You can
search the entire site.
or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices.
John v. Baker (12/16/2005) sp-5965
John v. Baker (12/16/2005) sp-5965
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage,
Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
| ANITA JOHN,
| ) |
|
| ) Supreme Court No. S-
11176 Appellant,
| ) |
|
| ) Superior Court
No. |
|
v. | ) 4FA-95-3103
CI |
|
| ) |
|
JOHN BAKER, | ) O P I N I O
N |
|
| ) |
|
Appellee. | ) [No. 5965 - December
16, 2005] |
|
| ) |
|
|
|
|
Appeal from the
Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Fourth
Judicial District, Fairbanks, Mark I. Wood,
Judge.
Appearances: Andrew Harrington and Mark
Regan, Alaska Legal Services Corporation,
Fairbanks, for Appellant. Diane L.
Wendlandt, Paul R. Lyle, and Robert C.
Nauheim, Assistant Attorneys General,
Anchorage, and Gregg D. Renkes, Attorney
General, Juneau, for State of Alaska, Child
Support Enforcement Division.
Before: Bryner, Chief Justice, Matthews,
Eastaugh, Fabe, and Carpeneti, Justices.
BRYNER, Chief Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2002, after multiple appeals to this court, the
superior court referred a child custody dispute between Anita
John and John Baker to the Native Village of Northway tribal
court. After the referral, the Child Support Enforcement
Division asked the superior court whether its standing child
support order which had been issued early in the course of the
proceedings and well before any of the appeals remained valid
and enforceable. The divisions simple inquiry mushroomed into a
wholesale battle over the reach of tribal court jurisdiction.
The trial court ultimately determined that only child custody and
not child support had been referred to the tribal court. The
trial court therefore concluded that its child support order
remained valid and that the division had authority to enforce the
order. The court then considered the jurisdictional issue at
some length and concluded that the courts of Alaska Native
villages lack jurisdiction over child support disputes. We
conclude that the superior court correctly ruled that child
support had never been referred to the tribal court and that the
division could enforce the courts child support order. This
disposes of the case and makes it unnecessary to resolve the
additional jurisdictional issues.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Anita John1 and John Baker are Alaska Natives. John is
a member of the Native Village of Mentasta. Baker is a member of
the Native Village of Northway. Although never married, John and
Baker lived together in a marriage-like relationship from 1991 to
May of 1993. During their relationship, they had two children,
John Malone Baker II (born in 1991), and Emmanuel Kenneth Baker
(born in 1992). After the parties separated in 1993, they shared
custody of the children under an informal arrangement with the
children residing primarily with John.
In July of 1995, after difficulties arose concerning
their custody arrangement, Baker petitioned for custody before
the Native Village of Northway Tribal court. The tribal court
awarded the parents shared custody, with each parent keeping the
children for alternating months. The tribal court also directed
the parties to help each other financially. Baker claims that
the court also told them orally that neither was to hit the other
with child support.
Shortly after the tribal court issued its decision,
Baker petitioned the Fairbanks superior court for custody and
child support. John moved to dismiss, arguing that the tribal
court had already issued a decision on the matter and that it
retained jurisdiction. The superior court denied her motion,
and, in April 1997, awarded full custody to Baker and ordered
John to pay child support.
John appealed. In John v. Baker I, this court held
that tribal and state courts share concurrent jurisdiction over
child custody disputes where the child is eligible for membership
in the tribe.2 We remanded the case to the superior court to
determine whether, under principles of comity, the tribal courts
resolution of the custody dispute . . . should be recognized.3
On remand, the superior court declined to extend comity
to the tribal court. John again appealed. In John v. Baker II,4
we reversed and remanded the case with instructions to the court
to refer the action to the tribal court. On October 4, 2001, the
superior court referred the matter to the Northway Tribal Court
to conduct further child custody proceedings.5
One week later, Johns attorney sent a letter to the
Child Support Enforcement Division (the division) informing it
that the case had been transferred to the tribal court. He
requested that the division cease attempting to collect any
ongoing support pursuant to the superior courts child support
order(s).
The division filed a motion before the superior court
asking it to clarify whether, given the referral of the matter to
the tribal court, the division could enforce the superior courts
child support order.
The divisions motion proved to be the beginning of an
escalating exchange of voluminous and detailed briefs and
supplemental briefs between the parties. Over the course of this
briefing John argued that this courts holding in John I that
tribal courts have jurisdiction over child custody disputes also
encompassed jurisdiction over child support. She also argued
that the superior court referred the case in its entirety
including both child custody and child support to the tribal
court, and that the superior courts child support order was
therefore no longer binding. In addition, she maintained that
Northways child support proceedings were entitled to full faith
and credit: she contended that the land on which the relevant
acts occurred qualified as Indian Country, and she reasoned that
because federal law requires full faith and credit to be granted
to child support orders that issue from courts of Indian Country,
Northways order merited full faith and credit.
For its part, the division argued that the superior
court referred only custody and not support to the tribal court.
It also argued that Alaska Native villages lack subject matter
jurisdiction over child support. It argued that if tribal courts
could exercise jurisdiction over child support, they would be
able to control and direct the actions of division officials.
This, the division argued, would run afoul of the Supreme Courts
determination in Nevada v. Hicks that tribal courts lack
jurisdiction over state officers enforcing state law since such
jurisdiction would involve tribal control over those officers.6
The division also argued that even if Northway might have subject
matter jurisdiction, it would be inappropriate to extend comity
to Northways order because the village would not qualify for
federal child support enforcement grants.
After hearing oral argument, the superior court issued
a decision. The court concluded that there was no tribal court
order to which it could extend comity, that child support had
never been referred to the tribal court, and that the superior
court retained jurisdiction. It therefore concluded that its
child support order was still binding and enforceable by the
division. It also ruled in the alternative that the village
lacked jurisdiction over child support disputes.
John appeals.
III. DISCUSSION
This case requires us to interpret four court orders.7
We must determine whether the issue of child support already
resides with the tribal court by virtue of orders issued either
by this court, by the superior court, or by the tribal court.
First, we must determine whether our opinions in John I or John
II required the superior court to refer both child custody and
child support to the tribal court, or whether, as the division
contends, we only addressed child custody in those opinions.
Second, we must determine whether the superior courts response to
John II in which it referred the matter to the tribal court
included child support or whether the superior court referred
child custody alone to the tribal court. If both this court and
the superior court intended that only child custody be referred
to the superior court, we will then need to consider whether the
tribal courts original order in which it directed the parties to
help each other financially was a support order to which the
Alaska courts should extend comity.
A. This Courts Rulings in John I and John II
John argues that in John I we implicitly conceded that
the courts of Alaska Native villages have jurisdiction to issue
child support orders. She argues that in John II, when we
directed the superior court to refer the action to the tribal
court, we intended that both the child custody and the child
support matters be referred to the tribal court.
We disagree.
The question this court addressed in John I was whether
Northway Village had the jurisdiction to adjudicate a custody
dispute involving children who are tribal members.8 In our
statement of facts and proceedings, we described only the custody
aspects of the case and made no mention of child support.9 And
in our conclusion, we held that [t]ribal courts in Alaska have
jurisdiction to adjudicate child custody disputes involving
tribal members.10
To be sure, both the court and the dissent referred in
passing to the possibility that an effect of John Is holding
might be to allow tribal courts to issue child support awards
that did not replicate the child support schedule of Alaska Civil
Rule 90.3.11 But a passing reference to child support does not
transform our lengthy consideration of child custody into a
holding about child support.
Our conclusion in John II supports this reasoning. In
John II, we remanded the case to the superior court and we
expressly stated that the reason for the remand was so that it
could refer the matter to the Northway court to conduct further
child custody proceedings.12
Given the plain language of John I and John II, it is
clear that we believed that the custody and support matters were
separate and that the transfer of the former to the tribal court
did not entail the transfer of the latter.
B. The Superior Courts 2001 Order
Following our remand in John II, the superior court
referred the matter to the Northway tribal court. John argues
that this referral included child support. But the superior
courts order specified that [t]his matter is referred to the
Northway Tribal Court to conduct further child custody
proceedings. This language clearly indicates that child custody
and not child support were referred to the tribal court.
C. The Tribal Courts Original Order
Once the superior court concluded that its previous
order did not refer child support to the tribal court, it
considered Johns argument that Northways 1995 custody order
included a support order and that the superior court ought to
extend comity to that order. The superior court observed that
the tribal court required that each parent help each other
financially and instructed the parties not to hit the other
with child support. The superior court concluded that the
tribal courts two statements do not constitute a valid support
order. Because the court concluded that there was no tribal
support order to which it could grant comity, the court
determined that its own previous support order was the only valid
order and that it retained jurisdiction over child support.
We agree. Although a tribal child support order need
not match the format of a support order issued by the Alaska
courts, it must, at a minimum, be concrete enough to be
enforceable. Northways order does not state a specific dollar
amount and provides no criteria by which to judge whether the
parties were fulfilling their obligations. We therefore agree
with the superior court that Northways 1995 order was not a
recognizable child support order to which the court could extend
comity.
This interpretation is supported by Northway Villages
own assessment of its 1995 order. In one of the amicus briefs it
filed in John I, Northway Village itself maintained that the
tribal courts 1995 order did not include child support.13
Although we generally apply de novo review when interpreting a
court order,14 we think that where an order has issued from a
foreign jurisdiction it is appropriate for us to consider that
jurisdictions interpretation of its own order. Northways
interpretation supports our understanding of the tribes 1995
custody order.
We also note that, given the procedural posture of the
case, it would not have been proper for the superior court to
refer any ongoing issues of child support to the tribal court.
The superior court was never presented with a motion either
requesting that comity be extended to the tribal courts putative
support order or requesting that the superior court relinquish
its ongoing jurisdiction and allow the tribal court to assume
jurisdiction over child support. Rather, the division merely
asked whether the superior court retained jurisdiction over child
support. Because no formal request for comity had been made and
the issue of child support had not been referred to Northway, the
superior court correctly determined that it retained jurisdiction
over child support. Accordingly, we affirm the superior courts
conclusion that the division could enforce the superior courts
child support order.15
IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we AFFIRM the superior courts
decision that it retained jurisdiction over child support and
that the division has authority to enforce that order.
_______________________________
1 John has married and is now Anita Adams. To maintain
consistency, we refer to her by her prior name.
2 John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 759 (Alaska 1999).
3 Id. at 765.
4 John v. Baker, 30 P.3d 68 (Alaska 2001).
5 While the comity issue was pending before the superior
court, we considered another appeal in this case. John v. Baker,
No. S-09556 (March 29, 2001). Although that appeal concerned
child support, it is not relevant to our resolution of the
present appeal.
6 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
7 The proper interpretation of a court order is a
question of law to which we apply our independent judgment.
E.g., Bennett v. Bennett, 6 P.3d 724, 726 (Alaska 2000).
8 John I, 982 P.2d at 744.
9 Id. at 743-44.
10 Id. at 765.
11 Id. at 764 n.185 (Fabe, J., for the court) and 802
(Matthews, J. dissenting).
12 John II, 30 P.3d at 78.
13 Amicus R. Br. of Native Village of Northway, John v.
Baker, No. S-08099, filed May 26, 1998, p.8.
14 State, CSED v. Wetherelt, 931 P.2d 383, 387 n.4 (Alaska
1997).
15 Our resolution of the case on this ground makes it
unnecessary to express any opinion on other issues addressed by
the superior court and raised by the parties.
