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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Alaska Public Interest Research Group v. State (09/07/2007) sp-6158
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage,
Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
| ALASKA PUBLIC INTEREST | ) |
| RESEARCH GROUP, | ) Supreme Court No. S- 12341 |
| ) | |
| Appellant, | ) Superior Court No. |
| ) 3AN-05-11945 CI | |
| v. | ) |
| ) O P I N I O N | |
| STATE OF ALASKA and FRANK | ) |
| H. MURKOWSKI, GOVERNOR, | ) No. 6158 - September 7, 2007 |
| ) | |
| Appellees. | ) |
| ) | |
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State
of Alaska, Third Judicial District,
Anchorage, Sen K. Tan, Judge.
Appearances: Chancy Croft, Chancy Croft Law
Office, Anchorage, for Appellant. Paul R.
Lyle, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
Fairbanks, Laura C. Bottger, Assistant
Attorney General, Anchorage, and David W.
M rquez, Attorney General, Juneau, for
Appellees.
Before: Fabe, Chief Justice, Matthews,
Eastaugh, Bryner, and Carpeneti, Justices.
FABE, Chief Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
This appeal raises a constitutional challenge to the
creation of the Workers Compensation Appeals Commission in 2005.
The Alaska Public Interest Research Group (AKPIRG) contends that
the establishment of the Appeals Commission violates the
separation of powers doctrine implicit in the Alaska Constitution
by creating a court in the executive branch and improperly
removing jurisdiction from the superior court. The State
responds that the creation of the Appeals Commission was simply
an exercise of the legislatures article III power to create a
quasi-judicial agency. The superior court granted summary
judgment to the State, deciding that the Appeals Commission is a
quasi-judicial agency. We conclude that establishment of the
Appeals Commission does not violate the separation of powers
doctrine, but we narrowly construe the statutes provision that
decisions of the Appeals Commission have the force of legal
precedent, determining that the decisions are binding only on the
Alaska Workers Compensation Board and the Appeals Commission
itself. We also conclude that we have the inherent authority to
order a trial de novo when due process requires one.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
The Twenty-Fourth Legislature enacted a number of
changes to the Alaska Workers Compensation Act in chapter 10,
FSSLA 2005. The governor sponsored the legislation in response
to a perception that workers compensation insurance rates were
too high and were making it difficult for some businesses in the
state to continue.1 Among the changes was the establishment of
the Workers Compensation Appeals Commission.2 The Appeals
Commission is comprised of five members.3 One member, the chair,
must be an attorney experienced in Alaska workers compensation
law.4 The other members of the Appeals Commission are equally
divided between representatives of employers and employees.5
Members of the Appeals Commission other than the chair must have
served for at least eighteen months on the Alaska Workers
Compensation Board.6 The members of the Appeals Commission are
appointed by the governor and confirmed by a majority of the
legislature.7 Those who want to serve on the Appeals Commission
submit their applications to the chief administrative law judge,
who chooses the individuals whose names are submitted to the
governor for selection.8 Members of the Appeals Commission are
subject to conflict of interest provisions9 and may only be
removed by the governor for good cause.10
Under the new statute, the Appeals Commission hears
appeals of decisions of the Alaska Workers Compensation Board;11
it is the exclusive and final authority for the . . .
determination of all questions of law and fact12 arising under the
Alaska Workers Compensation Act,13 except for an appeal to this
court.14 Three-member panels of the five-member Appeals
Commission hear and decide appeals.15 The statute also provides
that unless reversed by this court, decisions of the Appeals
Commission have the force of legal precedent.16 The statute
authorizes the Appeals Commission to adopt regulations
implementing its duties, including the adoption of rules of
procedure and evidence, in addition to its work reviewing
decisions of the Alaska Workers Compensation Board.17 It is also
able to award reasonable attorneys fees.18
AKPIRG filed a suit for declaratory and injunctive
relief on September 30, 2005. In its complaint it alleged that
the Workers Compensation Appeals Commission was an executive
court. It further alleged that creation of the Appeals
Commission violated article IV of the Alaska Constitution by:
(1) improperly removing superior court jurisdiction and granting
jurisdiction to the supreme court; (2) creating a court outside
the unified judicial system; (3) not following constitutional
provisions for the selection of judges; and (4) improperly
granting power to the Appeals Commission to make rules governing
the administration of the Appeals Commission. AKPIRG asked the
superior court to declare the provisions of the statute creating
the Appeals Commission null and void, enjoin the implementation
of those sections of the statute that created the Appeals
Commission, and declare that appeals in workers compensation
cases could be filed and heard in the superior court.
About two weeks after AKPIRG filed its complaint, the
State moved for summary judgment, asking the superior court to
decide as a matter of law that: (1) the Appeals Commission was a
properly created quasi-judicial agency under article III, section
22 of the Alaska Constitution, and (2) taking intermediate
appellate jurisdiction in workers compensation cases from the
superior court was a valid exercise of legislative power under
article IV, section 1 of the Alaska Constitution. On October 21,
2005, AKPIRG filed its own summary judgment motion, seeking an
order that sections 8, 40, and 41 of chapter 10, FSSLA 2005 were
unconstitutional.19
After hearing oral argument on the cross-motions for
summary judgment, the superior court granted the States motion.
It decided that the Appeals Commission was a quasi-judicial
agency that the legislature properly created under article III,
section 22 of the Alaska Constitution. In reaching its decision,
the superior court considered the difference between judicial and
quasi-judicial functions and the extent to which appellate review
was a uniquely judicial function. It determined that there was
no constitutional provision for intermediate appellate review by
the superior court, so that the legislature could properly limit
the superior courts appellate jurisdiction.
AKPIRG appeals.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo.20 We will
affirm a grant of summary judgment when there are no genuine
issues of material fact and the prevailing party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.21 For questions of constitutional
law, we apply our independent judgment.22 In interpreting the
constitution, we adopt a reasonable and practical interpretation
in accordance with common sense based upon the plain meaning and
purpose of the provision and the intent of the framers.23
Statutes are presumed to be constitutional, and the burden of
showing that they are unconstitutional is on the party
challenging the statute.24
B. The Workers Compensation Appeals Commission
Is a Quasi-Judicial Agency.
This case presents two interrelated issues: whether the
Workers Compensation Appeals Commission is a properly created
quasi-judicial agency and whether the Appeals Commission
represents executive branch encroachment on the power of the
judiciary, in violation of the separation of powers doctrine.
The parties agree that there are no factual disputes. We
conclude that the legislature acted within its constitutional
authority in creating the Appeals Commission and that, with some
limiting construction of the statute, the authority of the
Appeals Commission does not encroach on the judicial branch.
We have recognized that the separation of powers and
its complementary doctrine of checks and balances are part of the
constitutional framework of this state.25 The separation of
powers doctrine is derived from the distribution of power among
the three branches of government.26 The Alaska Constitution vests
legislative power in the legislature; executive power in the
governor; and judicial power in the supreme court, the superior
court, and additional courts as established by the legislature.27
The separation of powers doctrine limits the authority of each
branch to interfere in the powers that have been delegated to the
other branches.28 The purposes of the separation of powers
doctrine are to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power and to
safeguard the independence of each branch of government.29
In determining whether creation of the Appeals
Commission violates the separation of powers, we examine the
nature of the power that the legislature granted to the Appeals
Commission.30 We also examine which branch of government is
assigned this power in the constitution and whether the
constitution suggests that the power is to be shared by two
branches.31 Finally, we must determine whether the limits of any
express grant have been exceeded or present an encroachment on
another branch.32
The parties here agree that the function of the Appeals
Commission hearing appeals is adjudication, which is primarily
a judicial function.33 Although the Alaska Constitution vests
judicial power in the courts, it also explicitly envisions
legislatively created quasi-judicial agencies within the
executive branch.34
Article III, section 22 of the Alaska Constitution
provides: Regulatory, quasi-judicial, and temporary agencies may
be established by law . . . . But the constitution contains no
definition of quasi-judicial agency. Delegates to the
Constitutional Convention, in discussing whether to include quasi-
judicial agencies in the new Alaskan government, looked at a
dictionary definition of quasi-judicial as designating an act or
proceeding of or before an administrative tribunal or official of
the general nature of a judicial act or proceeding but not within
the judicial power as defined under the Constitution.35 The
delegates debated the advantages that quasi-judicial bodies might
offer, such as specialization and expertise, and the
disadvantages, such as the potential for abuses of power.36 The
delegates saw two checks on the power of quasi-judicial agencies:
the legislature, which could hear citizen complaints about
agencies, and the courts, which could rise up and destroy an
intrusion on judicial powers.37
AKPIRG contends that the creation of the Appeals
Commission improperly takes judicial power from the judicial
branch and delegates that power to the executive. The State
counters that the Appeals Commission is simply another quasi-
judicial agency, creation of which is within the constitutional
power of the legislature.
1. Delegation of judicial function
The legislature may constitutionally delegate some
adjudicative power to an executive agency, but it may not
delegate judicial power.38 The attempt to distinguish between a
judicial function, which cannot be delegated, and a quasi-
judicial function, which can be, is not new. In his treatise on
state administrative law, Professor Frank Cooper notes that in
delegation cases, courts have tried to distinguish purely
legislative or judicial functions from quasi-legislative or quasi-
judicial functions and concludes that no court has successfully
distinguished the two.39 Although there is not a clear line of
demarcation, courts have looked at several factors in analyzing
whether a particular delegation of power to an administrative
agency is constitutional. Among the factors are the limited
jurisdiction of administrative agencies, the lack of finality of
agency decisions, the availability of judicial review, and the
amount of discretion available to an agency.
a. Limited jurisdiction
One factor that courts rely on to determine that an
agency exercises only quasi-judicial authority is the limited
jurisdiction of the administrative agency.40 One of the policy
justifications for the existence of administrative adjudication
is that as a result of their limited jurisdiction, administrative
agencies are able to develop expertise in a narrow area.41 Some
courts have decided that a grant of judicial power to an
administrative agency is acceptable when the administrative body
resolve[s] factual issues underlying a purely statutory right.42
Administrative agencies do not have jurisdiction to decide issues
of constitutional law.43 Delegation to an administrative agency
is upheld as long as the administrative tribunal stays within the
bounds of its authority.44
The Appeals Commissions jurisdiction is limited to
hearing and determination of all questions of law and fact
arising under the Alaska Workers Compensation Act in matters that
have been appealed to the Appeals Commission.45 The scope of its
jurisdiction is not that different from the Boards jurisdiction,46
except that the Appeals Commission performs a quasi-judicial
function that is akin to appellate review, while the Board
performs a quasi-judicial function that resembles that of a trial
court. We recognize that the Appeals Commission, like the Board,
may be required to apply equitable or common law principles in a
specific case,47 but both of these quasi-judicial agencies can
only adjudicate in the context of a workers compensation case.
Neither the Appeals Commission nor the Board has jurisdiction to
hear any action outside of a workers compensation claim.48
Although AKPIRGs main argument is that the Appeals
Commission has usurped a judicial function and therefore cannot
really be a quasi-judicial agency, it does not appear that AKPIRG
argues that all administrative appellate review is
unconstitutional. AKPIRG lists the Boards authority to hear
appeals from decisions of the reemployment benefits administrator
(RBA) as one of the Boards functions. In appeals from a decision
of the RBA, the Board is limited by statute to reviewing the
action for abuse of discretion.49 AKPIRG does not attack the
Boards appellate authority as an excessive delegation and does
not explain why a delegation of appellate review to the Appeals
Commission would be suspect when a delegation of a similar,
though narrower, function to the Board is permissible.
The superior court considered whether appellate review
is a uniquely judicial function and decided that it was not. In
Alaska, multi-level agency review is used in unemployment claims50
as well as contract claims against the state.51 Decisions of fair
hearing officers in public assistance cases must be reviewed by
the division director before they can be appealed to the court.52
The procedures used by the Appeals Commission may be more formal
and more closely resemble the courts procedures, but that does
not render them unconstitutional.
AKPIRG also urges us to declare the Appeals Commission
a court because its function, to review Board decisions, was
formerly performed by the superior court. The fact that an
administrative body performs a function previously performed by a
court does not automatically make it a court. Several years
after Congress amended the Longshoremens and Harbor Workers
Compensation Act to provide for administrative appellate review
by the Benefits Review Board and judicial review by the United
States Courts of Appeal, two members of the Benefits Review
Board, who had been removed from their positions, claimed that
the Benefits Review Board was in fact an Article III court, in
part because its review function replaced a function that had
previously been performed by the District Court.53 In deciding
that the Benefits Review Board was not an Article III court, the
D.C. Circuit observed, Article III requires only that the
ultimate judicial power be reserved in the Article III courts; it
does not require that all adjudicative bodies exercising the
review standards that Article III courts exercise be constituted
as Article III courts.54 Similarly, the fact that the Appeals
Commission reviews Board decisions and uses standards of review
and procedures that closely parallel those of the court does not
make the Appeals Commission a court. The Appeals Commissions
limited jurisdiction supports the conclusion that it is a quasi-
judicial agency rather than a court.
b. Enforcement of orders
Another factor that courts have looked at in assessing
the constitutionality of an agencys power is whether an agency
can enforce an order that it creates.55 As we recognized in a
previous separation of powers case, the essence of judicial power
is the final authority to render and enforce a judgment.56
Neither the Appeals Commission nor the Board has the ability to
enforce its own orders. AKPIRG contends that after the
legislature removed the superior courts jurisdiction to hear
workers compensation appeals, this court alone can enforce Board
or Appeals Commission orders. We disagree. The superior court
retains jurisdiction to compel compliance with Board subpoenas57
and to enter judgments when a party to a workers compensation
proceeding defaults on payment of a compensation order.58 The
superior courts authority to enter a judgment when an employer
defaults on payments is independent of its power to hear appeals.59
In addition, nothing deprives the superior court of jurisdiction
to hear declaratory actions related to the Alaska Workers
Compensation Act.60 Because the Appeals Commission cannot enforce
its own orders, it lacks one of the essential attributes of a
court.
c. Agency discretion
Delegation of power to an administrative agency is more
likely to be found constitutional if the grant of power minimizes
agency discretion.61 For example, in workers compensation cases,
the amount of benefits is set by statute so that the Board has
minimal discretion in awarding benefits as compared to a jury
awarding tort damages.62 Courts also sometimes look at whether
the area of delegation is one that historically has been subject
to administrative regulation.63 Workers compensation is an area
of law that has been subject to administrative adjudication for a
considerable period of time.64 The Alaska Workers Compensation
Board was created in 1959, the same year that Alaska became a
state.65 AKPIRG does not question the Boards power to perform a
quasi-judicial function. The Appeals Commission has no more
discretion to award damages than the Board since its jurisdiction
is limited to review of Board decisions. This lack of discretion
weighs in favor of the Appeals Commission being a quasi-judicial
agency rather than a court.
d. Judicial review
Courts have also looked at the availability of judicial
review in determining whether an agency has been properly
delegated quasi-judicial authority.66 We have found a right to
judicial review of agency action in the absence of an explicit
statutory provision67 and a right to limited review even in cases
where the legislature has precluded judicial review.68 Decisions
of the Appeals Commission are subject to judicial review by this
court, so judicial review is available.69
AKPIRG contends that the legislature may not
constitutionally provide for direct appeals from administrative
agency decisions to this court because article IV, section 2 of
the Alaska Constitution provides that the supreme court has final
appellate jurisdiction. But we agree with the States argument
that this court can have both initial and final jurisdiction to
hear administrative appeals, just as it has initial and final
jurisdiction to hear civil appeals from the superior court.70
AKPIRG points to no authority that there is a right of
intermediate appellate review in agency decisions or otherwise,
and we find none in the Alaska Constitution. Superior court
review of administrative agency decisions is a statutory, not a
constitutional, right, even though the separation of powers
doctrine and principles of due process require an opportunity for
judicial review. The court reviewing the administrative action
does not need to be the superior court, however.
Among the goals of the legislature in changing the
Workers Compensation Act were decreasing costs and speeding the
processing of claims. The Appeals Commission was created to help
achieve these goals: it was intended to provide consistent,
legally precedential decisions in an expeditious manner.71 The
legislature hoped that the Appeals Commission would provide
necessary expertise and thereby improve the appeals process.
Other states have workers compensation systems similar to that
which was created by chapter 10, FSSLA 2005. At the request of
the superior court, the State provided information about five
other states with direct appeals to their supreme courts in
workers compensation appeals. A number of other states have
workers compensation statutes which have two-tier administrative
decisionmaking, with initial determinations reviewed within the
agency or department, followed by judicial review by an appellate
court.72
We are not aware of any successful constitutional
challenge to a similarly structured workers compensation
appellate procedure. Constitutional challenges to similar
statutes were rejected in New Hampshire73 and Kansas.74 Because
the Appeals Commission has limited jurisdiction and discretion
and because its decisions are subject to judicial review, the
legislature validly delegated quasi-judicial power to the Appeals
Commission.
AKPIRG contends that because the legislature did not
explicitly call the Appeals Commission a quasi-judicial agency as
it did when it created the Office of Tax Appeals in the
Department of Administration, the Appeals Commission is not in
fact a quasi-judicial agency. A comparison to the Alaska Workers
Compensation Board shows that AKPIRGs argument is flawed. The
Alaska Workers Compensation Board was an early quasi-judicial
agency, created by the legislature in 1959.75 At the time of its
creation, it was not explicitly labeled a quasi-judicial agency,
yet we have recognized that it is one.76 AKPIRG does not question
the Boards status as a quasi-judicial agency or the legitimacy of
its power: in fact, AKPIRG uses the Board as a model quasi-
judicial agency with which to compare the Appeals Commission.
AKPIRG also argues that the Appeals Commission cannot
be considered a valid quasi-judicial agency because of its
limited function. It alleges that the only power delegated to
the Appeals Commission is the authority to hear appeals in
workers compensation cases. While it is true that the Appeals
Commission has a more limited function than the Board, its
limited function does not disqualify it as a quasi-judicial
agency.77 Delegates to the Constitutional Convention appeared to
be more concerned that the scope of powers delegated to a quasi-
judicial agency would be too broad, rather than too narrow.78
Furthermore, the Appeals Commission, like other quasi-judicial
agencies, is empowered to adopt regulations consistent with its
function.79 It can also hold hearings and receive evidence on a
limited number of issues.80 The legislature acted within the
authority to create quasi-judicial agencies accorded to it by the
constitution when it established the Appeals Commission.
C. The Organization of the Appeals Commission Is
Permissible.
AKPIRG implies that the legislature could not validly
create a quasi-judicial agency independent of the Board to review
Board decisions. The constitution grants the legislature and the
executive broad power to organize administrative bodies.81 We
have also recognized that the legislature has constitutional
power to allocate executive department functions and duties among
the different administrative bodies within state government.82 In
this case, even though the legislature made the Appeals
Commission independent of the Board, both of them are within the
same executive department, the Department of Labor and Workforce
Development.83
The administrative structure adopted by the legislature
for the Appeals Commission is not unique among the states.
Minnesotas Workers Compensation Court of Appeals is an
independent agency within the executive branch and by statute is
required to maintain its offices in a building separate from the
Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry.84 The federal
government has established independent commissions for
administrative adjudication85 and also has administrative
appellate review within an executive department by different
sections of the department.86 While the Appeals Commission may be
the first Alaskan administrative agency to have the limited
function and structure that it does, we conclude that the
organization that the legislature chose does not violate the
separation of powers doctrine.
D. Appeals Commission Decisions Have Precedential Value
Only for the Appeals Commission and the Board.
The State contends that the Appeals Commission is not
the first level of judicial review, but merely a second layer of
administrative adjudication; according to the State, the Appeals
Commission simply renders the final agency decision for purposes
of judicial review. AKPIRG argues that the Appeals Commission is
not needed to add finality because the Boards decisions are
already final. It asserts that the result of creation of the
Appeals Commission is to give administrative adjudication legally
precedential effect. AKPIRGs argument misconstrues the concept
of final agency action. Nothing requires an appeal to the
Appeals Commission; if parties are satisfied with a Board
decision, that decision is final as to the parties and binds
them, just as a Board decision bound them under prior law.87 What
the 2005 amendment changed is the way in which an administrative
decision in a workers compensation case becomes final for
purposes of judicial review.
Only final administrative orders are subject to
judicial review.88 The legislature may require compliance with
specific procedures for an order to be final for purposes of
review.89 Here, the legislature decided that final agency action
for a workers compensation case now must be an Appeals Commission
decision, not a Board decision.90 However, if a party does not
want to appeal the Board decision, it need not do so; the Board
decision is then final.91
AKPIRG argues that the legislature acted improperly in
creating the Appeals Commission, staffing it with a majority of
non-lawyers, yet giving the decisions of the Appeals Commission
the force of legal precedent.92 It also asserts that the
acceptance of the States argument results in affording legally
precedential value to decisions of an executive agency but not
the superior court. But examination of administrative law
principles shows that the powers explicitly granted to the
Appeals Commission are similar to powers already exercised by non-
attorneys in quasi-judicial agencies, including the Board.
The Board is composed of eighteen members, who are
equally divided between representatives of labor and industry.93
Nothing requires that Board members be attorneys. Until the
creation of the Appeals Commission, the Board was the
administrative body responsible for interpretation of the Alaska
Workers Compensation Act, both through its quasi-legislative
function of promulgating regulations and its quasi-judicial
function of adjudicating claims.94 Administrative agencies can
set policy through adjudication, as well as rulemaking.95 While
there has never been a statutory provision that Board decisions
have precedential effect, the Board has looked to its prior
decisions in deciding individual cases.96 As a result, the
decisions of Board panels had some intra-agency precedential
effect. And while we have not had occasion to address this exact
issue, some courts have held that administrative agencies, while
not strictly subject to the doctrine of stare decisis,
nonetheless must act consistently with their prior adjudications
or explain why they do not.97 If administrative agencies did not
adhere to some loose form of precedent, their actions could
easily appear arbitrary.98 In fact, cases disapproving
administrative action for failing to follow agency precedent have
found the agency action arbitrary.99 In sum, the Board, which may
be composed of a majority of non-lawyers, already uses agency
adjudication as some form of precedent to establish policy.100
Non-lawyers in administrative agencies can also
interpret statutes by promulgating regulations.101 In reviewing
administrative action, we give deference to an agencys
interpretation of a statute when the question involves
fundamental policy decisions or administrative expertise.102 In so
doing, we in effect give some power to non-lawyers to interpret
the law. There is nothing new in giving non-lawyers some
interpretive authority in determining the meaning of a statute
through administrative agency action.
Alaska Statute 23.30.008 potentially goes beyond these
settled legal principles by providing that decisions of the
Appeals Commission have the force of legal precedent unless
reversed by this court.103 This provision could be read to
encroach on judicial functions if it meant that decisions of the
Appeals Commission could serve as precedent for courts or other
administrative agencies. Even though courts currently defer to
an agencys interpretation of a statute in questions of
fundamental policy, the judiciary exercises its independent
judgment when there is a question of law that does not involve
agency expertise.104 Courts also retain the authority to set aside
an agencys interpretation of the law, even if it involves a
fundamental policy question, if the agency interpretation is
unreasonable.105
The State responds to AKPIRGs argument by asserting
that Appeals Commission decisions are binding legal precedent
only in the sense that commission decisions bind the appeals
commission and the compensation board. However, nothing on the
face of the statute limits the precedential value of the
decisions in this way. The Appeals Commission provides an
additional layer of administrative adjudication in workers
compensation claims. It is constitutionally permissible for the
legislature to direct that the Board must adhere to Appeals
Commission decisions and that the Appeals Commission must give
precedential effect to its own decisions.106 But the legislature
cannot constitutionally require the courts to give precedential
value to Appeals Commission decisions.
The judiciary alone among the branches of government is
charged with interpreting the law.107 To give an administrative
agency decision precedential value in a way that binds the courts
or even other agencies would undermine the notion of judicial
review. Judicial review of legal questions is one of the
fundamental principles that underpins the notion that
administrative adjudication is constitutional.108 Any attempt to
undermine independent judicial review of agency action cannot be
constitutional. To better understand this statutory provision,
we explore what the doctrine of precedent entails and the reasons
that the legislature may have included this provision in the
statute.
The doctrine of precedent is a common law doctrine
under which courts are bound by prior decisions in their
consideration of new cases.109 Precedent is a judge-made rule
designed to constrain judicial decisionmaking by requiring that
prior decisions with similar relevant facts be followed or, if
they are not followed, that the reasons for departing from the
prior rule be explained.110 Two types of stare decisis have been
identified: horizontal stare decisis and vertical stare decisis.111
Horizontal stare decisis binds the issuing court to its own prior
decisions.112 Vertical stare decisis requires that courts of lower
rank follow decisions of higher courts.113 Vertical stare decisis
has a stronger effect, in that lower courts generally cannot
overrule decisions of higher courts, whereas a court may, given
adequate reasons to do so, overrule itself.114
Precedent goes beyond the related principles of res
judicata and collateral estoppel and serves a different purpose.
Res judicata, or claim preclusion, and collateral estoppel, or
issue preclusion, bind the parties and their privies to factual
findings, as well as legal conclusions, that have been the
subject of prior litigation.115 The goal of res judicata and
collateral estoppel is finality: both doctrines aim to prevent
parties from again and again attempting to reopen a matter that
has been resolved by a court of competent jurisdiction.116 When a
decision is precedent, that decision binds other parties in
similar, not necessarily identical, circumstances to the legal
conclusions of the precedential decision.117 Precedent serves
several purposes.118 One goal of precedent is to narrow issues
that need to be litigated, thus making litigation less costly and
time consuming. As we have previously noted, no judicial system
could do societys work if it eyed each issue afresh in every case
that raised it.119 Adherence to precedent also ensures that
litigants have an understanding of the rules that may be applied
to their actions.120 Finally, and perhaps most importantly,
precedent maintain[s] public faith in the judiciary as a source
of impersonal and reasoned judgments.121
We have already determined that the principles of res
judicata and collateral estoppel apply in administrative
proceedings. We have held that principles of res judicata apply
to Board proceedings to foreclose relitigation of the same issues
between the same parties.122 We have also held that administrative
agency decisions can have preclusive effect on later court
proceedings, so that if a party participates in an administrative
adjudication, the administrative adjudication may foreclose the
possibility of a later lawsuit on the same factual issues.123 But
when the courts evaluate an agency interpretation of a statute
using the reasonable basis test, we do not accept the agencys
interpretation as binding and do not use the same analysis to
overrule an agencys interpretation of a statute that we use to
overrule a legal precedent that we have established.124
The State argues that Appeals Commission decisions must
be given precedential weight in order to achieve the legislatures
goal of increasing efficiency and consistency in processing
workers compensation claims. There is little legislative history
about the precedential nature of Appeals Commission decisions.
The director of the Division of Workers Compensation testified
that the Appeals Commission would increase the speed, efficiency,
and predictability of appeals because superior court judges are
not experienced in workers compensation law and because [t]heir
decisions do not establish binding legal precedent.125
Before the creation of the Appeals Commission, the
Board was a party to any workers compensation case filed in the
superior court.126 The Board could elect not to participate in an
appeal, but its election not to participate would not affect
whether it was bound by a decision on appeal.127 The potential
difficulty for the Board was that one superior court decision did
not, and does not, bind other superior courts.128 As a result, the
Board could be left with conflicting legal guidance, which would
make it difficult to provide consistent and fair adjudication of
workers compensation claims. Creation of the Appeals Commission
resolves this issue.
Both the Appeals Commission and the Board have
jurisdiction in workers compensation cases, but without direction
from the legislature, the inter-agency precedential value of
Appeals Commission decisions would not have been apparent.
Furthermore, the process for administrative review of Board
decisions differs in one significant way from past practice: the
Board is not automatically a party to an Appeals Commission
proceeding.129 If the Board is not a party to an appeal to the
Appeals Commission, the Board would not be bound by an Appeals
Commission decision under principles of either res judicata or
collateral estoppel, unless it chose to intervene in every case
that came before the Appeals Commission.130 The provision that
decisions of the Appeals Commission have precedential effect
clarifies that its decisions are binding on the Board even when
the Board does not intervene in an appeal. In other words, the
statute gives vertical stare decisis effect to Appeals Commission
decisions. The statute also makes plain that different panels of
the Appeals Commission must follow prior decisions of the Appeals
Commission; it gives horizontal stare decisis effect to the
decisions as well. The statutory provision that Appeals
Commission decisions have precedential effect, if construed as
applying only to the Board and the Appeals Commission, furthers
the goal of achieving consistency in workers compensation cases.
The statutory provision that Appeals Commission
decisions have the force of legal precedent unless reversed by
this court could encroach on the power of the judiciary to be the
final interpreter of the law. Because statutes should be
construed to avoid the risk of unconstitutionality,131 we construe
the provision that decisions of the Appeals Commission have the
force of legal precedent as meaning that they serve as legal
precedent for the Board and the Appeals Commission only. This
construction does not detract from the legislations goals and
clarifies the relationships between the Board and the Appeals
Commission. It is also consistent with current administrative
law principles.
E. This Court Can Order a Trial de Novo if Necessary.
AKPIRG asserts that trial de novo is an important right
that was removed when the legislature took jurisdiction to hear
workers compensation appeals from the superior court. The
Appeals Commission does not have the authority to provide a trial
de novo, but it can remand to the Board matters that it
determines were improperly, incompletely, or otherwise
insufficiently developed.132 Before the enactment of chapter 10,
FSSLA 2005, workers compensation claims were appealed under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which permits the superior
court to conduct a trial de novo.133 Trial de novo is
discretionary in the APA as well as the Rules of Appellate
Procedure.134
To the extent that trial de novo is a statutory right,
the legislature can amend the statute to remove that procedural
right.135 To the extent that trial de novo is necessary as a
constitutional matter, however, the legislature cannot deprive
the courts of jurisdiction to hold a trial de novo.136 Although we
have held that there is no general constitutional right to a
trial de novo,137 we have recognized that in some cases, trial de
novo may be constitutionally required. We previously stated,
[W]here a statute establishes a right to a trial de novo, that
right must be recognized under Appellate Rule 45. We believe
that a similar right to trial de novo is created if an
administrative adjudicative procedure does not afford due
process.138 The only circumstance when a trial de novo is
constitutionally required is when administrative agency
procedures are so lacking as to deny due process to litigants.139
If the process provided by agency regulations conforms to due
process, but the agency has not adhered to the required process
in a particular case, the remedy is not a trial de novo but a
remand to the agency.140
Before the creation of the Appeals Commission, the
superior court could first, in its role as an appellate court
reviewing a Board decision, determine if the process afforded
litigants was so suspect as to be out of compliance with due
process. If it made that determination in its appellate
capacity, it could then hold a trial de novo as part of its
constitutional role as the trial court of general jurisdiction.
We agree with the State that we have the authority to order a
trial de novo as part of our inherent powers as an appellate
court in accordance with the Rules of Appellate Procedure. We
decided in State v. Lundgren Pacific Construction Co. that the
superior court had the authority to order a trial de novo
pursuant to its inherent authority. We stated, The superior
court has sufficient authority to order a trial de novo under
Appellate Rule 45(j) which confers upon the superior court power
to make such orders as are necessary and proper to aid its
appellate jurisdiction. 141 Appellate Rule 520(c) provides that
this court may require such further proceedings to be had as may
be just under the circumstances.142
As the only court with jurisdiction to review Appeals
Commission decisions, we have the authority to decide whether
workers compensation procedures in a case are so deficient as to
deprive litigants of due process.143 If they are and litigants are
constitutionally entitled to a trial de novo, their cases can be
assigned to the superior court as the constitutional trial court
of general jurisdiction.
F. Establishment of the Appeals Commission Is Substantive
Law.
AKPIRG argues that because chapter 10, FSSLA 2005
failed to amend the appellate rules that provide for appeals in
administrative proceedings, the court rules providing for an
appeal to the superior court remain in effect. It bases its
argument on the constitutional provision that changes to court
rules must be enacted by a two-thirds vote of each house of the
legislature.144 It also argues that because article IV, section 1
of the Alaska Constitution says that the jurisdiction of the
courts shall be prescribed by law, the legislature cannot
prohibit the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in administrative
cases. Prescribe is defined as to establish rules, laws, or
directions.145 Establishing a rule that the superior court does
not have intermediate appellate jurisdiction to hear workers
compensation cases prescribes the jurisdiction of the superior
court as much as granting the superior court jurisdiction to hear
them. The legislature could permissibly remove the superior
courts appellate jurisdiction in workers compensation cases.
We have previously stated that the question whether
article IV, section 15 of the Alaska Constitution applies to the
passage of legislation depends on whether the subject matter of
the statute at issue is substantive or procedural; only changes
in procedural law require a super-majority for passage.146
Substantive law creates, defines and regulates rights, while
procedural law prescribes the method of enforcing the rights.147
With the enactment of chapter 10, FSSLA 2005, the legislature
took subject matter jurisdiction to hear workers compensation
appeals from the superior court. We recently held that subject
matter jurisdiction is the legal authority of a court to hear and
decide a particular kind of case148 and noted that the legislature
could properly authorize the superior court and a quasi-judicial
agency to hear particular classes of cases.149 The removal of
subject matter jurisdiction to hear appeals in workers
compensation cases from the superior court is substantive because
it is directly related to the legislatures constitutional
authority to prescribe the jurisdiction of the courts.150 The
legislation was properly enacted.
IV. CONCLUSION
The legislature acted within its constitutional
authority when it created the Workers Compensation Appeals
Commission. The Appeals Commission is a properly established
quasi-judicial agency within the meaning of the Alaska
Constitution. Its decisions are subject to judicial review, and
it has jurisdiction only in workers compensation cases. If
procedures before the Appeals Commission or the Alaska Workers
Compensation Board were to be so deficient as to deny due process
to litigants, this court has the inherent authority to order
trials de novo in the superior court. Decisions of the Appeals
Commission can constitutionally serve as precedent only for the
Appeals Commission itself and the Alaska Workers Compensation
Board. With the limiting construction we have given, we
determine that the legislation creating the Appeals Commission
does not violate the separation of powers doctrine. The judgment
of the superior court is AFFIRMED.
_______________________________
1 Hearing on Senate Bill (S.B.) 130 Before the S. Labor &
Commerce Comm., March 8, 24th Leg. (Alaska 2005) (Testimony of
Department of Labor and Workforce Development Commissioner Greg
OClaray).
2 AS 23.30.007.
3 AS 23.30.007(b).
4 AS 23.30.007(b)(1) & (c)(2)(B)(C).
5 AS 23.30.007(b)(2) & (3).
6 AS 23.30.007(c)(1)(D) & (2)(A).
7 AS 23.30.007(b).
8 AS 23.30.007(d).
9 AS 23.30.007(l).
10 AS 23.30.007(j).
11 AS 23.30.127. The superior court no longer has
jurisdiction to hear workers compensation appeals. AS 23.30.129.
12 AS 23.30.008(a).
13 AS 23.30.001.400.
14 AS 23.30.008(a).
15 AS 23.30.007(i).
16 AS 23.30.008(a).
17 AS 23.30.008(c).
18 AS 23.30.008(d).
19 Chapter 10, 8, FSSLA 2005 became AS 23.30.007.009,
which create the Workers Compensation Appeals Commission; chapter
10, 40, FSSLA 2005 became the revised AS 23.30.125, which
provides for appeals from Board decisions to the Appeals
Commission; chapter 10, 41, FSSLA 2005 became AS 23.30.127.129,
which deal with Appeals Commission proceedings and judicial
review of commission decisions.
20 State, Dept of Health & Soc. Servs. v. Planned
Parenthood of Alaska, Inc., 28 P.3d 904, 908 (Alaska 2001).
21 Rockstad v. Erikson, 113 P.3d 1215, 1219 (Alaska 2005).
22 Planned Parenthood, 28 P.3d at 908.
23 Alaska Legislative Council v. Knowles, 21 P.3d 367, 370
(Alaska 2001) (internal quotations omitted) (citing Cook v.
Botelho, 921 P.2d 1126, 1128-29 (Alaska 1996)).
24 State, Dept of Revenue v. Andrade, 23 P.3d 58, 71
(Alaska 2001).
25 Planned Parenthood, 28 P.3d at 913 (citing State v.
Dupere, 709 P.2d 493, 496 (Alaska 1985), modified, 721 P.2d 638
(1986)).
26 Bradner v. Hammond, 553 P.2d 1, 5 (Alaska 1976).
27 Id. at 6.
28 See Abood v. League of Women Voters, 743 P.2d 333, 338
(Alaska 1987).
29 Bradner, 553 P.2d at 6.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 6-7.
32 Id. at 7-8.
33 As some courts have discussed, however, the other
branches of government may at times perform adjudication in the
exercise of their powers. Mulhearn v. Fed. Shipbuilding & Dry
Dock Co., 66 A.2d 726, 730 (N.J. 1949); State ex rel Attorney
Gen. v. Hawkins, 5 N.E. 228, 234 (Ohio 1886).
34 Alaska Const. art. III, 22.
35 3 Proceedings of the Alaska Constitutional Convention
(PACC) 2206 (January 14, 1956).
36 Id. at 2204-09.
37 Id. at 2205, 2209.
38 See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 49-50 (1932); cf.
Bradner, 553 P.2d at 5-7 (relying on federal cases to interpret
separation of powers).
39 1 Frank Cooper, State Administrative Law 50-51 (1965);
see also F. Scott Boyd, Floridas ALJs: Maintaining a Different
Balance, 24 J. Natl Assn Admin. L. Judges 175, 187-88 (2004)
(noting difficulty in distinguishing quasi-judicial from judicial
power, especially in areas like workers compensation where
adjudication of claims was once performed by courts).
40 See Crowell, 285 U.S. at 54; see also Dee Enters. v.
Indus. Claim Appeals Office of State of Colo., 89 P.3d 430, 434
(Colo. App. 2003) (noting that the legislature granted
administrative law judges and the Industrial Claim Appeals Office
limited jurisdiction to make decisions in workers compensation
cases).
41 Alan B. Morrison, Administrative Agencies Are Just Like
Legislatures and Courts Except When Theyre Not, 59 Admin. L.
Rev. 79, 101 (2007) (identifying agency expertise as one reason
that Congress has assigned certain proceedings to administrative
rather than judicial adjudication).
42 McKay v. N.H. Comp. Appeals Bd., 732 A.2d 1025, 1029
(N.H. 1999).
43 Dougan v. Aurora Elec., Inc., 50 P.3d 789, 795 n.27
(Alaska 2002).
44 See Quam v. State, 391 N.W.2d 803, 809 (Minn. 1986)
(holding that Minnesota Workers Compensation Court of Appeals
violated the separation of powers doctrine by deciding an issue
outside the scope of its jurisdiction).
45 AS 23.30.008(a).
46 DeNuptiis v. Unocal Corp., 63 P.3d 272, 277 (Alaska
2003) (noting that the Board has broad powers to administer the
Alaska Workers Compensation Act, including authority to formulate
policy and interpret statutes).
47 See Blanas v. Brower, 938 P.2d 1056, 1062 (Alaska 1997)
(holding that Board has authority to set aside settlement
agreements based on fraud); Wausau Ins. Cos. v. Van Biene, 847
P.2d 584, 588 (Alaska 1993) (holding that Board can apply
equitable principles to prevent an employer from asserting a
statutory right).
48 AS 23.30.005(h); AS 23.30.008(a); AS 23.30.110.
49 AS 23.30.041(d).
50 AS 23.20.340; AS 23.20.410.470.
51 AS 36.30.620; AS 36.30.625; AS 36.30.630(b); AS
36.30.675; AS 36.30.680.
52 7 Alaska Administrative Code (AAC) 49.220.230 (2004).
53 Kalaris v. Donovan, 697 F.2d 376, 386 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
54 Id. at 387.
55 Keyes v. Humana Hosp. Alaska, Inc., 750 P.2d 343, 356-
57 (Alaska 1988); Dee Enters., 89 P.3d at 434; State ex rel.
Keasling v. Keasling, 442 N.W.2d 118, 121 (Iowa 1989).
56 Keyes, 750 P.2d at 356 (citations omitted).
57 AS 23.30.005(h).
58 AS 23.30.170.
59 AS 22.10.020(d); AS 23.30.170.
60 AS 22.10.020(g).
61 See State v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 736 P.2d 1140,
1143 (Alaska 1987) (holding delegation of sweeping power to
governor with no guidance unconstitutional as an excessive
delegation of power); Jersey Maid Milk Prods. Co. v. Brock, 91
P.2d 577, 595-96 (Cal. 1939).
62 AS 23.30.175.225 provide for the rates of workers
compensation benefits in Alaska. In contrast, the trier of fact
has broad discretion in awarding damages under Alaskas wrongful
death statute. State v. Phillips, 470 P.2d 266, 271 (Alaska
1970); see also 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages 125 (2003).
63 See Boehl v. Sabre Jet Room, Inc., 349 P.2d 585, 588-89
(Alaska 1960) (noting history of broad administrative control in
regulating alcoholic beverages in support of broad delegation of
rule-making authority to administrative agency).
64 See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51-52 (1932)
(upholding constitutionality of agency adjudication of workers
compensation claims for maritime workers); Mulhearn v. Fed.
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 66 A.2d 726, 727 (N.J. 1949) (noting
that workers compensation claims were initially heard by judges
before establishment of an administrative agency). The
constitutionality of administrative adjudication in workers
compensation has been used to justify administrative adjudication
in other areas. See Plasti-line, Inc. v. Tenn. Human Rights
Commn, 746 S.W.2d 691, 693 (Tenn. 1988).
65 Ch. 193, SLA 1959. Even before statehood, an
administrative body heard workers compensation claims. The
Seventeenth Territorial Legislature created the Alaska Industrial
Board. Ch. 9, 36, SLA 1946. Among the Boards powers was the
adjudication of disputed workers compensation claims. Ch. 9,
15, SLA 1946.
66 See Ky. Commn on Human Rights v. Fraser, 625 S.W.2d
852, 855 (Ky. 1981); Nev. Indus. Commn v. Reese, 560 P.2d 1352,
1355 n.6 (Nev. 1977) (noting that administrative adjudication of
workers compensation claims has generally been upheld as
constitutional, provided that there is the customary judicial
review).
67 Alyeska Ski Corp. v. Holdsworth, 426 P.2d 1006, 1011-12
(Alaska 1967) (holding that determinations of the Director of
Division of Lands and the Commissioner of Natural Resources are
subject to judicial review).
68 K & L Distribs., Inc. v. Murkowski, 486 P.2d 351, 357
(Alaska 1971).
69 AS 23.30.129(a).
70 AS 22.05.010.
71 2005 Senate Journal 465.
72 AKPIRG does not challenge the States assertion that
thirty-four states use some form of a board or commission or
specialized appeal panel to address the first level of appeal
from an initial decision. A number of states provide for
judicial review to an appellate court rather than a trial court.
See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. 8-43-301(2003); Conn. Gen.
Stat. Ann. 31-301, 31-301b (2003); Kan. Stat. Ann. 44-555c, 44-
556 (2000); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 418.859a, 418.861a (1999); Or.
Rev. Stat. 656.289.298 (2005).
73 McKay v. N.H. Comp. Appeals Bd., 732 A.2d 1025 (N.H.
1999).
74 Gleason v. Samaritan Home, 926 P.2d 1349 (Kan. 1996).
75 Ch. 193, SLA 1959.
76 Ch. 193, 2, 25, SLA 1959; Wausau Ins. Cos. v. Van
Biene, 847 P.2d 584, 587 (Alaska 1993) (citing Hood v. State,
Workmens Comp. Bd., 574 P.2d 811, 813 (Alaska 1978)).
77 See Kalaris, 697 F.2d at 389 (noting that Congress
could place limited function of Benefits Review Board in an
executive agency).
78 3 PACC 2207 (January 14, 1956).
79 AS 23.30.008(c).
80 AS 23.30.128(c).
81 Alaska Const. art. III, 22 provides:
All executive and administrative offices,
departments, and agencies of the state
government and their respective functions,
powers, and duties shall be allocated by law
among and within not more than twenty
principal departments, so as to group them as
far as practicable according to major
purposes. Regulatory, quasi-judicial, and
temporary agencies may be established by law
and need not be allocated within a principal
department.
Alaska Const. art. III, 23 provides:
The governor may make changes in the
organization of the executive branch or in
the assignment of functions among its units
which he considers necessary for efficient
administration. Where these changes require
the force of law, they shall be set forth in
executive orders. The legislature shall have
sixty days of a regular session, or a full
session if of shorter duration, to disapprove
these executive orders. Unless disapproved
by resolution concurred in by a majority of
the members in joint session, these orders
become effective at a date thereafter to be
designated by the governor.
82 Capital Info. Group v. State, Office of the Governor,
923 P.2d 29, 40 (Alaska 1996).
83 AS 23.30.002; AS 23.30.005; AS 23.30.007(a).
84 Minn. Stat. Ann. 175A.01, 175A.04 (2006). Michigans
Workers Compensation Appellate Commission is also an autonomous
entity, but it is permitted to share offices with the Department
of Labor. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 418.274 (1999).
85 Congress established the Federal Mine Safety and Health
Review Commission to hear challenges to enforcement of the
Federal Mine Safety and Health Amendments Act of 1977; it is
independent of the Department of Labor. Thunder Basin Coal Co.
v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 202-04 (1994).
86 In federal workers compensation cases, administrative
appeals are heard by the Benefits Review Board, which is within
the Office of the Deputy Secretary of the Department of Labor. 33
U.S.C. 921(b); 20 C.F.R. 801.103 (2006). The Benefits Review
Board reviews decisions by the Employment Standards
Administration of the Department of Labor. 20 C.F.R. 801.103
(2006). By placing the Benefits Review Board in a different
section of the Department of Labor from the section where
administrative law judges worked, the Secretary of Labor was
attempting to insulate the Board from those who would be subject
to its review. Kalaris, 697 F.2d at 391. This administrative
structure was determined to be constitutional. Id. at 397-401.
Another example of two-tier administrative review in the federal
system is the Board of Indian Appeals in the Department of
Interior, which hears appeals of certain decisions of the Bureau
of Indian Affairs as part of its administrative appellate
jurisdiction. 43 C.F.R. 4.1(a)(2) (2006).
87 AS 23.30.125(a).
88 AS 23.30.129(a); AS 44.62.560(a). The administrative
adjudication procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act do
not apply to the Appeals Commission. AS 23.30.128(d).
89 2 Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise
15.11 (4th ed. 2002).
90 AS 23.30.125(b); AS 23.30.129.
91 AS 23.30.125(a).
92 AKPIRGs argument that the legislature evaded the intent
of the constitution in bypassing the judicial selection process
is without merit. Because we determine that the Appeals
Commission is a quasi-judicial agency, its members are not
subject to the judicial selection process set out in the Alaska
Constitution.
93 AS 23.30.005(a).
94 DeNuptiis v. Unocal Corp., 63 P.3d 272, 277 (Alaska
2003).
95 Amerada Hess Pipeline Corp. v. Alaska Pub. Utils.
Commn, 711 P.2d 1170, 1178 (Alaska 1986).
96 See, e.g., Stempniak v. Pioneer Alaskan Fisheries,
Inc., AWCB Decision No. 95-0012 (Feb. 7, 1995) (relying on
Williams v. Cal Worthington Ford, AWCB Decision No. 93-0254 (Oct.
13, 1993) to determine whether claimant changed physicians);
Nickerson v. Alaska Airlines, AWCB Decision No. 06-0330 (Dec. 18,
2006) (relying on past Board decisions for proposition that
participation in a second independent medical evaluation tolls
the statute of limitations).
97 In re Hughes & Coleman, 60 S.W.3d 540, 543 (Ky. 2001);
Steiner Corp. v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Commn, 979 P.2d
357, 361 (Utah 1999).
98 2 Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise
11.5 (4th ed. 2002).
99 Wolchuck v. Bowen, 871 F.2d 869, 875 (9th Cir. 1989);
In re Charles A. Field Delivery Serv., Inc., 488 N.E.2d 1223,
1227 (N.Y. 1985); cf. United Utils., Inc. v. Alaska Pub. Utils.
Commn, 935 P.2d 811, 815 (Alaska 1997) (noting that APUC
considered applications in accordance with its prior decisions).
100 See Bloom v. Tekton, Inc., 5 P.3d 235, 238 (Alaska
2000) (discussing genesis of agency policy about substitution of
physicians).
101 OCallaghan v. Rue, 996 P.2d 88, 94-95 (Alaska 2000).
102 Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. DeShong, 77 P.3d 1227,
1231 (Alaska 2003).
103 AS 23.30.008(a) provides:
The commission shall be the exclusive and
final authority for the hearing and
determination of all questions of law and
fact arising under this chapter in those
matters that have been appealed to the
commission, except for an appeal to the
Alaska Supreme Court. The commission does
not have jurisdiction in any case that does
not arise under this chapter or in any
criminal case. On any matter taken to the
commission, the decision of the commission is
final and conclusive, unless appealed to the
Alaska Supreme Court, and shall stand in lieu
of the order of the board from which the
appeal was taken. Unless reversed by the
Alaska Supreme Court, decisions of the
commission have the force of legal precedent.
104 Rydwell v. Anchorage Sch. Dist., 864 P.2d 526, 528
(Alaska 1993).
105 DeNuptiis, 63 P.3d at 277.
106 See Capital Info. Group v. State, Office of the
Governor, 923 P.2d 29, 40 (Alaska 1996) (recognizing legislatures
constitutional power to allocate executive department functions
and duties).
107 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)
(It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is.).
108 Crowell, 285 U.S. at 49-50.
109 Joseph v. State, 26 P.3d 459, 468 (Alaska 2001) (citing
State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386, 394 (Alaska 1999)).
110 20 Am. Jur. 2nd Courts 129 (2005). Some commentators
distinguish between stare decisis and precedent, viewing stare
decisis as the strict adherence to the doctrine of precedent.
Polly J. Price, Precedent and Judicial Power After the Founding,
42 B.C. L. Rev. 81, 105 (2000). Others use the terms
interchangeably. Michael Sinclair, Precedent, Super-Precedent,
14 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 363, 363 n.3 (2007). We will use the terms
interchangeably because the distinction is not critical for our
discussion.
111 State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 n.3 (Utah 1994);
Michael Sinclair, What is the R in IRAC?, 46 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev.
457, 486 (2002-2003).
112 Menzies, 889 P.2d at 399 n.3.
113 Sanford v. Clear Channel Broad., Inc., 719 N.W.2d 312,
319 (Neb. App. 2006).
114 See Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commn, 102 P.3d
937, 943 (Alaska 2004) (discussing circumstances when prior
decisions will be overruled).
115 Smith v. CSK Auto, Inc., 132 P.3d 818, 820 (Alaska
2006); Wilson v. Municipality of Anchorage, 977 P.2d 713, 726
(Alaska 1999).
116 State, Child Support Enforcement Div. v. Bromley, 987
P.2d 183, 192 (Alaska 1999) (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
117 20 Am. Jur. 2nd Courts 130 (2005).
118 Holm v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 251 (1998).
119 Pratt & Whitney Can., Inc. v. Sheehan, 852 P.2d 1173,
1175 (Alaska 1993) (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 854 (1992)).
120 Corby v. McCarthy, 840 A.2d 188, 207 (Md. App. 2003);
see also In re G.K., 497 P.2d 914, 917 n.14 (Alaska 1972) (noting
that the force of stare decisis is less when there has not been a
change in position in reliance on challenged decision).
121 Sheehan, 852 P.2d at 1175-76 n.4 (quoting Moragne v.
States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970)).
122 Robertson v. Am. Mech., Inc., 54 P.3d 777, 779-80
(Alaska 2002) (citing McKean v. Municipality of Anchorage, 783
P.2d 1169, 1171 (Alaska 1989)).
123 Matanuska Elec. Assn v. Chugach Elec. Assn, Inc., 152
P.3d 460, 468 (Alaska 2007); see Jeffries v. Glacier State Tel.
Co., 604 P.2d 4, 8-9 (Alaska 1979).
124 Compare DeNuptiis, 63 P.3d at 277-78 (agency
interpretation not reasonable), with State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386,
394 (Alaska 1999) (overruling Frye standard for admission of
scientific evidence).
125 Hearing on S.B. 130 Before the S. Labor & Commerce
Comm., March 10, 24th Leg. (Alaska 2005) (Testimony of Paul
Lisankie).
126 AS 44.62.560(a); Alaska R. App. P. 602(h); Crawford &
Co. v. Baker-Withrow, 81 P.3d 982, 985-86 (Alaska 2003).
127 Alaska R. App. P. 602(h).
128 Counsel for AKPIRG acknowledged at oral argument that
conflicting superior court decisions were a theoretical
possibility, although he denied that the Board had ever been
faced with such a conflict.
129 AS 23.30.127(a) permits the director of the Division of
Workers Compensation to intervene in an appeal. Appeals
Commission regulations set out the process for the director to
intervene. 8 AAC 57.030 (2007).
130 Res judicata and collateral estoppel only bind the
parties to the prior litigation and their privies. Tolstrup v.
Miller, 726 P.2d 1304, 1307 (Alaska 1986); Holmberg v. State,
Div. of Risk Mgmt., 796 P.2d 823, 829 (Alaska 1990) (holding that
collateral estoppel did not apply due to the lack of privity
between the State and the Public Employees Retirement System).
131 State v. Native Vill. of Nunapitchuk, 156 P.3d 389, 405
(Alaska 2007).
132 AS 23.30.128(d).
133 AS 44.62.330(a)(13); AS 44.62.570(d). Before the
creation of the Appeals Commission, the Alaska Workers
Compensation Act had no express provision related to judicial
review of Board decisions.
134 AS 44.62.570(d); Alaska R. App. P. 609(b).
135 Manthey v. Collier, 367 P.2d 884, 887 (Alaska 1962).
136 See K & L Distribs., Inc. v. Murkowski, 486 P.2d 351,
354-55 (Alaska 1971).
137 Keiner v. City of Anchorage, 378 P.2d 406, 409 (Alaska
1963).
138 State v. Lundgren Pac. Constr. Co., 603 P.2d 889, 895
(Alaska 1979). Appellate Rule 45 at that time governed appeals
to the superior court from administrative agencies. Id. at 890
n.3.
139 Id. at 896.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 894 n.9.
142 Alaska R. App. P. 520(c).
143 Nothing in the amendments to the Workers Compensation
Act divested the superior court of jurisdiction to hear
declaratory judgment cases related to constitutional deficiencies
in workers compensation procedures or regulations.
144 Alaska Const. art. IV, 15.
145 Websters II New College Dictionary 894 (3rd ed. 2005).
146 Channel Flying, Inc. v. Bernhardt, 451 P.2d 570, 575-76
(Alaska 1969).
147 Ware v. City of Anchorage, 439 P.2d 793, 794 (Alaska
1968).
148 Nw. Med. Imaging, Inc. v. State, Dept of Revenue, 151
P.3d 434, 438 (Alaska 2006) (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
149 Id.
150 See Native Vill. of Nunapitchuk, 156 P.3d at 404
(stating that a doctrine of substantive law is related to matters
of public policy within the sphere of elected representatives).
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