| Alaska Supreme Court Opinions made Available byTouch N' Go Systems and Bright Solutions |
|
|
|
This site is possible because of the following site sponsors. Please support them with your business.
|
| Alaska Supreme Court Opinions made Available byTouch N' Go Systems and Bright Solutions |
|
|
|
|
|
This site is possible because of the following site sponsors. Please support them with your business.
|
You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. State, Dept. of Commerce, Community & Economic Development, Division of Insurance v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Company (08/17/2007) sp-6145
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage,
Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
| STATE OF ALASKA, DEPART- | ) |
| MENT OF COMMERCE, | ) Supreme Court No. S- 12188 |
| COMMUNITY AND ECONOMIC | ) |
| DEVELOPMENT, DIVISION | ) Superior Court No. 3AN-04-7290 CI |
| OF INSURANCE, | ) |
| ) O P I N I O N | |
| Appellant, | ) |
| ) No. 6145 - August 17, 2007 | |
| v. | ) |
| ) | |
| PROGRESSIVE CASUALTY | ) |
| INSURANCE COMPANY; | ) |
| PROGRESSIVE SPECIALTY | ) |
| INSURANCE COMPANY; and | ) |
| PROGRESSIVE NORTHWESTERN | ) |
| INSURANCE COMPANY, | ) |
| ) | |
| Appellees. | ) |
| ) | |
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State
of Alaska, Third Judicial District,
Anchorage, Michael L. Wolverton, Judge.
Appearances: Nathaniel B. Atwood, Assistant
Attorney General, Anchorage, and David W.
M rquez, Attorney General, Juneau, for
Appellant. Gary A. Zipkin and Christina A.
Rankin, Guess & Rudd, P.C., Anchorage, for
Appellees.
Before: Fabe, Chief Justice, Eastaugh,
Bryner, and Carpeneti, Justices. [Matthews,
Justice, not participating.]
EASTAUGH, Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
Alaska Statute 21.36.460(d)(1) forbids insurers from
failing to renew or, at renewal, underwriting or rating a
personal insurance policy, based in whole or in part on a
consumers credit history or insurance score. Casualty insurers
asked the Alaska Division of Insurance to permit them to freeze
their insureds credit scores at policy initiation and use their
insureds frozen credit scores at policy renewal to make
underwriting risk group determinations. The division rejected
this proposal. On appeal, the superior court reversed. Because
the insurers proposal violates AS 21.36.460(d)(1), we reverse and
remand for reinstatement of the divisions order.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
In 2004 Progressive Casualty Insurance Company and two
other Progressive companies1 submitted to the Alaska Division of
Insurance a re-marketing rule proposal that described the way in
which Progressive wanted to place its consumers into various
underwriting risk groups (also known as markets). Progressive
wanted to use one of two methods to establish a consumers
underwriting risk group, depending on whether the consumer was
requesting a new policy or renewing an existing policy.
For new policies, Progressive would establish a
consumers underwriting risk group based on two factors: the
consumers credit tier2 and the consumers pre-credit tier. Per
Progressives proposal, the consumers credit tier would be based
on the consumers credit score, which would then be frozen for use
in subsequent policy renewals. The consumers pre-credit tier
would be based on all non-credit variables, such as whether the
consumer had prior insurance and, if so, the prior insurance
limits.
For policy renewals, Progressive would establish the
consumers underwriting risk group based on the consumers frozen
credit tier and Progressives re-evaluation of the consumers pre-
credit tier. Progressives proposed use of consumers frozen
credit scores at renewal gives rise to the main controversy of
this case.
The division rejected Progressives proposal on the
ground that Progressives continued use of credit scores at
renewal would violate AS 21.36.460(d)(1)s prohibition on again
underwriting or rating based in whole or in part on a consumers
credit history. Progressive appealed to the superior court,
which allowed Progressive to supplement the record, retained
jurisdiction, and remanded the case to the division for
reconsideration. Division Director Linda Hall agreed on remand
with the divisions initial rejection of Progressives proposal.
She issued an order that stated that Progressives proposal
violated AS 21.36.460(d)(1) as well as three other provisions of
the Insurance Code that prohibit arbitrary and unfair
discrimination.3 After oral argument, the superior court
reversed Director Halls order.
The division asks us to reverse the superior courts
ruling.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The superior court acted as an intermediate court of
appeal. When a superior court acts as an intermediate court in
an administrative matter, we directly review the agencys
decision.4
The division does not argue that its interpretation of
AS 21.36.460 implicates its expertise. We review an agencys
statutory interpretation that does not implicate its expertise or
the determination of fundamental policies under the independent
judgment standard.5 Using our independent judgment, our goal is
to give effect to the legislatures intent, with due regard for
the meaning the statutory language conveys to others.6 Although
some weight should still be given to the agencys interpretation,
especially if the agencys interpretation is longstanding,7 we
will interpret the statute in question by looking to the meaning
of the statutes language, its legislative history, and its
purpose.8
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Progressives Proposal Violates AS 21.36.460(d)(1).
Director Hall ruled that Progressives proposal violates
AS 21.36.460(d)(1). Progressive argues that Director Halls
interpretation contradicts both the statutes plain meaning and
its legislative history.
Alaska Statute 21.36.460(d)(1) states that an insurer
may not
fail to renew or, at renewal, again
underwrite or rate a personal insurance
policy based in whole or in part on a
consumers credit history or insurance score;
the prohibition in this paragraph against
underwriting or rating a personal insurance
policy at renewal may be waived by the
consumer; waiver allowed under this paragraph
must occur at each renewal . . . .
The division argues that because Progressive would leave a
consumer in the same credit tier based on that consumers frozen
credit score, Progressive would in part be using the consumers
credit history in the rating/underwriting process at renewal.
Progressive contends that its proposal does not violate the
statute because, in the statutes words, Progressive would not be
again underwriting or rating at all; instead, it would be
leav[ing] the consumer in the same credit tier based on that
consumers frozen credit score data.
1. The plain language of AS 21.36.460(d)(1) prohibits
Progressives proposal.
Progressive argues that underwriting, by definition,
requires an affirmative action. Progressive contends that
because it is proposing to merely maintain a consumers status in
the same underwriting credit tier or rate classification,
Progressive would not be taking an affirmative action and thus
not again underwriting or rating. The division responds by
arguing that there is no way to use credit scoring (or any other
rating or eligibility factor) at renewal other than for
underwriting or rating. This is proved, the division argues, by
Progressives concession that consumers rates will be impacted if
Progressive removes their credit scores at renewal.
Using our independent judgment, we interpret Alaska
Statutes according to reason, practicality, and common sense,
taking into account the plain meaning and purpose of the law as
well as the intent of the drafters.9 Words that have not
acquired a peculiar meaning, by virtue of statutory definition or
judicial construction, are to be construed in accordance with
their common usage.10
Alaska Statute 21.36.460 does not define the terms
again underwrite or again rate, and the parties do not cite any
cases in which we have defined those terms. Underwrite, however,
is a verb with two common meanings, depending on the context in
which it is used. Thus, underwriting has been defined as the
process by which an insurer decides whether, and at what price,
the insurer will accept a given risk.11 Under this first
definition, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has explained the
scope of underwriting as follows:
An insurer may obtain a consumer report to
decide whether or not to issue a policy to
the consumer, the amount and terms of
coverage, the duration of the policy, the
rates or fees charged, or whether or not to
renew . . . a policy, because these are all
underwriting decisions.[12]
Second, underwrite means to write ones signature at the end of
(an insurance policy), thus assuming liability in the event of a
specified loss or damage.13
Given the context in which the terms underwrite and
underwriting exist in AS 21.36.460(d)(1), we interpret those
terms to refer to the process by which an insurer measures a
consumers risk level to decide whether, and at what price, the
insurer will accept the risk of loss posed by that consumer. In
context, the phrase again underwrite or rate at renewal therefore
refers to the process by which an insurer re-evaluates a
consumers risk level in deciding whether or not to renew that
consumers policy and, if so, at what rate. This definition was
confirmed by an expert witness, who stated in an affidavit
submitted by Progressive, that the term underwrite refers to the
function of securing and evaluating information, and making
decisions to accept or reject risks.
Progressive argues that it would not be again
underwriting at renewal because, it asserts, it would not be
taking an affirmative action; it would be merely maintain[ing] an
insureds status in the same credit underwriting tier or rate
classification. This argument, however, overlooks a fundamental
question: For what purpose would Progressive maintain a
consumers credit tier if not for underwriting?
An insurers decision to offer a consumer the option to
renew her policy is, by definition, an underwriting decision.14
It is a decision that necessarily implies that the insurer has
analyzed the consumers risk of loss and found it to be
acceptable. Under its proposal, even if Progressive offers to
renew a consumers policy at the same rate and underwriting risk
group, it will have done so only after considering the consumers
frozen credit tier as a factor in its renewal decision. This
process violates AS 21.36.460(d)(1) because it falls within the
plain meaning of again underwriting or rating at renewal based in
part on a consumers credit history.
2. The divisions interpretation of AS 21.36.460(d)(1)
does not render other sections of AS 21.36.460
superfluous.
When we engage in statutory construction, we must,
whenever possible, interpret each part or section of a statute
with every other part or section, so as to create a harmonious
whole.15 We must presume that the legislature intended every
word, sentence, or provision of a statute to have some purpose,
force, and effect, and that no words or provisions are
superfluous.16 Progressive argues that the divisions
interpretation of AS 21.36.460(d)(1) is wrong because it renders
four distinct provisions of AS 21.36.460 superfluous.
Progressive contends that if credit must be completely removed
from consideration at renewal as the division claims, all four of
these provisions would be unnecessary.
First, Progressive notes that AS 21.36.460(d)(1)
prevents insurers from fail[ing] to renew . . . a personal
insurance policy . . . based in whole or in part on credit. It
argues that if AS 21.36.460(d)(1) really requires insurers to
completely strip out credit scores at renewal when underwriting
or rating, the statute would not need to also prohibit insurers
from using credit to fail to renew a policy because credit would
already be removed from consideration. Second, Progressive notes
that per AS 21.36.460(e) if a consumer is charged a higher
premium based on the use of incorrect credit history, the insurer
must rerate the policy retroactive to the effective date of the
current policy term. (Emphasis by appellee.) Progressive
argues that if credit must be stripped out at renewal, there
would be no need for the word current because only the consumers
first policy could be based on credit. Finally, Progressive
notes that the definition of adverse action as used in AS
21.36.460(i)(1)(A) and (C) includes both the failure to renew
coverage and the unfavorable change in coverage based upon credit
information. These too, it argues, would be superfluous if
insurers were forced to strip out credit scores at renewal.
However, as the division points out, all of these
arguments ignore the significance of AS 21.36.460(d)(1)s waiver
provision. Because the statute permits a consumer to waive the
credit usage ban, it is possible that credit can be used even
when a policy is renewed, and it is therefore possible such usage
can cause an unfavorable change in coverage. Similarly
unpersuasive is Progressives argument that AS 21.36.460s
fail[ure] to renew based on credit language is superfluous under
the divisions interpretation. Under AS 21.36.460(d)(1),
fail[ing] to renew based on credit and underwriting or rating
based on credit are two distinct concepts. By its own terms, the
waiver provision in AS 21.36.460(d)(1) only applies to
underwriting or rating a personal insurance policy at renewal.
The waiver provision therefore allows a consumer to permit his
insurer to re-underwrite or re-rate his policy based on credit.
The waiver provision in AS 21.36.460(d)(1) does not, however,
extend so far as to allow insurers to fail to renew a consumers
policy based on credit. A consumer who thinks he has a favorable
credit score is thus able to allow his insurer to underwrite or
rate his policy based on credit. But if that consumers credit
score is actually unfavorable the insurer is prohibited from
failing to renew his policy on that basis. Progressive argues
that this hypothetical scenario is improbable because What
[consumer] would ask for credit to be used at renewal if it would
lead to a failure to renew their policy? Progressive overlooks
the possibility that consumers might mistakenly believe that
their credit scores are better than they actually are. Given the
legislatures criticism of the credit scoring process as
mysterious,17 the legislature has apparently contemplated such a
scenario. Alaska Statute 21.36.460s language prohibiting
insurers from failing to renew based on credit is therefore not
superfluous under the divisions interpretation.
3. Alaska Statute 21.36.460s legislative history
supports the divisions interpretation.
When we interpret Alaska statutes we apply a sliding
scale of interpretation, where the plainer the language, the more
convincing contrary legislative history must be.18 The division
interpreted the plain language of AS 21.36.460(d)(1) as
prohibiting Progressives proposed use of consumers frozen credit
scores at renewal. Progressive argues that AS 21.36.460s
legislative history does not support this interpretation. We
disagree.
Annette Skibinski, staff to Senator Cowdery (who, with
Senator Elton, co-authored Senate Bill 13, which enacted AS
21.36.460(d)(1))19 testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee
that Senate Bill 13 precludes insurers from [using] credit when
its time to renew a policy in rating or underwriting.20 Ms.
Skibinski further testified that at every renewal period, the
consumer has to ask for the[ir] credit to be used. Otherwise it
wont be used at all at renewal.21 Moreover, Ms. Skibinski
testified that Senate Bill 13 requires insurers at renewal to
look at factors such as the consumers driving record, payment
history, and how many claims the consumer has filed but not the
consumers credit score.22 Even if we assume, for the sake of
argument, that the plain language of AS 21.36.460(d)(1) is
ambiguous, AS 21.36.460s legislative history convincingly
supports the divisions position that a consumers credit score
must be stripped out at renewal unless the consumer consents to
its continued usage.23
B. Alaska Statute 21.36.460 Is Not Preempted by the
Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act.
1. The McCarran-Ferguson Act does not apply.
Progressive also argues that AS 21.36.460 is preempted
by the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA).24 The division
counters that there is no preemption here, given both ordinary
preemption principles and the McCarran-Ferguson Acts25 special
anti-preemption rule. We address the divisions latter argument
first.
Under the Supremacy Clause of the federal constitution,26
state laws that interfere with federal laws are invalid.27
Federal laws can preempt state laws in the following three ways:
(1) if Congress expressly declares that state law is preempted;
(2) if Congress demonstrates an intent to occupy a field
exclusively; and (3) if there is an actual conflict between
federal and state law.28 When considering preemption, courts
start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the
States were not to be superseded by [a] Federal Act unless that
was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.29
In contrast to these ordinary preemption principles,
the McCarran-Ferguson Act created a special insurance-related
federal anti-pre-emption rule that applies to certain state
statutes that regulate the insurance industry.30 The McCarran-
Ferguson Act seeks to protect state regulation primarily against
inadvertent federal intrusion say, through enactment of a
federal statute that describes an affected activity in broad,
general terms, of which the insurance business happens to
constitute one part.31 Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, a federal
statute will not pre-empt a state statute enacted for the purpose
of regulating the business of insurance unless the federal
statute specifically relates to the business of insurance. 32 In
Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, the Supreme Court
held that a federal statute specifically related to the business
of insurance because it specifically referred to the insurance
industry, and its state regulatory implications were not
surprising or inadvertent.33
Progressive argues that the McCarran-Ferguson Act does
not apply because the FCRA specifically relates to the business
of insurance. The division does not dispute this. Instead, the
division seems to argue that the McCarran-Ferguson Act applies
because the FCRA indicates that Congress did not intend to
preempt state regulation of insurance. However, the test for
whether the McCarran-Ferguson Act applies is not whether the
federal statute intends to preempt the state regulation; it is
whether the federal statute specifically relates to the business
of insurance. And the FCRA does just that because it
specifically refers to the insurance industry. For example, the
FCRA states that a person may use a consumer report in connection
with the underwriting of insurance involving the consumer.34
Because the FCRA relates to the business of insurance, the
McCarran-Ferguson Act does not apply.
2. Under ordinary preemption principles, AS 21.36.460
is not preempted by the FCRA.
Progressive contends that the FCRA preempts AS
21.36.460 insofar as the two conflict. Progressive argues that
because several provisions of the FCRA clearly contemplate that
insurance companies may use credit scores in connection with
insurance underwriting, the divisions interpretation of AS
21.36.460 is unenforceable because it stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress expressed in the [FCRA]. The division
responds by observing that the FCRA explicitly states that it
does not preempt state laws except to the extent that [they] are
inconsistent with [the FCRA], and then only to the extent of the
inconsistency.35 It notes that although the FCRA allows insurers
to use credit scores to underwrite, it also allows consumers to
prohibit insurers from doing so.36 The division also points out
that the FCRA merely states that insurers may use consumers
credit information for underwriting; not that they must use it.
The division argues that because AS 21.36.460s restriction of an
insurers ability to use credit information could not trigger a
federal enforcement action, AS 21.36.460 is not inconsistent with
the FCRA.37
A state law is inconsistent with a federal law if the
state law conflicts with the federal law to the extent that (a)
it is impossible to comply simultaneously with both or (b) the
state regulation obstructs the execution of the purpose of the
federal regulation.38 The division relies on Credit Data of
Arizona, Inc. v. State of Arizona to support its argument that
the FCRA does not preempt AS 21.36.460.39 In Credit Data, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that an
Arizona law that prohibits credit reporting agencies from
charging fees for disclosure was not inconsistent with the FCRA,
which permits the assessment of such fees, for two reasons.40
First, the court held that the Arizona law is not inconsistent
with the FCRA because compliance with the Arizona law could not
trigger a federal enforcement action.41 Second, the court
reasoned that the Arizona law does not stand as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress in enacting the Federal Act since it
merely adds an additional protection to the consumer for whose
protection both statutes were enacted.42
In Davenport v. Farmers Insurance Group, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the
provisions of the Minnesota Insurance Fair Information Reporting
Act (MIFIRA) that require insurers to notify consumers before
obtaining their credit information are not preempted by the FCRA.43
In so holding, the Davenport court noted that the FTCs commentary
on the FCRA included the following example of a permissible state
regulation that it found to closely resemble the MIFIRA: A State
law requirement that an employer provide notice to a consumer
before ordering a consumer report . . . would not be pre-empted,
because a party that complies with such provisions would not
violate the FCRA.44 The Eighth Circuit found this commentary
particularly analogous to the situation presented by the MIFIRA
because employers and insurance companies are treated similarly
with respect to the acquisition of consumer reports under the
FCRA.45
Among its various permissible purposes of consumer
reports, the FCRA states that any consumer reporting agency may
furnish a consumer report to an insurer for use in connection
with the underwriting of insurance involving the consumer.46
Alaska Statute 21.36.460 does not ban the use of credit at
renewal for that purpose; it merely requires consumer consent
before an insurer may do so. Because the FCRA does not provide
insurers with an absolute right to use credit for underwriting
purposes, AS 21.36.460s restriction on credit score usage could
not trigger an enforcement action under the FCRA. The FTCs
commentary to the FCRA, as noted by the Eighth Circuit in
Davenport, supports this conclusion because it indicates that
states may impose restrictions on the use of credit without
violating the FCRA.47 Furthermore, as the Ninth Circuit pointed
out in Credit Data, Congress enacted the FCRA to protect
consumers.48 Because AS 21.36.460s consumer consent requirement
was similarly enacted to protect consumers, it does not stand as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress expressed in the FCRA.
Alaska Statute 21.36.460 is therefore not preempted by the FCRA.
V. CONCLUSION
The division correctly interpreted AS 21.36.460(d)(1)
as prohibiting Progressives proposal. Furthermore, AS
21.36.460(d)(1) is not preempted by the federal FCRA. We
therefore REVERSE the superior court order that reversed the
divisions order and REMAND for entry of the divisions order.
_______________________________
1 Progressive Specialty Insurance Company and Progressive
Northwestern Insurance Company were the other two companies. We
refer to all three Progressive companies collectively as
Progressive.
2 Progressive sometimes refers to the credit tier as the
financial responsibility tier.
3 See AS 21.39.030; AS 21.36.090(c), .120(c).
4 Gwichin Steering Comm. v. State, Office of the
Governor, 10 P.3d 572, 577 (Alaska 2000).
5 Natl Bank of Alaska v. State, Dept of Revenue, 642 P.2d
811, 815 (Alaska 1982).
6 Govt Employees Ins. Co. v. Graham-Gonzalez, 107 P.3d
279, 284 (Alaska 2005) (citing Muller v. BP Exploration (Alaska)
Inc., 923 P.2d 783, 78788 (Alaska 1996)).
7 Natl Bank of Alaska, 642 P.2d at 815 (citing State,
Dept of Revenue v. Debenham Elec. Supply Co., 612 P.2d 1001, 1003
n.6 (Alaska 1980)).
8 Govt Employees Ins. Co., 107 P.3d at 284 (citations
omitted).
9 Grimm v. Wagoner, 77 P.3d 423, 427 (Alaska 2003)
(citation omitted).
10 Govt Employees Ins. Co., 107 P.3d at 284 (citations
omitted); see also AS 01.10.040 (Words and phrases shall be
construed according to the rules of grammar and according to
their common and approved usage.).
11 28 Eric Mills Holmes, Holmess Appleman on Insurance
175.01(2d ed. 1996).
12 Wilting v. Progressive County Mut. Ins. Co., 227 F.3d
474, 476 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting FTC Commentary on the Fair
Credit Reporting Act, Comment 604(3)(C)1, 16 C.F.R. Pt. 600,
App.) (emphasis added).
13 Websters New World College Dictionary 1558 (4th ed.
2004); see also AS 21.27.900 (stating that [i]n this chapter . .
. underwrite means the authority to accept or reject risk on
behalf of the insurer).
14 See Wilting, 227 F.3d at 476.
15 Kodiak Island Borough v. Exxon Corp., 991 P.2d 757, 761
(Alaska 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).
16 Id.
17 See, e.g., Minutes of the Senate Labor and Commerce
Committee, April 8, 2003, testimony of Annette Skibinski, staff
to Senator Cowdery (Tape 0319, Side A) ([M]ost of us are aware
that the insurance industry uses our credit score to determine
our rates, and I said aware that they use this not how they use
this. And I would tell you if I could but I cant because its a
secret.).
18 State v. Pub. Safety Employees Assn, 93 P.3d 409, 415
(Alaska 2004) (quotation omitted).
19 Minutes of the Senate Labor and Commerce Committee,
April 8, 2003, testimony of Annette Skibinski, staff to Senator
Cowdery (Tape 0319, Side A).
20 Minutes of the Senate Judiciary Committee, May 12,
2003, testimony of Annette Skibinski, staff to Senator Cowdery
(Tape 0344, Side A).
21 Minutes of the House Labor and Commerce Committee, May
18, 2003, testimony of Annette Skibinski, staff to Senator
Cowdery (Tape 0354, Side A).
22 Id.
23 Because we hold that Progressives proposal violates AS
21.36.460(d)(1)s ban on using credit history at policy renewal,
we do not need to decide whether the division correctly also
rejected Progressives proposal because it violates the Insurance
Codes prohibition against arbitrary and unfair discrimination.
See AS 21.39.030; AS 21.36.090(c); AS 21.36.120(c).
24 15 U.S.C. 168181x (2006).
25 15 U.S.C. 101115 (2006).
26 U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
27 Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 604
(1991).
28 State v. Dupier, 118 P.3d 1039, 1049 (Alaska 2005)
(citing Totemoff v. State, 905 P.2d 954, 958 (Alaska 1995)).
29 Mortier, 501 U.S. at 605 (quotation omitted); see also
Native Vill. of Eklutna v. Alaska R.R. Corp., 87 P.3d 41, 56
(Alaska 2004).
30 Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A., v. Nelson, 517
U.S. 25, 2728 (1996).
31 Id. at 39 (emphasis in original).
32 Id. at 2728 (emphasis in original) (quoting the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. 1012(b)).
33 Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A., v. Nelson, 517
U.S. 25, 3841 (1996).
34 15 U.S.C. 1681b(a)(3)(C) (2006); see also 15 U.S.C.
1681b(c), (e), (g) (2006).
35 15 U.S.C. 1681t(a) (2006).
36 The division cites 15 U.S.C. 1681b(c) and (e) to
support this proposition.
37 See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 540 (1977)
(holding that because it would be possible to comply with state
law without triggering federal enforcement action, state
requirement was not inconsistent with federal law).
38 Interior Regl Hous. Auth. v. James, 989 P.2d 145, 149
(Alaska 1999) (quoting In re J.R.B., 715 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Alaska
1986)).
39 Credit Data of Ariz., Inc. v. State of Ariz., 602 F.2d
195 (9th Cir. 1979).
40 Id. at 198.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Davenport v. Farmers Ins. Group, 378 F.3d 839, 84243
(8th Cir. 2004) (discussing Minnesota Insurance Fair Information
Reporting Act, Minn. Stat. 72A.494.505).
44 Id. at 843 (quoting Comment 6222, 16 C.F.R. Pt. 600,
App.).
45 Id. (comparing 15 U.S.C. 1681b(a)(3)(B) (which permits
consumer reporting agency to release consumer report for
employment purposes) with 15 U.S.C. 1681b(a)(3)(C) (which
permits same for purpose of underwriting insurance for
consumer)).
46 15 U.S.C. 1681b(a)(3)(C) (2006).
47 Davenport, 378 F.3d at 843 (quoting Comment 6222, 16
C.F.R. Pt. 600, App.).
48 Credit Data, 602 F.2d at 198.
 |
| Case Law Statutes, Regs & Rules Constitutions Miscellaneous |
|
