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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Christiansen v. Christiansen (01/26/2007) sp-6094
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage,
Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
| ALMERIA CHRISTIANSEN, in her | ) |
| capacity as the Administrator of | ) Supreme Court No. S-11789 |
| the Estate of WESLEY J. | ) |
| CHRISTIANSEN, and her personal | ) Superior Court No. 3KO-02-262 CI |
| capacity, | ) |
| ) | |
| Appellant, | ) O P I N I O N |
| ) | |
| v. | ) No. 6094 - January 26, 2007 |
| ) | |
| KENNY CHRISTIANSEN, | ) |
| ) | |
| Appellee. | ) |
| ) | |
Appeal from the
Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third
Judicial District, Kodiak, Joel H. Bolger,
Judge.
Appearances: Michael J. Walleri, Law Offices
of Michael J. Walleri, Fairbanks, for
Appellant. Laura L. Farley, Farley & Graves,
P.C., Anchorage, for Appellee.
Before: Bryner, Chief Justice, Matthews,
Eastaugh, Fabe, and Carpeneti, Justices.
BRYNER, Chief Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
After drinking on his cousin Kennys boat, Wesley
Christiansen fell from a dock and drowned. Wesleys widow,
Almeria Christiansen, sued Kenny, arguing that Kenny had a duty
to supervise, monitor, and control Wesleys drinking. Almeria
acknowledged that Kenny could not be held liable under Alaskas
dram shop law, which immunizes social hosts, but argued that he
owed Wesley duties under federal maritime law that precluded
applying state law. The superior court disagreed and granted
Kennys motion for partial summary judgment. Almeria appeals.
Because we conclude that Alaskas social-host immunity provision
neither materially prejudices a characteristic feature of
maritime law nor interferes with its proper harmony and
uniformity, we affirm the superior courts decision.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Wesley Christiansen arrived at the city dock in Old
Harbor, Kodiak, after a day of duck hunting. He brought beer and
may have been intoxicated when he arrived. Wesleys cousin Kenny
was at the dock, having recently returned from a hunting trip of
his own. Kenny was aboard his fishing vessel, the Mekenna C,
socializing with his brother and a few friends. Wesley boarded
Kennys vessel and proceeded to drink while aboard. Some of the
alcohol Wesley consumed may have been supplied by Kenny.
Some time later Wesley announced that he had to
urinate. One of Kennys passengers suggested that Wesley could
urinate off the end of the dock. Wesley disembarked from the
Mekenna C and was not seen again until his body was discovered
floating in the water near the Mekenna Cs starboard side. State
troopers later concluded that Wesley had fallen from the end of
the dock.
Almeria Christiansen filed a wrongful death suit
against Kenny, alleging in part that Kenny had violated duties
owed to Wesley imposed by virtue of Kennys status as owner and
captain of the Mekenna C.
Kenny contested liability and moved for summary
judgment on the ground that, as a social host, he owed no legal
duty to Wesley under Alaska law.1 In opposition, Almeria argued
that federal maritime law applied and that it imposed a general
duty of reasonable care on Kenny, as well as specific duties to
ensure passengers a safe disembarkment and to supervise and
control their alcohol consumption while aboard his vessel. She
acknowledged, though, that under Alaskas dram shop act Kenny owed
no duties to Wesley as a social host.
Superior Court Judge Joel H. Bolger granted partial
summary judgment for Kenny, ruling that Alaska law governed the
case and that, under Alaskas dram shop act, Kenny had no duty to
control Wesleys drinking. The judge also rejected Almerias claim
for negligent disembarkation, noting that Wesley had fallen from
the dock, not from Kennys boat. Judge Bolger nevertheless
allowed Almerias case to proceed on the limited theory that Kenny
might have caused the dock to become dangerously icy by operating
a bilge pump that coated the dock with mist and ice. Almeria
proceeded to a jury trial on this new icy-dock theory.
After being instructed that [a] person who provides
alcoholic beverages to another person is not liable for injuries
resulting from that persons intoxication, unless the person who
provides the alcohol holds a liquor license, the jury returned a
special verdict answering No to the question, Was the defendant
Kenny Christiansen negligent?
Almeria appeals.
III. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Almeria challenges the superior courts order action.
In granting Kennys motion for partial summary judgment,
the superior court assumed that the facts of this case triggered
admiralty jurisdiction.3 We follow the same approach here. But
the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction . . . does not result in
[the] automatic displacement of state law.4 Admiralty
jurisdiction precludes application of state law only when it
would work a material prejudice to the characteristic features of
[maritime] law or would interfere[] with the proper harmony and
uniformity of [maritime] law in its international and interstate
relations.5
The state law at issue here, AS 04.21.020(a), provides
that only persons who are licensed to sell alcohol may be held
civilly liable for injuries resulting from a recipients
intoxication.6 By limiting liability to licensed sellers, this
provision of Alaskas dram shop act absolves social hosts of civil
liability for harm resulting from the intoxication of their
guests.7 In so providing, Alaskas law follows the trend
reflected in many state dram shop and civil damages statutes. At
common law, dram shop immunity generally extended to commercial
providers and social hosts alike.8 But most states have now
narrowed the scope of dram shop immunity by adopting laws that
allow commercial providers of alcohol to be held accountable for
furnishing liquor to intoxicated persons under certain
circumstances, while continuing to hold social hosts immune:
Generally, [dram shop] statutes only permit a
cause of action to be brought against a
person or entity who is in the business of
providing liquor for commercial remuneration,
such as a tavern owner, and not against one
who furnishes alcohol as a mere act of
hospitality or courtesy. . . .
[C]ivil-damages acts and dram shop statutes
generally do not apply to social hosts[.][9]
To determine whether the superior court could apply
Alaskas dram shop act in a case brought under maritime law, the
first question we must resolve is whether applying a law of this
kind would result in material prejudice to [any] characteristic
feature[] of maritime law.10 United States Supreme Court
precedent suggests that a characteristic feature of admiralty law
is one that originated in admiralty or has exclusive application
there[in].11
Almeria argues that AS 04.21.020s social-host immunity
provision violates this test because federal maritime law imposed
a duty on Kenny to monitor, supervise, and possibly even control
Wesleys drinking. In support of this assertion she cites two
federal district court cases and one decision by the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals.12 But these cases fail to support
Almerias claim. None of them deals with a vessel owner who acted
merely as a social host, and none purports to recognize or create
a general rule of maritime law that would abrogate the
traditional social-host immunity rule as it existed at common
law.
Given the lack of analogous precedent in maritime law,
the superior court found no controlling federal rule imposing
liability on an unlicensed social host. We agree. In the
absence of a controlling federal rule, we conclude that Almeria
has not demonstrated that a characteristic feature of maritime
law would be materially prejudiced by applying AS 04.21.020 in
this case.
We must separately ask whether applying AS 04.21.020s
social-host immunity provision would interfere with the proper
harmony and uniformity of maritime law.13 Almeria maintains that
AS 04.21.020 would interfere with the uniform application of
maritime laws wrongful death cause of action.14 Specifically, she
asserts that [w]hile general maritime law does not limit a state
from providing for remedies not present in federal maritime law,
state law may not impede[] remedies created under federal
maritime law. Almeria argues that applying AS 04.21.020 in this
case would impose [a] limit[] on recovery which would infringe
upon the right of recovery created in federal law. Kenny
responds that Alaska is free to apply its own law here because
there is no controlling federal law governing unlicensed social
host[s].15
We have previously noted that [c]ourts apply a
balancing test to decide issues of harmony and uniformity.16 As
one commentator explains,
[S]tate law will not be preempted if the
state has a strong interest in the subject
matter and there is correspondingly little
need for uniformity; if, however, there is a
strong federal interest, state law will not
be allowed to impair the essential uniformity
of maritime law.[17]
We are not convinced that applying AS 04.21.020 in this
case would impede any strong federal interest. The maritime
cause of action for wrongful death advances the federal interest
in affording decedents representatives an avenue for recovery;
but beyond establishing the maritime laws interest in ensuring
the availability of an action for wrongful death, Almeria
identifies no strong federal interest in dictating the precise
scope of an actionable wrongful death claim.
In fact, as we have already observed, Almeria cites no
maritime cases that have imposed social-host liability under
circumstances comparable to those at issue here. To be sure,
under maritime law vessel owners owe visitors aboard their
vessels a general duty of exercising reasonable care under the
circumstances of each case.18 But given the absence of case law
extending this duty to a social-host setting like the one here,
we fail to see any strong federal interest in demanding a uniform
rule that would impose social-host liability; nor do we see any
reasonable possibility that Alaskas social-host immunity law
might impair the essential uniformity of maritime law.19
IV. CONCLUSION
In summary, because the superior court correctly ruled
that AS 04.21.020 could be applied in this case without
materially prejudicing a characteristic feature of maritime law
or interfering with its proper harmony and uniformity, we AFFIRM
the superior courts judgment.
_______________________________
1 See AS 04.21.020.
2 We review awards of summary judgment de novo. See,
e.g., Bennett v. Weimar, 975 P.2d 691, 694 (Alaska 1999).
3 A tort case falls within admiralty jurisdiction when it
satisfies the tests of location and connection as described by
the United States Supreme Court in Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v.
Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 534 (1995).
4 Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 206 (1996)
(quoting Jerome B. Grubart, Inc., 513 U.S. at 545) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
5 Kodiak Island Borough v. Exxon Corp., 991 P.2d 757, 766
(Alaska 1999) (quoting Hughes v. Foster Wheeler Co., 932 P.2d
784, 787 (Alaska 1997)).
6 AS 04.21.020, Civil liability of persons providing
alcoholic beverages, provides, in relevant part:
(a) Except as provided under (b) and (d) of
this section, a person who provides alcoholic
beverages to another person may not be held
civilly liable for injuries resulting from
the intoxication of that person unless the
person who provides the alcoholic beverages
holds a license authorized under AS 04.11.080
04.11.220 or is an agent or employee of such
a licensee . . . .
(Emphasis added.)
7 See Chokwak v. Worley, 912 P.2d 1248, 1254 (Alaska
1996) (AS 04.21.020 extends civil immunity to social hosts who
provide alcohol to minors); Mulvihill v. Union Oil Co., 859 P.2d
1310, 1311-12 (Alaska 1993) (AS 04.21.020 extended civil immunity
to employer acting as social host by providing alcohol to
employees at holiday party). But see Gordon v. Alaska Pacific
Bancorporation, 753 P.2d 721, 723 (Alaska 1988) (claim not barred
by AS 04.21.020 where social host should have protected a guest
from the harmful presence of other intoxicated party-goers).
8 Diane Schmauder Kane, Annotation, Social Hosts
Liability for Death or Injuries Incurred by Person to Whom
Alcohol was Served, 54 A.L.R. 5th 326 (1997).
9 Id.
10 Kodiak Island Borough, 991 P.2d at 766 (quoting Hughes,
932 P.2d at 787).
11 Id. at 767 (quoting American Dredging Co. v. Miller,
510 U.S. 443, 450 (1994)).
12 See Reyes v. Vantage Steamship Co., Inc., 558 F.2d 238
(5th Cir. 1977) (holding, in a maritime wrongful death action
filed after intoxicated crewman jumped from his vessel and
drowned while swimming toward a buoy, that vessel owner could be
liable for apportioned fault because owner acted at least
negligently by regularly selling large quantities of alcohol to
crewmembers in violation of applicable federal regulations);
Young v. Players Lake Charles, L.L.C., 47 F. Supp. 2d 832 (S.D.
Tex. 1999) (denying motion to dismiss under state dram shop
immunity provision and holding casino riverboat operator
potentially liable under maritime law for damages resulting from
drunken driving homicide caused by intoxicated casino patron
while driving home after casino served him numerous drinks as
inducement to gamble); Thier v. Lykes Bros., Inc., 900 F. Supp.
864 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (vessel owner held liable for injuries to
seaman cadet caused by cadets supervising officer, who became
intoxicated aboard the vessel while it was in port and recklessly
caused an auto accident while driving the cadet to a restaurant).
13 Kodiak Island Borough, 991 P.2d at 767 (citation
omitted).
14 See Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp. v. Garris, 532
U.S. 811, 820 (2001) (The maritime cause of action that Moragne
established for unseaworthiness is equally available for
negligence.); Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375,
409 (1970) ([A]n action does lie under general maritime law for
death caused by violation of maritime duties.).
15 Cf. Wilburn Boat Co. v. Firemans Fund Ins. Co., 348
U.S. 310, 320-21 (1955) (holding that in the absence of federal
legislation or conflicting rule judicially established by federal
courts, regulation of marine insurance left to states); Thomas J.
Schoenbaum, 1 Admiralty and Maritime Law 4-3, at 169 (4th ed.
2004) (state law may fill gaps and supplement the maritime law).
16 Kodiak Island Borough, 991 P.2d at 767 (citing Kossick
v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 738-42 (1961); Huron Portland
Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 442-48 (1960); Just
v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383 (1941); Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach
Shellfish, 32 F.3d 623, 628 (1st Cir. 1994); Brockington v.
Certified Elec. Inc., 903 F.2d 1523, 1530 (11th Cir. 1990)).
17 Schoenbaum, supra note 15, at 169-70 (footnotes
omitted).
18 Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358
U.S. 625, 632 (1959).
19 Cf. Meyer v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 1994 WL 832006, at
*3-4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 1994) (noting that extensive research
has uncovered no federal maritime dram shop rule and holding that
need for uniformity does not preclude applying California dram
shop act in negligence action under maritime law for injuries
suffered by cruise ship passenger at sea).
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