  U.S.C.
1983, and (2) precluding her from relitigating the factual issues
decided in a prior child in need of aid case.  Because it appears
that  the superior court failed to apply the proper federal  test
for  qualified  immunity,  we vacate the  superior  courts  order
denying  Eldridge  qualified  immunity  and  remand  for  further
proceedings on this issue.  Because Eldridge was neither a  party
to  nor in privity with a party to the prior child in need of aid
case,  we  reverse the superior courts order precluding her  from
relitigating issues of fact determined in that case.
II.  FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
     A.   Facts
          Lynn  Eldridge is a social worker employed by the State
of  Alaska, Department of Health and Social Services,  Office  of
Childrens  Services (OCS).1  Kelly Sullivan Doherty is  a  former
resident  of Fairbanks.  Kellys minor daughter, Shannon Sullivan,
was  born  on October 10, 2000, and is also a former resident  of
Fairbanks.   The  current  lawsuit  by  Kelly  and  Shannon  (the
Sullivans)  against Eldridge arises from Eldridges  participation
in  a  child  in  need  of aid (CINA) case  in  which  the  State
unsuccessfully  sought to terminate Kellys parental  rights  over
Shannon.
          On  August  18,  2001, the Sullivans  were  treated  at
Fairbanks Memorial Hospitals emergency room for injuries they had
sustained as the result of domestic violence.  At the time, Kelly
refused to identify the abuser2 or to avail herself of any of the
social services that could have potentially protected her and her
daughter  from  further abuse.  As a result, OCS removed  Shannon
from  Kellys care and placed her in a foster home.  Eldridge  was
assigned as the social worker to the case.
          On  December 16, 2001, Shannon was adjudicated a  child
in  need  of  aid.  On January 28, 2003, OCS filed a petition  in
superior court to terminate Kellys parental rights with regard to
Shannon.   The superior court then held a twelve-day  termination
trial.
          After the close of the trial, the superior court issued
an  order  denying OCSs petition to terminate Kellys  rights  and
criticizing  the manner in which OCS and its social  workers  had
pursued  the  case.  In the superior courts words, the  case  was
remarkable  and had been investigated and prosecuted  unlike  any
other termination case the Court ha[d] ever heard.
          In  its  findings of fact and conclusions of  law,  the
superior  court detailed the novelty of the case.   According  to
the   superior   court,   OCS   had   failed   to   fulfill   its
responsibilities  at  nearly every stage  of  the  CINA  process.
Before  trial,  the  social  workers,  the  Office  of  Childrens
Services, licensing authorities, and the foster mother ha[d] done
more  to undermine the parents progress and reunification efforts
than  in  any other case the superior court had ever heard.3   At
trial, some parts of OCSs case were based largely on innuendo and
          reminded the superior court of the Army-McCarthy hearings.
          With  regard to Eldridge, the superior court found that
she had improperly instructed other social workers not to call or
remind  Kelly  of her appointments and had improperly  terminated
Kellys  visits  with  her daughter.  According  to  the  superior
court,  Eldridge did not want Kelly to succeed in her efforts  to
regain  custody  of Shannon and was likely biased  against  Kelly
because  of  Kellys second job as an adult dancer.  The  superior
court  also found that OCS and its social workers had  failed  to
protect Shannon by not acting on concerns about the foster mother
or  repeated recommendations that Shannon should be removed  from
the foster home.
          Ultimately,  the superior court concluded that  Shannon
was  no  longer  a  child  in need of  aid  and  ordered  OCS  to
immediately begin plans for reunification so that the  child  may
be returned to the mother.
     B.   Proceedings
          The Sullivans filed their initial complaint for damages
against  Eldridge on October 22, 2004.4  In this  complaint,  the
Sullivans  leveled an array of state and federal  claims  against
Eldridge,  including  two claims brought pursuant  to  42  U.S.C.
19835  that  Eldridge had violated the Sullivans  rights  to  due
process  under  the United States Constitution.   In  support  of
their  claims, the Sullivans attached a number of documents  from
the original CINA case, including the superior courts findings of
fact  and conclusions of law in which it criticized OCS  and  its
social workers and declined to terminate Kellys parental rights.
          Eldridge  filed an answer to the complaint  on  January
14,  2005.   In her answer, Eldridge denied many of the Sullivans
factual   claims  and  asserted  several  affirmative   defenses,
including the defense of immunity.
          On  January 25, 2005, the Sullivans filed a  motion  in
limine asking the superior court to preclude Eldridge, under  the
doctrine  of collateral estoppel, from relitigating the  findings
of  fact  from  the  original CINA case.  Eldridge  opposed  this
motion  on April 22, arguing, among other things, that collateral
estoppel did not apply because she was neither a party to nor  in
privity  with  a  party  to the CINA proceeding.   The  Sullivans
replied  that  Eldridge was in privity with OCS because  she  had
been  a  key  individual in initiating the CINA proceedings,  had
been  a  key  witness  at the termination  trial,  and  had  been
adequately represented by OCS at the termination trial.
          On  May  13, 2005, Eldridge filed a motion to  dismiss,
arguing,  in  relevant  part, that she was entitled  to  absolute
quasi-prosecutorial immunity with regard to the  Sullivans   1983
claims.  The Sullivans opposed the motion and argued that,  under
the  facts of the case, Eldridge was entitled to neither absolute
nor qualified immunity.  Eldridge replied and reasserted that she
was entitled to absolute quasi-prosecutorial immunity.
          On  October  26,  2005,  the superior  court  issued  a
memorandum  decision granting the Sullivans motion for collateral
estoppel.   With  regard  to  the issue  of  privity,  the  court
concluded that there is no question that [OCSs] attorney  was  in
the position of defending the actions of its social workers.   It
          also noted that Eldridge was the States primary witness and
testified  at  length about the actions she had taken  throughout
the time Shannon was in state custody.
          On  October  27,  2005,  the superior  court  issued  a
memorandum decision in which it found, in relevant part, that (1)
Eldridge  was  not  shielded  by  either  absolute  or  qualified
immunity,  and  (2) the Sullivans had pled facially  valid   1983
claim[s].  As such, the superior court denied Eldridges motion to
dismiss the Sullivans  1983 claims.
          On    November    7,   2005,   Eldridge    moved    for
reconsideration, arguing that the superior court had applied  the
wrong  standard  for determining her immunity  to  the  Sullivans
1983  claims.  According to Eldridge, the superior court  applied
state  immunity law when it should have applied federal  immunity
law.   The  Sullivans objected to the motion for reconsideration,
arguing   that  the  superior  courts  discussion  of   Eldridges
qualified  immunity occurred in a portion of its order addressing
state  law claims only and did not directly discuss the  doctrine
[of] qualified immunity as applied to [their  1983] claims.   The
superior  court  effectively denied this motion by  declining  to
rule on it.6
          On  the  same  day  that she moved for reconsideration,
Eldridge  also filed a motion requesting that the superior  court
clarify which of the factual findings from the CINA case would be
given   preclusive   effect.    According   to   Eldridge,   this
clarification  was necessary to facilitate an appeal.   Over  the
objections of the Sullivans, the superior court issued  an  order
on  March  17, 2006, detailing forty-seven factual findings  that
could  not be relitigated at trial and explaining that  the  jury
would be instructed to assume that each of these facts were true.
          Eldridge   subsequently   filed   two   petitions   for
interlocutory  review, requesting that we  reverse  the  superior
courts orders (1) denying Eldridge qualified immunity with regard
to  the  Sullivans  1983 claims, and (2) granting  the  Sullivans
motion   for  collateral  estoppel.   We  agreed  to  hear   both
petitions.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
          Whether  an  individual is entitled to immunity  for  a
1983 claim is a question of law that we review de novo, using our
independent judgment.7  Whether collateral estoppel applies to  a
particular set of facts is also a question of law that we  review
using our independent judgment.8
IV.  DISCUSSION
     A.   Qualified Immunity
          Both  federal  and  state law maintain  that  executive
officials  who  perform discretionary functions may  be  shielded
from  liability  for  civil damages on  the  basis  of  qualified
immunity.   However, the relevant legal standards  applicable  to
and  tests  for  qualified immunity vary with the nature  of  the
claim asserted against the executive official.
          In  the case at hand, Eldridge argues that the superior
court  applied  the incorrect legal standard when  it  determined
that  she  was  not  entitled  to  qualified  immunity  from  the
Sullivans   1983  claims.   According to Eldridge,  the  superior
          court applied the state test for state law tort claims when it
should  have  applied the federal test for federal statutory  and
constitutional claims.  As evidence, she points to  the  superior
courts  lengthy discussion and application of Alaskas three-prong
test for immunity from state law tort claims.
          The  Sullivans  do not dispute that the superior  court
discussed  the  test for qualified immunity from state  law  tort
claims,  but insist that this discussion must be read in context.
They  note  that the superior courts determination that  Eldridge
was  not  entitled  to  qualified  immunity  was  included  in  a
comprehensive memorandum decision that covered a wide variety  of
claims  and  defenses, brought under both state and federal  law.
Consequently,  they argue, the fact [t]hat Judge  Wood  discussed
the  state standard for qualified immunity in one part . .  .  of
his  comprehensive  memorandum decision does  not  mean  that  he
applied  this  standard to the  1983 claims discussed  separately
[in  another  part].   According to the Sullivans,  the  superior
court  adequately resolved the federal immunity question  in  the
section of its memorandum decision dedicated exclusively to their
1983 claims.
          Under   federal   law,   qualified   immunity   shields
government  officials performing discretionary functions  .  .  .
from  liability for civil damages insofar as their  conduct  does
not  violate  clearly  established  statutory  or  constitutional
rights  of  which  a reasonable person would  have  known.9   The
United States Supreme Court has established a two-prong test  for
resolving  claims of qualified immunity.10  First, taken  in  the
light  most favorable to the party asserting the injury,  do  the
facts alleged show the officers conduct violated a constitutional
right?11  Second, if so, was that right clearly established?12  In
determining whether a right is clearly established, the  relevant
inquiry is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that
his  conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.13  This
inquiry  should be objective and based upon the specific  factual
circumstances of the case at hand.14  The burden of  establishing
that a right is clearly established falls upon the plaintiff.15
          Under  our  case law, courts faced with  a  defense  of
immunity  from  state law tort claims must determine:   (1)  does
official immunity apply to the officials conduct; (2) if  so,  is
the  immunity  absolute  or qualified; and  (3)  if  it  is  only
qualified, did the official act in a corrupt or malicious  manner
or  in bad faith.16  This test is distinct from the federal  test
and  involves  a  line of inquiry that the United States  Supreme
Court  has  specifically rejected  namely, the inquiry  into  the
subjective intentions of the government official.17
          As  both the Sullivans and Eldridge agree, the superior
court  discussed the test for qualified immunity from  state  law
tort  claims  at  great length in the section of  its  memorandum
decision labeled Eldridge is entitled to qualified immunity only.
In  this section, the superior court set out the three-part  test
for  immunity  from state law tort claims, applied that  test  to
Eldridge,  and  concluded  that  Eldridge  was  not  shielded  by
qualified  immunity because the Sullivans had adequately  alleged
that  Eldridge acted in bad faith.  Although the Sullivans insist
          that the courts application of state immunity law in this section
of  its decision was intended only to address Eldridges claims of
immunity from their state law tort claims, nothing in the text of
the  superior  courts decision evinces such a limited  intention.
This is the only section of the superior courts decision in which
immunity  is  explicitly  discussed,  and  it  concludes  with  a
statement  denying Eldridges motion to dismiss a  number  of  the
Sullivans claims, including their claims under  1983.
          The Sullivans nonetheless argue that the superior court
adequately addressed the issue of federal qualified immunity in a
later section of its memorandum decision.  But the section of the
superior  courts  decision  that  the  Sullivans  point   to   is
explicitly  dedicated to determining whether  the  Sullivans  had
pled a facially valid claim under  1983.  Although the test for a
facially  valid   1983 claim and the test for  federal  qualified
immunity both require the court to ask whether the plaintiff  has
shown  a violation of a right, the two tests have little else  in
common.18  Unlike the test for qualified immunity, the test for a
facially valid  1983 claim does not require the court to consider
whether   the  constitutional  right  in  question  was   clearly
established or whether a reasonable officer would have known that
his or her conduct violated that right.19  And, indeed, this later
section  of  the  superior courts decision  a section  explicitly
dedicated  to  determining  whether  the  Sullivans  had  pled  a
facially  valid   1983  claim  does  not  make  either  of  these
determinations.
          In  the  end,  there is nothing in the superior  courts
decision  to indicate that the superior court applied the  proper
federal test.  Because the defenses to a federal cause of  action
are  defined  by federal law,20 the superior courts determination
that  Eldridge  is  not entitled to qualified immunity  from  the
Sullivans  1983 claims cannot be sustained.
          Eldridge maintains that we should not apply the federal
test  for qualified immunity on appeal and should instead  remand
the  issue  back  to  the superior court for further  litigation.
According to Eldridge, such a remand is necessary because  claims
of federal qualified immunity must be analyzed within the context
of  the  specific facts of the case, and she has not  yet  had  a
chance  to  develop those facts.  In her words, she  has  had  no
opportunity  to  actually  litigate the  defense  (i.e.,  provide
affidavits,  deposition testimony, or other relevant  documentary
evidence).   Eldridge  explains that she has  not  yet  had  this
opportunity because of the specific manner in which the  superior
court addressed the issue.  As Eldridge points out, her motion to
dismiss  was based not on the defense of qualified immunity,  but
on  the  defense  of  absolute immunity.  As such,  the  superior
courts decision that Eldridge was not shielded by either absolute
or  qualified  immunity from the Sullivans  1983 claims  actually
went  beyond the scope of Eldridges motion.21  And, according  to
Eldridge,  [s]ince  she  had  not  sought  summary  judgment   on
qualified  immunity,  she  did  not submit  relevant  documentary
evidence in support of this defense.22
          Eldridge is correct to note that the specific facts  of
the case are relevant to the resolution of her qualified immunity
          defense.  As the Ninth Circuit has explained, the inquiry into
whether  a  reasonable officer would know that  his  conduct  was
unlawful  is a wholly objective inquiry that should be undertaken
in light of the specific factual circumstances of the case.23  In
fact,  the  United  States Supreme Court has specifically  stated
that,  at  least  with  regard to law  enforcement  officers  and
warrantless searches, the reasonableness of the officials actions
should  be assessed in light of the information that the official
possessed  at the time he or she took those actions.24   And,  as
Eldridge  points  out,  she  may be able  to  submit  documentary
evidence  that  would be relevant to the objective reasonableness
of  her  actions.  For instance, she notes that there may be  OCS
policies  in  place that could explain her decision to  terminate
the Sullivans visitation sessions.
          Because  Eldridge  has not yet had the  opportunity  to
submit  relevant documentary evidence, we decline  to  apply  the
federal  test  for  qualified immunity  and  instead  vacate  the
superior   courts  order  and  remand  the  issue   for   further
proceedings.
     B.   Collateral Estoppel
          As  we have explained in the past, collateral estoppel,
or issue preclusion, prohibits a party from relitigating an issue
of fact only if four factors are met:
          (1) the party against whom the preclusion  is
          employed was a party to or in privity with  a
          party  to  the  first action; (2)  the  issue
          precluded  from relitigation is identical  to
          the  issue  decided in the first action;  (3)
          the issue was resolved in the first action by
          a  final judgment on the merits; and (4)  the
          determination of the issue was  essential  to
          the final judgment.[25]
          
          Eldridge  maintains that the superior court erred  when
it granted the Sullivans motion to preclude her from relitigating
forty-seven  factual  findings  from  the  original  CINA   case.
According  to  Eldridge, she should not be collaterally  estopped
because she was not a party to or in privity with a party to  the
CINA  case.   Moreover,  she  contends that  applying  collateral
estoppel  against social workers sued in their personal  capacity
would inject improper focus into CINA proceedings.
          The  Sullivans  disagree and assert that  the  superior
court  correctly  found that Eldridge was in  privity  with  OCS.
According to the Sullivans, [t]here is no question that it was in
[OCSs]  interest  in  the  CINA case to  fully  defend  Eldridges
actions  because Eldridges dealings with Kelly were  the  central
issue.   The  Sullivans also assert that [t]here is  no  question
that Eldridge had notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to
be  heard  on the collaterally estopped issues.  They  note  that
Eldridge  attended every day of the trial and testified for  four
days;  that many of the factual findings from the CINA case  were
based  upon either Eldridges testimony or documents that Eldridge
had prepared; and that Eldridge controlled [OCSs] presentation of
evidence in the CINA case.
          The   majority  of  courts  maintain  that   government
employees, in their individual capacities, are generally  not  in
privity  with  the  government  and  are  not  bound  by  adverse
determinations  against the government.26  This  is  because  the
interests,  incentives,  and  immediate  goals  of  a  government
employee  in  his or her individual capacity will most  often  be
dissimilar  from those of the government or even  from  those  of
that  same  employee  in his or her official  capacity.27   As  a
result,  cases  brought  by  or against  the  government  or  its
employees in their official capacities will not usually provide a
proper  forum or even the slightest opportunity for a  government
employee to protect his or her own personal interests.  And as  a
matter  of sound policy, this is how it should be.  For when  the
government  enters the courthouse in order to prosecute  criminal
conduct  or  protect a child in need of aid,  it  should  not  be
distracted  from  its purpose by the personal  interests  of  its
employees.28
          While  the  Sullivans seem to recognize that government
employees  acting in their personal capacities are generally  not
in  privity with the state, they insist that this general rule is
not an automatic bar to privity with a government entity and that
courts  must  come[] to a conclusion based on the  facts  of  the
particular case.  As evidence, the Sullivans point to  a  handful
of  cases  in  which courts have concluded that public  officials
acting  in  their personal capacities were, in fact,  in  privity
with  the state.  However, as Eldridge notes, these cases largely
involved  instances  of  government  employees  using  collateral
estoppel  in  a  defensive  manner  to  prevent  plaintiffs  from
relitigating   issues   that  had  already  been   unsuccessfully
litigated  against  the  same government employees  in  different
capacities,   other  government  employees,  or  the   government
entities  themselves.29  As such, these cases did not  raise  the
same  sort  of fairness and policy concerns that are  present  in
cases  such as the one at hand  they neither bound a litigant  to
the adverse determinations of a case to which he or she was not a
party  nor  burdened  the  government  with  concerns  about  its
employees personal interests.
          Ultimately, we find no reason in this case  to  deviate
from  the  general rule that employees acting in  their  personal
capacities  are not in privity with the government  and  are  not
bound  by adverse determinations against the government.  Indeed,
the facts of this case are such that even under our standard case
law,  Eldridge cannot be understood to have been in privity  with
the   state.   As  we  explained  in  Powers  v.  United  Service
Automobile  Assn,  a  non-party will be found  to  have  been  in
privity with a party to a prior legal proceeding only if that non-
party  (1) substantially participated in the control of a  partys
presentation in the adjudication or had an opportunity to do  so;
(2)  agreed to be bound by the adjudication between the  parties;
or  (3) was represented by a party in a capacity such as trustee,
agent, or executor.30  Here, Eldridge did not agree to be bound by
the adjudication and was not represented by a party in a capacity
such as trustee.  And, contrary to the Sullivans contentions, the
fact  that  Eldridge drafted and signed the initial  petition  to
          terminate Kellys parental rights, prepared records, and testified
at the termination trial, does not mean that Eldridge had control
over  the  litigation  or  the ability  to  pursue  her  personal
interests.  Eldridge was therefore not afforded a full  and  fair
opportunity  to  litigate  the  issues  of  fact  and  cannot  be
precluded from relitigating these issues.31


V.   CONCLUSION
          For  the reasons detailed above, we VACATE the superior
courts  order  denying  Eldridge  qualified  immunity  from   the
Sullivans   1983  claims  and REMAND for further  proceedings  in
accordance  with  this  decision.  We also REVERSE  the  superior
courts order precluding Eldridge from relitigating factual issues
determined in the previous CINA proceeding and REMAND for further
proceedings in accordance with this decision.
_______________________________
     1     OCS was previously known as the Division of Family and
Youth Services.

     2     Kelly  later identified the abuser as a state  trooper
trainee  and explained that she had initially refused to identify
him out of fear.

     3     Similarly,  the  superior court  found  that  OCS  had
totally failed in fulfilling its concurrent planning obligation.

     4     Kellys original suit also named OCS and Patrick Octuck
as defendants. However, neither OCS nor Octuck is a party to this
appeal.   At  the  time petitions for interlocutory  review  were
filed in this case, the Sullivans only claim against OCS had been
dismissed.  After petitions for review were filed, the  Sullivans
only  claim  against Octuck was settled.  Therefore, this  appeal
concerns only Eldridge.

     5    42 U.S.C.  1983 provides:

          Every person who, under color of any statute,
          ordinance, regulation, custom, or  usage,  of
          any  State  or Territory or the  District  of
          Columbia,   subjects,   or   causes   to   be
          subjected,  any citizen of the United  States
          or   other  person  within  the  jurisdiction
          thereof  to  the deprivation of  any  rights,
          privileges,  or  immunities  secured  by  the
          Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
          party  injured in an action at law,  suit  in
          equity,   or  other  proper  proceeding   for
          redress . . . .
          
     6     Alaska  Rule of Civil Procedure 77(k)(4) provides,  in
relevant part:

          If  the  motion for reconsideration  has  not
          been  ruled upon by the court within 30  days
          from the date of the filing of the motion, or
          within  30  days of the date of filing  of  a
          response  request by the court, whichever  is
          later, the motion shall be taken as denied.
          
     7    Mabe v. San Bernadino County, Dept of Pub. Soc. Servs.,
237 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2001).

     8    Chilton-Wren v. Olds, 1 P.3d 693, 696 (Alaska 2000).

     9    Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

     10    We note that we have chosen generally to follow federal
precedent  for determining whether qualified immunity  should  be
conferred  for  executive acts alleged to  contravene  a  [state]
statutory  or constitutional mandate.  Breck v. Ulmer,  745  P.2d
66, 71-72 (Alaska 1987).

     11     San  Jose Charter of Hells Angels Motorcycle Club  v.
City  of  San  Jose, 402 F.3d 962, 971 (9th Cir.  2005)  (quoting
Saucier  v.  Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)); see  also  City  of
Fairbanks  v. Rice, 20 P.3d 1097, 1109 (Alaska 2000)  (explaining
federal qualified immunity).

     12     San Jose Charter of Hells Angels Motorcycle Club, 402
F.3d at 971 (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201).

     13    Id.

     14    Id.

     15     Devereaux  v. Perez, 218 F.3d 1045,  1051  (9th  Cir.
2000),  affd en banc sub nom. Devereaux v. Abbey, 263  F.3d  1070
(9th Cir. 2001).

     16     Alpine  Indus.,  Inc. v. Feyk, 22  P.3d  445,  447-48
(Alaska 2001).

     17    Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817-18 (concluding that allegations
of  malice  should  not  suffice to subject government  officials
either  to the costs of trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching
discovery  and  articulating  an  objective  test  for  qualified
immunity).

     18    See Crawford v. Kemp, 139 P.3d 1249, 1255 n.10 (Alaska
2006) (explaining that a  1983 claim can only be sustained if the
plaintiff  shows:   (1)  that  the  conduct  complained  of   was
committed  by a person acting under color of state law,  and  (2)
that  the  conduct  deprived the plaintiff  of  a  constitutional
right) (citing Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept, 901 F.2d  696,
699 (9th Cir. 1990)).

     19    Id.
          
     20    Van Sandt v. Brown, 944 P.2d 449, 452 n.5 (Alaska 1997)
(citing  Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 375-76 (1990)); see  also
Martinez  v.  California, 444 U.S. 277, 284 (1980) (It  is  clear
that  the  California immunity statute does not  control  this  [
1983]  claim  even though the federal cause of  action  is  being
asserted in the state courts.).

     21     Although  Eldridge  had touched  upon  the  issue  of
qualified immunity in her opposition to the Sullivans motion  for
partial summary judgment, the superior court decided the issue of
qualified immunity in its ruling on Eldridges motion to  dismiss,
which was based only on absolute immunity.

     22     Moreover,  Eldridge  could  not  have  submitted  any
evidence in support of the defense of qualified immunity  without
the superior court converting her motion to dismiss into a motion
for  summary judgment.  See Alaska R. Civ. P. 12(c) (stating that
[i]f . . . matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not
excluded  by the court, the motion shall be treated  as  one  for
summary judgment).

     23     San  Jose Charter of Hells Angels Motorcycle Club  v.
City of San Jose, 402 F.3d 962, 971 (9th Cir. 2005).

     24    Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987) (noting
that  a  determination  of  whether it  was  objectively  legally
reasonable  to  conclude  that a given search  was  supported  by
probable  cause  or  exigent  circumstances  will  often  require
examination  of  the  information  possessed  by  the   searching
officials).

     25     Powers  v. United Serv. Auto. Assn, 6 P.3d  294,  297
(Alaska 2000).

     26     See Bilida v. McCleod, 211 F.3d 166, 170-71 (1st Cir.
2000) (noting that most precedent indicates that individual state
officials  are  not  bound,  in their individual  capacities,  by
determinations adverse to the state in prior criminal cases); see
also  Turpin  v. County of Rock, 262 F.3d 779, 782-83  (8th  Cir.
2001)  (stating that [c]ollateral estoppel cannot be used against
the  officers . . . as the officers were neither parties  nor  in
privity with the State in the criminal action and did not have  a
full  and fair opportunity to litigate the issues in the criminal
action);  Smith v. Holtz, 210 F.3d 186, 199 n.18 (3d  Cir.  2000)
(concluding that the defendants in their individual capacities  .
. . are not in privity with the government); Morgan v. Gertz, 166
F.3d  1307,  1309 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that a social  worker
and  police detective were not in privity with the State and were
therefore  not  precluded  from relitigating  findings  that  the
plaintiffs  constitutional rights had  been  violated);  Gray  v.
Lacke, 885 F.2d 399, 405 (7th Cir. 1989) (concluding that to  the
extent county officials were sued in their individual capacities,
they  were not in privity with the county); Harris v. Jones,  471
N.W.2d  818, 820 (Iowa 1991) (noting that the court was aware  of
no  case  in which a person, sued individually, has been estopped
to  litigate an issue because of a ruling adverse to the State in
a  prior criminal prosecution); Brown v. Osier, 628 A.2d 125, 128
(Me.  1993)  (noting  that an official  sued  in  his  individual
capacity  is generally not considered to be in privity  with  the
government) (quoting Cohen v. Shea, 788 F. Supp. 66, 68 (D. Mass.
1992));   Lamb  v.  Geovjian,  683  A.2d  731,  734  (Vt.   1996)
(recognizing  that  a  public official  sued  in  her  individual
capacity  is generally not considered to be in privity  with  the
government  for  the purpose of res judicata); 18A  Charles  Alan
Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure  4458 (2d
ed.  2002) (stating that [t]he relationships between a government
and  its  officials  justify preclusion  only  as  to  litigation
undertaken in an official capacity).

     27     See  Bilida, 211 F.3d at 170-71 (explaining that  the
interests  and incentives of the individual police  or  officials
are  not  identical  to  those of the  state,  and  the  officers
normally  have  little  control over the conduct  of  a  criminal
proceeding); Restatement (Second) of Judgments  36 cmt. a  (1982)
(noting  that  [a]  legal  capacity other  than  ones  individual
capacity is by definition representative of interest of others).

     28     We also note that we have previously adopted portions
of  the  Restatement (Second) of Judgments approach  to  privity.
Powers, 6 P.3d at 297-98.  The Restatement maintains that a party
appearing   in   an  action  in  one  capacity,   individual   or
representative,  is  not thereby bound  by  or  entitled  to  the
benefits  of the rules of res judicata in a subsequent action  in
which  he  appears in another capacity.  Restatement (Second)  of
Judgments  36(2) (1982).

     29    See, e.g., Powell v. Snyder, 84 Fed. Appx. 650, 651-52
(7th Cir. 2003) (unreported) (barring, under the doctrine of  res
judicata, a state prisoners suit against prison officials because
he  had  already unsuccessfully litigated the same claims against
the  Department of Corrections).  We also briefly note  that  the
bulk   of  cases  cited  by  the  Sullivans  were,  like  Powell,
unreported and carry no precedential weight.

     30    6 P.3d at 298 (citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments
 39-41 (1982)).

     31     See id. (concluding that collateral estoppel did  not
apply,  in  part,  because the litigant  had  not  been  afforded
meaningful notice and an opportunity to be heard).

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