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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Williams v. Williams (09/08/2006) sp-6043
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage,
Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
| MELANIE GINN-WILLIAMS, | ) |
| ) Supreme Court No. S- 11927 | |
| Appellant, | ) |
| ) Superior Court No. | |
| v. | ) 3AN-04- 3449CI |
| ) | |
| CHANNING O. WILLIAMS, | ) O P I N I O N |
| ) | |
| Appellee. | ) No. 6043 - September 8, 2006 |
| ) | |
Appeal from the
Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third
Judicial District, Anchorage, Sharon L.
Gleason, Judge.
Appearances: Melanie Ginn-Williams, pro se,
Anchorage, Appellant. No appearance by
Appellee.
Before: Bryner, Chief Justice, Matthews,
Eastaugh, Fabe, and Carpeneti, Justices.
BRYNER, Chief Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
Melanie Ginn-Williams and Channing O. Williams divorced
after five years of marriage. At their trial, they agreed to
share legal custody of their children and acknowledged that the
superior courts acceptance of their agreement would be final and
binding. On appeal, Ginn-Williams challenges the courts denial
of her motion to reconsider the shared legal custody award in
light of new evidence offered to show that Williams had a history
of domestic violence evidence that might have triggered a
statutory presumption disqualifying Williams from sharing legal
custody. Ginn-Williams also questions the courts decision to
award Williams a dependency exemption for their son (who is
living with her, not with Williams), and its decision to treat
two debts as marital property. We affirm, holding: (1) because
Ginn-Williams offered no evidence of changed circumstances
affecting the childrens best interests, the superior court
properly declined to reconsider its joint legal custody award;
(2) the disputed dependency exemption complies with federal and
state law, even though Williams is a noncustodial parent; and (3)
substantial evidence supports the superior courts rulings on
marital debt.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Melanie Ginn-Williams and Channing O. Williams married
in 1999 and separated in August 2002. Their two children
remained with Ginn-Williams, and the parties made informal
arrangements for visitation by Williams. Williams filed for
divorce in January 2004; the parties then engaged in some marital
counseling. By October 2004, the parties efforts to reconcile
had apparently stalled, and Superior Court Judge Sharon L.
Gleason scheduled the case for a trial to begin in January 2005.
Judge Gleason tried the case in three separate hearings held in
January, March, and April 2005. Throughout the superior court
proceedings, both parties appeared pro se.
At the January 2005 hearing, the court mainly
considered issues of custody and visitation. The parties arrived
at an agreement that allowed Ginn-Williams to keep primary
physical custody of both children, established a visitation
schedule for Williams, and provided for shared legal custody.
After finding the agreement to be in the childrens best
interests, the superior court accepted it as a final and binding
determination of the custody issues.
Less than a week later, Ginn-Williams moved for
reconsideration of the decision allowing Williams to have joint
legal custody, alleging for the first time that Williams had a
history of domestic violence and that, under a recently enacted
law, the court was obliged to consider this history before
deciding the legal custody issue.
At the March 2005 hearing, the superior court denied
Ginn-Williamss motion for reconsideration, declining to revisit
its shared-legal-custody order. The court noted that the order
reflected a voluntary and binding agreement; that both parties
had acknowledged that the agreement would be in the childrens
best interests; and that Ginn-Williamss motion for
reconsideration failed to make any showing that shared legal
custody would prove unworkable or that it might not serve the
childrens best interests.
Apart from denying the motion for reconsideration, the
court mainly used the March hearing to address issues of child
support. After it became clear that neither party had all their
required financial documentation, the court postponed further
consideration of child support until early April, when another
hearing had already been set to consider unresolved property
issues.
The court resolved the remaining issues of child
support and property division at the April 2005 hearing. It
decided, among other things, that Williams could claim a federal
income tax dependency exemption for the couples older child; that
the second mortgage for the parties marital home was a marital
debt; and that an automobile loan the parties had received to buy
a minivan was also a marital debt. The superior court
incorporated these rulings in the divorce decree.
Ginn-Williams now appeals.1
III. DISCUSSION
A. Denial of Motion To Reconsider Legal Custody Award
Ginn-Williams initially challenges the superior courts
order denying her motion to reconsider the courts decision
awarding joint legal custody, resting her challenge on the
evidence she presented below to show that Williams had a history
of domestic violence. Ginn-Williams argues, as she did below,
that the court was required to consider this evidence because
recently enacted amendments to AS 25.24.150 create a rebuttable
presumption that a parent who has a history of perpetrating
domestic violence against the other parent . . . may not be
awarded . . . joint legal custody[.]2
Our review of the record convinces us that this
argument is unpersuasive.3 At the outset of the January 2005
hearing, the superior court and the parties informally discussed
custody and visitation issues with a view toward reaching an
agreement. Neither party had expressed any interest in altering
the existing physical custody arrangement, under which Ginn-
Williams exercised primary custody of both children. Ginn-
Williams and Williams eventually agreed upon a detailed
visitation schedule for Williams. The court then informed the
parties that they also needed to address the issue of legal
custody, which neither Ginn-Williams nor Williams had evidently
specifically addressed. After the court described the concept of
legal custody and explained what it actually entails, the parties
agreed upon shared legal custody.
Since the parties seemed to have agreed on all custody
and visitation issues, Judge Gleason proceeded to summarize the
agreements terms. The judge then formalized the agreement by
placing Ginn-Williams and Williams under oath, asking each of
them separately whether they understood the agreement, and
inquiring whether both parties believed that it would serve the
childrens best interests. Williams answered yes to both
questions. Ginn-Williams initially hesitated, expressing some
reservations regarding Williamss ability to abide by the
visitation schedule; but after discussing her concerns with Judge
Gleason and receiving further clarification, Ginn-Williams
assured the judge that she understood the agreement, was willing
to try it, and believed that it would serve the childrens best
interests.
Judge Gleason then addressed the parties once more to
ensure that they understood the agreement and accepted its terms;
the judge emphasized that, once the court accepted the agreement,
it would be pretty much in concrete final and binding. Ginn-
Williams and Williams both reassured the court that they
understood, and believed that the agreement would be in the
childrens best interests. Judge Gleason then gave the courts
formal approval: All right, then, it sounds like youve got . . .
a final and binding agreement of the custody issues.
Five days after the January 26 hearing, Ginn-Williams
filed a motion to reconsider the order granting shared legal
custody. Although neither party had previously mentioned any
domestic violence problems and their pleadings were silent on the
issue,4 Ginn-Williams alleged that the parties had a history of
domestic violence in their relationship and that under the
recently enacted provisions of AS 25.24.150(g), the court should
have considered this history before entering the shared-legal-
custody order.
Judge Gleason addressed Ginn-Williamss motion at the
next hearing, on March 7, 2005. After noting Alaskas traditional
preference for keeping both parents involved in the limited types
of basic decisions encompassed by the right to exercise legal
custody, the judge asked, I guess my question is: why do you
think that you and Mr. Williams couldnt make that type of those
types of decisions together? In response, Ginn-Williams
disclosed that, upon recently visiting the family law self help
center, she had realized that, because Williams had a history of
domestic violence, the new law would not allow him to have legal
custody. Ginn-Williams went on to say that the trouble she
foresaw with shared legal custody was that, during the period of
their separation, Williams had been hard to reach and slow to
answer when questions arose concerning the children: Now, we do
not get along. If I call him, it takes him three or four days to
return the phone call. For any decision.
Judge Gleason expressed doubt as to whether the
recently amended law would apply, noting that the alleged
incidents of domestic violence had occurred before the amendments
effective date. The judge then proposed a middle-ground
arrangement that would enable both parents to participate in
decisions concerning the childrens school and their medical care,
while giving Ginn-Williams authority to make those decisions on
her own if Williams proved to be non-responsive or unavailable.
When asked, Is that something you might see as workable here?
Ginn-Williams replied, That might be workable, cause, I mean, in
past and present I have called him, tried to involve him, and it
just takes him days to be back with me[.] But when pressed to
decide whether she might be willing to try a shared legal custody
arrangement that would give her the final say if you tried to
reach him and . . . you couldnt . . . hear back from him, Ginn-
Williams answered that she would rather just be able to make the
decision myself.
After considering Ginn-Williamss position, Judge
Gleason decided to deny the motion to reconsider the legal
custody order. In reaching this decision, Judge Gleason pointed
out that her order incorporated an agreement that both parties
had accepted as a workable resolution of the legal custody issue
a resolution that would be in their childrens best interests. At
the same time, the judge emphasized that she would be willing to
revisit the issue if she saw any sign that the shared custody
arrangement might actually be turning out to be problematic:
[W]hat Ive said is that, if this doesnt work,
were going to change it. But if it can work,
your children are going to be better off.
And I am going to rely on your testimony that
you thought it could work. And it, and it
effectively has. . . . [T]he two of you have
been separated for two and a half years, and
I can only assume thereve been difficulties,
I mean most people separating have had
difficulties. But . . . what I see from the
two of you is very little which . . . means
that I have higher hope for your ability, for
your childrens sake, to work things out. But
if you cant, were going to make changes.
Thats thats what I am saying here.
Judge Gleason further expressed the opinion that AS
25.24.150(g) did not preclude this conclusion. In the judges
view, the new statute did not automatically override the parties
agreement and, in any event, it might not apply to domestic
violence occurring before its enactment.5
On this record, we conclude that Ginn-Williamss belated
attempt to invoke AS 25.24.150(g), did not require the court to
reopen the legal custody issue. At the January 26 hearing the
court had resolved all pending custody issues based on an
agreement that both parties believed would be workable and would
serve their childrens best interests. When the court
incorporated the agreement in its custody decision, Ginn-Williams
understood that the custody ruling would be final and binding.
Her subsequent motion for reconsideration did not dispute this
point; nor did it assert that she had acted involuntarily or that
she had been pressured, confused, or misled in any respect.
To be sure, Ginn-Williams did contend at the March
hearing that she had been unaware of the new domestic violence
provision when the agreement was accepted. But the new laws
existence did not by itself amount to a changed circumstance
requiring the court to revisit its decision. As already
mentioned, before filing her motion for reconsideration, Ginn-
Williams never alleged that domestic violence played any role in
the parties divorce or that it might have any effect on the
pending custody issues. Moreover, as the superior court noted,
during their two-plus years of pre-divorce separation, the
parties had managed to share legal custody of their children on
an informal basis without ever encountering an insurmountable
problem.
And even after alleging that Williams had a history of
domestic violence, Ginn-Williams never established any obvious
link between Williamss alleged history of violence and her
reasons for wanting to have sole legal custody. To the contrary,
the potential problems Ginn-Williams predicted at the March 7
hearing were essentially the same ones she described before
agreeing to share legal custody at the January 26 hearing: during
their two years of separation, Williams had simply been hard to
reach and slow to respond when questions concerning the children
arose.
Considering the totality of these circumstances, we see
no legal error or abuse of discretion in the superior courts
refusal to reopen its custody determination on the sole basis of
the new statutes existence. Alaska law has traditionally
encouraged parties to resolve custody disputes amicably,6 and we
have rarely hesitated to enforce parties custody agreements when
they appeared to further the childrens best interests.7 Based on
a careful consideration of the evidence before her, Judge Gleason
had expressly found that the parties agreement in this case would
serve the childrens best interests. Having made that decision,
Judge Gleason could properly find that, absent any apparent
connection between Williamss alleged history of domestic violence
and Ginn-Williamss reasons for seeking sole legal custody, her
late invocation of AS 25.24.150(g) did not justify restructuring
the parties final and binding agreement.8
B. Award of Dependency Exemption to Williams
Ginn-Williams next challenges the superior courts
decision to allow Williams to claim a federal tax dependency
exemption for the couples son, who lived with Ginn-Williams.
She claims that this ruling violates federal law. Specifically,
Ginn-Williams argues that under federal law only primary physical
custodians can lawfully claim dependency exemptions.
But this claim lacks merit. The federal tax code
provisions that directly control this issue are 26 U.S.C. 151(c)
and 152(e).9 Subsection 151(c) specifically allows an individual
taxpayer to claim an additional exemption for each individual who
is a dependent, as that term is defined in 152.10 Subsection
152(e)(1), in turn, defines a dependent to include a child of a
noncustodial divorced parent who (a) is primarily supported by
the income of one or both divorced parents; (b) lives with one or
both of the parents for more than one-half of the year; and (c)
meets the requirements of 152(e)(2). Subsection 152(e)(2)
provides that its requirements will be met for a noncustodial
parent of a child if that parties divorce decree provides that
the noncustodial parent shall be entitled to any deduction
allowable under section 151 for such child.11
Here, the divorce decree issued by the superior court
expressly provided that, after 2004, Williams would be entitled
to receive the additional exemption allowed under 151(c):
Ms. Ginn-Williams is entitled to claim both
of the children as dependents on her 2004
federal income tax return. Thereafter,
Father may claim the parties older child as a
dependent so long as he is not more than 4
months in arrears on his child support
obligation as of December 31 for that year.
When the parties oldest child can no longer
be claimed as a dependent, the parties shall
alternate claiming the parties younger child,
with Ms. Ginn-Williams to be able to claim
that child first.
Williamss son was thus a qualifying child who could be
claimed as a dependent by his noncustodial parent under
152(e)(1), since: (a) the child was primarily supported by the
income of one or both divorced parents; (b) the child lived with
one or both of his parents for more than one-half of the year;
and (c) the divorce decree met the requirements of 152(e)(2) in
other words, the decree expressly allowed Williams to have the
exemptions.
Ginn-Williams separately claims that the dependency
exemption fails to comport with Alaska law by violating AS
25.24.152. But Ginn-Williamss reliance on this provision is
equally unavailing. Alaska Statute 25.24.152(a) expressly
authorizes courts to grant a noncustodial parent the right to
claim a child as a dependent under federal tax laws for a tax
year if the noncustodial parent satisfies the requirements of
federal law and was not in arrears at the end of the tax year in
an amount more than four times the monthly obligation. As we
have seen, Williams satisfied the requirements of federal law
with respect to the disputed exemption. And the divorce decree
specifically limited his right in the manner required by AS
25.24.152(a) by providing that he could claim the exemption for
any given year only so long as he is not more than 4 months in
arrears on his child support obligation as of December 31 for
that year.
Thus, in awarding the additional exemption to Williams,
the superior court complied with both federal and state law.
C. Property Division
Ginn-Williamss final claim is that the superior court
erred in classifying the parties second mortgage and auto loan as
marital debts. She argues that both debts were the separate
property of Williams. But in our view, the record supports the
trial courts ruling.12
Evidence presented to the superior court indicated that
Williams took out a loan from Denali Alaskan Federal Credit Union
in 2000 to buy a Mazda MPV minivan for Ginn-Williams to use. In
late 2003, after the parties had separated, Williams surrendered
the minivan to the credit union to help pay off the loan; this
left an outstanding balance of about $8,000. The superior court
considered this obligation to be clearly . . . a marital debt.
Ginn-Williams nevertheless argues that the loan was Williamss
property because her name was not on the loan and because
Williams had control of the minivan when he returned it to the
bank.
But [m]arital property includes all property acquired
during the marriage excepting only inherited property and
property acquired with separate property which is kept as
separate property. 13 We have also held that, [a]bsent any
showing that the parties intended a debt to be separate, the
trial court must presume that a debt incurred during the marriage
is marital and should consider it when dividing the marital
estate.14 Here, the parties incurred the disputed debt during the
marriage. Moreover, Williams testified that he bought the
minivan for Ginn-Williams to drive, that she was the primary
user, and that she joined, or at least acquiesced, in the
decision to surrender it to help repay the loan. Ginn-Williams
points to no evidence suggesting an intent to keep the debt
separate besides Williamss name on the note, and the fact that he
physically returned the minivan to the credit union. On this
record, because Williamss testimony provides substantial evidence
to support the trial courts ruling, we find no clear error or
abuse of discretion in treating the loan as a marital debt.
Ginn-Williams similarly argues that the superior court
erred in treating the second mortgage on the marital residence as
a marital debt. Although she acknowledges that the residence
itself became marital property because Williams added her name to
the title after they married, Ginn-Williams points out that
Williams obtained the second mortgage in his name shortly before
the marriage and never added her name to the note. Ginn-Williams
reasons that, under these circumstances, the home became marital
property but Williams remained the sole owner of the underlying
debt. The superior court disagreed, ruling that the debt
accompanied the home and that both transmuted into a unitary
marital asset during the marriage.
Again, substantial evidence supports this ruling, so we
find no clear error. Whether an initially nonmarital debt
transmutes into a marital liability is a question of intent and
acceptance.15 Here, the home was Williamss separate property when
he obtained the second mortgage shortly before the marriage.
According to Williams, both parties used the mortgage proceeds to
pay off their respective credit card debts. After the marriage,
Williams added Ginn-Williamss name to the title; the parties
lived in the home together, and regarded it as their marital
residence. There is no indication that Williams made postmarital
payments on the mortgage with nonmarital funds.
Given this evidence, the trial court could properly
conclude that when the home transmuted to marital property, the
mortgage transmuted too, because the parties showed no clear
intent to keep the debt separate.16 In other words, as Judge
Gleason put it, When you bring an asset into the marriage, [you
bring in] both the good and the bad.17
Because the record supports the courts rulings on
marital debt, we affirm the superior courts decision to treat
both the auto loan and the second mortgage as marital debts.
IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we AFFIRM the superior courts
judgment.
_______________________________
1 Williams has not entered an appearance or filed a brief
in response to Ginn-Williamss appeal.
2 AS 25.24.150(g) provides:
There is a rebuttable presumption that a
parent who has a history of perpetrating
domestic violence against the other parent, a
child, or a domestic living partner may not
be awarded sole legal custody, sole physical
custody, joint legal custody, or joint
physical custody of a child.
3 We generally review custody decisions and accompanying
best-interests determinations for abuse of discretion. See,
e.g., McClain v. McClain, 716 P.2d 381, 384 (Alaska 1986). But
we apply de novo review to determine whether the trial court used
the correct legal standard in reaching its decision.
Moeller-Prokosch v. Prokosch, 27 P.3d 314, 316 (Alaska 2001).
4 Ginn-Williamss comments at the March 7 hearing
suggested that she had raised the issue of domestic violence in
her answer to Williamss complaint. But our review of Ginn-
Williamss answer and the paperwork that accompanied the answer
reveals no mention of the issue.
5 Our decision that the statute does not automatically
trump a voluntary custody agreement makes it unnecessary to
consider whether AS 25.24.150(g) applies to conduct occurring
before the provisions effective date.
6 See, e.g., An Act Relating to Child Custody, ch. 88,
1(b), SLA 1982 ([I]t is in the best interests of a child to
encourage parents to implement their own child care agreements
outside of the court setting.); see also Crane v. Crane, 986 P.2d
881, 889 (Alaska 1999) (The legislature recognized these effects
when it found that it is in the best interests of children to
have their own parents fashion custody agreements rather than
have courts impose custodial regimes upon them.).
7 See, e.g., Crane, 986 P.2d at 889 (commenting on need
to encourage custody agreements in a system where litigation is
both expensive and, in the context of child custody disputes,
emotionally debilitatingand observing that a contrary holding
would have a counterproductive effect by discourag[ing]
settlement and defeat[ing] settlement efforts).
8 Regarding the superior courts custody order, Ginn-
Williams also briefly argues that Judge Gleason erred by
directing both parties not to consume alcohol within twelve hours
of having contact with the children. Because Williams was the
one with the drinking problem, Ginn-Williams alleges, [t]he judge
took away Ms. Ginn-Williamss right to consume alcohol. But the
record reveals that Judge Gleason imposed this mutual restriction
only after both parties expressly agreed to have it added to the
terms of their visitation agreement. Since Ginn-Williams points
to nothing in the record suggesting that she later asked the
superior court to rescind the restriction, we find no error on
this point.
9 In support of her argument, Ginn-Williams cites IRS
Publications 504 and 929, two worksheets designed to help
taxpayers in claiming exemptions. Because these publications are
based on 26 U.S.C. 151(c) and 152(e) and have no independent
legal significance, our analysis here relies directly on the tax
code provisions.
10 26 U.S.C. 151, Allowance of deductions for personal
exemptions, provides, in relevant part:
(a) Allowance of deductions.In the case of
an individual, the exemptions provided by
this section shall be allowed as deductions
in computing taxable income.
. . . .
(c) Additional exemption for dependents.An
exemption of the exemption amount for each
individual who is a dependent (as defined in
section 152) of the taxpayer for the taxable
year.
11 26 U.S.C. 152(e) (2004) (amended 2005). The relevant
text of 152(e) is as follows:
(e) Special rule for divorced parents, etc.
(1) In general. . . . [I]f
(A) a child receives over one-half
of the childs support during the
calendar year from the childs parents
(i) who are divorced or
legally separated under a decree of
divorce or separate maintenance,
. . . and
(B) such child is in the custody
of 1 or both of the childs parents for
more than one-half of the calendar year,
such child shall be treated as being the
qualifying child or qualifying relative
of the noncustodial parent for a
calendar year if the requirements
described in paragraph (2) are met.
(2) Requirements.For purposes of
paragraph (1), the requirements described in
this paragraph are met if
(A) a decree of divorce or
separate maintenance or written
separation agreement between the parents
applicable to the taxable year beginning
in such calendar year provides that
(i) the noncustodial parent
shall be entitled to any deduction
allowable under section 151 for
such child, or
(ii) the custodial parent will
sign a written declaration (in such
manner and form as the Secretary
may prescribe) that such parent
will not claim such child as a
dependent for such taxable year, or
. . . .
(3) Custodial parent and noncustodial
parent.For purposes of this subsection
(A) Custodial parent.The term
custodial parent means the parent with
whom a child shared the same principal
place of abode for the greater portion
of the calendar year.
(B) Noncustodial parent.The term
noncustodial parent means the parent who
is not the custodial parent.
(Emphasis added.)
12 We review a trial courts decision classifying property
in a divorce action for abuse of discretion; but we review
factual findings the court makes to support its decision for
clear error. See Abood v. Abood, 119 P.3d 980, 984 (Alaska 2005)
(a finding that the parties intended to treat property as marital
will be disturbed only if it is clearly erroneous); cf. Veselsky
v. Veselsky, 113 P.3d 629, 632 (Alaska 2005) (The determination
of what property is marital is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion although the classification of some items may present
a question of law to which we apply our independent judgment.).
13 Hansen v. Hansen, 119 P.3d 1005, 1009 (Alaska 2005)
(quoting Lewis v. Lewis, 785 P.2d 550, 558 (Alaska 1990)).
14 Veselsky, 113 P.3d at 636; see also Leis v. Hustad, 22
P.3d 885, 889 (Alaska 2001).
15 See Brett R. Turner, 2 Equitable Distribution of
Property 6:97 DebtsClassification of debts (3d ed. 2005)
(Nonmarital assets can become[] marital assets if the owner makes
an express or implied gift to the marital estate. Under the same
theory, a nonmarital debt can become marital if the non-incurring
spouse agrees to accept liability.).
16 Cf. Chotiner v. Chotiner, 829 P.2d 829, 832-33 (Alaska
1992) (Separate property can become marital property where that
is the intent of the owner and there is an act or acts which
demonstrate that intent. For example, separate real estate can
become marital where the owner permits the non-owner spouse to
lend her credit to improve the property, or to devote substantial
efforts to its management, maintenance or improvement, or where
the parties use the premises as their personal residence.);
Schmitz v. Schmitz, 88 P.3d 1116, 1128 (Alaska 2004) ([P]lacing
separate property in joint ownership is rebuttable evidence that
the owner intended the property to be marital.).
17 Although we recognize that the classification of a
secured debt does not necessarily hinge on the character of the
underlying security, see Turner, 2 Equitable Distribution of
Property 6:97, it seems reasonable to infer that, in the absence
of evidence clearly establishing a specific intent to treat the
debt separately, when a solely owned premarital home becomes the
marital residence and transmutes, the accompanying debt
ordinarily transmutes with it. Cf. Turner, 2 Equitable
Distribution of Property 6:97 (The definition of joint benefit
for purposes of [the rule that a marital debt is any debt
incurred during the marriage for the joint benefit of the
parties] does not require that both spouses directly benefit from
every single marital obligation.).
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