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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. City of Kotzebue v. State, Dept. of Corrections (08/31/2007) sp-6156

City of Kotzebue v. State, Dept. of Corrections (08/31/2007) sp-6156, 166 P3d 37

     Notice:   This opinion is subject to correction  before
     publication  in  the  Pacific  Reporter.   Readers  are
     requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
     of  the  Appellate  Courts, 303  K  Street,  Anchorage,
     Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
     e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.


            THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA

CITY OF KOTZEBUE, )
) Supreme Court No. S- 12149
Appellant, )
) Superior Court No. 2KB-03-66 CI
v. )
)
STATE OF ALASKA, ) O P I N I O N
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, )
and STATE OF ALASKA, ) No. 6156 August 31, 2007
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC )
SAFETY, )
)
Appellee. )
)
Appeal    from     the
          Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Second
          Judicial   District,  Kotzebue,  Michael   I.
          Jeffery, Judge.

          Appearances:  Joseph W. Evans, Kotzebue  City
          Attorney,  Silverdale, Washington.   John  K.
          Bodick,     Assistant    Attorney    General,
          Anchorage,  and  David W.  M rquez,  Attorney
          General, Juneau, for Appellee.

          Before:    Fabe,  Chief  Justice,   Matthews,
          Eastaugh, Bryner, and Carpeneti, Justices.

          BRYNER, Justice.

I.   INTRODUCTION
          For  a  number of years, the City of Kotzebue  operated
the  Kotzebue  Regional  Jail under a contract  with  the  state.
After  being  rebuffed by the state in its  efforts  to  increase
funding  under the contract, the city opted to let  the  contract
expire  and then sued the state to recover the cost of  operating
the  jail  and  transporting prisoners to court for  arraignment.
The  main  issue  here  is  whether  the  Alaska  departments  of
corrections and public safety owed a continuing duty to house and
transport prisoners held in the Kotzebue jail after the  contract
expired.   In  all but one minor respect, we affirm the  superior
courts ruling on summary judgment that the states duty to provide
housing  ceased  when the contract expired but  that  it  owed  a
continuing duty to transport prisoners to court.
II.  FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
          The operative facts are not in dispute.  The department
of  corrections has administered Alaskas community jails  program
since  fiscal  year 1995.  Community jails are  local  facilities
used  to hold prisoners for short periods of time between  arrest
and arraignment; during trials and while serving short sentences;
pending  transfer  to  larger correctional facilities;  and  when
awaiting  commitment  for mental health  and  alcohol  treatment.
Built  in  1988, the Kotzebue Regional Jail was operated  by  the
city  of  Kotzebue under contract with the state as part  of  its
community jail program for many years; the jail serves an area of
approximately  35,000  square miles in the  northwest  region  of
Alaska.
          In  the  years  leading  up to  2003,  Kotzebue  became
convinced that its contract with the state was not fully covering
the  cost  of  operating  the jail,  thus  forcing  the  city  to
subsidize  the  facility even though it housed prisoners  charged
with  violating state laws.  On June 6,  2003, after being denied
additional funding, the city informed the department that it  did
not  expect to renew the contract, that it planned to  close  the
jail  when the contract expired at the end of the month, and that
its  city council was in the process of adopting a resolution  to
that effect.
          In   response,  on  June  18,  2003,  Commissioner   of
Corrections  Marc S. Antrim advised Kotzebue City Manager  Herman
Reich  that if the city executed the resolution closing the jail,
it  would  have  to make arrangements to deliver offenders  to  a
Department of Corrections facility.  The nearest facility was  in
Nome, which is not connected to Kotzebue by road.  Antrim further
stated that, in his view, the department was not responsible  for
an  offender at the time of arrest and was not obligated to  take
custody  of  a  prisoner  until a  booking  officer  at  a  state
correctional  facility  signed a remand slip  accepting  custody.
Reich  answered Antrim on June 24, challenging his  understanding
of   state  law.   According  to  Reich,  under  applicable  law,
responsibility    for   pre-arraignment   and    post-arraignment
transportation   of  state-charged  prisoners   lies   with   the
Department of Corrections and the Department of Public Safety.
          Meanwhile, on June 19, 2003, the Kotzebue City  Council
had passed a resolution prohibiting Reich from renewing the jails
contract and directing him to close the jail at midnight June 30,
2003,  unless the state provided full funding for the next fiscal
year  beginning July 1.  At midnight on June 30 the  city  closed
the jail.  No prisoners were being held there at the time.
          In  the  early  morning  hours of  July  2,  2003,  the
Kotzebue Police Department arrested an individual for a violation
of  state  law.   The Alaska State Troopers, a  division  of  the
department  of  public safety, refused to  take  custody  of  the
prisoner,  taking  the  position that  their  obligations  toward
prisoners  did not begin until after arraignment.   The  troopers
refusal forced the city to re-open the jail on a limited basis.
          In  the  ensuing two weeks, further discussions between
the  city  and the department evidently took place.  On  July  17
City  Attorney Joseph Evans spoke with Commissioner Antrim  at  a
city  council  meeting.  The next day Evans  faxed  a  letter  to
Antrim  to  confirm  that [t]he City Council has  reaffirmed  its
decision . . . that the City of Kotzebue cannot and will not sign
a  [fiscal  year  2004] contract for $589,000.00 to  operate  the
Kotzebue  Regional Jail.  Insisting that the citys interpretation
of state law was well grounded, Evans implored the departments of
corrections  and  public  safety to  re-examine  their  positions
declining to take responsibility for state-charged prisoners from
arrest  to  arraignment.   On the same  day,  the  department  of
corrections Deputy Director of Institutions, Mike Addington, sent
a  letter  to City Manager Reich reaffirming that the  department
lacked  the  resources to provide the City of Kotzebue  with  the
additional funds to run the jail.
          In a reply sent by fax on July 22, Reich challenged the
departments  decision  to  deny  funding  as  legally  incorrect,
politically  inappropriate  and  predicted  that  it  would  most
assuredly require the City to seek judicial redress.  On the same
day,   City  Attorney  Evans  signed  the  citys  superior  court
complaint  against  the  state.  The complaint  sought  an  order
declaring the departments of corrections and public safety to  be
responsible  for  housing and transporting unarraigned  prisoners
arrested  by the city, enjoining the departments to take  custody
of and transport such prisoners, and reimbursing the city for any
costs and expenses it incurred in providing transportation or  in
operating the jail.
          The   parties   positions  remained   unchanged   until
October  10,  2003,  when  state troopers  in  Kotzebue  abruptly
changed  course and resumed transporting prisoners from the  jail
to the Kotzebue courthouse for arraignment.  Troopers in Kotzebue
also began using temporary holding cells, or cages, to house post-
arraignment prisoners and prisoners awaiting arraignment who  had
been  arrested by state troopers.  The holding cells were managed
exclusively by the department of public safety and were  intended
to  hold  prisoners  for only a few hours  until  they  could  be
transported to correctional facilities in Nome.
          Monthly  reports  of activity at the Kotzebue  Regional
Jail  for  the  period from July 2003 to October 2004  show  that
state-charged  prisoners continued to be housed at  the  Kotzebue
jail until their arraignments.  Monthly arrest totals ranged from
a  low  of  seventeen  in March 2004 to a high  of  fifty-two  in
September 2004.1
          The state and city both moved for summary judgment.  On
August  30, 2004, Superior Court Judge Michael I. Jeffery granted
summary  judgment  in  favor of the city on the  prisoner-custody
issue,  ruling that the department of corrections had a statutory
duty  to care for prisoners before their arraignment in locations
where a state correctional facility existed.  In the courts view,
          the cages maintained by the state in Kotzebue qualified as a
correctional facility because the state accepted custody and held
prisoners  in  the cages.  The court reasoned that  although  the
city  had no viable claim for housing expenses during the  period
between  the jails initial closure and the opening of the  cages,
it  was  entitled  to reimbursement of its jail costs  after  the
cages opened.  The court also ruled that the department of public
safety had an independent duty to transport Kotzebue prisoners to
court  for arraignment; in the courts view, the duty began  after
the  troopers installed the cages to hold prisoners.   The  court
thus awarded the city reimbursement for the costs it incurred  in
transporting prisoners to arraignment between the opening date of
the  cages  and  October 10, 2003  the date when  state  troopers
voluntarily resumed transporting all Kotzebue prisoners to court.
          In  issuing  its initial summary judgment  ruling,  the
court  mistakenly believed that the cages built by  the  troopers
had  been operated by the department of corrections.  Soon  after
the  ruling,  the state moved for reconsideration,  pointing  out
that  the  cages had been maintained by the department of  public
safety  without any involvement by the department of corrections,
so  they  did not qualify as correctional facilities.   Based  on
this  clarification, the court granted reconsideration and issued
a  revised  summary  judgment  order,  ruling  that  because  the
department  of public safetys cages were not a state correctional
facility,  the  city  had no right to be reimbursed  for  housing
prisoners at the Kotzebue jail even after the cages opened.   The
court  nonetheless broadened its original ruling  concerning  the
department  of  public  safetys  independent  statutory  duty  to
transport   prisoners  from  the  Kotzebue  jail  to  court   for
arraignment.   The  court ruled that, even in the  absence  of  a
local  correctional  facility, this duty applied  to  all  state-
charged  prisoners held in Kotzebue by the police.  The  superior
court   thus  ordered  that  the  city  be  reimbursed  for   all
transportation costs it incurred from July 1 to October 10, 2003.
          In  entering  its  final judgment, the  superior  court
ruled  that  the state was the prevailing party in the  case  and
denied  the  citys  request for public-interest litigant  status,
finding  that  it  had  ample economic  incentive  to  bring  the
lawsuit.   Accordingly,  the court ordered  the  city  to  pay  a
portion of the states attorneys fees.
          The city then filed this appeal.2
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
          We   review  a  trial  courts  order  granting  summary
judgment  independently3 and uphold the judgment if  we  conclude
that  the record presents no genuine issues of material fact  and
that  the  moving  party  was entitled to  judgment  on  the  law
applicable  to  the  established  facts.4   We  similarly  review
questions of statutory interpretation independently, adopting the
interpretation most persuasive in light of precedent, reason  and
policy.5
IV.  DISCUSSION
     A.   The  Citys  Claim Against the Department of Corrections
          for Reimbursement of Housing Expenses
          The city argues that the Alaska Constitution and Alaska
          Statutes require the state to take custody of and care for pre-
arraignment  prisoners  arrested  for  violating  state  law   by
Kotzebue  police.  It contends that this obligation arises  under
article  I,  section  12  of  the  Alaska  Constitution  and   AS
33.30.011(1).
          Article    I,    section    12    addresses    criminal
administration,   providing   in   relevant    part:     Criminal
administration shall be based upon the following:  the  need  for
protecting  the public, community condemnation of  the  offender,
the  rights of victims of crimes, restitution from the  offender,
and  the  principle of reformation.6  The city asserts that  this
language  places  responsibility  for  Alaskas  criminal  justice
system on the State of Alaska.  It specifically contends that the
language  makes the department responsible for custody of  state-
charged  offenders, citing a footnote from State  v.  Chaney7  to
support this assertion.
          But neither the constitutional provision nor the Chaney
footnote  supports  the citys position.  Article  I,  section  12
describes the general goals that Alaskas criminal justice  system
must  strive to attain.  It addresses the criminal justice system
as  a  whole and does not assign responsibility to any particular
agencies  within that system for housing city-arrested  prisoners
before arraignment.
          Likewise,  the  citys reliance on State  v.  Chaney  is
unavailing.  Chaney dealt with issues of criminal sentencing8 and
did  not  purport  to address the central issue  presented  here:
responsibility   for   housing   and   transporting   unarraigned
prisoners.  Moreover, the Chaney footnote lends scant support  to
the  citys  constitutional theory; it simply states  the  general
proposition   that   [o]peration   of   our   system   of   penal
administration in Alaska is dependent upon a properly staffed and
functioning [Department] of Corrections which has, in addition to
probation and parole functions, the responsibility for treatment,
rehabilitation,  and custody of incarcerated offenders.9  Nothing
in this language refers to individuals who have been arrested but
not  yet  arraigned,  nor does it purport to define  the  precise
scope of the departments responsibility for arrested persons  who
have not yet been committed to state custody.
          The   citys   argument  also  relies  heavily   on   AS
33.30.011(1),   which  broadly  defines   the   duties   of   the
commissioner   of   corrections  with  respect  to   correctional
facilities.    In  relevant  part,  the  provision  directs   the
commissioner to
          establish,  maintain,  operate,  and  control
          correctional  facilities  suitable  for   the
          custody,  care,  and  discipline  of  persons
          charged or convicted of offenses against  the
          state or held under authority of state law.[10
          ]
Because Kotzebue police officers make arrests only for violations
of  state  law,  the city reasons, this provisions  reference  to
persons  .  .  . held under authority of state law  requires  the
commissioner  to  provide  correctional  facilities   for   every
individual arrested by the Kotzebue police.
          But   in   directing  the  commissioner  to  establish,
maintain, operate, and control correctional facilities  that  are
suitable  for  such  prisoners,  the  statute  hardly  implies  a
responsibility  extending  to individual  prisoners  or  specific
categories  of  prisoners.  More important, the citys  contention
that  this  provision  sets  out specific,  unequivocal  dictates
largely  ignores  a  companion provision, AS 33.30.071(b),  which
defines  the events that trigger the departments duty to  provide
suitable  prison facilities. This provision specifies that  [t]he
responsibility of the commissioner under AS 33.30.011 begins when
a prisoner is accepted into the commissioners custody or admitted
into a correctional facility.11
          Under subsection .071(b), then, the duties described in
AS  33.30.011  begin only when a prisoner is  accepted  into  the
commissioners custody or admitted into a correctional facility.12
The  first  stated trigger of the duty  being accepted  into  the
commissioners  custody  is not defined by statute or  regulation.
The superior court plausibly viewed this phrase as a reference to
prisoners who are committed by a court to the departments custody
but  have  not  yet  arrived  at a correctional  facility.13   So
construed, this provision has no relevance here.
          The  second  triggering condition set out in subsection
.071(b)  is admission to a correctional facility.  Alaska Statute
33.30.901  defines correctional facility to mean a prison,  jail,
camp,  farm,  half-way  house, group  home,  or  other  placement
designated  by  the  commissioner  for  the  custody,  care,  and
discipline  of prisoners.14  Under the department of  corrections
regulations, admission to a correctional facility is governed  by
22  Alaska  Administrative Code (AAC) 05.020;  at  the  time  the
Kotzebue  jail closed, this regulation allowed arresting officers
to admit prisoners to a correctional facility by either producing
commitment  papers  from a court or executing a remand-to-custody
order in the presence of booking staff.15
          When  read in conjunction with these provisions, as  it
must  be,16  AS  33.30.071(b)  can  be  seen  as  triggering  the
departments responsibility to provide for suitable custody  of  a
prisoner  when  an  arresting officer  delivers  a  state-charged
prisoner  (together  with  a properly executed  remand-to-custody
form)  to  a booking officer at any jail that has been designated
by  the  commissioner for the custody, care,  and  discipline  of
prisoners.17
          This  language  suggests  that  the  commissioner  must
specifically  designate a jail as a suitable  place  for  housing
prisoners before it can qualify as a correctional facility.   The
need for a specific designation also finds support in the history
of AS 33.30.011(1) and AS 33.30.071.  Alaska Statute 33.30.071(b)
specifically refers to the duties set out in subsection  .011(1).
As  already  mentioned, subsection .011(1)  broadly  directs  the
commissioner to
          establish,  maintain,  operate,  and  control
          correctional  facilities  suitable  for   the
          custody,  care,  and  discipline  of  persons
          charged or convicted of offenses against  the
          state or held under authority of state law.[18
          ]
Subsection .071(b) elaborates on subsection .011(1) by making  it
clear  that the commissioners responsibility to carry  out  these
duties  begins when a prisoner is accepted into the commissioners
custody or admitted into a correctional facility.19
          Before  the  current  version of  AS  33.30.071(b)  was
enacted in 1995,20 subsections .071(a) and (b) both addressed the
custodial  duties  established under AS  33.30.011(1),  but  only
insofar  as  these  duties applied during  the  early  stages  of
custody; unlike the current provision, the earlier version of  AS
33.30.071  assigned  these duties to the commissioner  of  public
safety  rather than the commissioner of corrections.  Subsections
.071(a) and (b) formerly provided:
               (a)   Notwithstanding  AS  33.30.011(1),
          the   commissioner  of  public  safety  shall
          provide for the custody, care, and discipline
          of  prisoners pending arraignment, commitment
          by a court to the custody of the commissioner
          of  corrections,  or  admission  to  a  state
          correctional facility. . . .
          
               (b)     The   responsibility   of    the
          commissioner  of public safety under  (a)  of
          this  section does not begin until a prisoner
          is   accepted   into  the  custody   of   the
          commissioner  of public safety,  or  admitted
          into   a   correctional  facility  or   other
          facility designed for holding prisoners,  and
          the commissioner of public safety is notified
          of the acceptance or admission.[21]
          
          The  legislature  amended section  .071  in  1995;  the
amendment  shifted responsibility for early custody of  prisoners
from  the  commissioner of public safety to the  commissioner  of
corrections.22  In addition, the amendment changed the  scope  of
the duty.23  Whereas the earlier version required the commissioner
of  public  safety to provide for prisoners pending  arraignment,
commitment  by  a  court to the custody of  the  commissioner  of
corrections, or admission to a state correctional facility24  and
further  specified  that this duty began  when  the  commissioner
accepted the prisoner into custody,25 the amended form of section
.071  dropped all mention of responsibility for prisoners pending
arraignment and merely imposed responsibility on the commissioner
of  corrections  beginning when a prisoner is accepted  into  the
commissioners custody or admitted into a correctional facility.26
          Although   the  city  downplays  the  significance   of
omitting the earlier reference to custody pending arraignment, we
agree  with the state that the omission indicates that  the  1995
legislature did not intend to make the commissioner categorically
responsible  for  all  prisoners held on  state  charges  pending
arraignment.  This evidence of legislative intent reinforces  the
appropriateness of interpreting subsection .071(b) as  triggering
the    commissioners   custodial   responsibilities   under    AS
33.30.011(1) only upon a prisoners remand to a jail that has been
          designated by the commissioner for the custody, care, and
discipline of prisoners.27
          The  Kotzebue  jail  necessarily met  this  designation
requirement  before  its state contract expired.28   The  crucial
question  here,  then,  is whether the jail  continued  to  be  a
designated  place  for  the  custody,  care,  and  discipline  of
prisoners   and  thus  continued to  qualify  as  a  correctional
facility to which prisoners arrested for state offenses could  be
remanded   after  the citys contract with the  state  expired  at
midnight on June 30, 2003.
          As  already noted, the superior court ultimately  found
that the Kotzebue jail ceased to be a correctional facility as of
July  1, 2003, so that the department had no duty to take custody
of  any  unarraigned city prisoners as of that date.  In reaching
this conclusion, the court essentially equated the existence of a
valid contract to run the Kotzebue jail with the jails status  as
a  correctional  facility  as  defined  by  statute.29   But  the
commissioners  power to enter into contracts for confinement  and
care  of prisoners  a power established under AS 33.30.03130   is
not  necessarily coextensive with the commissioners authority  to
designate   suitable  placements  for  the  custody,  care,   and
discipline  of prisoners  an authority implicitly encompassed  in
AS  33.30.011(1)s list of the commissioners duties and  expressly
recognized  in  AS  33.30.901(4)s definition  of  a  correctional
facility or facility.
          We  have  already observed that a contract  allowing  a
regional  jail to operate as a correctional facility suffices  to
designate  the  jail  as  a  suitable place  to  house  prisoners
awaiting  arraignment.  Yet it hardly follows from  this  that  a
contract  is a necessary ingredient of a designation.   Nor  does
the state cite any provision of law or legal authority supporting
the  conclusion that a lapse in a jails contractual  arrangements
with  the  department  necessarily equates  to  a  withdrawal  of
designation  and automatically nullifies the jails  status  as  a
designated  facility.   The commissioners powers  to  enter  into
contracts  and  designate suitable placements for  prisoners  may
well  overlap  to  a  considerable extent, but  they  arise  from
independent statutory sources and do not necessarily merge.
          Here,  the  limited evidence in the record  on  summary
judgment  fails to establish that the citys unilateral resolution
to close the jail at the moment its longstanding contract expired
automatically   resulted   in   withdrawing   the   commissioners
designation of the jail as a suitable place to remand  prisoners.
The  power  of designation belongs to the commissioner,  not  the
city,  and  the portions of the contract quoted in the  appellate
record do not address the topic of designation.31
          Correspondence  between  the parties  undeniably  shows
that both sides used the contracts impending expiration date as a
bargaining  chip  to encourage the opposing party  to  relax  its
demands regarding the contracts renewal.  For example, on June 6,
2003,  City  Manager Reich evidently sent Commissioner  Antrim  a
letter  warning that the city expected to close the jail  at  the
end  of  the  month  if the department refused  to  increase  its
contractual payments.  Reichs letter was accompanied by a copy of
          the city councils pending resolution proposing to direct Reich to
close  the jail and a copy of a memo from City Attorney Evans  to
Kotzebue   Police   Chief   Ed   Weibl   discussing   alternative
arrangements  in  the  event  of  closure.   Commissioner  Antrim
responded on June 18, predicting that the citys proposed decision
would  cause  it  to  suffer significant  adverse  impacts.   The
commissioner  disputed Evanss legal position and emphasized  that
the  department was still prepared to provide $589,000  in  funds
through  the  Community  Jails Program  to  assist  the  City  of
Kotzebue.  Relying on his view of the law, the commissioner  also
argued that, [s]hould the City of Kotzebue execute its resolution
to  close the city jail, your police department will have to make
arrangements to deliver offenders to a Department of  Corrections
facility  and  would  be  placed in the  logistically  unenviable
position  of  transporting  its arrestees  to  a  state  operated
correctional facility.
          Nothing in this exchange amounted to an official notice
of  withdrawal  of the commissioners designation.   Although  the
parties advanced escalating threats in attempting to negotiate  a
renewed  contract, they took no definitive step to end the  jails
use  as  a  suitable holding place for persons  arrested  by  the
Kotzebue police.  As already noted, the contracts expiration  and
the  citys  unilateral action of closing  the  jail  did  not  by
themselves  withdraw  the commissioners  designation.   Two  days
after the contract expired, when the city reopened the jail,  the
Alaska  State  Troopers formally declined to transport  prisoners
from the jail to the court for arraignment.  But this action  was
based  on the department of public safetys belief that it  lacked
statutory responsibility for transporting prisoners, not  on  the
department of corrections withdrawal of designation.
          On  the  record  before us, it appears that  the  first
official  communication notifying the city that the  commissioner
of  corrections had actually decided to end the jails designation
as  a  suitable  place  for  holding prisoners  arrested  by  the
Kotzebue police occurred on July 18, 2003, when the department of
corrections Director of Institutions, Mike Addington,  sent  City
Manager  Reich a letter declaring that the department would  make
no additional funding available to the jail.  That same day, City
Attorney  Evans  sent  a  letter by fax to  Commissioner  Antrim,
reaffirming  the  citys  decision not  to  sign  the  departments
proposed fiscal year 2004 contract.  Division Director Addingtons
letter  to Reich expressed Addingtons respect [for] the  decision
of  the Kotzebue City Council not to sign the [fiscal year  2004]
contract but went on to confirm the departments decision that  we
do  not  have the resources to provide the City of Kotzebue  with
the additional funds to run the jail.
          As  of  July 18, then, the city unquestionably received
formal   notice  that  the  department  had  actually   withdrawn
authorization  for prisoners to be placed at the  Kotzebue  jail,
thereby   effectively   ending  the  jails   designation   as   a
correctional  facility.   Because the record  reveals  no  actual
withdrawal  of designation until July 18, we find  no  basis  for
concluding  that  the department of corrections was  entitled  to
summary judgment as a matter of law on the issue of reimbursement
for any housing costs incurred by the city before that date.
          Based  on our conclusion that the Kotzebue jail  ceased
to be a correctional facility as of July 18, 2003, we must vacate
the  superior  courts summary judgment order on  this  point  and
remand  for  modification of the judgment to the  limited  extent
that  it  summarily denies the citys housing-reimbursement  claim
for the period between July 1 and July 18.  Conversely, we affirm
the  courts order denying reimbursement of housing expenses  from
July 18 forward.
     B.   The Citys Claim Against the Department of Public Safety
          for Reimbursement of Transportation Expenses
          The  superior court viewed the citys motion for summary
judgment  as including a request for reimbursement of  the  citys
costs  in  transporting  city-arrested  prisoners  to  court  for
arraignment from July 1, 2003, through October 10, 2003, when the
troopers resumed handling the task of transportation.  The  court
granted the city summary judgment on this issue, concluding  that
[t]he  Department  of  Public Safety has the  statutory  duty  to
provide  or  arrange  for  transport of prisoners  to  court  for
arraignment  within  Kotzebue.  Relying on its  finding  of  this
general  obligation,  the  court  concluded  that  the  city  was
entitled  to reimbursement for all prisoner transportation  costs
it incurred from July 1 to October 10, 2003.
          On  appeal, the city requests this court to direct  the
superior  court  to  issue an even broader  order,  prospectively
requiring  the State of Alaska to fulfill its constitutional  and
statutory  obligations  for the . . . escort  of  pre-arraignment
state-charged  prisoners.  But the state  has  not  appealed  the
superior  courts order of reimbursement; nor has it disputed  the
conclusion of law underlying the courts order.  In effect,  then,
the city prevailed below in establishing the departments duty  to
transport  prisoners within Kotzebue; the superior courts  ruling
on  the  point is undisputed; and, as the law of the  case,  that
ruling will be binding on the parties in their future handling of
prisoners   held   by   the  city  in  Kotzebue.    Under   these
circumstances,  we  see  no reason to  require  a  broader  order
addressing  the department of public safetys future  handling  of
Kotzebue  prisoners.  And to the extent that the order  requested
by  the  city seeks to control the departments future conduct  in
other communities, we think that the city has failed to establish
any  present  controversy that would make its  request  ripe  for
review.  Accordingly, we decline to address the citys request  to
direct the superior court to issue a broader order.
     C.   Attorneys Fees
          After  the superior court issued its rulings on summary
judgment, the state moved for reasonable attorneys fees and costs
under  Alaska Civil Rule 82, asserting that it was the prevailing
party in the action.  The city opposed the motion, insisting that
it  should be exempted from having to pay fees because its claims
fell  within  the  public-interest exception  to  Rule  82.   The
superior  court  rejected this argument and  granted  the  states
motion for costs and fees, ruling that the city failed to qualify
as  a  public-interest  litigant because it  had  ample  economic
incentive   to  pursue  the  issues  raised  in  the  litigation,
regardless  of  whether those issues raised  matters  of  general
public  concern.  Accordingly, the court ordered the city to  pay
the state $4,400 in attorneys fees.
          The  city challenges the superior courts order awarding
fees, arguing that even if the city does not win on the merits of
its appeal, the fee award should be vacated on remand because the
citys  action falls under the public-interest exception  to  Rule
82.32  We  review  a superior courts determination  of  a  partys
qualifications  as  a  public-interest  litigant  for  abuse   of
discretion.33
          We  have  identified  four  factors  that  courts  must
consider  in  deciding  whether a party qualifies  as  a  public-
interest litigant:
          (1)   Is  the  case  designed  to  effectuate
          strong public policies?
          
          (2)   If the plaintiff succeeds will numerous
          people receive benefits from the lawsuit?
          
          (3)   Can  only  a  private party  have  been
          expected to bring the suit?
          
          (4)   Would  the  purported  public  interest
          litigant  have sufficient economic  incentive
          to file suit even if the action involved only
          narrow issues lacking general importance?[34]
          
A  party  seeking public-interest-litigant status must  establish
that it meets each of these elements.35
          The  superior court centered its ruling on  the  fourth
element, which required the city to establish that it would  have
lacked  economic incentive sufficient to pursue this case if  its
claims  had  raised  no  issue of general  importance.   In  Eyak
Traditional Elders Council v. Sherstone, Inc., we explained  this
factors rationale:
          If  a  party possesses a sufficient  economic
          incentive to sue, there is less need to  fear
          that the potential burden of an attorneys fee
          award would deter the plaintiff from pursuing
          beneficial litigation.[36]
Under Eyak, the fact that a litigant seeks monetary relief is not
by itself conclusive.37  Rather, the court must look to the facts
of  the  case  to determine the litigants primary motivation  for
filing suit.38
          Our decisions addressing this element illustrate how we
have  applied  it in a variety of situations.  For  instance,  we
have  held  that claims dealing with subsistence use  of  natural
resources  qualify for public-interest status.39   We  have  also
accorded  public-interest-litigant status to a  homeowners  group
that  attempted to curtail use of a private airstrip, noting that
the  groups  consistent  emphasis on health  and  safety  to  the
virtual exclusion of economic concerns indicated that its  action
was  designed  to vindicate a strong public policy and  that  the
group  would not have had sufficient economic incentive to  bring
the  lawsuit  even  if  it involved only  narrow  issues  lacking
          general importance. 40
          By contrast, we have generally declined to find public-
interest-litigant status when employees have sued  for  increased
salaries or reinstatement to their jobs; in these cases  we  have
emphasized  that the prospect of a job or an increase  in  salary
usually provides a sufficient economic incentive to motivate  the
suit.41   Even  more  to  the point, in an action  for  increased
funding brought against the state by a borough and a local school
district,  we approved an award of fees against the  borough  and
the  district.42  We found no abuse of discretion  in  the  trial
courts  order  denying them public-interest status, because  both
stood to gain financially from the funding increases they sought.43
We  emphasized that [w]here the sums at stake in a suit are large
enough to prompt suit regardless of the public interest, public[-
]interest litigant status will be denied.44
          Here,  the  city sought reimbursement for  hundreds  of
thousands  of dollars  in jail-operation costs.  As the  superior
court  aptly  noted, [t]he effort to obtain reimbursement  for  a
substantial  amount of money put[s] the City in a very  different
category than a plaintiff  such as a homeowners association suing
over  health and safety concerns.45  Because of the citys  strong
economic  interest in the action at issue here, we hold that  the
superior  court  did not abuse its discretion in denying  public-
interest-litigant status and in awarding fees  against  the  city
under Rule 82.
V.   CONCLUSION
          For  these reasons, we REMAND this case to the superior
court with directions to enter a modified judgment reflecting our
holding  that  the  Department of Corrections obligation  to  pay
housing  costs to the city ended on July 18 rather than  July  1,
2003.46   In  all  other respects, we AFFIRM the superior  courts
judgment.
_______________________________
     1     Reports for later months are not in the record  before
this court.
     2     The  city and state eventually reached a new agreement
on funding for the Kotzebue jail in the spring of 2005, about six
months  after  the  superior court issued  its  summary  judgment
order.   The agreement applied prospectively and did not  resolve
the reimbursement issues raised in the present appeal.

     3     Schmitz v. Yukon-Koyukuk Sch. Dist., 147 P.3d 720, 724
(Alaska 2006).

     4     Ganz  v.  Alaska Airlines, Inc., 963 P.2d  1015,  1017
(Alaska 1998).

     5     Newton  v.  Magill, 872 P.2d 1213, 1215 (Alaska  1994)
(quoting  Ford  v. Municipality of Anchorage, 813 P.2d  654,  655
(Alaska 1991)).

     6    Alaska Const. art. I,  12.

     7    State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441 (Alaska 1970).

     8    Id. at 44142.

     9    Id. at 447 n.26.

     10    AS 33.30.011(1).

     11    AS 33.30.071(b).

     12    Id.

     13    Specifically, the court based its theory on language in
a  pre-1995  version  of  AS 33.30.071(a).   The  former  version
stated:

               [T]he  commissioner . . . shall  provide
          for  the  custody,  care, and  discipline  of
          prisoners pending arraignment commitment by a
          court  to the custody of the commissioner  of
          corrections,   or  admission   to   a   state
          correctional facility.
          
Ch.  88,   6, SLA 1986 (emphasis added).  The legislature amended
this subsection in 1995 to read:

               The  commissioner is not responsible for
          providing custody, care, and discipline for a
          person  detained  under AS 47.30.705  and  AS
          47.37.170 unless the person is admitted  into
          a state correctional facility.
          
Ch. 92,  1, SLA 1995.

     14     AS  33.30.901(4).   The  definition  of  correctional
facility  set  out  in subsection .901(4) also specifies  that  a
state  correctional facility means a correctional facility  owned
or run by the state.  Id.

     15    Former 22 AAC 05.020.  In September 2004 the department
revised  this  regulation on an emergency basis to  clarify  that
prisoners  can  be remanded only to correctional facilities  that
the  commissioner of corrections has designated as  suitable  for
that  purpose.  See Emergency Regulation, Alaska Admin. Reg.  171
(Oct.  2004) (effective Sept. 3, 2004) (amending 22 AAC  05.020).
We  assume for the sake of deciding this appeal that the  earlier
version of the regulation governs the citys reimbursement claim.

     16     As  we  have  previously  observed,  when  trying  to
determine the meaning of a statute, courts must look not only  to
the  particular  language at issue but also to the  language  and
design  of  the  statute as a whole.   FDIC v.  Laidlaw  Transit,
Inc.,  21  P.3d 344, 351 (Alaska 2001) (quoting K Mart  Corp.  v.
Cartier,  Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988)); 2A Norman  J.  Singer,
Statutes  and   Statutory  Construction   46:05  (6th  ed.  2000)
([E]ach  part  or section should be construed in connection  with
every  other part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole.
Thus,  it  is  not proper to confine interpretation  to  the  one
section  to be construed.) (footnote omitted).  We have  likewise
emphasized  that  [w]hen a statute or regulation  is  part  of  a
larger   framework  or  regulatory  scheme,  even   a   seemingly
unambiguous  statute must be interpreted in light  of  the  other
portions  of the regulatory whole.  FDIC, 21 P.3d at 351 (quoting
Millman  v.  State,  841  P.2d  190,  194  (Alaska  App.   1992))
(alteration in original).

     17    AS 33.30.901(4).

     18    AS 33.30.011(1).

     19    AS 33.30.071(b).

     20    See ch. 92,  2, SLA 1995.

     21    Ch. 88,  6, SLA 1986.

     22    See Ch. 92,  1-2, SLA 1995.

     23    Id.

     24    Ch. 88,  6, SLA 1986.

     25    Id.

     26    See AS 33.30.071.

     27    AS 33.30.901(4).

     28    Under the departments regulations, a contract facility
means  a  correctional  facility provided to  the  department  of
corrections   by   agreement  under  AS  33.30.031.    Under   AS
33.30.901(4),  facility and correctional facility have  identical
meanings:   correctional facility  or facility  means  a  prison,
jail,  camp, farm, half-way house, group home, or other placement
designated  by  the  commissioner  for  the  custody,  care,  and
discipline  of prisoners; a state correctional facility  means  a
correctional facility owned or run by the state.  Alaska  Statute
33.30.031  broadly authorizes the commissioner of corrections  to
enter  into  various kinds of contracts for facilities  providing
custody  and  care  to Alaska prisoners.  It is  undisputed  here
that,  before  closing, the Kotzebue jail  was  provided  to  the
department  of  corrections  by  a  contract  entered  under   AS
33.30.031.  In establishing the jail as a contract facility under
the  departments regulations, then, the commissioner  necessarily
designated it as a correctional facility under AS 33.30.901(4).

     29    In granting the states motion for reconsideration, the
court  stated:  Once the contract ended, the state Department  of
Corrections  had exercised its discretion to end its  involvement
in  the  facility.  Therefore,  no  state  correctional  facility
existed  in Kotzebue once the contractual relationship  ended  in
2003.

     30    See AS 33.30.031.

     31     Although the parties quote various passages from  the
citys contract with the department, the contract itself does  not
appear to be part of the record before this court.

     32    In 2003, the legislature abrogated the general public-
interest-litigation exception set out in Civil Rule 82.  See  Ch.
86,  3, SLA 2003 (codified as AS 09.68.040(c)).  Because the city
filed its claim in this case before the effective date of the new
legislation, the claim was governed by the original provisions of
Rule 82.  Id.

     33    Koyukuk River Tribal Task Force on Moose Mgmt. v. Rue,
63  P.3d 1019, 1020 (Alaska 2003) (citing Citizens Coalition  for
Tort Reform, Inc. v. McAlpine, 810 P.2d 162, 171 (Alaska 1991)).

     34    Rue, 63 P.3d at 1020-21.

     35     Cabana v. Kenai Peninsula Borough, 21 P.3d  833,  837
(Alaska 2001).

     36    Eyak Traditional Elders Council v. Sherstone, Inc., 904
P.2d 420, 425-26 (Alaska 1995).

     37    Id. at 426; see also Girves v. Kenai Peninsula Borough,
536 P.2d 1221, 1227 (Alaska 1975).

     38     Eyak Traditional Elders Council, 904 P.2d at 426; see
also Abbott v. Kodiak Island Borough Assembly, 899 P.2d 922, 924-
25 (Alaska 1995).

     39    Rue, 63 P.3d at 1021; Alaska Survival v. State, Dept of
Natural Res., 723 P.2d 1281, 1292 (Alaska 1986); see also Gwichin
Steering Comm. v. State, Office of the Governor, 10 P.3d 572, 585
(Alaska 2000).

     40     Oceanview Homeowners Assn v. Quadrant Constr. & Engg,
680 P.2d 793, 799 (Alaska 1984).

     41      See  Municipality  of  Anchorage  v.  Citizens   for
Representative Governance, 880 P.2d 1058, 1062-63  (Alaska  1994)
(citing cases).

     42    Matanuska-Susitna Borough Sch. Dist. v. State, 931 P.2d
391, 403 (Alaska 1999).

     43    Id. at 403.

     44    Id.

     45    See Oceanview Homeowners Assn, 680 P.2d at 799.

     46     On remand, if the issue is raised, the superior court
will  also be authorized to reexamine its original ruling  as  to
which party prevailed.

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