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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. State, Dept. of Commerce, Community & Economic Development, Division of Insurance v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Company (08/17/2007) sp-6145

State, Dept. of Commerce, Community & Economic Development, Division of Insurance v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Company (08/17/2007) sp-6145, 165 P3d 624

     Notice:   This opinion is subject to correction  before
     publication  in  the  Pacific  Reporter.   Readers  are
     requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
     of  the  Appellate  Courts, 303  K  Street,  Anchorage,
     Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
     e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.


            THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA

     
STATE OF ALASKA, DEPART- )
MENT OF COMMERCE, ) Supreme Court No. S- 12188
COMMUNITY AND ECONOMIC )
DEVELOPMENT, DIVISION ) Superior Court No. 3AN-04-7290 CI
OF INSURANCE, )
) O P I N I O N
Appellant, )
) No. 6145 - August 17, 2007
v. )
)
PROGRESSIVE CASUALTY )
INSURANCE COMPANY; )
PROGRESSIVE SPECIALTY )
INSURANCE COMPANY; and )
PROGRESSIVE NORTHWESTERN )
INSURANCE COMPANY, )
)
Appellees. )
)

          Appeal  from the Superior Court of the  State
          of    Alaska,   Third   Judicial    District,
          Anchorage, Michael L. Wolverton, Judge.

          Appearances:  Nathaniel B. Atwood,  Assistant
          Attorney  General, Anchorage,  and  David  W.
          M rquez,   Attorney  General,   Juneau,   for
          Appellant.   Gary A. Zipkin and Christina  A.
          Rankin,  Guess  & Rudd, P.C., Anchorage,  for
          Appellees.

          Before:     Fabe,  Chief  Justice,  Eastaugh,
          Bryner,  and Carpeneti, Justices.  [Matthews,
          Justice, not participating.]

          EASTAUGH, Justice.

I.   INTRODUCTION
          Alaska  Statute 21.36.460(d)(1) forbids  insurers  from
failing  to  renew  or,  at  renewal, underwriting  or  rating  a
personal  insurance  policy, based in  whole  or  in  part  on  a
consumers  credit history or insurance score.  Casualty  insurers
asked  the Alaska Division of Insurance to permit them to  freeze
their  insureds credit scores at policy initiation and use  their
insureds  frozen  credit  scores  at  policy  renewal   to   make
underwriting  risk  group determinations.  The division  rejected
this  proposal.  On appeal, the superior court reversed.  Because
the insurers proposal violates AS 21.36.460(d)(1), we reverse and
remand for reinstatement of the divisions order.
II.  FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
          In  2004 Progressive Casualty Insurance Company and two
other Progressive companies1 submitted to the Alaska Division  of
Insurance a re-marketing rule proposal that described the way  in
which  Progressive  wanted to place its  consumers  into  various
underwriting  risk  groups (also known as markets).   Progressive
wanted  to  use  one  of  two methods to  establish  a  consumers
underwriting  risk group, depending on whether the  consumer  was
requesting a new policy or renewing an existing policy.
          For   new  policies,  Progressive  would  establish   a
consumers  underwriting risk group based  on  two  factors:   the
consumers  credit tier2 and the consumers pre-credit  tier.   Per
Progressives proposal, the consumers credit tier would  be  based
on the consumers credit score, which would then be frozen for use
in  subsequent  policy renewals.  The consumers  pre-credit  tier
would  be based on all non-credit variables, such as whether  the
consumer  had  prior  insurance and, if so, the  prior  insurance
limits.
          For  policy  renewals, Progressive would establish  the
consumers  underwriting risk group based on the consumers  frozen
credit tier and Progressives re-evaluation of the consumers  pre-
credit  tier.   Progressives proposed  use  of  consumers  frozen
credit  scores  at renewal gives rise to the main controversy  of
this case.
          The  division  rejected Progressives  proposal  on  the
ground  that  Progressives continued  use  of  credit  scores  at
renewal  would violate AS 21.36.460(d)(1)s prohibition  on  again
underwriting or rating based in whole or in part on  a  consumers
credit  history.   Progressive appealed to  the  superior  court,
which  allowed  Progressive to supplement  the  record,  retained
jurisdiction,  and  remanded  the  case  to  the   division   for
reconsideration.  Division Director Linda Hall agreed  on  remand
with  the  divisions initial rejection of Progressives  proposal.
She  issued  an  order  that  stated that  Progressives  proposal
violated AS 21.36.460(d)(1) as well as three other provisions  of
the   Insurance   Code   that  prohibit  arbitrary   and   unfair
discrimination.3   After  oral  argument,  the   superior   court
reversed Director Halls order.
          The  division  asks us to reverse the  superior  courts
ruling.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
          The  superior court acted as an intermediate  court  of
appeal.   When a superior court acts as an intermediate court  in
an   administrative  matter,  we  directly  review  the   agencys
decision.4
          The division does not argue that its interpretation  of
AS  21.36.460  implicates its expertise.  We  review  an  agencys
statutory interpretation that does not implicate its expertise or
the  determination of fundamental policies under the  independent
judgment standard.5  Using our independent judgment, our goal  is
to  give  effect to the legislatures intent, with due regard  for
the  meaning the statutory language conveys to others.6  Although
some  weight should still be given to the agencys interpretation,
especially  if  the  agencys interpretation is longstanding,7  we
will  interpret the statute in question by looking to the meaning
of  the  statutes  language,  its legislative  history,  and  its
purpose.8
IV.  DISCUSSION
     A.   Progressives Proposal Violates AS 21.36.460(d)(1).
          Director Hall ruled that Progressives proposal violates
AS  21.36.460(d)(1).   Progressive  argues  that  Director  Halls
interpretation  contradicts both the statutes plain  meaning  and
its legislative history.
          Alaska  Statute 21.36.460(d)(1) states that an  insurer
may not
          fail   to   renew   or,  at  renewal,   again
          underwrite  or  rate  a  personal   insurance
          policy  based  in  whole  or  in  part  on  a
          consumers credit history or insurance  score;
          the  prohibition  in this  paragraph  against
          underwriting  or rating a personal  insurance
          policy  at  renewal  may  be  waived  by  the
          consumer; waiver allowed under this paragraph
          must occur at each renewal . . . .
The  division  argues  that  because Progressive  would  leave  a
consumer  in the same credit tier based on that consumers  frozen
credit  score, Progressive would  in part be using the  consumers
credit  history  in the rating/underwriting process  at  renewal.
Progressive  contends  that its proposal  does  not  violate  the
statute because, in the statutes words, Progressive would not  be
again  underwriting  or  rating at  all;  instead,  it  would  be
leav[ing]  the  consumer in the same credit tier  based  on  that
consumers frozen credit score data.
          1.   The plain language of AS 21.36.460(d)(1) prohibits
               Progressives proposal.
          Progressive  argues that underwriting,  by  definition,
requires  an  affirmative  action.   Progressive  contends   that
because it is proposing to merely maintain a consumers status  in
the   same  underwriting  credit  tier  or  rate  classification,
Progressive  would not be taking an affirmative action  and  thus
not  again  underwriting  or rating.  The  division  responds  by
arguing that there is no way to use credit scoring (or any  other
rating   or  eligibility  factor)  at  renewal  other  than   for
underwriting or rating.  This is proved, the division argues,  by
Progressives concession that consumers rates will be impacted  if
Progressive removes their credit scores at renewal.
          Using  our  independent judgment, we  interpret  Alaska
Statutes  according to reason, practicality,  and  common  sense,
taking  into account the plain meaning and purpose of the law  as
well  as  the  intent  of the drafters.9   Words  that  have  not
acquired a peculiar meaning, by virtue of statutory definition or
judicial  construction, are to be construed  in  accordance  with
their common usage.10
          Alaska  Statute  21.36.460 does not  define  the  terms
again  underwrite or again rate, and the parties do not cite  any
cases in which we have defined those terms.  Underwrite, however,
is  a verb with two common meanings, depending on the context  in
which  it  is used.  Thus, underwriting has been defined  as  the
process  by which an insurer decides whether, and at what  price,
the  insurer  will  accept  a given  risk.11   Under  this  first
definition, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has explained  the
scope of underwriting as follows:
          An  insurer may obtain a consumer  report  to
          decide  whether or not to issue a  policy  to
          the   consumer,  the  amount  and  terms   of
          coverage,  the  duration of the  policy,  the
          rates  or fees charged, or whether or not  to
          renew  . . . a policy, because these are  all
          underwriting decisions.[12]
Second,  underwrite means to write ones signature at the  end  of
(an insurance policy), thus assuming liability in the event of  a
specified loss or damage.13
          Given  the  context in which the terms  underwrite  and
underwriting  exist  in AS 21.36.460(d)(1),  we  interpret  those
terms  to  refer  to the process by which an insurer  measures  a
consumers  risk level to decide whether, and at what  price,  the
insurer will accept the risk of loss posed by that consumer.   In
context, the phrase again underwrite or rate at renewal therefore
refers  to  the  process  by  which  an  insurer  re-evaluates  a
consumers  risk level in deciding whether or not  to  renew  that
consumers  policy and, if so, at what rate.  This definition  was
confirmed  by  an  expert  witness, who stated  in  an  affidavit
submitted by Progressive, that the term underwrite refers to  the
function  of  securing  and evaluating  information,  and  making
decisions to accept or reject risks.
          Progressive   argues  that  it  would  not   be   again
underwriting  at  renewal because, it asserts, it  would  not  be
taking an affirmative action; it would be merely maintain[ing] an
insureds  status  in the same credit underwriting  tier  or  rate
classification.  This argument, however, overlooks a  fundamental
question:    For  what  purpose  would  Progressive  maintain   a
consumers credit tier if not for underwriting?
          An  insurers decision to offer a consumer the option to
renew  her  policy is, by definition, an underwriting decision.14
It  is  a decision that necessarily implies that the insurer  has
analyzed  the  consumers  risk  of  loss  and  found  it  to   be
acceptable.   Under its proposal, even if Progressive  offers  to
renew  a consumers policy at the same rate and underwriting  risk
group,  it will have done so only after considering the consumers
frozen  credit  tier as a factor in its renewal  decision.   This
process  violates AS 21.36.460(d)(1) because it falls within  the
plain meaning of again underwriting or rating at renewal based in
part on a consumers credit history.
          2.   The divisions interpretation of AS 21.36.460(d)(1)
               does  not  render other sections of  AS  21.36.460
               superfluous.
          When  we  engage  in statutory construction,  we  must,
whenever  possible, interpret each part or section of  a  statute
with  every  other part or section, so as to create a  harmonious
whole.15   We  must presume that the legislature  intended  every
word,  sentence, or provision of a statute to have some  purpose,
force,   and  effect,  and  that  no  words  or  provisions   are
superfluous.16    Progressive   argues   that    the    divisions
interpretation of AS 21.36.460(d)(1) is wrong because it  renders
four   distinct   provisions   of   AS   21.36.460   superfluous.
Progressive  contends that if credit must be  completely  removed
from consideration at renewal as the division claims, all four of
these provisions would be unnecessary.
          First,   Progressive  notes  that  AS   21.36.460(d)(1)
prevents  insurers  from fail[ing] to renew  .  .  .  a  personal
insurance policy . . . based  in whole or in part on credit.   It
argues  that  if AS 21.36.460(d)(1) really requires  insurers  to
completely  strip out credit scores at renewal when  underwriting
or  rating, the statute would not need to also prohibit  insurers
from  using credit to fail to renew a policy because credit would
already be removed from consideration.  Second, Progressive notes
that  per  AS  21.36.460(e) if a consumer  is  charged  a  higher
premium based on the use of incorrect credit history, the insurer
must  rerate the policy retroactive to the effective date of  the
current  policy  term.    (Emphasis  by  appellee.)   Progressive
argues  that  if  credit must be stripped out at  renewal,  there
would  be no need for the word current because only the consumers
first  policy  could  be based on credit.   Finally,  Progressive
notes  that  the  definition of adverse  action  as  used  in  AS
21.36.460(i)(1)(A)  and (C) includes both the  failure  to  renew
coverage and the unfavorable change in coverage based upon credit
information.   These  too,  it argues, would  be  superfluous  if
insurers were forced to strip out credit scores at renewal.
          However,  as  the  division points out,  all  of  these
arguments  ignore the significance of AS 21.36.460(d)(1)s  waiver
provision.  Because the statute permits a consumer to  waive  the
credit  usage  ban, it is possible that credit can be  used  even
when a policy is renewed, and it is therefore possible such usage
can   cause   an  unfavorable  change  in  coverage.    Similarly
unpersuasive   is  Progressives  argument  that   AS   21.36.460s
fail[ure] to renew based on credit language is superfluous  under
the   divisions   interpretation.   Under   AS   21.36.460(d)(1),
fail[ing]  to  renew based on credit and underwriting  or  rating
based on credit are two distinct concepts.  By its own terms, the
waiver   provision  in  AS  21.36.460(d)(1)   only   applies   to
underwriting  or rating a personal insurance policy  at  renewal.
The  waiver  provision therefore allows a consumer to permit  his
insurer  to re-underwrite or re-rate his policy based on  credit.
The  waiver  provision in AS 21.36.460(d)(1) does  not,  however,
extend  so  far as to allow insurers to fail to renew a consumers
policy based on credit.  A consumer who thinks he has a favorable
credit  score is thus able to allow his insurer to underwrite  or
rate  his  policy based on credit.  But if that consumers  credit
score  is  actually  unfavorable the insurer is  prohibited  from
failing  to  renew his policy on that basis.  Progressive  argues
that  this  hypothetical  scenario  is  improbable  because  What
[consumer] would ask for credit to be used at renewal if it would
lead  to  a failure to renew their policy?  Progressive overlooks
the  possibility  that  consumers might mistakenly  believe  that
their credit scores are better than they actually are.  Given the
legislatures   criticism  of  the  credit  scoring   process   as
mysterious,17 the legislature has apparently contemplated such  a
scenario.    Alaska   Statute  21.36.460s  language   prohibiting
insurers  from failing to renew based on credit is therefore  not
superfluous under the divisions interpretation.
          3.   Alaska   Statute  21.36.460s  legislative  history
               supports the divisions interpretation.
          When  we  interpret Alaska statutes we apply a  sliding
scale of interpretation, where the plainer the language, the more
convincing contrary legislative history must be.18  The  division
interpreted   the   plain  language  of  AS  21.36.460(d)(1)   as
prohibiting Progressives proposed use of consumers frozen  credit
scores   at  renewal.   Progressive  argues  that  AS  21.36.460s
legislative  history  does not support this  interpretation.   We
disagree.
          Annette Skibinski, staff to Senator Cowdery (who,  with
Senator  Elton,  co-authored Senate Bill  13,  which  enacted  AS
21.36.460(d)(1))19 testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee
that  Senate Bill 13 precludes insurers from [using] credit  when
its  time  to  renew  a policy in rating or underwriting.20   Ms.
Skibinski  further  testified that at every renewal  period,  the
consumer has to ask for the[ir] credit to be used.  Otherwise  it
wont  be  used  at  all  at renewal.21  Moreover,  Ms.  Skibinski
testified  that Senate Bill 13 requires insurers  at  renewal  to
look  at  factors  such as the consumers driving record,  payment
history, and how many claims the consumer has filed  but not  the
consumers  credit score.22  Even if we assume, for  the  sake  of
argument,  that  the  plain  language of  AS  21.36.460(d)(1)  is
ambiguous,   AS   21.36.460s  legislative  history   convincingly
supports  the  divisions position that a consumers  credit  score
must  be stripped out at renewal unless the consumer consents  to
its continued usage.23
     B.   Alaska  Statute  21.36.460  Is  Not  Preempted  by  the
          Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act.
          1.   The McCarran-Ferguson Act does not apply.
          Progressive also argues that AS 21.36.460 is  preempted
by  the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA).24  The division
counters  that  there is no preemption here, given both  ordinary
preemption  principles and the McCarran-Ferguson  Acts25  special
anti-preemption  rule.  We address the divisions latter  argument
first.
          Under the Supremacy Clause of the federal constitution,26
state  laws  that  interfere  with federal  laws  are  invalid.27
Federal laws can preempt state laws in the following three  ways:
(1)  if  Congress expressly declares that state law is preempted;
(2)  if  Congress  demonstrates  an  intent  to  occupy  a  field
exclusively;  and  (3)  if  there is an actual  conflict  between
federal  and  state  law.28  When considering preemption,  courts
start with the assumption that the historic police powers of  the
States  were not to be superseded by [a] Federal Act unless  that
was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.29
          In  contrast  to these ordinary preemption  principles,
the  McCarran-Ferguson  Act  created a special  insurance-related
federal  anti-pre-emption  rule that  applies  to  certain  state
statutes  that regulate the insurance industry.30  The  McCarran-
Ferguson Act seeks to protect state regulation primarily  against
inadvertent  federal  intrusion   say,  through  enactment  of  a
federal  statute  that describes an affected activity  in  broad,
general  terms,  of  which  the  insurance  business  happens  to
constitute one part.31  Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, a federal
          statute will not pre-empt a state statute enacted for the purpose
of  regulating  the  business of insurance   unless  the  federal
statute specifically relates to the business of insurance. 32  In
Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, the Supreme  Court
held  that a federal statute specifically related to the business
of  insurance  because it specifically referred to the  insurance
industry,  and  its  state  regulatory  implications   were   not
surprising or inadvertent.33
          Progressive argues that the McCarran-Ferguson Act  does
not  apply because the FCRA specifically relates to the  business
of  insurance.  The division does not dispute this.  Instead, the
division  seems to argue that the McCarran-Ferguson  Act  applies
because  the  FCRA  indicates that Congress  did  not  intend  to
preempt  state regulation of insurance.  However,  the  test  for
whether  the  McCarran-Ferguson Act applies is  not  whether  the
federal  statute intends to preempt the state regulation;  it  is
whether  the federal statute specifically relates to the business
of   insurance.   And  the  FCRA  does  just  that   because   it
specifically refers to the insurance industry.  For example,  the
FCRA states that a person may use a consumer report in connection
with  the  underwriting  of insurance involving  the  consumer.34
Because  the  FCRA  relates  to the business  of  insurance,  the
McCarran-Ferguson Act does not apply.
          2.   Under ordinary preemption principles, AS 21.36.460
               is not preempted by the FCRA.
               
          Progressive   contends  that  the  FCRA   preempts   AS
21.36.460  insofar as the two conflict.  Progressive argues  that
because  several provisions of the FCRA clearly contemplate  that
insurance  companies  may use credit scores  in  connection  with
insurance  underwriting,  the  divisions  interpretation  of   AS
21.36.460  is unenforceable because it stands as an  obstacle  to
the  accomplishment  and  execution  of  the  full  purposes  and
objectives  of  Congress expressed in the [FCRA].   The  division
responds  by  observing that the FCRA explicitly states  that  it
does not preempt state laws except to the extent that [they]  are
inconsistent with [the FCRA], and then only to the extent of  the
inconsistency.35  It notes that although the FCRA allows insurers
to  use credit scores to underwrite, it also allows consumers  to
prohibit insurers from doing so.36  The division also points  out
that  the  FCRA  merely states that insurers  may  use  consumers
credit  information for underwriting; not that they must use  it.
The division argues that because AS 21.36.460s restriction of  an
insurers  ability to use credit information could not  trigger  a
federal enforcement action, AS 21.36.460 is not inconsistent with
the FCRA.37
           A  state law is inconsistent with a federal law if the
state  law conflicts with the federal law to the extent that  (a)
it  is  impossible to comply simultaneously with both or (b)  the
state  regulation obstructs the execution of the purpose  of  the
federal  regulation.38  The division relies  on  Credit  Data  of
Arizona,  Inc.  v. State of Arizona to support its argument  that
the  FCRA  does not preempt AS 21.36.460.39  In Credit Data,  the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that an
Arizona  law  that  prohibits  credit  reporting  agencies   from
charging fees for disclosure was not inconsistent with the  FCRA,
which  permits  the assessment of such fees, for  two  reasons.40
First,  the  court held that the Arizona law is not  inconsistent
with  the FCRA because compliance with the Arizona law could  not
trigger  a  federal  enforcement  action.41   Second,  the  court
reasoned  that the Arizona law does not stand as an  obstacle  to
the  accomplishment  and  execution  of  the  full  purposes  and
objectives  of  Congress in enacting the  Federal  Act  since  it
merely  adds an additional protection to the consumer  for  whose
protection both statutes were enacted.42
          In  Davenport  v. Farmers Insurance Group,  the  United
States  Court  of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit  held  that  the
provisions of the Minnesota Insurance Fair Information  Reporting
Act  (MIFIRA)  that require insurers to notify  consumers  before
obtaining their credit information are not preempted by the FCRA.43
In so holding, the Davenport court noted that the FTCs commentary
on the FCRA included the following example of a permissible state
regulation that it found to closely resemble the MIFIRA:  A State
law  requirement that an employer provide notice  to  a  consumer
before  ordering a consumer report . . . would not be pre-empted,
because  a  party  that complies with such provisions  would  not
violate  the  FCRA.44  The Eighth Circuit found  this  commentary
particularly analogous to the situation presented by  the  MIFIRA
because  employers and insurance companies are treated  similarly
with  respect  to the acquisition of consumer reports  under  the
FCRA.45
          Among  its  various  permissible purposes  of  consumer
reports,  the FCRA states that any consumer reporting agency  may
furnish  a  consumer report to an insurer for use  in  connection
with  the  underwriting  of insurance involving  the  consumer.46
Alaska  Statute  21.36.460 does not ban  the  use  of  credit  at
renewal  for  that  purpose; it merely requires consumer  consent
before  an insurer may do so.  Because the FCRA does not  provide
insurers  with  an absolute right to use credit for  underwriting
purposes,  AS 21.36.460s restriction on credit score usage  could
not  trigger  an  enforcement action under the  FCRA.   The  FTCs
commentary  to  the  FCRA,  as noted by  the  Eighth  Circuit  in
Davenport,  supports this conclusion because  it  indicates  that
states  may  impose  restrictions on the use  of  credit  without
violating the FCRA.47  Furthermore, as the Ninth Circuit  pointed
out  in  Credit  Data,  Congress  enacted  the  FCRA  to  protect
consumers.48  Because AS 21.36.460s consumer consent  requirement
was similarly enacted to protect consumers, it does not stand  as
an  obstacle  to  the accomplishment and execution  of  the  full
purposes  and  objectives  of Congress  expressed  in  the  FCRA.
Alaska Statute 21.36.460 is therefore not preempted by the FCRA.

V.   CONCLUSION
          The  division  correctly interpreted AS 21.36.460(d)(1)
as    prohibiting   Progressives   proposal.    Furthermore,   AS
21.36.460(d)(1)  is  not  preempted  by  the  federal  FCRA.   We
therefore  REVERSE  the superior court order  that  reversed  the
divisions order and REMAND for entry of the divisions order.
_______________________________
     1    Progressive Specialty Insurance Company and Progressive
Northwestern Insurance Company were the other two companies.   We
refer   to  all  three  Progressive  companies  collectively   as
Progressive.

     2     Progressive sometimes refers to the credit tier as the
financial responsibility tier.

     3    See AS 21.39.030; AS 21.36.090(c), .120(c).

     4      Gwichin  Steering  Comm.  v.  State,  Office  of  the
Governor, 10 P.3d 572, 577 (Alaska 2000).

     5    Natl Bank of Alaska v. State, Dept of Revenue, 642 P.2d
811, 815 (Alaska 1982).

     6     Govt  Employees Ins. Co. v. Graham-Gonzalez, 107  P.3d
279,  284 (Alaska 2005) (citing Muller v. BP Exploration (Alaska)
Inc., 923 P.2d 783, 78788 (Alaska 1996)).

     7     Natl  Bank  of Alaska, 642 P.2d at 815 (citing  State,
Dept of Revenue v. Debenham Elec. Supply Co., 612 P.2d 1001, 1003
n.6 (Alaska 1980)).

     8     Govt  Employees Ins. Co., 107 P.3d at  284  (citations
omitted).

     9     Grimm  v.  Wagoner,  77 P.3d 423,  427  (Alaska  2003)
(citation omitted).

     10     Govt  Employees Ins. Co., 107 P.3d at 284  (citations
omitted);  see  also  AS 01.10.040 (Words and  phrases  shall  be
construed  according  to the rules of grammar  and  according  to
their common and approved usage.).

     11     28  Eric Mills Holmes, Holmess Appleman on  Insurance
175.01(2d ed. 1996).

     12     Wilting v. Progressive County Mut. Ins. Co., 227 F.3d
474,  476  (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting FTC Commentary  on  the  Fair
Credit  Reporting  Act, Comment 604(3)(C)1, 16  C.F.R.  Pt.  600,
App.) (emphasis added).

     13     Websters New World College Dictionary 1558  (4th  ed.
2004); see also AS 21.27.900 (stating that [i]n this chapter .  .
.  underwrite  means the authority to accept or  reject  risk  on
behalf of the insurer).

     14    See Wilting, 227 F.3d at 476.

     15    Kodiak Island Borough v. Exxon Corp., 991 P.2d 757, 761
(Alaska 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).

     16    Id.

     17     See,  e.g., Minutes of the Senate Labor and  Commerce
Committee,  April 8, 2003, testimony of Annette Skibinski,  staff
to  Senator Cowdery (Tape 0319, Side A) ([M]ost of us  are  aware
that  the  insurance industry uses our credit score to  determine
our  rates, and I said aware that they use this not how they  use
this.   And I would tell you if I could but I cant because its  a
secret.).

     18     State v. Pub. Safety Employees Assn, 93 P.3d 409, 415
(Alaska 2004) (quotation omitted).

     19     Minutes  of the Senate Labor and Commerce  Committee,
April  8, 2003, testimony of Annette Skibinski, staff to  Senator
Cowdery (Tape 0319, Side A).

     20     Minutes  of the Senate Judiciary Committee,  May  12,
2003,  testimony  of Annette Skibinski, staff to Senator  Cowdery
(Tape 0344, Side A).

     21    Minutes of the House Labor and Commerce Committee, May
18,  2003,  testimony  of  Annette Skibinski,  staff  to  Senator
Cowdery (Tape 0354, Side A).

     22    Id.

     23    Because we hold that Progressives proposal violates AS
21.36.460(d)(1)s ban on using credit history at  policy  renewal,
we  do  not  need  to decide whether the division correctly  also
rejected  Progressives proposal because it violates the Insurance
Codes  prohibition  against arbitrary and unfair  discrimination.
See AS 21.39.030; AS 21.36.090(c); AS 21.36.120(c).

     24    15 U.S.C.  168181x (2006).

     25    15 U.S.C.  101115 (2006).

     26    U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.

     27     Wis.  Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S.  597,  604
(1991).

     28     State  v.  Dupier, 118 P.3d 1039, 1049 (Alaska  2005)
(citing Totemoff v. State, 905 P.2d 954, 958 (Alaska 1995)).

     29    Mortier, 501 U.S. at 605 (quotation omitted); see also
Native  Vill.  of Eklutna v. Alaska R.R. Corp., 87  P.3d  41,  56
(Alaska 2004).

     30     Barnett  Bank of Marion County, N.A., v. Nelson,  517
U.S. 25, 2728 (1996).

     31    Id. at 39 (emphasis in original).

     32     Id.  at  2728  (emphasis in  original)  (quoting  the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C.  1012(b)).

     33     Barnett  Bank of Marion County, N.A., v. Nelson,  517
U.S. 25, 3841 (1996).

     34     15  U.S.C.  1681b(a)(3)(C) (2006); see also 15 U.S.C.
1681b(c), (e), (g) (2006).

     35    15 U.S.C.  1681t(a) (2006).

     36     The  division cites 15 U.S.C.  1681b(c)  and  (e)  to
support this proposition.

     37    See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 540 (1977)
(holding  that because it would be possible to comply with  state
law   without   triggering  federal  enforcement  action,   state
requirement was not inconsistent with federal law).

     38     Interior Regl Hous. Auth. v. James, 989 P.2d 145, 149
(Alaska  1999) (quoting In re J.R.B., 715 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Alaska
1986)).

     39    Credit Data of Ariz., Inc. v. State of Ariz., 602 F.2d
195 (9th Cir. 1979).

     40    Id. at 198.

     41    Id.

     42    Id.

     43     Davenport v. Farmers Ins. Group, 378 F.3d 839,  84243
(8th  Cir. 2004) (discussing Minnesota Insurance Fair Information
Reporting Act, Minn. Stat.  72A.494.505).

     44     Id. at 843 (quoting Comment 6222, 16 C.F.R. Pt.  600,
App.).

     45    Id. (comparing 15 U.S.C.  1681b(a)(3)(B) (which permits
consumer   reporting  agency  to  release  consumer  report   for
employment  purposes)  with  15  U.S.C.   1681b(a)(3)(C)   (which
permits   same   for  purpose  of  underwriting   insurance   for
consumer)).

     46    15 U.S.C.  1681b(a)(3)(C) (2006).

     47     Davenport, 378 F.3d at 843 (quoting Comment 6222,  16
C.F.R. Pt. 600, App.).

     48    Credit Data, 602 F.2d at 198.

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