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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. City of Kotzebue v. State, Dept. of Corrections (08/31/2007) sp-6156
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage,
Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
| CITY OF KOTZEBUE, | ) |
| ) Supreme Court No. S- 12149 | |
| Appellant, | ) |
| ) Superior Court No. 2KB-03-66 CI | |
| v. | ) |
| ) | |
| STATE OF ALASKA, | ) O P I N I O N |
| DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, | ) |
| and STATE OF ALASKA, | ) No. 6156 August 31, 2007 |
| DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC | ) |
| SAFETY, | ) |
| ) | |
| Appellee. | ) |
| ) | |
Appeal from the
Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Second
Judicial District, Kotzebue, Michael I.
Jeffery, Judge.
Appearances: Joseph W. Evans, Kotzebue City
Attorney, Silverdale, Washington. John K.
Bodick, Assistant Attorney General,
Anchorage, and David W. M rquez, Attorney
General, Juneau, for Appellee.
Before: Fabe, Chief Justice, Matthews,
Eastaugh, Bryner, and Carpeneti, Justices.
BRYNER, Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
For a number of years, the City of Kotzebue operated
the Kotzebue Regional Jail under a contract with the state.
After being rebuffed by the state in its efforts to increase
funding under the contract, the city opted to let the contract
expire and then sued the state to recover the cost of operating
the jail and transporting prisoners to court for arraignment.
The main issue here is whether the Alaska departments of
corrections and public safety owed a continuing duty to house and
transport prisoners held in the Kotzebue jail after the contract
expired. In all but one minor respect, we affirm the superior
courts ruling on summary judgment that the states duty to provide
housing ceased when the contract expired but that it owed a
continuing duty to transport prisoners to court.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
The operative facts are not in dispute. The department
of corrections has administered Alaskas community jails program
since fiscal year 1995. Community jails are local facilities
used to hold prisoners for short periods of time between arrest
and arraignment; during trials and while serving short sentences;
pending transfer to larger correctional facilities; and when
awaiting commitment for mental health and alcohol treatment.
Built in 1988, the Kotzebue Regional Jail was operated by the
city of Kotzebue under contract with the state as part of its
community jail program for many years; the jail serves an area of
approximately 35,000 square miles in the northwest region of
Alaska.
In the years leading up to 2003, Kotzebue became
convinced that its contract with the state was not fully covering
the cost of operating the jail, thus forcing the city to
subsidize the facility even though it housed prisoners charged
with violating state laws. On June 6, 2003, after being denied
additional funding, the city informed the department that it did
not expect to renew the contract, that it planned to close the
jail when the contract expired at the end of the month, and that
its city council was in the process of adopting a resolution to
that effect.
In response, on June 18, 2003, Commissioner of
Corrections Marc S. Antrim advised Kotzebue City Manager Herman
Reich that if the city executed the resolution closing the jail,
it would have to make arrangements to deliver offenders to a
Department of Corrections facility. The nearest facility was in
Nome, which is not connected to Kotzebue by road. Antrim further
stated that, in his view, the department was not responsible for
an offender at the time of arrest and was not obligated to take
custody of a prisoner until a booking officer at a state
correctional facility signed a remand slip accepting custody.
Reich answered Antrim on June 24, challenging his understanding
of state law. According to Reich, under applicable law,
responsibility for pre-arraignment and post-arraignment
transportation of state-charged prisoners lies with the
Department of Corrections and the Department of Public Safety.
Meanwhile, on June 19, 2003, the Kotzebue City Council
had passed a resolution prohibiting Reich from renewing the jails
contract and directing him to close the jail at midnight June 30,
2003, unless the state provided full funding for the next fiscal
year beginning July 1. At midnight on June 30 the city closed
the jail. No prisoners were being held there at the time.
In the early morning hours of July 2, 2003, the
Kotzebue Police Department arrested an individual for a violation
of state law. The Alaska State Troopers, a division of the
department of public safety, refused to take custody of the
prisoner, taking the position that their obligations toward
prisoners did not begin until after arraignment. The troopers
refusal forced the city to re-open the jail on a limited basis.
In the ensuing two weeks, further discussions between
the city and the department evidently took place. On July 17
City Attorney Joseph Evans spoke with Commissioner Antrim at a
city council meeting. The next day Evans faxed a letter to
Antrim to confirm that [t]he City Council has reaffirmed its
decision . . . that the City of Kotzebue cannot and will not sign
a [fiscal year 2004] contract for $589,000.00 to operate the
Kotzebue Regional Jail. Insisting that the citys interpretation
of state law was well grounded, Evans implored the departments of
corrections and public safety to re-examine their positions
declining to take responsibility for state-charged prisoners from
arrest to arraignment. On the same day, the department of
corrections Deputy Director of Institutions, Mike Addington, sent
a letter to City Manager Reich reaffirming that the department
lacked the resources to provide the City of Kotzebue with the
additional funds to run the jail.
In a reply sent by fax on July 22, Reich challenged the
departments decision to deny funding as legally incorrect,
politically inappropriate and predicted that it would most
assuredly require the City to seek judicial redress. On the same
day, City Attorney Evans signed the citys superior court
complaint against the state. The complaint sought an order
declaring the departments of corrections and public safety to be
responsible for housing and transporting unarraigned prisoners
arrested by the city, enjoining the departments to take custody
of and transport such prisoners, and reimbursing the city for any
costs and expenses it incurred in providing transportation or in
operating the jail.
The parties positions remained unchanged until
October 10, 2003, when state troopers in Kotzebue abruptly
changed course and resumed transporting prisoners from the jail
to the Kotzebue courthouse for arraignment. Troopers in Kotzebue
also began using temporary holding cells, or cages, to house post-
arraignment prisoners and prisoners awaiting arraignment who had
been arrested by state troopers. The holding cells were managed
exclusively by the department of public safety and were intended
to hold prisoners for only a few hours until they could be
transported to correctional facilities in Nome.
Monthly reports of activity at the Kotzebue Regional
Jail for the period from July 2003 to October 2004 show that
state-charged prisoners continued to be housed at the Kotzebue
jail until their arraignments. Monthly arrest totals ranged from
a low of seventeen in March 2004 to a high of fifty-two in
September 2004.1
The state and city both moved for summary judgment. On
August 30, 2004, Superior Court Judge Michael I. Jeffery granted
summary judgment in favor of the city on the prisoner-custody
issue, ruling that the department of corrections had a statutory
duty to care for prisoners before their arraignment in locations
where a state correctional facility existed. In the courts view,
the cages maintained by the state in Kotzebue qualified as a
correctional facility because the state accepted custody and held
prisoners in the cages. The court reasoned that although the
city had no viable claim for housing expenses during the period
between the jails initial closure and the opening of the cages,
it was entitled to reimbursement of its jail costs after the
cages opened. The court also ruled that the department of public
safety had an independent duty to transport Kotzebue prisoners to
court for arraignment; in the courts view, the duty began after
the troopers installed the cages to hold prisoners. The court
thus awarded the city reimbursement for the costs it incurred in
transporting prisoners to arraignment between the opening date of
the cages and October 10, 2003 the date when state troopers
voluntarily resumed transporting all Kotzebue prisoners to court.
In issuing its initial summary judgment ruling, the
court mistakenly believed that the cages built by the troopers
had been operated by the department of corrections. Soon after
the ruling, the state moved for reconsideration, pointing out
that the cages had been maintained by the department of public
safety without any involvement by the department of corrections,
so they did not qualify as correctional facilities. Based on
this clarification, the court granted reconsideration and issued
a revised summary judgment order, ruling that because the
department of public safetys cages were not a state correctional
facility, the city had no right to be reimbursed for housing
prisoners at the Kotzebue jail even after the cages opened. The
court nonetheless broadened its original ruling concerning the
department of public safetys independent statutory duty to
transport prisoners from the Kotzebue jail to court for
arraignment. The court ruled that, even in the absence of a
local correctional facility, this duty applied to all state-
charged prisoners held in Kotzebue by the police. The superior
court thus ordered that the city be reimbursed for all
transportation costs it incurred from July 1 to October 10, 2003.
In entering its final judgment, the superior court
ruled that the state was the prevailing party in the case and
denied the citys request for public-interest litigant status,
finding that it had ample economic incentive to bring the
lawsuit. Accordingly, the court ordered the city to pay a
portion of the states attorneys fees.
The city then filed this appeal.2
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a trial courts order granting summary
judgment independently3 and uphold the judgment if we conclude
that the record presents no genuine issues of material fact and
that the moving party was entitled to judgment on the law
applicable to the established facts.4 We similarly review
questions of statutory interpretation independently, adopting the
interpretation most persuasive in light of precedent, reason and
policy.5
IV. DISCUSSION
A. The Citys Claim Against the Department of Corrections
for Reimbursement of Housing Expenses
The city argues that the Alaska Constitution and Alaska
Statutes require the state to take custody of and care for pre-
arraignment prisoners arrested for violating state law by
Kotzebue police. It contends that this obligation arises under
article I, section 12 of the Alaska Constitution and AS
33.30.011(1).
Article I, section 12 addresses criminal
administration, providing in relevant part: Criminal
administration shall be based upon the following: the need for
protecting the public, community condemnation of the offender,
the rights of victims of crimes, restitution from the offender,
and the principle of reformation.6 The city asserts that this
language places responsibility for Alaskas criminal justice
system on the State of Alaska. It specifically contends that the
language makes the department responsible for custody of state-
charged offenders, citing a footnote from State v. Chaney7 to
support this assertion.
But neither the constitutional provision nor the Chaney
footnote supports the citys position. Article I, section 12
describes the general goals that Alaskas criminal justice system
must strive to attain. It addresses the criminal justice system
as a whole and does not assign responsibility to any particular
agencies within that system for housing city-arrested prisoners
before arraignment.
Likewise, the citys reliance on State v. Chaney is
unavailing. Chaney dealt with issues of criminal sentencing8 and
did not purport to address the central issue presented here:
responsibility for housing and transporting unarraigned
prisoners. Moreover, the Chaney footnote lends scant support to
the citys constitutional theory; it simply states the general
proposition that [o]peration of our system of penal
administration in Alaska is dependent upon a properly staffed and
functioning [Department] of Corrections which has, in addition to
probation and parole functions, the responsibility for treatment,
rehabilitation, and custody of incarcerated offenders.9 Nothing
in this language refers to individuals who have been arrested but
not yet arraigned, nor does it purport to define the precise
scope of the departments responsibility for arrested persons who
have not yet been committed to state custody.
The citys argument also relies heavily on AS
33.30.011(1), which broadly defines the duties of the
commissioner of corrections with respect to correctional
facilities. In relevant part, the provision directs the
commissioner to
establish, maintain, operate, and control
correctional facilities suitable for the
custody, care, and discipline of persons
charged or convicted of offenses against the
state or held under authority of state law.[10
]
Because Kotzebue police officers make arrests only for violations
of state law, the city reasons, this provisions reference to
persons . . . held under authority of state law requires the
commissioner to provide correctional facilities for every
individual arrested by the Kotzebue police.
But in directing the commissioner to establish,
maintain, operate, and control correctional facilities that are
suitable for such prisoners, the statute hardly implies a
responsibility extending to individual prisoners or specific
categories of prisoners. More important, the citys contention
that this provision sets out specific, unequivocal dictates
largely ignores a companion provision, AS 33.30.071(b), which
defines the events that trigger the departments duty to provide
suitable prison facilities. This provision specifies that [t]he
responsibility of the commissioner under AS 33.30.011 begins when
a prisoner is accepted into the commissioners custody or admitted
into a correctional facility.11
Under subsection .071(b), then, the duties described in
AS 33.30.011 begin only when a prisoner is accepted into the
commissioners custody or admitted into a correctional facility.12
The first stated trigger of the duty being accepted into the
commissioners custody is not defined by statute or regulation.
The superior court plausibly viewed this phrase as a reference to
prisoners who are committed by a court to the departments custody
but have not yet arrived at a correctional facility.13 So
construed, this provision has no relevance here.
The second triggering condition set out in subsection
.071(b) is admission to a correctional facility. Alaska Statute
33.30.901 defines correctional facility to mean a prison, jail,
camp, farm, half-way house, group home, or other placement
designated by the commissioner for the custody, care, and
discipline of prisoners.14 Under the department of corrections
regulations, admission to a correctional facility is governed by
22 Alaska Administrative Code (AAC) 05.020; at the time the
Kotzebue jail closed, this regulation allowed arresting officers
to admit prisoners to a correctional facility by either producing
commitment papers from a court or executing a remand-to-custody
order in the presence of booking staff.15
When read in conjunction with these provisions, as it
must be,16 AS 33.30.071(b) can be seen as triggering the
departments responsibility to provide for suitable custody of a
prisoner when an arresting officer delivers a state-charged
prisoner (together with a properly executed remand-to-custody
form) to a booking officer at any jail that has been designated
by the commissioner for the custody, care, and discipline of
prisoners.17
This language suggests that the commissioner must
specifically designate a jail as a suitable place for housing
prisoners before it can qualify as a correctional facility. The
need for a specific designation also finds support in the history
of AS 33.30.011(1) and AS 33.30.071. Alaska Statute 33.30.071(b)
specifically refers to the duties set out in subsection .011(1).
As already mentioned, subsection .011(1) broadly directs the
commissioner to
establish, maintain, operate, and control
correctional facilities suitable for the
custody, care, and discipline of persons
charged or convicted of offenses against the
state or held under authority of state law.[18
]
Subsection .071(b) elaborates on subsection .011(1) by making it
clear that the commissioners responsibility to carry out these
duties begins when a prisoner is accepted into the commissioners
custody or admitted into a correctional facility.19
Before the current version of AS 33.30.071(b) was
enacted in 1995,20 subsections .071(a) and (b) both addressed the
custodial duties established under AS 33.30.011(1), but only
insofar as these duties applied during the early stages of
custody; unlike the current provision, the earlier version of AS
33.30.071 assigned these duties to the commissioner of public
safety rather than the commissioner of corrections. Subsections
.071(a) and (b) formerly provided:
(a) Notwithstanding AS 33.30.011(1),
the commissioner of public safety shall
provide for the custody, care, and discipline
of prisoners pending arraignment, commitment
by a court to the custody of the commissioner
of corrections, or admission to a state
correctional facility. . . .
(b) The responsibility of the
commissioner of public safety under (a) of
this section does not begin until a prisoner
is accepted into the custody of the
commissioner of public safety, or admitted
into a correctional facility or other
facility designed for holding prisoners, and
the commissioner of public safety is notified
of the acceptance or admission.[21]
The legislature amended section .071 in 1995; the
amendment shifted responsibility for early custody of prisoners
from the commissioner of public safety to the commissioner of
corrections.22 In addition, the amendment changed the scope of
the duty.23 Whereas the earlier version required the commissioner
of public safety to provide for prisoners pending arraignment,
commitment by a court to the custody of the commissioner of
corrections, or admission to a state correctional facility24 and
further specified that this duty began when the commissioner
accepted the prisoner into custody,25 the amended form of section
.071 dropped all mention of responsibility for prisoners pending
arraignment and merely imposed responsibility on the commissioner
of corrections beginning when a prisoner is accepted into the
commissioners custody or admitted into a correctional facility.26
Although the city downplays the significance of
omitting the earlier reference to custody pending arraignment, we
agree with the state that the omission indicates that the 1995
legislature did not intend to make the commissioner categorically
responsible for all prisoners held on state charges pending
arraignment. This evidence of legislative intent reinforces the
appropriateness of interpreting subsection .071(b) as triggering
the commissioners custodial responsibilities under AS
33.30.011(1) only upon a prisoners remand to a jail that has been
designated by the commissioner for the custody, care, and
discipline of prisoners.27
The Kotzebue jail necessarily met this designation
requirement before its state contract expired.28 The crucial
question here, then, is whether the jail continued to be a
designated place for the custody, care, and discipline of
prisoners and thus continued to qualify as a correctional
facility to which prisoners arrested for state offenses could be
remanded after the citys contract with the state expired at
midnight on June 30, 2003.
As already noted, the superior court ultimately found
that the Kotzebue jail ceased to be a correctional facility as of
July 1, 2003, so that the department had no duty to take custody
of any unarraigned city prisoners as of that date. In reaching
this conclusion, the court essentially equated the existence of a
valid contract to run the Kotzebue jail with the jails status as
a correctional facility as defined by statute.29 But the
commissioners power to enter into contracts for confinement and
care of prisoners a power established under AS 33.30.03130 is
not necessarily coextensive with the commissioners authority to
designate suitable placements for the custody, care, and
discipline of prisoners an authority implicitly encompassed in
AS 33.30.011(1)s list of the commissioners duties and expressly
recognized in AS 33.30.901(4)s definition of a correctional
facility or facility.
We have already observed that a contract allowing a
regional jail to operate as a correctional facility suffices to
designate the jail as a suitable place to house prisoners
awaiting arraignment. Yet it hardly follows from this that a
contract is a necessary ingredient of a designation. Nor does
the state cite any provision of law or legal authority supporting
the conclusion that a lapse in a jails contractual arrangements
with the department necessarily equates to a withdrawal of
designation and automatically nullifies the jails status as a
designated facility. The commissioners powers to enter into
contracts and designate suitable placements for prisoners may
well overlap to a considerable extent, but they arise from
independent statutory sources and do not necessarily merge.
Here, the limited evidence in the record on summary
judgment fails to establish that the citys unilateral resolution
to close the jail at the moment its longstanding contract expired
automatically resulted in withdrawing the commissioners
designation of the jail as a suitable place to remand prisoners.
The power of designation belongs to the commissioner, not the
city, and the portions of the contract quoted in the appellate
record do not address the topic of designation.31
Correspondence between the parties undeniably shows
that both sides used the contracts impending expiration date as a
bargaining chip to encourage the opposing party to relax its
demands regarding the contracts renewal. For example, on June 6,
2003, City Manager Reich evidently sent Commissioner Antrim a
letter warning that the city expected to close the jail at the
end of the month if the department refused to increase its
contractual payments. Reichs letter was accompanied by a copy of
the city councils pending resolution proposing to direct Reich to
close the jail and a copy of a memo from City Attorney Evans to
Kotzebue Police Chief Ed Weibl discussing alternative
arrangements in the event of closure. Commissioner Antrim
responded on June 18, predicting that the citys proposed decision
would cause it to suffer significant adverse impacts. The
commissioner disputed Evanss legal position and emphasized that
the department was still prepared to provide $589,000 in funds
through the Community Jails Program to assist the City of
Kotzebue. Relying on his view of the law, the commissioner also
argued that, [s]hould the City of Kotzebue execute its resolution
to close the city jail, your police department will have to make
arrangements to deliver offenders to a Department of Corrections
facility and would be placed in the logistically unenviable
position of transporting its arrestees to a state operated
correctional facility.
Nothing in this exchange amounted to an official notice
of withdrawal of the commissioners designation. Although the
parties advanced escalating threats in attempting to negotiate a
renewed contract, they took no definitive step to end the jails
use as a suitable holding place for persons arrested by the
Kotzebue police. As already noted, the contracts expiration and
the citys unilateral action of closing the jail did not by
themselves withdraw the commissioners designation. Two days
after the contract expired, when the city reopened the jail, the
Alaska State Troopers formally declined to transport prisoners
from the jail to the court for arraignment. But this action was
based on the department of public safetys belief that it lacked
statutory responsibility for transporting prisoners, not on the
department of corrections withdrawal of designation.
On the record before us, it appears that the first
official communication notifying the city that the commissioner
of corrections had actually decided to end the jails designation
as a suitable place for holding prisoners arrested by the
Kotzebue police occurred on July 18, 2003, when the department of
corrections Director of Institutions, Mike Addington, sent City
Manager Reich a letter declaring that the department would make
no additional funding available to the jail. That same day, City
Attorney Evans sent a letter by fax to Commissioner Antrim,
reaffirming the citys decision not to sign the departments
proposed fiscal year 2004 contract. Division Director Addingtons
letter to Reich expressed Addingtons respect [for] the decision
of the Kotzebue City Council not to sign the [fiscal year 2004]
contract but went on to confirm the departments decision that we
do not have the resources to provide the City of Kotzebue with
the additional funds to run the jail.
As of July 18, then, the city unquestionably received
formal notice that the department had actually withdrawn
authorization for prisoners to be placed at the Kotzebue jail,
thereby effectively ending the jails designation as a
correctional facility. Because the record reveals no actual
withdrawal of designation until July 18, we find no basis for
concluding that the department of corrections was entitled to
summary judgment as a matter of law on the issue of reimbursement
for any housing costs incurred by the city before that date.
Based on our conclusion that the Kotzebue jail ceased
to be a correctional facility as of July 18, 2003, we must vacate
the superior courts summary judgment order on this point and
remand for modification of the judgment to the limited extent
that it summarily denies the citys housing-reimbursement claim
for the period between July 1 and July 18. Conversely, we affirm
the courts order denying reimbursement of housing expenses from
July 18 forward.
B. The Citys Claim Against the Department of Public Safety
for Reimbursement of Transportation Expenses
The superior court viewed the citys motion for summary
judgment as including a request for reimbursement of the citys
costs in transporting city-arrested prisoners to court for
arraignment from July 1, 2003, through October 10, 2003, when the
troopers resumed handling the task of transportation. The court
granted the city summary judgment on this issue, concluding that
[t]he Department of Public Safety has the statutory duty to
provide or arrange for transport of prisoners to court for
arraignment within Kotzebue. Relying on its finding of this
general obligation, the court concluded that the city was
entitled to reimbursement for all prisoner transportation costs
it incurred from July 1 to October 10, 2003.
On appeal, the city requests this court to direct the
superior court to issue an even broader order, prospectively
requiring the State of Alaska to fulfill its constitutional and
statutory obligations for the . . . escort of pre-arraignment
state-charged prisoners. But the state has not appealed the
superior courts order of reimbursement; nor has it disputed the
conclusion of law underlying the courts order. In effect, then,
the city prevailed below in establishing the departments duty to
transport prisoners within Kotzebue; the superior courts ruling
on the point is undisputed; and, as the law of the case, that
ruling will be binding on the parties in their future handling of
prisoners held by the city in Kotzebue. Under these
circumstances, we see no reason to require a broader order
addressing the department of public safetys future handling of
Kotzebue prisoners. And to the extent that the order requested
by the city seeks to control the departments future conduct in
other communities, we think that the city has failed to establish
any present controversy that would make its request ripe for
review. Accordingly, we decline to address the citys request to
direct the superior court to issue a broader order.
C. Attorneys Fees
After the superior court issued its rulings on summary
judgment, the state moved for reasonable attorneys fees and costs
under Alaska Civil Rule 82, asserting that it was the prevailing
party in the action. The city opposed the motion, insisting that
it should be exempted from having to pay fees because its claims
fell within the public-interest exception to Rule 82. The
superior court rejected this argument and granted the states
motion for costs and fees, ruling that the city failed to qualify
as a public-interest litigant because it had ample economic
incentive to pursue the issues raised in the litigation,
regardless of whether those issues raised matters of general
public concern. Accordingly, the court ordered the city to pay
the state $4,400 in attorneys fees.
The city challenges the superior courts order awarding
fees, arguing that even if the city does not win on the merits of
its appeal, the fee award should be vacated on remand because the
citys action falls under the public-interest exception to Rule
82.32 We review a superior courts determination of a partys
qualifications as a public-interest litigant for abuse of
discretion.33
We have identified four factors that courts must
consider in deciding whether a party qualifies as a public-
interest litigant:
(1) Is the case designed to effectuate
strong public policies?
(2) If the plaintiff succeeds will numerous
people receive benefits from the lawsuit?
(3) Can only a private party have been
expected to bring the suit?
(4) Would the purported public interest
litigant have sufficient economic incentive
to file suit even if the action involved only
narrow issues lacking general importance?[34]
A party seeking public-interest-litigant status must establish
that it meets each of these elements.35
The superior court centered its ruling on the fourth
element, which required the city to establish that it would have
lacked economic incentive sufficient to pursue this case if its
claims had raised no issue of general importance. In Eyak
Traditional Elders Council v. Sherstone, Inc., we explained this
factors rationale:
If a party possesses a sufficient economic
incentive to sue, there is less need to fear
that the potential burden of an attorneys fee
award would deter the plaintiff from pursuing
beneficial litigation.[36]
Under Eyak, the fact that a litigant seeks monetary relief is not
by itself conclusive.37 Rather, the court must look to the facts
of the case to determine the litigants primary motivation for
filing suit.38
Our decisions addressing this element illustrate how we
have applied it in a variety of situations. For instance, we
have held that claims dealing with subsistence use of natural
resources qualify for public-interest status.39 We have also
accorded public-interest-litigant status to a homeowners group
that attempted to curtail use of a private airstrip, noting that
the groups consistent emphasis on health and safety to the
virtual exclusion of economic concerns indicated that its action
was designed to vindicate a strong public policy and that the
group would not have had sufficient economic incentive to bring
the lawsuit even if it involved only narrow issues lacking
general importance. 40
By contrast, we have generally declined to find public-
interest-litigant status when employees have sued for increased
salaries or reinstatement to their jobs; in these cases we have
emphasized that the prospect of a job or an increase in salary
usually provides a sufficient economic incentive to motivate the
suit.41 Even more to the point, in an action for increased
funding brought against the state by a borough and a local school
district, we approved an award of fees against the borough and
the district.42 We found no abuse of discretion in the trial
courts order denying them public-interest status, because both
stood to gain financially from the funding increases they sought.43
We emphasized that [w]here the sums at stake in a suit are large
enough to prompt suit regardless of the public interest, public[-
]interest litigant status will be denied.44
Here, the city sought reimbursement for hundreds of
thousands of dollars in jail-operation costs. As the superior
court aptly noted, [t]he effort to obtain reimbursement for a
substantial amount of money put[s] the City in a very different
category than a plaintiff such as a homeowners association suing
over health and safety concerns.45 Because of the citys strong
economic interest in the action at issue here, we hold that the
superior court did not abuse its discretion in denying public-
interest-litigant status and in awarding fees against the city
under Rule 82.
V. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we REMAND this case to the superior
court with directions to enter a modified judgment reflecting our
holding that the Department of Corrections obligation to pay
housing costs to the city ended on July 18 rather than July 1,
2003.46 In all other respects, we AFFIRM the superior courts
judgment.
_______________________________
1 Reports for later months are not in the record before
this court.
2 The city and state eventually reached a new agreement
on funding for the Kotzebue jail in the spring of 2005, about six
months after the superior court issued its summary judgment
order. The agreement applied prospectively and did not resolve
the reimbursement issues raised in the present appeal.
3 Schmitz v. Yukon-Koyukuk Sch. Dist., 147 P.3d 720, 724
(Alaska 2006).
4 Ganz v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 963 P.2d 1015, 1017
(Alaska 1998).
5 Newton v. Magill, 872 P.2d 1213, 1215 (Alaska 1994)
(quoting Ford v. Municipality of Anchorage, 813 P.2d 654, 655
(Alaska 1991)).
6 Alaska Const. art. I, 12.
7 State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441 (Alaska 1970).
8 Id. at 44142.
9 Id. at 447 n.26.
10 AS 33.30.011(1).
11 AS 33.30.071(b).
12 Id.
13 Specifically, the court based its theory on language in
a pre-1995 version of AS 33.30.071(a). The former version
stated:
[T]he commissioner . . . shall provide
for the custody, care, and discipline of
prisoners pending arraignment commitment by a
court to the custody of the commissioner of
corrections, or admission to a state
correctional facility.
Ch. 88, 6, SLA 1986 (emphasis added). The legislature amended
this subsection in 1995 to read:
The commissioner is not responsible for
providing custody, care, and discipline for a
person detained under AS 47.30.705 and AS
47.37.170 unless the person is admitted into
a state correctional facility.
Ch. 92, 1, SLA 1995.
14 AS 33.30.901(4). The definition of correctional
facility set out in subsection .901(4) also specifies that a
state correctional facility means a correctional facility owned
or run by the state. Id.
15 Former 22 AAC 05.020. In September 2004 the department
revised this regulation on an emergency basis to clarify that
prisoners can be remanded only to correctional facilities that
the commissioner of corrections has designated as suitable for
that purpose. See Emergency Regulation, Alaska Admin. Reg. 171
(Oct. 2004) (effective Sept. 3, 2004) (amending 22 AAC 05.020).
We assume for the sake of deciding this appeal that the earlier
version of the regulation governs the citys reimbursement claim.
16 As we have previously observed, when trying to
determine the meaning of a statute, courts must look not only to
the particular language at issue but also to the language and
design of the statute as a whole. FDIC v. Laidlaw Transit,
Inc., 21 P.3d 344, 351 (Alaska 2001) (quoting K Mart Corp. v.
Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988)); 2A Norman J. Singer,
Statutes and Statutory Construction 46:05 (6th ed. 2000)
([E]ach part or section should be construed in connection with
every other part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole.
Thus, it is not proper to confine interpretation to the one
section to be construed.) (footnote omitted). We have likewise
emphasized that [w]hen a statute or regulation is part of a
larger framework or regulatory scheme, even a seemingly
unambiguous statute must be interpreted in light of the other
portions of the regulatory whole. FDIC, 21 P.3d at 351 (quoting
Millman v. State, 841 P.2d 190, 194 (Alaska App. 1992))
(alteration in original).
17 AS 33.30.901(4).
18 AS 33.30.011(1).
19 AS 33.30.071(b).
20 See ch. 92, 2, SLA 1995.
21 Ch. 88, 6, SLA 1986.
22 See Ch. 92, 1-2, SLA 1995.
23 Id.
24 Ch. 88, 6, SLA 1986.
25 Id.
26 See AS 33.30.071.
27 AS 33.30.901(4).
28 Under the departments regulations, a contract facility
means a correctional facility provided to the department of
corrections by agreement under AS 33.30.031. Under AS
33.30.901(4), facility and correctional facility have identical
meanings: correctional facility or facility means a prison,
jail, camp, farm, half-way house, group home, or other placement
designated by the commissioner for the custody, care, and
discipline of prisoners; a state correctional facility means a
correctional facility owned or run by the state. Alaska Statute
33.30.031 broadly authorizes the commissioner of corrections to
enter into various kinds of contracts for facilities providing
custody and care to Alaska prisoners. It is undisputed here
that, before closing, the Kotzebue jail was provided to the
department of corrections by a contract entered under AS
33.30.031. In establishing the jail as a contract facility under
the departments regulations, then, the commissioner necessarily
designated it as a correctional facility under AS 33.30.901(4).
29 In granting the states motion for reconsideration, the
court stated: Once the contract ended, the state Department of
Corrections had exercised its discretion to end its involvement
in the facility. Therefore, no state correctional facility
existed in Kotzebue once the contractual relationship ended in
2003.
30 See AS 33.30.031.
31 Although the parties quote various passages from the
citys contract with the department, the contract itself does not
appear to be part of the record before this court.
32 In 2003, the legislature abrogated the general public-
interest-litigation exception set out in Civil Rule 82. See Ch.
86, 3, SLA 2003 (codified as AS 09.68.040(c)). Because the city
filed its claim in this case before the effective date of the new
legislation, the claim was governed by the original provisions of
Rule 82. Id.
33 Koyukuk River Tribal Task Force on Moose Mgmt. v. Rue,
63 P.3d 1019, 1020 (Alaska 2003) (citing Citizens Coalition for
Tort Reform, Inc. v. McAlpine, 810 P.2d 162, 171 (Alaska 1991)).
34 Rue, 63 P.3d at 1020-21.
35 Cabana v. Kenai Peninsula Borough, 21 P.3d 833, 837
(Alaska 2001).
36 Eyak Traditional Elders Council v. Sherstone, Inc., 904
P.2d 420, 425-26 (Alaska 1995).
37 Id. at 426; see also Girves v. Kenai Peninsula Borough,
536 P.2d 1221, 1227 (Alaska 1975).
38 Eyak Traditional Elders Council, 904 P.2d at 426; see
also Abbott v. Kodiak Island Borough Assembly, 899 P.2d 922, 924-
25 (Alaska 1995).
39 Rue, 63 P.3d at 1021; Alaska Survival v. State, Dept of
Natural Res., 723 P.2d 1281, 1292 (Alaska 1986); see also Gwichin
Steering Comm. v. State, Office of the Governor, 10 P.3d 572, 585
(Alaska 2000).
40 Oceanview Homeowners Assn v. Quadrant Constr. & Engg,
680 P.2d 793, 799 (Alaska 1984).
41 See Municipality of Anchorage v. Citizens for
Representative Governance, 880 P.2d 1058, 1062-63 (Alaska 1994)
(citing cases).
42 Matanuska-Susitna Borough Sch. Dist. v. State, 931 P.2d
391, 403 (Alaska 1999).
43 Id. at 403.
44 Id.
45 See Oceanview Homeowners Assn, 680 P.2d at 799.
46 On remand, if the issue is raised, the superior court
will also be authorized to reexamine its original ruling as to
which party prevailed.
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