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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Copper v. Cooper (09/29/2006) sp-6054
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage,
Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
| CYNTHIA M. COOPER, | ) |
| n/k/a CYNTHIA M. HORA, | ) Supreme Court Nos. S- 11566/11649 |
| ) | |
| Appellant, | ) Superior Court Nos. |
| ) 3AN-04-01451 CI | |
| v. | ) 3AN-03-13336 CI |
| ) | |
| DANIEL R. COOPER, JR., | ) O P I N I O N |
| ) | |
| Appellee. | ) No. 6054, September 29, 2006 |
| ) | |
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State
of Alaska, Third Judicial District,
Anchorage, Sharon Gleason and John Suddock,
Judges.
Appearances: Cynthia M. Hora, pro se,
Anchorage. Karla F. Huntington, Law Office
of K. F. Huntington, Anchorage, for Appellee.
Christine McLeod Pate, Kari Robinson, Sitka,
for Amicus Curiae Alaska Network on Domestic
Violence and Sexual Assault.
Before: Bryner, Chief Justice, Matthews,
Eastaugh, and Fabe, Justices. [Carpeneti,
Justice, not participating.]
MATTHEWS, Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
In these consolidated cases we review a denial of a
petition for a domestic violence protective order, and, in the
separate divorce case, a grant of a mutual restraining order. We
affirm the former and reverse the latter.
The main question presented is whether a person subject
to a domestic violence order prohibiting him from being in the
presence of or contacting a protected person commits the crime of
violating a protective order by simply being in the same public
place as the protected person. Our answer is no. The crime
requires a violation of statutory prohibitions that may be
included in a protective order and being in the presence of a
protected person is not among them. While a no-contacting order
is an included statutory prohibition, merely being in the
presence of a protected person without communicating with her is
not contacting within the meaning of the statute.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Cynthia Hora1 and Daniel Cooper were a married couple
when, in October 2003, Cooper was arrested for assaulting Hora.
In November 2003 Hora petitioned for a long-term protective order
and filed for divorce.
On November 28, 2003, a master issued a long-term
domestic violence protective order against Cooper. The
protective order prohibited Cooper from threatening to commit or
committing acts of domestic violence, stalking, or harassment
against Hora and her two children. This prohibition was to
remain in effect until dissolved by a court. To date, it remains
in effect. The protective order also contained prohibitions to
remain in effect for six months, including a prohibition on being
in the physical presence of, telephoning, contacting, or
otherwise communicating directly or indirectly with Hora or her
children. These proscriptions expired on May 28, 2004.
Hora alleges that on the day after the protective order
was issued, she saw Cooper at the Dimond Mall in Anchorage. She
alleges that he was staring at her in the housewares department
of Gottshalks and that later that day she saw him outside the pet
store. Cooper admits that he was at the Dimond Mall on the day
in question, but denies having seen Hora. In January of 2004
Cooper drove past Hora and her son as they exited a barbershop.
Cooper was driving slowly and he and Hora made eye contact.
In February 2004 Cooper pled no contest to a charge of
family violence stemming from his October arrest. As a condition
of probation, his sentence included a prohibition on contact with
Hora or her children.
On April 28, 2004, Hora attended the morning session of
the Alaska Bar Association Annual Convention held in Anchorage at
the Captain Cook Hotel. When she noticed that Cooper was also
attending the session, Hora requested that Cooper leave the
conference, which he did. Cooper returned to the Captain Cook
that afternoon. Hora saw Cooper at the Captain Cook and called
the police. That evening Cooper was arrested for violating the
November 28, 2003 protective order.
The next day, Cooper moved for clarification of the
protective order. In response to this motion, Superior Court
Judge John Suddock entered an order on April 30, 2004, finding
that Coopers attendance at the bar convention was not a per se
violation of the order. Hora filed a motion for reconsideration,
which was denied by Judge Suddock on May 5, 2004.
On May 26, 2004, Hora, in a new proceeding,2 petitioned
for a twenty-day ex parte and a long-term protective order
against Cooper. Superior Court Judge Sharon Gleason granted Hora
an ex-parte protective order based on Coopers April 28 arrest for
violating the November 28, 2003 protective order. When she
granted the ex parte order, Judge Gleason was unaware that Judge
Suddock had previously made and entered two decisions on the
topic of Coopers attendance at the bar convention.
Hora alleges that on May 27, 2004, Cooper slowed down
in his car and paced her car for at least fifty feet while she
was driving down I Street. Cooper denies this allegation and
asserts that he was in his office when the incident allegedly
occurred.
Cooper moved to dismiss the May 26 petition for
protective order on the basis that Judge Suddock had already
ruled that attendance at the bar convention was not a per se
violation of the existing protective order. Judge Gleason denied
the motion to dismiss, stating that she intended to apply the
standard set out by Judge Suddock in his order dated April 30,
2004, as well as the order denying reconsideration dated [May 5,
2004].
On June 22, 2004, an evidentiary hearing was held on
Horas petition for a long-term protective order. At the
conclusion of this hearing, Judge Gleason vacated the ex parte
order of May 26 and denied Horas petition for a long-term
protective order.
On August 19, 2004, Judge Suddock held a hearing to
review the parties property distribution agreement, after which
he issued a final decree of divorce. At Coopers request, Judge
Suddock also issued a mutual restraining order prohibiting
future, direct contact between the parties, including in-person
contact, mail, phone, and electronic contact.
Hora appeals Judge Gleasons denial of her petition for
a long-term protective order and Judge Suddocks grant of a mutual
restraining order.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law
which involves this courts independent judgment.3 Findings of
fact are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard.4 We
review the decisions to deny a protective order and grant a
mutual restraining order for abuse of discretion.5
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Horas Appeal Is Not Moot
This court requested supplemental briefing on the issue
of mootness. If Hora prevailed in her appeal, she might be
entitled to a protective order containing provisions like those
in the November 28, 2003 order that expired after six months. We
conclude that this possibility is sufficient to avoid dismissal
for mootness.
B. Denial of the Protective Order
1. Judge Gleasons decision
Horas petition for a protective order was based on the
allegation that Cooper had committed the crime of violating a
protective order. Hora alleged that Cooper violated the order
(1) at the bar convention, (2) at the Dimond Mall, (3) outside
the barber shop, and (4) by pacing her on I Street. Judge
Gleason applied Judge Suddocks previous rulings clarifying the
November 28, 2003 order to Horas first allegation. Hora claimed
that Cooper had committed the crime of violating a protective
order based on two theories. First, because his conduct amounted
to stalking and stalking is prohibited by the protective order.
Second, because his conduct amounted to contacting, which is also
prohibited by the protective order. Judge Gleason concluded that
the facts did not support entering a protective order under
either theory.
As to stalking, Judge Gleason recognized that the
placing-in-fear element required objective fear and concluded
that the proof did not satisfy that standard. As to the no-
contacting order, Judge Gleason found that there had been no
violation either at the bar convention or in the other instances
alleged by Hora. In so ruling, Judge Gleason accepted Judge
Suddocks ruling that merely being in the presence of another
party at a public place was not prohibited contacting. She also
found that conclusion to be consistent with the statutory
language since the applicable statute, AS 18.66.100(c)(2), does
not list precluding a respondent from being in the presence of
the other party. As to each of the incidents described by Hora,
at the bar convention and elsewhere, Judge Gleason found that
they at most involved one to two second unplanned eye contact
which did not constitute a violation of the protective order.
She concluded: [B]ased on the testimony Ive heard, I find by a
preponderance of the evidence that those were not intentional
acts by Mr. Cooper to place himself in a situation where he would
be having eye contact with . . . Ms. Cooper. Judge Gleason also
gave an example to illustrate her conclusion:
Say hes at the barbershop, hes half shaved
. . . , and all of a sudden Ms. Cooper walks
in. Does he need to say then oops, sorry,
got to go, and his physical countenance left
in disarray? No, I dont see it that way.
But does that mean that he can turn his chair
and stare at Ms. Cooper? No. So thats how I
would interpret the order as it was then, in
a manner that is consistent with the statute.
Hora argues that Judge Gleason applied an incorrect
placing-in-fear standard with respect to stalking, and
incorrectly interpreted the elements of the crime of violating a
protective order with respect to the no-contacting order.
2. Elements of the crime of violating a protective
order.
Alaska Statute 18.66.100(b) gives the superior court
the authority to issue a protective order if it finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that the respondent has committed a
crime involving domestic violence against the petitioner.6 Under
AS 18.66.990, crimes involving domestic violence include stalking
and violating a domestic violence order under AS 11.56.740.7 The
crime of violating a protective order is defined by AS
11.56.740(a):
A person commits the crime of violating
a protective order if the person is subject
to a protective order
(1) issued or filed under AS 18.66 and
containing a provision listed in AS
18.66.100(c)(1)(7) and knowingly commits or
attempts to commit an act with reckless
disregard that the act violates or would
violate a provision of the protective
order[.]
Stalking is conduct that is listed in AS
18.66.100(c)(1) and therefore when it occurs and is prohibited by
a protective order, it also may be a crime of violating a
protective order under AS 11.56.740(a). We understand Horas
position to be that Coopers alleged stalking conduct is a crime
involving domestic violence (justifying a new protective order
under AS 18.66.100(b)) because such conduct directly violated the
criminal stalking statutes and because it amounted to the crime
of violating a protective order under AS 11.56.740(a).
The relevant mental states referred to in AS
11.56.740(a) and in Judge Gleasons decision are defined in AS
11.81.900.8
3. Stalking
No argument is made that stalking as used in the
protective order, and in AS 18.66.100(c)(1), has a different
meaning than stalking under the statute making it an independent
crime. Under the latter, [a] person commits the crime of
stalking . . . if the person knowingly engages in a course of
conduct that recklessly places another person in fear of death or
physical injury . . . .9 To be a course of conduct there must be
repeated acts of nonconsensual contact.10 Under the stalking
statute, nonconsensual contact specifically includes following or
appearing within the sight of [the] person.11 The court of
appeals stated in Kenison v. State12 that AS 11.41.270 is not
referring to the victims subjective feelings of fright or
intimidation. Rather, the statute requires proof that the victim
reasonably perceived or apprehended the threat of death or
physical injury.13 This objective standard is individualized, and
focuses on a whether a reasonable person in the same situation
would also experience fear under the same circumstances. The
court of appeals applied an individualized objective standard in
Kenison by allowing the jury to consider evidence of the past
relationship between the perpetrator and the victim.14
Hora argues that Judge Gleason did not apply an
individualized objective standard and erred in finding that
Cooper had not committed stalking. We conclude Judge Gleason did
not err in finding that the evidence of stalking was insufficient
to support the issuance of a protective order. Coopers mere
presence in Horas line of vision, if sufficiently repeated, could
be nonconsensual contact for purposes of the course-of-conduct
element of stalking. But Judge Gleason relied on the
insufficiency of evidence satisfying the placing-in-fear element,
not the course-of-conduct element, in reaching her decision.
Judge Gleason found that Cooper did not threaten, approach, or
engage with Hora in any manner except to make momentary unplanned
eye contact with her. Judge Gleason was fully aware of the
parties history and there is no indication that she did not apply
an individualized objective standard with respect to the placing-
in-fear element. We are unable to say that it was clearly
erroneous for Judge Gleason to conclude that the requisite
placing-in-fear element had not been met.
4. Contacting
The protective order of November 28, 2003, directed
that Cooper not be in the physical presence of Hora, and that he
refrain from contacting or otherwise communicating with her
either directly or indirectly. Under AS 11.56.740(a)(1) in order
to commit the crime of violating a protective order the
protective order must contain a provision listed in AS
18.66.100(c)(1)(7). Although this statute read literally only
requires a violation of a provision of the protective order
without specifying that the provision must be one listed in AS
18.66.100(c)(1)(7), the section implies that only a violation of
a provision listed in subsection .100(c)(1)(7) may constitute the
crime of violating a protective order.15 Otherwise, there would
be no reason to specify, as subsection .740(a)(1) does,
particular provisions of subsection .100(c) that the protective
order must contain.16 This is significant in this case because
the prohibition that Cooper not be in the physical presence of
Hora is not a provision listed in subsection .100(c)(1)(7). This
does not mean that the in-the-presence prohibition is
unauthorized. Under AS 18.66.100(c)(16) a court in framing a
protective order may order other relief the court determines
necessary to protect the petitioner or any household member. An
order issued under AS 18.66.100(c)(16) may be enforceable by
contempt, and possibly other means, but violation of such an
order does not amount to the crime of violating a protective
order as that crime is defined in AS 11.56.740(a)(1).
The protective orders prohibition on Cooper contacting
or otherwise communicating with Hora is a provision listed in AS
18.66.100(c)(2). Thus if Cooper contacted Hora with the
requisite mental state he committed the crime of violating a
protective order. This crime, as we have seen, is a crime
involving domestic violence. As such, it would have been grounds
for granting the petition for a long-term protective order under
AS 18.66.100(b).
Hora takes issue with Judge Gleasons conclusion that
Cooper did not violate the no-contacting order in two respects.
She contends first that contacting as used in AS 18.66.100(c)(2)
should be construed to encompass appearing within the sight of
the protected person. Second, she contends that Judge Gleason
erroneously found that Cooper had to intentionally place himself
where he could be seen by Hora, and that only knowing behavior is
required by AS 11.56.740(a)(1). We reject Horas first point. As
to the second point, we agree that only knowing contacting is
required but conclude that the error was harmless because there
was no conduct that amounted to contacting within the meaning of
AS 18.66.100(c)(2).
a. Merely appearing within the protected persons
sight is not contacting.
Horas argument is that the statute defining the crime
of stalking defines nonconsensual contact as including appearing
within the sight of a protected person. She contends that this
definition of contact should apply to the contacting prohibition
listed in AS 18.66.100(c)(2). Although this is not an
implausible argument, we reject it for the following reasons.
Contacting, as a verb, means in common usage physically touching
or communicating.17 The stalking statutes use of the term, in
conjunction with nonconsensual, to include merely appearing
within the sight of another person goes beyond the meaning of
contact in normal usage. Words in statutes are to be construed
in accordance with their normal usage unless there is some
indication that a special meaning is intended.18 In the present
case the context in which contacting is used in AS
18.66.100(c)(2) argues in favor of adhering to the normal
meaning. The statutes inclusion of the phrase or otherwise
communicating immediately after contacting strongly suggests that
nonphysical contact must involve some element of direct or
indirect communication and does not merely mean coming within
view. Further, the special and considerably broader meaning of
nonconsensual contact in the stalking statute is not, as there
used, all that is needed for a crime to take place. The contact
must also be repeated, so that it is a course of conduct, and it
must place the protected person in fear. The need for these
additional requirements to make stalking a crime argues against a
construction that makes merely appearing in the sight of a
protected person, without more, a crime.19
b. Knowing contacting
As noted, Hora takes issue with Judge Gleasons
conclusion that Coopers conduct had to be intentional, rather
than merely knowing. The difference between the two concepts is
that a person acts intentionally with respect to a result . . .
when the persons conscious objective is to cause that result
. . . .20 By contrast, a person acts knowingly when he knows that
a particular result will occur even if his objective is not to
cause that result.21
Horas argument on this point is that
[t]he plain language of the statute requires
proof of the following elements: (1) the
perpetrator acted knowingly with respect to
his conduct; (2) the perpetrator knew of the
existence of the protective order; and (3)
the perpetrator recklessly disregarded a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that his
conduct was prohibited by the order. Since
the word intentionally does not appear in AS
11.56.740, there is no requirement that the
perpetrator act intentionally.
We agree with this formulation. But our rejection of
Horas argument that an act of contacting within the meaning of AS
18.66.100(c)(2) occurred means that this point is moot. Coopers
mental state would only be relevant if conduct amounting to
contacting occurred. There is no evidence that the momentary eye
contact that Judge Gleason found to have occurred had
communicative content. Thus, contacting did not take place.22
C. The Mutual Restraining Order
Hora also challenges the mutual restraining order
entered by Judge Suddock in the divorce proceeding, contending
that the court had no basis to impose any restraint against her.
Under Siggelkow v. State, where an independent basis exists for a
restraining order, it may issue pursuant to the courts equitable
power.23 However, the court may not issue an order merely because
the parties are before it in a divorce action.24 Because this is
a mutual order, there must be an independent basis for the order
against each party. Judge Suddocks basis for the mutual
restraining order was that [b]oth parties have expressed a
concern for their safety from the other party. There has been a
high level of animosity and distrust exhibited throughout the
litigation.
In our view, an expression of concern by the parties is
insufficient to establish an independent basis for the order. A
more specific factual basis was required to support Coopers
belief that there will be future acts of harassment or contact by
Hora. Judge Suddock noted that Hora had done nothing that would
justify [Cooper] from having concern about physical violence.
Likewise, a general acknowledgment of animosity and distrust
during a divorce is insufficient to establish an independent
basis for the order.25 We conclude that because the order lacked
an independent basis, it was an abuse of discretion to issue the
mutual restraining order.
V. CONCLUSION
In No. S-11566 we AFFIRM the superior courts denial of
a domestic violence protective order. In No. S-11649 we REVERSE
the decision of the superior court granting a mutual restraining
order and REMAND the case to the court with directions to VACATE
the mutual restraining order.
_______________________________
1 Cynthia Hora was Cynthia Cooper until August 2004, when
her divorce became final.
2 That is, with a docket number separate from the
November 2003 domestic violence proceeding.
3 Odum v. Univ. of Alaska, Anchorage, 845 P.2d 432, 434
(Alaska 1993).
4 Williams v. Williams, 129 P.3d 428, 431 (Alaska 2006).
5 See State v. Kluti Kaah Native Vill. of Copper Ctr.,
831 P.2d 1270, 1272 n.4 (Alaska 1992).
6 AS 18.66.100 in the form that it was in when the acts
in question in this case took place provided in relevant part:
(b) When a petition for a protective
order is filed, the court shall schedule a
hearing and provide at least 10 days notice
to the respondent of the hearing and of the
respondents right to appear and be heard,
either in person or by an attorney. If the
court finds by a preponderance of evidence
that the respondent has committed a crime
involving domestic violence against the
petitioner, regardless of whether the
respondent appears at the hearing, the court
may order any relief available under (c) of
this section. The provisions of a protective
order issued under
(1) (c)(1) of this section are effective
until further order of the court;
(2) (c)(2) - (16) of this section are
effective for six months unless earlier
dissolved by court order.
(c) A protective order under this
section may
(1) prohibit the respondent from
threatening to commit or committing domestic
violence, stalking, or harassment;
(2) prohibit the respondent from
telephoning, contacting, or otherwise
communicating directly or indirectly with the
petitioner;
(3) remove and exclude the respondent
from the residence of the petitioner,
regardless of ownership of the residence;
(4) direct the respondent to stay away
from the residence, school, or place of
employment of the petitioner or any specified
place frequented by the petitioner or any
designated household member;
(5) prohibit the respondent from
entering a propelled vehicle in the
possession of or occupied by the petitioner;
. . .
(16) order other relief the court
determines necessary to protect the
petitioner or any household member.
(Emphasis added.)
7 AS 18.66.990(3) provides in relevant part:
domestic violence and crime involving
domestic violence mean one or more of the
following offenses or an offense under a law
or ordinance of another jurisdiction having
elements similar to these offenses, or an
attempt to commit the offense, by a household
member against another household member:
(A) a crime against the person under AS
11.41;
. . .
(G) violating a domestic violence order
under AS 11. 56.740[.]
Stalking is a crime against the person under AS 11.41,
specifically, AS 11.41.260 (stalking in the first degree) and AS
11.41.270 (stalking in the second degree). The elements of
stalking are discussed infra at pages 10-11.
8 AS 11.81.900(a) provides in relevant part:
For purposes of this title, unless the
context requires otherwise,
(1) a person acts intentionally with
respect to a result described by a provision
of law defining an offense when the persons
conscious objective is to cause that result;
when intentionally causing a particular
result is an element of an offense, that
intent need not be the persons only
objective;
(2) a person acts knowingly with respect
to conduct or to a circumstance described by
a provision of law defining an offense when
the person is aware that the conduct is of
that nature or that the circumstance exists;
when knowledge of the existence of a
particular fact is an element of an offense,
that knowledge is established if a person is
aware of a substantial probability of its
existence, unless the person actually
believes it does not exist; a person who is
unaware of conduct or a circumstance of which
the person would have been aware had that
person not been intoxicated acts knowingly
with respect to that conduct or circumstance;
(3) a person acts recklessly with
respect to a result or to a circumstance
described by a provision of law defining an
offense when the person is aware of and
consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the result will occur
or that the circumstance exists; the risk
must be of such a nature and degree that
disregard of it constitutes a gross deviation
from the standard of conduct that a
reasonable person would observe in the
situation; a person who is unaware of a risk
of which the person would have been aware had
that person not been intoxicated acts
recklessly with respect to that risk[.]
9 AS 11.41.270(a).
10 AS 11.41.270(b)(1).
11 AS 11.41.270(b)(3)(A).
12 107 P.3d 335 (Alaska App. 2005).
13 Id. at 342.
14 Id. at 343-44 (allowing the jury to consider evidence
of the couples deteriorating relationship and a long series of
nonconsensual contacts for the purposes of evaluating whether the
victims fear was reasonable). See also Petersen v. State, 930
P.2d 414, 432 (Alaska App. 1996) (allowing the jury to consider
evidence of the perpetrators long-standing course of conduct
. . . his persistent refusal to stay away from her, [and] his
repeated presence at her workplace to establish that the victim
feared injury or death at the perpetrators hands).
15 We assumed this to be the case in State v. Strane, 61
P.3d 1284, 1286 (Alaska 2003).
16 The principle that ambiguities in a criminal statute
should be resolved by construing the statute narrowly also
supports this conclusion. See State v. Andrews, 707 P.2d 900,
907 (Alaska App. 1985), adopted as the opinion of this court, 723
P.2d 85 (Alaska 1986).
17 Thus, Websters Third New International Dictionary says
the following concerning contact when used as a transitive verb,
including its ed/ing forms: to bring into contact: enter or be
in contact with: a: to press against . . . b: to make connection
with: get in communication with . . . c: to talk or confer with
. . . .
18 AS 01.10.040(a) (Words and phrases shall be construed
according to the rules of grammar and according to their common
and approved usage. Technical words and phrases and those which
have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning, whether by
legislative definition or otherwise, shall be construed according
to the peculiar and appropriate meaning.).
19 AS 18.66.100(c)(3) provides that a protective order may
remove and exclude the respondent from the residence of the
petitioner and subsection (c)(4) provides that a protective order
may direct the respondent to stay away from the residence,
school, or place of employment of the petitioner or any specified
place frequented by the petitioner or any designated household
member. A respondents mere presence in any of these locations,
where the petitioner is most likely to be found, could constitute
violation of a protective order. But the active language of AS
18.66.100(c)(2) (telephoning, contacting, communicating) suggests
that an appearance in the presence of a protected person outside
of these safeguarded locations would not constitute a violation,
unless a fact finder were to determine that by appearing in the
presence of the petitioner, the respondent knowingly
communicated, directly or indirectly, with the petitioner.
20 AS 11.81.900(a).
21 AS 11.81.900(a)(2). Further, knowingly does not
require definite knowledge. Rather, when knowledge of the
existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, that
knowledge is established if a person is aware of a substantial
probability of its existence, unless the person actually believes
that it does not exist. Id.
22 Hora makes two other arguments with respect to the
protective order. She argues that Judge Gleason improperly gave
collateral effect to Judge Suddocks ruling that Coopers
attendance at the bar convention was not a per se violation of
the protective order. This argument would only be of importance
if Judge Gleasons order was not, as a stand-alone order,
affirmable without consideration of Judge Suddocks ruling. Here,
both Judge Gleason and Judge Suddock correctly concluded that
Coopers presence at the bar convention was not, per se, a
violation of the protective order. Thus Judge Gleasons order
does not require the shielding from review on appeal that
application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel might give it.
Hora also argues that the superior court denied her
request for a long-term protective order based in part on the
protection provided by Coopers no-contact probation condition.
While Judge Gleason did mention the criminal provision, it does
not appear from the transcript that the existence of the no-
contact probation condition affected the final judgment.
23 731 P.2d 57, 61 (Alaska 1987).
24 Id.
25 As a matter of policy, mutual restraining orders have
come to be disfavored in domestic violence cases. See AS
18.66.130(b) (A court may not grant protective orders against the
petitioner and the respondent in the same action under [the
Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault] chapter.). We believe this
should carry over to divorce litigation as well when only one
partner has committed acts of domestic violence.
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