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Sharon Ranney v. Whitewater Engineering and Alaska Insurance (10/14/2005) sp-5949
Sharon Ranney v. Whitewater Engineering and Alaska Insurance (10/14/2005) sp-5949
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage,
Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
| SHARON RANNEY,
| ) |
|
| ) Supreme Court No. S-
11442 |
|
Appellant, | ) |
|
| ) Superior Court
No. |
|
v. | ) 3AN-03-7470
CI |
|
| ) |
|
WHITEWATER ENGINEERING | ) O P I N I O
N |
|
and ALASKA INSURANCE | ) |
|
GUARANTY ASSOCIATION for | ) [No. 5949 - October
14, 2005] |
|
FREMONT INDUSTRIAL | ) |
|
(insolvent insurer | ),
| ) |
|
| ) |
|
Appellees. | )
|
|
| ) |
|
|
|
|
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State
of Alaska, Third Judicial District,
Anchorage, John Reese, Judge.
Appearances: William J. Soule, Law Office of
William J. Soule, Anchorage, for Appellant.
Richard L. Wagg, Russell, Tesche, Wagg,
Cooper & Gabbert, Anchorage, for Appellees.
Before: Bryner, Chief Justice, Matthews,
Eastaugh, Fabe, and Carpeneti, Justices.
BRYNER, Chief Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Alaska Workers Compensation Act provides that when
an employee suffers a work-related death, the employees surviving
widow or widower is eligible for death benefits. When Sharon
Ranney sought death benefits after the work-related death of her
long-term partner, Gary Stone, the Alaska Workers Compensation
Board ruled that she was not eligible for benefits because she
and Stone had never been married. Ranney challenges this ruling,
arguing that the board misinterpreted the workers compensation
act and violated her rights to privacy and equal protection under
the Alaska Constitution. We affirm the boards decision, holding
that the decision correctly interpreted the act and did not
deprive Ranney of her constitutional rights, since denying
spousal death benefits to Ranney did not substantially burden her
freedom to have an unmarried intimate relationship with Stone and
was fairly and substantially related to the acts goal of
providing quick, efficient, fair, and predictable benefits to
families of deceased workers at a reasonable cost to employers.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Sharon Ranney and Gary Stone became romantically
involved in the spring of 1995 and moved in together that fall.
Although Stone and Ranney were never legally married, they lived
together as a couple until Gary Stones death in April 1999.
While together they shared a joint checking account.
They were jointly listed in the Cordova telephone book. And they
purchased various kinds of machinery together a small sawmill, a
crane, and a truck. Stone also purchased a life-insurance policy
and named Ranney the primary beneficiary. Although Ranney worked
off and on throughout their relationship, she depended on Stones
income to maintain her standard of living. Ranney submitted many
affidavits from friends attesting to the couples intent to get
married. And Ranney testified that Stone bought her a wedding
ring in 1997 and that he formally proposed to her in March of
1999.
In April 1999 Stone was killed in a work-related
accident while employed by Whitewater Engineering. Ranney then
filed a claim for death benefits as Stones unmarried spouse.
Whitewater and its insurer, Fremont Compensation/Cambridge
Integrated Services Group, controverted Ranneys claim on the
ground that she was never Stones wife and that she was therefore
not entitled to benefits under the act.
In addressing Ranneys claim, the Alaska Workers
Compensation Board noted that AS 23.30.215 provides for the
payment of death benefits to the widow or widower or a child or
children of the deceased. Because the act defines widow to
include only the decedents wife living with or dependent for
support upon the decedent at the time of death, or living apart
for justifiable cause or by reason of the decedents desertion at
such a time,1 the board reasoned that Ranney would qualify as the
decedents wife only if she had actually been married to Stone.
Since Ranney had never married Stone, the board concluded that
she was ineligible for benefits as his wife.
After appealing to the superior court, which affirmed
the boards decision, Ranney filed this appeal.
III. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Ranney argues that the unmarried partners of
deceased employees are eligible to receive death benefits under
the workers compensation act. Moreover, if the act does not
cover unmarried but committed relationships like hers and Stones,
Ranney asserts, it violates her rights to privacy and equal
protection under the Alaska Constitution.
A. Standard of Review
In an appeal from a decision entered by the superior
court as an intermediate court of appeal in a workers
compensation case, we independently review and directly
scrutinize the merits of the boards decision.2 Determining the
proper meaning of the act in this case requires us to interpret
the words widow and married; we review an agencys interpretation
of non-technical statutory terms such as these under the
substitution of judgment standard.3 Whether the act violates the
Alaska Constitution presents a legal question and does not
involve agency expertise. We use our independent judgment to
review constitutional questions.4
B. The Acts Express Language
Ranney argues that, as Stones [u]nmarried, [d]ependent
[w]idow, she is entitled to death benefits under the Alaska
Workers Compensation Act. Whitewater responds that because
Ranney was never married to Stone, she fails to qualify as his
widow, and so cannot properly claim benefits under the act.
When interpreting a statute, we consider its language,
its purpose, and its legislative history, in an attempt to give
effect to the legislatures intent. 5 Although [w]e have rejected
a mechanical application of the plain meaning rule, we have
placed a heavy burden on parties who urge us to adopt an
interpretation that appears contrary to a statutes plain
language.6
The workers compensation act specifies that where a
work-related injury causes an employees death, death benefits are
payable to a widow or widower or a child or children of the
deceased.7 If there is no widow or widower and there are no
children, then benefits must be paid to specified members of the
extended family.8
The act defines widow as only the decedents wife living
with or dependent for support upon the decedent at the time of
death, or living apart for justifiable cause or by reason of the
decedents desertion at such a time.9 The act does not define
wife, but does provide that married includes a person who is
divorced but is required by the decree of divorce to contribute
to the support of the former spouse.10
Ranney contends that the acts definition of wife could
plausibly be read to include unmarried cohabitants, so that they
would fall within the definition of widow.
We disagree. The Alaska legislature has directed that
[w]ords and phrases shall be construed . . .
according to their common and approved usage.
Technical words and phrases and those which
have acquired a peculiar and appropriate
meaning, whether by legislative definition or
otherwise, shall be construed according to
the peculiar and appropriate meaning.[11]
Because wife has not been defined statutorily and has
no technical meaning in the present context, we look to common
usage, where the word ordinarily refers to a married woman.12
Marriage has been defined by statute. The Alaska Marriage Code
provides:
(a) Marriage is a civil contract entered
into by one man and one woman that requires
both a license and solemnization.
. . . .
(b) A person may not be joined in marriage
in this state until a license has been
obtained for that purpose as provided in this
chapter. A marriage performed in this state
is not valid without solemnization as
provided in this chapter.[13]
We have previously held that this definition of marriage does not
recognize common law marriage.14 Thus, neither common usage nor
legislative definition suggests that people in Ranneys position
unmarried cohabitants should be considered wives or husbands
under the workers compensation act.
Moreover, the detailed benefits scheme set out in the
workers compensation act suggests that the legislature did not
intend to include unmarried cohabitants as beneficiaries. Alaska
Statute 23.30.215 provides that if there is a widow or widower
and/or children, they are entitled to benefits.15 If there is no
widow or widower and no children, death benefits may go to the
employees parents, grandchildren, brothers, and sisters if they
were dependent upon the deceased at the time of injury.16
Where a statute expressly enumerates the things or
persons to which it applies, we often invoke the principle of
statutory construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
This principle establishes the inference that, where certain
things are designated in a statute, all omissions should be
understood as exclusions. 17 We have indicated that [t]he case
for application of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is
particularly compelling, where . . . the scheme is purely
statutory and without a basis in the common law.18 In the context
of the workers compensation act, which creates a detailed and
complicated scheme for requiring employers to provide support to
some surviving members of the employees family, it is appropriate
to apply this canon of interpretation. Because the act includes a
detailed list of beneficiaries, the failure to include unmarried
cohabitants suggests their exclusion.
In addition, as Whitewater points out, the act includes
in its definition of child, a child in relation to whom the
deceased employee stood in loco parentis for at least one year
before the time of injury.19 And it defines married to include a
person who is divorced but is required by the decree of divorce
to contribute to the support of the former spouse.20 The
legislatures expansion of these definitions shows that where the
legislature intended to expand the meanings of commonly
understood words, it did so expressly.
Ranney nonetheless contends that [t]he concept of
family is changing, so that she should be included within the
definition of family. She notes that state law in many instances
includes unmarried persons within its definition of spouse. She
cites Alaskas regulations for adult public assistance, which
include within the definition of spouse unmarried persons who
live together and hold themselves out to the community as husband
and wife.21 And she points to similar language in Alaskas
childcare assistance program and its disaster relief regulations.22
She argues that these programs are intended to prevent people
from going hungry or homeless. Because [w]orkers compensation
death benefits serve a very similar purpose, she contends, a
similarly broad definition of family should be read into the
workers compensation act.
But as Whitewater correctly observes in response, under
the regulations cited by Ranney the non-traditional family
members qualify precisely because the regulations expressly allow
them to do so. At most, these regulations illustrate that
agencies are capable of expanding the meanings of common terms
when they intend to do so. It may be true that the acts purpose
is analogous to the purposes of the various public assistance
programs cited by Ranney. But where those programs include non-
traditional family members, they do so expressly. Here if the
legislature had intended to include unmarried cohabitants in its
definition of widow, it similarly could have done so expressly.
Accordingly, it appears that the legislatures intent, as
manifested in the statutory language, was to limit beneficiaries
to those expressly enumerated in the statute. As Stones unmarried
cohabiting partner, Ranney is not eligible for death benefits
under the acts language.
Despite the express language of the statute, Ranney
contends that she should be deemed eligible for benefits under
our ruling in Burgess Construction Co. v. Lindley.23
In Lindley, the unmarried partner of a construction
worker sought workers compensation benefits when her partner was
killed on the job.24 Jeanne Lindley and the deceased worker,
Ronald Lindley, were originally married but had gotten divorced
and then later resumed living together.25 Their divorce decree
required Ronald to contribute to Jeannes support.26 The
construction company argued that because the Lindleys were
divorced, Jeanne was not a surviving wife entitled to death
benefits under the act.27
To determine whether Jeanne Lindley was a surviving
wife we examined the acts language. We observed that it defined
married to include a person who is divorced but is required by
the decree of divorce to contribute to the support of his former
wife.28 And we noted that widow included the decedents wife living
with or dependent for support upon him at the time of his death.29
These definitions led us to conclude that
the decedent, though divorced, was married
for the purpose of the Workmens Compensation
Act, for the divorce decree required him to
contribute to appellees support. It follows
that under the Act appellee would be regarded
as his surviving wife.[30]
We then determined that because she was his wife for purposes of
the statute, and because she was living with him and was
dependent upon him for her support, Jeanne Lindley qualified as
Ronald Lindleys widow.31 We therefore held that Jeanne Lindley
was entitled to benefits.32
Ranney argues that Lindley stands for the proposition
that an unmarried dependent live-in partner is a spouse for
purposes of the act; to hold otherwise, Ranney suggests, would
frustrate the liberal humanitarian purposes of the act.
But Ranneys reliance on Lindley is misplaced. To be
sure, we described our holding in Lindley as required by the
liberal humanitarian purposes of the Act.33 But Lindley hardly
supports Ranneys further contention that the goal of the [Workers
Compensation Act] is to compensate dependent people, not to
compensate dependent people who went through a formal ceremony.
Lindley did not hold that Jeanne Lindleys dependency alone
sufficed to render her eligible for benefits. Instead, it relied
primarily on the statutory definitions. Under those definitions,
Jeanne qualified as being married to Ronald Lindley when he died.
Consequently, she qualified as his wife. The definition of widow
includes wives who were living with the decedent or who were
dependent upon him. Jeanne was both. She therefore qualified as
his widow. As his widow, she qualified for benefits. In other
words, it was Jeannes formal, legal relation with Ronald, coupled
with her dependency upon him, that qualified her for benefits.
By contrast, Ranney was not, and had never been,
married to Stone when he died. And Stone was not legally
obligated to support her. Under Lindley, then, Ranney does not
qualify for benefits.
Ranney further argues that the purpose of the act is to
compensate dependents for a workers death. She insists that in
light of this purpose, the distinctions created by the statute
between married and unmarried wives should be ignored. Yet
compensating dependents is not the acts singular purpose.34 The
acts broader purpose is to provide a system of compensation that
is quick, efficient, fair and predictable and is not
unreasonably expensive for employers.35
As Whitewater points out, allowing unmarried partners
to receive benefits would require the board to distinguish
between relationships that were sufficiently serious to merit the
award of benefits and those that were not. Whitewater also notes
that requiring such a fact-intensive inquiry could substantially
delay the award of benefits and undermine the quick and
predictable award of benefits.
The legislature could have adopted a system that
required that each relationship be scrutinized on an individual
basis to determine whether death benefits should be granted. But
it did not. Instead, it engaged in the traditional legislative
practice of line drawing. The legislature apparently determined
that the potentially increased precision of requiring an ad hoc
decision in all cases would be so administratively costly that
the system would better be served by using a more formal rule in
this case requiring marriage for determining which relationships
require the payment of benefits.36 By adopting marriage as the
primary criterion for determining when an intimate partner
qualifies for benefits, the legislature has determined that legal
marriage is an adequate proxy for the more particularized inquiry
concerning whether a relationship is serious enough or the
partner is sufficiently dependent to justify awarding benefits.
As with all line drawing, particularly where social
welfare legislation is involved, the precise point where the line
is drawn may seem arbitrary, and there may be close cases at the
margins.37 But this does not mean that line drawing is
impermissible. This kind of line drawing which involves
balancing the benefits of greater precision against its costs and
determining how the workers compensation system can best provide
support for workers and their families is within the
legislatures competence. We decline Ranneys invitation to
substitute our judgment for the legislatures.
C. Right to Privacy
Ranney alternatively argues that the boards
determination that she was ineligible for benefits because she
was never married to Stone violates her constitutional right to
privacy. Ranney posits that she has a fundamental right to live
with Mr. Stone in a marriage-like relationship without the
formality of a civil or religious marriage ceremony. And she
argues that the Boards interpretation of [AS 23.30.215] infringes
upon Ms. Ranneys right to privacy because she cannot exercise
that right in respect to her intimate relationships without
losing her right as a dependent to death benefits under [the
statute].
Article I, section 22 of the Alaska Constitution
provides that, [t]he right of the people to privacy is recognized
and shall not be infringed. The right of privacy protects
fundamental rights of personal autonomy,38 including a persons
right to control his appearance,39 a patients privacy interest in
protecting sensitive personal information from public disclosure,40
and a womans reproductive rights.41 Ranney argues that the right
to privacy similarly protects her right to have an unmarried
intimate relationship with Stone.
When a party argues that a statutory provision violates
the partys right to privacy, we ordinarily balance the importance
of the individual right allegedly infringed against the interests
of the state.42 Where a fundamental right is infringed, we
require the state to articulate a compelling interest and to
demonstrate the absence of a less restrictive alternative.43 In
contrast, where the state interferes with an individuals freedom
in an area that is not characterized as fundamental, we require
the state to show a legitimate interest and a close and
substantial relationship between its interest and its chosen
means of advancing that interest.44
Here, we assume for purposes of our decision that
Ranney has a fundamental right to have an unmarried intimate
relationship with Stone. But even so, her constitutional claim
falls short because the workers compensation act at most imposes
only a minimal burden on the relational freedom asserted by
Ranney.
Ranneys privacy argument seems to assume that
conferring a benefit on persons who marry necessarily burdens
liberty interests of persons who freely choose not to. But the
states decision to provide benefits to people who choose to
exercise a constitutional right does not invariably require it to
provide equal benefits to those who decline to exercise the
right. For example, the state provides free public schooling at
state expense.45 But providing these benefits to parents does
not require the state to provide matching funds to people who
choose not to have children. Nor does the states failure to do
so impose any significant burden on their important privacy
interest in choosing not to have children. Similarly, in the
present case, the states decision to provide benefits to married
people unquestionably benefits couples who choose to marry; but
giving this admittedly one-sided benefit to persons who marry
does not in itself equate to imposing a significant burden on
those who freely choose not to. Yet apart from relying on the
one-sided nature of the benefit, Ranney has failed to explain how
her relational rights have been burdened. Nor do we perceive any
significant burden. To be sure, our substantive due process
clause requires that all laws bear a reasonable relation to a
legitimate state purpose.46 But as we explain below in discussing
Ranneys equal protection complaint, the challenged legislation
easily satisfies that standard. Thus, given Ranneys failure to
identify any significant burden on the rights of unmarried
couples to pursue committed relationships while choosing not to
marry, we find no violation of her right to privacy.
D. Equal Protection
Ranney also argues that the workers compensation act
infringes her right to equal protection under the law. She
argues that she is similarly situated to legally married wives:
Ms. Ranney was dependent upon Mr. Stone at the time of his death
just like legally married wives are dependent upon their
husbands. And she contends that because, unlike legally married
wives, dependents in her situation are not eligible for benefits,
AS 23.30.215 violates the equal protection clause.
We apply a sliding scale to equal protection analysis.
To implement Alaskas . . . equal protection
standard, we have adopted a three-step,
sliding-scale test that places a
progressively greater or lesser burden on the
state, depending on the importance of the
individual right affected by the disputed
classification and the nature of the
governmental interests at stake: first, we
determine the weight of the individual
interest impaired by the classification;
second, we examine the importance of the
purposes underlying the governments action;
and third, we evaluate the means employed to
further those goals to determine the
closeness of the means-to-end fit.[47]
We have held that [w]orkers compensation benefits are
merely an economic interest, and therefore, are entitled only to
minimum protection under this courts equal protection analysis.48
Under this level of protection, the states ends need only be
legitimate and the statutes classification must bear a fair and
substantial relationship to the purposes of the Act.49
As we noted above, the acts purpose to ensure the
quick, efficient, fair and predictable delivery of indemnity and
medical benefits to injured workers at a reasonable cost to
employers is certainly legitimate.50 Ranney nonetheless argues
that the state cannot show that the challenged provision bears a
fair and substantial relation to the acts purpose, because
the Act is not intended to do anything except
compensate injured workers and their
dependents for work-related injuries and
deaths. The Act is not intended to encourage
marriage or to strengthen any traditional
concept of marriage or family its intent
under these circumstances is to compensate
dependents of a deceased worker.
(Emphasis in original.) Given this purpose, Ranney maintains, the
distinction between legally-married spouses and unmarried
cohabitants is untenable.
Yet even if one purpose of the act is to compensate
dependents rather than families,51 Ranneys argument overlooks the
fact that the act also serves another, even broader purpose: to
provide benefits in a manner that is quick, efficient, fair, and
predictable, at a reasonable cost to the employer.52 The acts
spousal benefit substantially furthers this overarching purpose,
even if it might fall short in compensating all potential
dependents.
Because the acts spousal death benefit provision bears
a close and substantial relationship to furthering a legitimate
state interest, it does not violate Ranneys constitutional right
to equal protection. The legislature also had to devise a system
that was quick, efficient, and predictable and that could provide
benefits without unduly burdening employers. As already noted,
the legislature could have taken an ad hoc approach. But it
could just as reasonably have concluded that such an approach
would be slower, less efficient, and less predictable for
beneficiaries and unduly expensive for employers. The
legislatures reliance on marriage as the determining factor for
spousal death benefits thus bears a fair and substantial
relationship to the goal of ensuring the quick, efficient, fair
and predictable delivery of benefits at a reasonable cost. The
acts balance between perfect fairness on the one hand, and cost,
efficiency, speed, and predictability on the other, does not
violate the equal protection clause.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the decision of
the board denying death benefits to Ranney.
_______________________________
1 AS 23.30.395(33).
2 Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. DeShong, 77 P.3d 1227,
1231 (Alaska 2003).
3 Northern Alaska Envtl. Ctr. v. State, Dept of Natural
Res., 2 P.3d 629, 633 (Alaska 2000) (noting that we review an
agencys interpretation of . . . non-technical statutory terms
under the substitution of judgment standard).
4 Holding v. Municipality of Anchorage, 63 P.3d 248, 250
(Alaska 2003).
5 DeShong, 77 P.3d at 1234 (quoting Muller v. BP
Exploration (Alaska) Inc., 923 P.2d 783, 787 (Alaska 1996)).
6 Muller v. BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., 923 P.2d 783,
787 (Alaska 1996).
7 AS 23.30.215(a)(2).
8 AS 23.30.215(a)(4).
9 AS 23.30.395(33).
10 AS 23.30.395(19).
11 AS 01.10.040(a). See also Tesoro Alaska Petroleum Co.
v. Kenai Pipe Line Co., 746 P.2d 896, 905 (Alaska 1983) (citing
AS 01.10.040).
12 See Serradell v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 843
P.2d 639, 641 (Alaska 1992) (relying on a lay definition of
spouse). See also Hedland v. Monumental Gen. Ins. Co., 404 N.W.
2d 371, 373-74 (Minn. App. 1987) (noting that spouse is commonly
known to mean husband or wife), quoted in Serradell, 843 P.2d at
641 n.6. By the same token, wife is commonly known to mean
spouse, or a married woman.
13 AS 25.05.011.
14 Harrelson v. Harrelson, 932 P.2d 247, 250 (Alaska
1997).
15 AS 23.30.215 provides in relevant part:
(a) If the injury causes death, the
compensation is known as a death benefit and
is payable in the following amounts to or for
the benefit of the following persons:
. . . .
(2) if there is a widow or widower or a
child or children of the deceased, the
following percentages of the spendable weekly
wages of the deceased:
(A) 80 percent for the widow or widower with
no children;
(B) 50 percent for the widow or widower with
one child and 40 percent for the child;
(C) 30 percent for the widow or widower with
two or more children and 70 percent divided
equally among the children;
(D) 100 percent for an only child when there
is no widow or widower;
(E) 100 percent, divided equally, if there
are two or more children and no widow or
widower;
. . . .
(4) if there is no widow or widower or child
or children, then for the support of father,
mother, grandchildren, brothers and sisters,
if dependent upon the deceased at the time of
injury, 42 percent of the spendable weekly
wage of the deceased to such beneficiaries,
share and share alike, not to exceed $20,000
in the aggregate;
(5) $5,000 to a surviving widow or widower,
or equally divided among surviving children
of the deceased if there is no widow or
widower.
16 AS 23.30.215(a)(4).
17 Croft v. Pan Alaska Trucking, Inc., 820 P.2d 1064, 1066
(Alaska 1991) (citing Puller v. Municipality of Anchorage, 574
P.2d 1285, 1287 (Alaska 1978)).
18 Croft, 820 P.2d at 1066.
19 AS 23.30.395(6).
20 AS 23.30.395(19).
21 7 Alaska Administrative Code (AAC) 40.240(b)(2).
22 4 AAC 65.901(a)(18) (defining family for the Child Care
Assistance Program); 6 AAC 94.900(12) (defining family for
Disaster Assistance Programs).
23 504 P.2d 1023 (Alaska 1972).
24 Id. at 1023-24.
25 Id. at 1023.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 1024.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 1025.
33 Id.
34 Indeed, dependency alone is not enough under the act to
render someone eligible for benefits. For example, cousins and
friends are never eligible for benefits. The dependent must be a
grandchild, a parent, or a sibling. And even those dependents
are only eligible if there is neither a surviving spouse nor any
children. AS 23.30.215(a)(4).
35 E.g., Meek v. Unocal Corp., 914 P.2d 1276, 1281 (Alaska
1996).
36 In Trombley v. Starr-Wood Cardiac Group, PC, 3 P.3d
916, 923 (Alaska 2000), we noted the difficulty of assessing the
emotional, sexual and financial relationship of cohabiting
parties to determine whether their arrangement was the equivalent
of a marriage . . . . (quoting Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582,
590 (Cal. 1988)).
37 State, Div. of Elections v. Metcalfe, 110 P.3d 976, 981
(Alaska 2005). See also Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282, 284
(1979) (noting that with social security legislation, [t]he
process of categorization presents the difficulties inherent in
any line-drawing exercise where the draftsman confronts a
universe of potential beneficiaries with different histories and
distinct needs. He strives for a level of generality that is
administratively practicable with full appreciation that the
included class has members whose needs upon a statutorily defined
occurrence may not be as marked as those of isolated individuals
outside the classification. General rules are essential if a
fund of this magnitude is to be administered with a modicum of
efficiency, even though such rules inevitably produce seemingly
arbitrary consequences in some individual cases. A process of
case-by-case adjudication that would provide a perfect fit in
theory would increase administrative expenses to a degree that
benefit levels would probably be reduced, precluding a perfect
fit in fact.) (internal citation omitted). See also Colgrove v.
Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 183 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(Normally, in our system we leave the inevitable process of
arbitrary line drawing to the Legislative Branch, which is far
better equipped to make ad hoc compromises. In the past, we have
therefore given great deference to legislative decisions in cases
where the line must be drawn somewhere and cannot be precisely
delineated by reference to principle. This Court has involved
itself in the sticky business of separating cases along a
continuum only when the Constitution clearly compels it to do so
and when the legislature has plainly defaulted.).
38 Sampson v. State, 31 P.3d 88, 94 (Alaska 2001).
39 Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159, 169 (Alaska 1972).
40 Falcon v. Alaska Pub. Offices Commn, 570 P.2d 469, 480
(Alaska 1977).
41 Valley Hosp. Assn, Inc. v. Mat-Su Coalition for Choice,
948 P.2d 963, 969 (Alaska 1997).
42 Sampson, 31 P.3d at 91.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 AS 14.03.080.
46 Cabana v. Kenai Peninsula Borough, 50 P.3d 798, 805
(Alaska 2002).
47 Malabed v. North Slope Borough, 70 P.3d 416, 420-21
(Alaska 2003).
48 Williams v. State, Dept of Revenue, 895 P.2d 99, 104
(Alaska 1995).
49 Id. (quoting Gilmore v. Alaska Workers Comp. Bd., 882
P.2d 922, 927 (Alaska 1994)).
50 Meek, 914 P.2d at 1281 (citing ch. 79, 1, SLA 1988).
51 Compare Taylor v. Southeast-Harrison Western Corp., 694
P.2d 1160, 1164 (Alaska 1985) (characterizing the goal of the Act
as being to secure guaranteed and expeditious compensation for
injured workers and their dependents . . . .) (emphasis added)
with Wien Air Alaska v. Arant, 592 P.2d 352, 357 (Alaska 1979)
(describing the purpose as to compensate the victims of work-
rated injury for a part of their economic loss, measured by the
wage loss to the worker or the surviving family) (emphasis added)
(overruled on other grounds by Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch.
Dist. v. Crider, 736 P.2d 770, 775 (Alaska 1987)).
52 Meek, 914 P.2d at 1281.
