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Chesser-Witmer v. Chesser (07/15/2005) sp-5923
Chesser-Witmer v. Chesser (07/15/2005) sp-5923
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage,
Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
| LAURIE K. CHESSER-WITMER,
| ) |
| ) Supreme Court No. S-
11512 |
| Appellant,
| ) |
| ) Superior Court
No. |
| v. | ) 4FA-
01-112 CI |
| ) |
| MICHAEL A.
CHESSER, | ) O P I N I O
N |
| ) |
| Appellee.
| ) [No. 5923 - July 15,
2005] |
| ) |
|
|
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State
of Alaska, Fourth Judicial District,
Fairbanks, Richard D. Savell, Judge.
Appearances: Gloria Hanssen Hooper, Law
Office of Rita T. Allee, P.C., Fairbanks, for
Appellant. Michael A. Chesser, pro se, Fort
Drum, New York.
Before: Bryner, Chief Justice, Matthews,
Eastaugh, Fabe, and Carpeneti, Justices.
CARPENETI, Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
A custody order gave ex-spouses joint legal and shared
physical custody over their young daughter. Two years later,
upon learning that the Army was transferring him to New York, the
father moved to modify custody, seeking physical custody of the
child during the school year. The superior court granted the
modification. The mother appeals, arguing that the superior
court erred in its factual findings and abused its discretion in
granting the modification. Because the superior courts factual
findings are supported by substantial evidence and are not
clearly erroneous, and because the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in making the custody determination, we affirm.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Michael and Laurie Chesser1 married on December 24,
1997 in Tennessee. Michael has been in the Army since 1991.
During the marriage, Michael was stationed at Ft. Wainwright,
near Fairbanks. Their only child, Bryanna, was born on September
16, 1998. Michael and Laurie separated on January 9, 2001, and
two days later Laurie filed a complaint for divorce. Both
parents requested primary physical custody of Bryanna.
After a two-day trial, Superior Court Judge Richard D.
Savell issued a Decree of Divorce and Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law on December 12, 2001. With regard to child
custody, the order concluded that it was in Bryannas best
interest to give the parents joint legal custody and shared
physical custody. It set forth a detailed schedule, as follows:
A. Mr. Chesser shall exercise physical
custody from Friday evening until Sunday
evening and from Wednesday evening until
Thursday morning. Ms. Chesser shall
exercise physical custody from Sunday
evening until Wednesday evening and from
Thursday morning until Friday evening.
B. [I]n addition . . . Mr. Chesser will
exercise a three-overnight weekend one
time a month . . . .
C. The times for exchanges . . . shall be
set by agreement of the parties.
D. Both parties will be entitled to take a
two-week vacation with the minor child
outside the Fairbanks area . . . .
Though Laurie was not denoted as the primary custodian in the
order or elsewhere, this schedule gave Laurie slightly more
physical custody than Michael. The court ordered this
arrangement in part because it anticipated that Michael would be
unavailable for up to seventy-five days per year due to military
deployment. The order also provided that if either parent needs
child care for a period of two hours or longer, the other parent
must be given the opportunity to care for the child if that
parent is available.2
About one year after entry of this order, Michael moved
for modification of the custody schedule. Because his position
in the Army had changed to Permanent Rear Detachment a position
with apparently no risk of deployment Michael requested an
exactly equal share of physical custody. His calculation asked
for an additional fourteen to fifteen days per year.3 On March
3, 2003 Judge Savell denied Michaels motion.
In January 2004 Michael learned that the Army planned
to transfer him to Fort Drum, New York the following summer.
Wanting to take Bryanna with him and have custody during the
school year, Michael again filed for modification. He proposed
that Laurie have custody during summers and holidays. Michael
sought modification based on his impending transfer and based on
Lauries alleged violations of the existing court order and
parenting behavior alleged to negatively affect Bryannas welfare.
He attached a list of these violations, and later supplemented
the list. He alleged that Laurie frequently left Bryanna in a
third partys care for two or more hours without first contacting
Michael, and that Bryanna was often not available for telephone
contact during their agreed-upon times. He also claimed that
Bryannas personal hygiene and health suffered while she was with
Laurie, that her school performance was substandard, including
numerous tardy arrivals, and that she was harmed by other
conduct of Laurie.
Laurie opposed the motion, arguing that Michaels
complaints were exaggerated or unfounded and that Michaels own
conduct had been less than ideal. She pointed out that, since
the divorce, Michael had moved seven times, had numerous
girlfriends, drank excessively, and had been convicted of driving
while intoxicated.
Trial on Michaels motion to modify custody was held in
May 2004. Testimony at trial supported the pretrial allegations
of both parties: principally, that Laurie had violated the
existing court order regarding Bryannas contacts with her father,
and that Michael had problems with alcohol and had experienced
instability in his living arrangements. The trial also showed
the following.
Laurie runs an assisted-living facility for the elderly
out of her home. The assisted living home comprised the top
floor of the house, while the family (including Laurie, her
husband, her step-son, and Bryanna) occupied the lower floor.
The business normally housed between two and four patients, with
a staff of two employees. Laurie regularly used one of the
businesss employees to babysit Bryanna. On one occasion, an
elderly patient napped in Bryannas bed for about forty-five
minutes. Laurie testified that the living situation was good for
Bryanna because it allowed Laurie to work mostly at home.
Two of Michaels ex-girlfriends testified regarding his
drinking habits and occasional argumentative/aggressive behavior.
In addition, Lauries husband testified that Michael had referred
to Laurie in a derogatory manner. However, there was no clear
testimony that such behavior occurred while Michael was in
Bryannas presence. Michael conceded that his living situation
had been unstable, but suggested that his situation had improved
he was in a serious committed relationship that included
discussion of marriage. Michael and his girlfriend both
testified about their strong connection with Bryanna.
There was extensive testimony that communication
between Laurie and Michael had broken down. Michael testified
that he felt like Laurie was more likely to give additional
visitation when their relations were going well, and less likely
to do so when they were not. Michael testified that, by his
calculations, there were seventy-two violations of the custody
provision regarding babysitting, and forty-four occasions when
Bryanna was not available to talk on the telephone.4 He also
complained that Laurie failed to inform him about Bryannas school
performance, or involve him in the decisions to enroll Bryanna in
the Sylvan Learning Center and in private therapy.
There was no expert testimony presented at the trial.
Bryannas therapist testified that the primary source of Bryannas
unhappiness was the conflict between her parents. However, she
noted that Bryanna was generally fine and enjoyed a very, very
strong relationship with both parents and stepparents. She also
testified that:
If [Bryanna] stayed with her mother, she was
going to be devastated by dad moving and
being so far away. And if she moved with
dad, she was going to be devastated that mom
and brother were going to be so far away.
Bryannas therapist also testified that Bryanna was happy about
moving with her father, but that she was sad because she said her
father had told her that she would never see her mother again.
Though the therapist said it would have been advantageous to have
full-family counseling, she did not involve Michael because of
her negative impression of him during their first and only
meeting.
Following the trial, Judge Savell modified custody in
favor of Michael. He found a substantial change in circumstances
based both on Michaels impending move and on other changes
relating to the statutory best interest factors. He emphasized
certain facts: that Laurie had abused the authority she has had
by inadequately sharing co-parenting responsibilities; that
living in a house with an assisted-living facility may not have
been a healthy environment for Bryanna; and that Laurie failed to
be fully open with Michael on parenting issues, which caused an
increase in distrust. Judge Savell concluded that Michaels
alcohol use, while a concern, was not a negative mark on the
custody scale because it was not done in front of Bryanna and was
not shown to have affected her.5 He also found that there was no
domestic violence and that it was significant that the therapist
testified without criticism, contradiction or hesitation that
Bryanna was excited to go with her father.
Judge Savell stated that the case was extremely close
and that no independent factor led to his conclusion. He
concluded that the two factors tipping the balance were (1) the
unhealthy, excessive exposure to and reliance upon the home
health care business, and (2) Lauries abuse of authority and
interference with an open, frequent, loving relationship with
Michael. He concluded that: it is in the childs best interest
and . . . both parents will have greater access . . . if the
child is given a chance to reside with Mr. Chesser in Fort Drum.
Judge Savell gave many additional instructions to the
parents, including that Bryanna was to remain with Laurie during
the summer until Michael was settled in New York and that if
Michael was later deployed, Bryanna would return to Laurie. Most
significantly, the court provided that the modified custody
order, though a final order, had a one year duration and no
more. He ordered the parents to file status reports by May 1,
2005, setting forth their respective personal progress and the
successes or failures they have had in co-parenting their child.
Judge Savells rationale behind this arrangement was to reverse
the roles to raise each parents standards of conduct. He
instructed Michael that he should demonstrate how [parenting] is
supposed to be done and that if he abuses his custodial power, he
will quickly lose it.
Judge Savell subsequently denied Lauries motions for
reconsideration and for stay of enforcement. Laurie then sought
emergency supreme court reconsideration of the order denying the
motion for stay pending appeal, which we denied in August 2004.
This appeal followed.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The trial court has broad discretion in child custody
decisions. A trial courts determination of custody will be set
aside only if the entire record demonstrates that the controlling
findings of fact are clearly erroneous or that the trial court
abused its discretion.6
A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when this court
is left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court
has made a mistake. Abuse of discretion is established if the
trial court considered improper factors in making its custody
determination, failed to consider statutorily mandated factors,
or assigned disproportionate weight to particular factors while
ignoring others.7
IV. DISCUSSION
A. The Trial Courts Findings of Fact Were Not Clearly
Erroneous.
Laurie argues that two of the trial courts primary
factual findings were clearly erroneous: (1) that the assisted
living home was harmful to Bryanna and (2) that Laurie interfered
with Michaels relationship with Bryanna.
1. Assisted living home
The trial court found an unhealthy, excessive exposure
to and reliance upon the home health care business with this
child. Judge Savell noted that it is not always a pleasant
business and that patients wander, act unpredictably, and
ultimately die. He agreed with testimony that clients should not
be present in the residential quarters and expressed worry that a
client had napped in Bryannas bed. He also expressed concern
that employees of a care facility [were] substitute parents and
stated: you cant rely on the charges, the wards, the elderly
patients for whom you care to be a social outlet, friends,
roommates or bed-mates of a child.
While acknowledging that she operates an assisted
living home, Laurie argues that it should be a non-issue. She
points to the testimony of Ms. Kathleen Evans, a care coordinator
for the state, for the proposition that the contact between
Bryanna and the patients is actually beneficial. She also
complains that Michaels testimony provided the only evidence of
any detriment, and that this evidence consisted only of the one-
time nap incident.
The facts in the record were sufficient for the court
to find the assisted living home a concern. There was evidence
of troubling aspects of this living arrangement, even if it was
something of an exaggeration to refer to clients as Bryannas
social outlet, friends, roommates. First, Laurie conceded that a
client had indeed napped in Bryannas bed for forty-five minutes.
Her excuse that the client wanted to watch I Love Lucy and there
was apparently no other television available did not satisfy the
trial court. Although there was no evidence that this incident
negatively affected Bryanna, she found it significant enough to
mention to Michael. Second, the evidence showed that one of
Bryannas regular babysitters was an employee of the facility. As
Laurie was enrolled in classes and held a second part-time job,
Bryanna was often in the employees care before or after school.
Third, Bryannas excessive school tardiness was in part due to the
operation of the facility Mr. Witmer could not drive Bryanna to
school until an employee arrived for the morning shift, since
elderly clients cannot be left without some supervision.
Laurie attempted to offset this evidence with the
testimony of Kathleen Evans. Ms. Evans, the care coordinator for
the state, made regular biweekly visits to the care facility as
part of her job, but she never saw the downstairs living
quarters. She gave her personal opinion8 that small children
living in such a setting will not be traumatized if the parents
handle it correctly. She explained that children could form
bonds with the clients, and that if children are talked to and
told about the cycles of life, . . . they can handle
it . . . just as if . . . their father died or the brother died
or a dog died. She added that the patients normally die in the
hospital, not in the house. The testimony of Ms. Evans was
apparently not entirely convincing to Judge Savell. It is the
function of the trial court, and not this court, to determine the
weight and effect of the testimony.9
Ms. Evanss testimony can be viewed as supporting the
notion that living in a home containing an assisted living
facility could present unsettling and even frightening situations
for a child, if not handled correctly. Combined with the napping
incident, the employee babysitting, and the late arrivals to
school, we conclude that the court did not clearly err in finding
this living arrangement a concern and assigning some weight to
it.
2. Interference with Michael and Bryannas
relationship
The trial court also found an abuse of authority that
has let emotional involvement get in the way of [Lauries] ability
to allow an open, frequent, loving relationship and has
interfered with that by making decisions and taking actions
unilaterally and . . . interfering with or not facilitating the
communication that had become a pattern. Similarly, Judge Savell
found that Laurie failed to adequately co-parent by relying upon
the employee, rather than Michael, to babysit Bryanna, and that
her irrational and emotional responses obstructed communication
and deepened mutual mistrust. Rather than make specific findings
regarding particular symptoms of Laurie and Michaels antagonism,
such as the number of missed phone calls, the court stressed it
was more important to examine the behavior of the parties in what
each side acknowledges to have become a practice. The judge
thought Laurie viewed Michael as a pain in the neck and figured
it was easier not to deal with him. Consequently, she let such
feelings get in the way of Michael and Bryannas relationship.
On appeal, Laurie seems to argue that there was no
interference because Michael enjoyed ample visitation. She notes
that he enjoyed 171 overnights in 2003, that she regularly
accommodated his scheduling needs, and that she even let him stay
in the Witmers guest house on occasion to be closer to Bryanna.
She also claims that any interferences with babysitting were at
best technical violations of the order.
These arguments miss the mark. The point is not
whether Michael has had enough visitation and contact the
question is whether Lauries acts interfered with the
relationship. There was testimony suggesting that she
arbitrarily refused consent for Michael to take Bryanna on a
Canadian vacation. Moreover, Michael testified that Laurie
interfered with his babysitting opportunities seventy-two times
and his telephone contact forty-four times. While she argues
that some of these instances may be exaggerated or unfounded, she
generally gives no response or excuse for her actions, and even
concedes that some were violations of the custody order (when she
called them merely technical). In light of the evidence that
Laurie obstructed Michael from co-parenting, we conclude that the
trial courts finding of interference was not clearly erroneous.
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Granting the Modification.
Lauries final contention is that the court abused its
discretion by modifying the custody order. She argues that it
failed to consider all of the factors mandated by statute and
assigned disproportionate weight to one factor while ignoring
others. More specifically, she maintains that the court failed
to adequately consider the factor regarding stability and
continuity of the relationship with the child.
An award of child custody or visitation may be modified
if the court determines that: (1) a change in circumstances
requires the modification of the award and (2) the modification
is in the best interests of the child.10 The court must enter on
the record its reason for the modification.11 The moving parent
bears the burden of showing a significant or substantial change
in circumstances.12 Such a change exists as a matter of law when
a custodial parent moves out of state.13 This rule includes
custodial parents who have joint custody.14
The trial court in this case found a substantial change
in circumstances based on Michaels move and on other changes
relating to the statutory best interest factors (presumably,
parental decisions impacting Bryannas welfare). Because the out-
of-state move was a sufficient ground upon which to satisfy the
statutory requirement, we need not review the second ground.
Michael is a custodial parent, and it has not been alleged that
his move had an illegitimate purpose.15 Moreover, Laurie does not
argue on appeal that the court erred in finding a substantial
change in circumstances. Thus, our review addresses only whether
the courts best interests findings were an abuse of discretion.
In determining the best interests of a child, a court
is required to consider the nine factors of AS 25.24.150(c).16
These factors include:
(1) the physical, emotional, mental,
religious, and social needs of the child;
(2) the capability and desire of each parent
to meet these needs;
(3) the childs preference if the child is of
sufficient age and capacity to form a
preference;
(4) the love and affection existing between
the child and each parent;
(5) the length of time the child has lived in
a stable, satisfactory environment and the
desirability of maintaining continuity;
(6) the willingness and ability of each
parent to facilitate and encourage a close
and continuing relationship between the other
parent and the child . . . ;
(7) any evidence of domestic violence, child
abuse, or child neglect . . . or a history of
violence between the parents;
(8) evidence that substance abuse by either
parent or other members of the household
directly affects the emotional or physical
well-being of the child;
(9) other factors that the court considers
pertinent.
In performing such analysis, a trial court
need not specifically address the statutory
factors . . . and make explicit ultimate
findings that the best interests of the
children require the custodial disposition
reached, but its findings must either give us
a clear indication of the factors which the
superior court considered important in
exercising its discretion or allow us to
glean from the record what considerations
were involved.[17]
Similarly, we have stated that courts need not memorialize their
findings for each given factor. Where there is no substantive
dispute about a certain factor, the court need not specifically
address it.18
The superior court in this case did not make findings
regarding each statutory factor, but the language of its analysis
makes clear that it properly considered all factors. The court
found that two considerations tipped the balance in favor of
Michael. The first consideration was Lauries failure to share co-
parenting duties and her interference in Michaels relationship
with Bryanna, which demonstrated an unwillingness to allow an
open and loving relationship between Bryanna and Michael. The
second consideration was Bryannas exposure to certain facets of
Lauries assisted living facility, which raised a concern about
Lauries ability to meet Bryannas physical, emotional, mental and
social needs.
The court also briefly addressed the other statutory
factors. It found that Michaels alcohol use did not impact
Bryanna and was not severe enough to be a negative mark. It
found no domestic violence. It found Bryanna too young to
consider her placement preference, though it did find significant
that testimony recounting Bryannas excitement at the prospect of
living with her father was not challenged. The court found the
factors of stability and continuity to be inapplicable because
Michaels move rendered actual stability impossible either way,
Bryanna would lose some contact with one parent. The court also
suggested that the parenting history and ability of the parents
were roughly equal: Neither parent is a bad parent. Neither
parent is an Olympic gold medalist.
In short, though the court did not explicitly place
these findings within the structure of the statutory list, we can
easily glean the trial judges thoughts on each statutory factor.
As a result, we conclude that the court properly considered all
factors and acted within its discretion.
Lauries argument to the contrary is that the court
erred in failing to adequately consider Bryannas need for
stability, instead relying solely on Lauries interference with
Michaels relationship with Bryanna.19 She argues that the court
mentioned stability only in passing and purely in a geographical
(not emotional) sense. She also notes that a move to distant New
York will remove Bryanna from her home community, mothers family,
sibling, school, counselor, and all that is familiar to Bryanna.
There is, of course, a certain difficulty in the
determination of stability where an out-of-state move will
necessarily disrupt the status quo.20 We have noted that a
continuity test centered entirely on the childs geographic
stability would always favor placing the child with the non-
moving parent.21 As a result, we have indicated that it is
impermissible to treat the move itself (assuming it is a
legitimate move) as a best-interests factor weighing against the
moving parent.22 Instead, in these situations a court must
examine not only the desirability of maintaining geographical
continuity, but also the importance of maximizing relational
stability.23 In other words, the court may properly award custody
to a parent who offers superior emotional stability.24
In the present case, the trial court properly found
that the stability of Bryannas life will be disrupted regardless
which decision it makes. Laurie is right that removing Bryanna
from her current home will alter her relationships with her
mother, friends, school, extended family and sense of place. It
is also true that rejecting Michaels motion for modification
would change Bryannas relationship with her father and, perhaps,
cause an equally or even more damaging disruption. The superior
court examined Bryannas need for stability and implicitly
concluded that awarding Michael custody would not be so much more
disruptive to Bryannas life that this factor outweighed other
relevant factors. Laurie has not raised any claims that convince
us that this decision was an abuse of discretion.
Laurie also contends that the superior court relied on
only one factor. We disagree. The record reflects that the
court considered all of the statutory best interest factors.
Many of the factors were found inapplicable (e.g., substance
abuse, domestic violence, childs preference). Others did not
weigh strongly in favor of either parent (e.g., childs needs,
amount of love and affection). The court found two factors
weighed in favor of custody to Michael: (1) the parents
respective abilities to meet Bryannas needs, and (2) their
willingness to allow an open and loving relationship between
Bryanna and the other parent.
Hamilton v. Hamilton25 presented a similar situation.
In Hamilton, an ex-husband sought to modify a custody arrangement
to make himself the primary custodian after his wife moved with
their two sons from Juneau to Tacoma, Washington.26 The trial
court granted the modification based primarily on the wifes
interference in the fathers relationship with his sons the
mother had not co-operated in sharing parental duties and had
acted with the purpose of thwarting the fathers access to the
children.27 The trial court concluded that the remaining factors
were either not applicable or favored neither parent.28 Most
notably, the court did not explicitly mention the effect of its
decision on the boys interest in stability, but it found the
mothers inability to allow [the father] frequent access to the
children, and the stress that this was causing the boys, to be
more important than the desirability of maintaining continuity of
care by the mother.29 We held that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in placing more weight on interference than
stability and that it properly considered all best interest
factors.30 The trial court similarly considered all factors in
this case. We conclude that the superior court did not abuse its
discretion in granting the modification to Michael.
Moreover, the courts findings and conclusions must be
reviewed in light of the particular circumstances of this case
and the custody arrangement it ultimately issued. We have stated
that trial courts have broad discretion to fashion custody awards
designed to meet the unique needs of the individuals involved.31
Here the change in custody was ordered to be for one year
duration and no more. Judge Savell ordered both parents to file
status reports on May 1, 2005, setting forth the events since the
change and whether the modification arrangements should be
altered. Given that these status reports will be filed and
another modification hearing may be held at the superior court
level, and given that there were no mistakes of law or fact
during the modification hearing reviewed today, we decline to
undo the current arrangement and interrupt a perhaps more gradual
process.
V. CONCLUSION
Because the superior courts factual findings are
supported by substantial evidence and because the court did not
abuse its discretion in making the custody decision, we AFFIRM
the superior courts modification of child custody in favor of
Michael Chesser.
_______________________________
1 Laurie Chesser has remarried and is now known as Laurie
Chesser-Witmer. For simplicity, we refer to the ex-spouses by
their first names.
2 There was also a provision that, if one parent decided
to leave the Fairbanks area, the parents will participate in at
least three sessions with a mediator before resorting to the
courts. This provision was ignored in this case. Michael
claimed that mediation was impossible, given the unwillingness of
Laurie to communicate and the short time frame. In any case,
Laurie has not at any time objected to the noncompliance with
this provision.
3 He asked for overnight custody every other Tuesday
evening.
4 Telephonic visitation usually occurred between 5 and 7
p.m. This time is not memorialized in any court order. Michael
claimed that it may have been suggested by the court, and that at
least it was the accepted practice of the parents.
5 In Judge Savells words, we dont care what people do as
long as theyre not doing it in front of and with the child.
6 Hamilton v. Hamilton, 42 P.3d 1107, 1111 (Alaska 2002).
7 Id.
8 Ms. Evans conceded that her personal opinion was not
professional because I do not work with children . . . as my
primary job.
9 Evans v. Evans, 869 P.2d 478, 480-81 (Alaska 1994).
10 AS 25.20.110(a).
11 Id.
12 Barrett v. Alguire, 35 P.3d 1, 5-6 (Alaska 2001).
13 Id. at 6.
14 See McQuade v. McQuade, 901 P.2d 421, 423-24 & n.6
(Alaska 1995); see also Meier v. Cloud, 34 P.3d 1274, 1279
(Alaska 2001).
15 An out-of-state move is legitimate when it is not
primarily motivated by a desire to make visitation . . . more
difficult. Moeller-Prokosch v. Prokosch, 53 P.3d 152, 157
(Alaska 2002) (citation omitted).
16 AS 25.20.060(a).
17 Smith v. Weekley, 73 P.3d 1219, 1225 (Alaska 2003)
(citing Borchgrevink v. Borchgrevink, 941 P.2d 132, 139-40
(Alaska 1997)) (emphasis added).
18 Virgin v. Virgin, 990 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Alaska 1999)
(citation omitted).
19 She cites to Platz v. Aramburo, 17 P.3d 65 (Alaska
2001), for the proposition that custody cannot be transferred
solely on the ground of factor (6) (interference). Laurie
misreads the Platz case. Unlike the superior court in this case,
the court in Platz did not conduct a best interests hearing.
Instead, the court transferred custody based largely on one
parents refusal to cooperate with a visitation order. We
reversed the custody order and remanded for an evidentiary
hearing regarding the AS 25.24.150(c) best interest factors.
20 Meier v. Cloud, 34 P.3d 1274, 1279 (Alaska 2001) (a
parents decision to relocate to another state will ordinarily
necessitate a change in the status quo . . . .).
21 Id.
22 Moeller-Prokosch v. Prokosch, 53 P.3d 152, 157 (Alaska
2002).
23 Meier, 34 P.3d at 1279.
24 Id.
25 42 P.3d 1107 (Alaska 2002).
26 Id. at 1111.
27 Id. at 1114, 1116.
28 Id. at 1116.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 1115-16.
31 Deininger v. Deininger, 835 P.2d 449, 451 (Alaska 1992)
(upholding gradual two-year transition period to 50/50 custody).
