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Rockstad v. Erikson (06/10/2005) sp-5908
Rockstad v. Erikson (06/10/2005) sp-5908
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage,
Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
RONALD D. ROCKSTAD, )
) Supreme Court No. S-10464
Appellant, )
) Superior Court No.
v. ) 4FA-00-00497 CI
)
GERALD ERIKSON, ) O P I N I O N
)
Appellee. ) [No. 5908 - June 10, 2005]
)
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State
of Alaska, Fourth Judicial District,
Fairbanks, Richard D. Savell, Judge.
Appearances: Richard D. Wright, Fairbanks,
for Appellant. Richard L. Crabtree, Routh
Crabtree, APC, Anchorage, for Appellee.
Before: Bryner, Chief Justice, Matthews,
Eastaugh, Fabe, and Carpeneti, Justices.
CARPENETI, Justice
I. INTRODUCTION
A jury found Ronald Rockstad liable for failing to
repay a loan from Gerald Erikson that was secured by a note and
deed of trust on Rockstads home. The superior court awarded
Erikson the unpaid sum, including the substantial interest that
had accumulated on it, as well as costs and fees. Rockstad
claims that the trial court erroneously granted summary judgment
to Erikson on Rockstads statute of limitations defense. Because
Rockstads trial admissions render any error associated with the
grant of summary judgment harmless, we do not reach his claim of
error. Rockstad also argues that the trial court erroneously
granted summary judgment to Erikson on Rockstads usury defense.
Because we hold that as a matter of law the parties transaction
was not usurious, we affirm. Rockstad next claims that the note
and deed of trust were void, and thus that the judgment and
subsequent judicial foreclosure were inappropriate. We affirm
the trial courts application of quasi-estoppel to enforce the
parties agreement. Finally, we affirm the superior courts award
of costs and attorneys fees to Erikson, with the exception of the
costs and fees that accrued during litigation of Rockstads
bankruptcy proceeding.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
A. Facts
Rockstad and his wife were the equal co-owners of
Rockstad & Co., Realtors, Inc. In August 1990 Erikson loaned
Rockstad $26,000 to consummate a real estate purchase. Erikson
claims that there was a single loan for $26,000, while Rockstad
asserts there were actually two separate loans, of $12,200 and
$13,800. Erikson claims that Rockstad failed to make payments
since July 1997, while Rockstad responds that he paid the loan(s)
back in full no later than the end of 1993.
Rockstad signed a Deed of Trust Note (the Note) and a
deed of trust at the time the loan was made. The Note states
that Rockstad promises to pay Erikson the sum of $26,000,
together with interest thereon at the rate of an amount equal to
the interest rates tabulated on the credit cards providing the
source for this loan. Erikson called as an expert witness an
accountant who estimated that this interest rate averaged 17.99%
per month during the term of the loan. The deed of trust is on
Rockstads home,1 to secure repayment of the $26,000. The Note
states that [if] any suit or action is instituted to collect this
note, or any part thereof, the undersigned promise(s) and
agree(s) to pay . . . a reasonable sum as attorneys fees in such
action. The deed of trust states that Rockstad agrees to pay all
costs and expenses, including . . . attorneys fees in a
reasonable sum, in any . . . action or proceeding . . . brought
by [Erikson] to foreclose this Deed.
Rockstad claimed that [t]he agreement between the
parties was that these documents would not be recorded, and that
various critical terms were left blank on the deed of trust such
that they were not recordable. Rockstad also asserted that he
was to be charged no interest on the loan, because he was to
provide interest via assisting Erikson in various real estate
ventures. Rockstad thus alleged that Erikson altered the Note
and deed of trust subsequent to signing, and added the interest
and repayment provisions.
At some point in late 1997, Rockstad signed a Statement
of Commission and Agreement to Offset (the Offset). It stated
that Rockstad Realty earned a commission of $5,700.00 at the
closing of the sale by Gerald Erikson of a certain piece of
property on July 11, 1997, that Rockstad Realty shall retain the
$100.00 of earnest money previously deposited by the buyer, and
that [t]he balance of $5,600.00 is credited to the outstanding
indebtedness of Rockstad Realty to Gerald Erikson. Rockstad
asserts that he was rushing to clear snow from his driveway in
order to travel to the airport when Erikson approached him and
requested that he sign the Offset. Rockstad claims that Erikson
misrepresented the document he presented to Rockstad as a
document necessary for his taxes, and that because he was in a
rush, Rockstad signed the document without reviewing it.
Rockstad further claims that there was no written commission
agreement between Rockstad & Co. and Erikson, and that there was
no commission due and thus no commission to assign.
B. Proceedings
Erikson filed suit against Rockstad in February 2000,
demanding damages equivalent to the original loan principal of
$26,000, plus interest, late charges, and costs and fees, minus
payments made by Rockstad.2 Erikson asked that the deed of trust
be foreclosed, Rockstads home sold, and the proceeds of the sale
be applied toward payment of the judgment. Rockstad answered
that the note and deed of trust had been paid in full and that
the deed of trust had been modified from the original. Rockstads
answer also pleaded seven affirmative defenses: accord and
satisfaction, payment in full, fraud, laches, statute of
limitations, failure to account, and usury. In a pretrial order,
the superior court ordered Rockstad to file for summary judgment
on, or withdraw, his affirmative defenses of accord and
satisfaction, payment in full, statute of limitations, and usury.
After Rockstad moved for summary judgment, the superior court
denied Rockstads motions for summary judgment, allowed both
parties to submit additional briefing on the statute of
limitations issue, and granted partial summary judgment to
Erikson denying Rockstads usury and statute of limitations
defenses.
The case was tried before a jury in November 2001. The
jury found that (1) Rockstad breached his agreement with Erikson
by failing to fully repay the amount he borrowed and the interest
on it; and (2) Rockstad owed Erikson a total of $121,310.00. The
superior court entered judgment against Rockstad for this sum,
plus prejudgment interest, and fixed the post-judgment interest
rate at 17.99%. The court later awarded Erikson a total of
$11,082.12 in costs and $34,522.75 in attorneys fees. The court
also denied Rockstads post-trial Motion to Dismiss Judicial
Foreclosure, and ordered the foreclosure of the deed of trust
and the sale of Rockstads share of his home in satisfaction of
the judgment. In July 2002 the court amended its final judgment
to include all costs, attorneys fees, and accrued interest, and
concluded that Rockstad owed Erikson a total of $182,071.96.
Rockstad appeals.3
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a trial courts rulings on questions of fact
for clear error.4 We review a trial courts rulings on questions
of law, and the application of law to fact, de novo and adopt the
rule of law that is most persuasive in light of precedent,
reason, and policy.5 Although the interpretation of contractual
language is a question of law and reviewed de novo, [t]he intent
of the parties when entering a contract is a question of fact and
is thus reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard.6
We review grants of summary judgment de novo, drawing
all factual inferences in favor of, and viewing the facts in the
light most favorable to the non-prevailing party (generally the
non-movant).7 We affirm grants of summary judgment when there
are no genuine issues of material fact, and the prevailing party
(generally the movant) was entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.8 Summary judgment is therefore improper in contractual
disputes when the evidence before the superior court establishes
a factual dispute as to the intent of the contracting parties.9
We exercise our independent judgment when interpreting
Alaskas civil rules,10 but review a superior courts procedural
decisions for abuse of discretion.11 We will treat a superior
courts decision to apply a novel procedural rule as a decision of
law, and review it de novo.12
We overturn an award of attorneys fees only where we
find an abuse of discretion,13 or reverse a trial decision
favoring the prevailing party.14 We reverse a ruling for abuse of
discretion only when left with a definite and firm conviction,
after reviewing the entire record, that the trial court erred.15
IV. DISCUSSION
A. The Superior Courts Grant of Summary Judgment in Eriksons
Favor on the Statute of Limitations Issue, if Error, Was
Harmless.
1. The superior court is not required to grant
summary judgment merely because the motion for
summary judgment is unopposed.
Rockstad argues that the superior court erred in
denying his unopposed motion for summary judgment on the statute
of limitations issue. Rockstad moved for summary judgment on
several grounds, including the statute of limitations, but
Eriksons opposition did not address the statute of limitations
issue. The superior courts order appeared to grant the motion in
favor of Erikson, noting that Rockstads acknowledgment of debt
revived/extended the limitations period. Rockstad moved for
reconsideration, and the superior court clarified the effect of
the order, stating that the undisputed facts may support a
finding that the statute of limitations defense is inapplicable
as a matter of law. The court then allowed Rockstad and Erikson
to submit further briefing on the matter, and ultimately granted
partial summary judgment on this issue to Erikson.
Even though Rockstads motion for summary judgment was
initially unopposed, the superior court was not required to
grant it. We have stated that a movant does not have a right to
summary judgment merely because the non-moving party fails to
respond.16 Civil Rule 56(e) provides that where the non-moving
party fails to offer an affidavit setting forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial, a court shall
enter summary judgment against that party if appropriate. We
have noted that [t]his language indicates that the superior court
retains some degree of discretion in deciding whether to grant
summary judgment in cases where there is no response to the
filing of the summary judgment motion.17 In sum, the superior
court is not required to grant summary judgment even where the
motion is unopposed. Where, as here, the record appeared to show
that summary judgment for the moving party was not appropriate,
the superior court properly declined to grant summary judgment to
that party. We cannot agree with Rockstads claim that the court
was required to grant the motion in his favor.
2. Any error in the court's grant of summary judgment
in Eriksons favor was harmless.
Rockstad renews several arguments he made to the
superior court as to why summary judgment was improperly granted
in favor of Erikson. First, he argues that Alaskas six-year time
limit for bringing actions on contractual obligations runs from
the date of the last payment toward the obligation, and had
lapsed between Rockstads last payment to Erikson, which he states
was no later than the end of 1993, and the date Erikson filed his
lawsuit, February 28, 2000. Second, he argues that the offset
was invalid because (1) he was duped into signing the offset by
Eriksons fraudulent behavior; (2) he had no authority to forgive
a debt owed only to Rockstad Realty Co., which is a separate
entity; and (3) neither he nor Rockstad Realty Co. was entitled
to any commission from Erikson in the first place. Therefore,
according to Rockstad, the offset should not count as a payment
to Erikson that renewed the statutory time limit for bringing
suit. Rockstad argues that by swearing to these three points in
an affidavit, he raised a genuine issue of material fact that
precluded summary judgment in Eriksons favor.
However, we need not reach any of these arguments
because Rockstad introduced evidence at trial showing that he had
made a payment to Erikson in 1994, thereby reviving the debt for
statute of limitations purposes. Rockstads trial exhibits L and
L-1 consisted of pages from his dayplanner listing payments to
Erikson and a summary of these payments, and Rockstad offered the
exhibits as proof that he made a March 31, 1994 payment to
Erikson as part of his obligation on the Note. This payment
moots Rockstads statute of limitations argument because even
assuming that the six-year statute of limitations applies,
Erikson filed suit before the limitations period ran out. As
Rockstads own evidence shows that Eriksons action was timely
filed, we hold that even if Rockstad raised a triable fact issue
as to the offset, any error in granting summary judgment on that
issue was harmless.18 Accordingly, the judgment and accompanying
jury verdict in Eriksons favor must stand.
B. The Superior Court Properly Granted Erikson Summary
Judgment on Rockstads Usury Defense.
Rockstad also moved for summary judgment on his
affirmative defense that Eriksons loan arrangement was usurious
according to AS 45.45.010(b). That statute provides:
Interest may not be charged by express agreement
of the parties in a contract or loan commitment
that is more than five percentage points above the
annual rate charged member banks for advances by
the 12th Federal Reserve District on the day on
which the contract or loan commitment is made. A
contract or loan commitment in which the principal
amount exceeds $25,000 is exempt from the
limitation of this subsection.
The interest rate charged by the Twelfth Federal Reserve District
on the date Rockstad and Erikson made their arrangement was seven
percent. Erikson claimed that the parties agreed to a credit-
card-based interest rate of twenty percent, clearly more than
five percentage points above the federal rate. As mentioned,
Erikson claimed he had loaned $26,000 to Rockstad, thus putting
the loan outside the reach of AS 45.45.010. Rockstad argued at
summary judgment, however, that his transaction with Erikson
involved two separate loans, each loan below the statutes $25,000
limit. Thus, Rockstad claims, the transaction should be void as
unlawful.
Rockstad supported his motion with an affidavit
explaining that there had been two separate loans, and a copy of
the two checks from Erikson that Rockstad claimed represented
separate loans. Erikson admitted that he did in fact write two
separate checks to Rockstad, but pointed out that the checks are
both dated August 30, 1990 and insisted that they pertain to a
single loan. On appeal, Erikson notes that the only evidence
Rockstad offered to support his motion (besides the checks
themselves) was his affidavit. Rockstad argues that this
affidavit was sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material
fact, and the superior courts grant of summary judgment to
Erikson on the usury issue was thus inappropriate.
A single affidavit may suffice to create a genuine
issue of material fact precluding summary judgment, as Rockstad
notes.19 However, Rockstads affidavit on this issue is largely
irrelevant, because the facts that are not in dispute are
sufficient to support summary judgment as a matter of law. As
Rockstad himself admits, it is undisputed that there was only one
promissory note between the parties, for the sum of $26,000.
Since the Note constituted a contract between the parties, its
proper meaning is a legal question.
In interpreting a contract, we depart from its plain
language only where the contracts language is ambiguous.20 A
court may find ambiguity in a contractual provision only where
the contract as a whole and all extrinsic evidence support two
different interpretations, both of which are reasonable.21 There
is no such ambiguity in the Note. The Note speaks in the
singular only, of the sum of Twenty Six Thousand
Dollars, and this loan, this debt, and this note. Nowhere does
it even suggest that there were multiple loans involved.
There is also, as Erikson suggests, a general
presumption in American law that transactions are lawful and non-
usurious.22 And we are mindful of the venerable rule that where a
contract is fairly open to two constructions, by one of which it
would be lawful and the other unlawful, the former must be
adopted.23 Even assuming that the Note could possibly be read as
providing for two separate loans, such a reading would
necessarily imply that the Note constitutes an unlawfully
usurious contract.
Because the plain language of the Note shows that there
was only one loan, for $26,000, and because even if the Note were
ambiguous we would construe it to favor its legality, we decline
to adopt Rockstads interpretation of the Note, and affirm the
grant of summary judgment to Erikson on this issue.24
C. The Deed of Trust Is Enforceable Under the Doctrine of
Quasi-Estoppel.
Following trial, the superior court considered
Rockstads Motion to Dismiss Judicial Foreclosure. According to
the motion, (1) Rockstads family residence was the property named
in the deed of trust to secure Eriksons loan; (2) this family
residence was held by Rockstad and his wife Lauren Rockstad as
tenants by the entirety, and Lauren Rockstads name appears on the
title to that property; (3) where husband and wife both appear on
the deed both must sign in order for a conveyance to be valid
under AS 34.15.010(b) and (d); (4) the deed of trust was signed
only by Rockstad himself; and (5) therefore the deed of trust is
void.25 The superior court denied Rockstads motion, and Rockstad
appeals.
The superior court based its decision to allow
foreclosure in part on the equitable doctrine of quasi-estoppel.
Quasi-estoppel appeals to the conscience of the court to prevent
injustice by precluding a party from taking a position so
inconsistent with one he has previously taken that circumstances
render assertion of the second position unconscionable.26 Unlike
other forms of estoppel, quasi-estoppel does not require
ignorance or reliance as essential elements, but any
representation made to the party claiming quasi-estoppel must
have been based [on] full knowledge of the facts.27 Since a
finding of quasi-estoppel is closely tied to the particular facts
and circumstances of the individual case, the determination is
essentially a factual one and, as such, is one which will not be
disturbed on appeal unless the findings on which it is based are
clearly erroneous.28
Among the many factors we consider in applying quasi-
estoppel are: (1) whether the party asserting the inconsistent
position has gained an advantage or produced some disadvantage
through the first position; (2) the magnitude of the
inconsistency; (3) whether changed circumstances tend to justify
the inconsistency; (4) whether the party claiming estoppel relied
on the inconsistency to his detriment; and (5) whether the first
assertion was made with full knowledge of the facts.29
Most of the elements of quasi-estoppel are self-evident
in this case. Since Rockstad himself signed the deed of trust in
order to secure his loan from Erikson, he obviously changed his
position by later asserting that the document was invalid. The
gain to Rockstad and detriment to Erikson that resulted from the
change in position, and from Eriksons reliance on Rockstads
original position, were clearly significant. Rockstad must have
known that his wife was listed on the title to their home. And
Rockstad has offered nothing that could justify his inconsistent
positions. In sum, the court was justified in applying quasi-
estoppel to validate the deed of trust and enforce Eriksons
foreclosure on Rockstads half-interest in the property.30
D. The Superior Court Properly Awarded Full Reasonable
Attorneys Fees to Erikson Covering the Trial and Post-
Trial Periods, But Erred in Awarding Attorneys Fees
Incurred in Litigating Rockstads Bankruptcy Petition.
1. Erikson is entitled to an award of full reasonable
attorneys fees, including fees incurred on appeal.
Rockstad argues that various aspects of the superior
courts fee award to Erikson were legally erroneous, and should be
reversed even if we uphold all other aspects of the courts
rulings and the jurys verdict. Rockstad claims that it has long
been the Alaska practice to allow the prevailing party to recover
partial fees, but the courts award of total fees rather than
partial fees is manifestly unreasonable. (Emphasis in original.)
Generally speaking, Rockstad is correct. We have stated that
Civil Rule 82 embodies a policy that the prevailing party is only
entitled to recover partial attorneys fees,31 and have held that
full fee awards are manifestly unreasonable unless the prevailing
party has shown bad faith or vexatious conduct by the losing
party.32 However, as Rockstad admits, where a contract between
the parties allows for one party to recover attorneys fees in the
event of litigation, the contract provision must prevail over any
limitations otherwise imposed by Rule 82.33 Such a contract
provision was in fact the basis for Eriksons motion for costs and
fees, and the superior courts subsequent award. Rockstad does
not appear to dispute that both the Note and the deed of trust
contain valid clauses requiring him to pay Eriksons reasonable
attorneys fees in the event of default. Since the jury
determined that Rockstad did in fact default, it was permissible
for the superior court to award Erikson full fees, pursuant to
the parties contract.
The parties also dispute the propriety of the superior
courts order that Rockstad pay Erikson attorneys fees for all
post-judgment appellate proceedings, insofar as the judgment is
upheld or the appeal dismissed by this court. Rockstad argues
that Rule 82 does not cover post-judgment fees and costs.34 As
discussed above, the fees in this case were awarded pursuant to
the terms of the parties agreement, and not pursuant to Rule 82.
We have previously held that where a contract provision has the
evident purpose of shifting reasonable fees to the winner in
litigation concerning the contract, that contract requires fee
shifting at all court levels, and not just in proceedings before
the trial court.35 The superior court thus properly construed the
terms of the Note and the deed of trust to cover fees incurred in
post-judgment appellate proceedings.
2. Erikson is not entitled to any fees incurred in
litigating Rockstads bankruptcy petition.
As a final matter, Rockstad argues that attorneys fees
and costs for bankruptcy actions can only be awarded by a federal
bankruptcy court, and that the superior court erroneously awarded
fees in an action other than the one before it, i.e., the
bankruptcy case.36 Eriksons rebuttal is that filing and
dismissing a bankruptcy petition, along with other post-judgment
conduct by Rockstad, amounted to maneuvers and vexatious conduct,
for which attorneys fees were properly awarded. Erikson also
argues that the fee-shifting language in the Note and deed of
trust entitle him to all actual attorneys fees, including fees
incurred while the debtor was in bankruptcy proceedings. We
agree with Rockstad on this issue.
We have indicated that trial courts may have authority
to award attorneys fees incurred by a litigant responding to an
opponents frivolous or vexatious post-judgment conduct.37 But we
have never specifically applied this rule to bankruptcy
proceedings. When attorneys fees are awarded based upon
misconduct by an attorney or party, and not the outcome of the
litigation, the matter is procedural.38 Federal courts have
original and exclusive jurisdiction over all bankruptcy
proceedings.39 Federal and state courts addressing the issue40
have followed the Ninth Circuits conclusion that it is for
Congress and the federal courts, not the state courts, to decide
what incentives and penalties are appropriate for use in
connection with the bankruptcy process and when those incentives
or penalties shall be utilized.41 The Ninth Circuit has explained
that the need for uniform and expeditious handling of bankruptcy
cases compels the application of federal sanctions by federal
courts as to procedural abuses in those cases.42
We have also never explicitly addressed the issue of
whether contractual fee-shifting provisions can cover post-
judgment bankruptcy proceedings.43 The interpretation and
application of contracts is a question of Alaska state law.
Where the substantive issues raised in a bankruptcy proceeding
include issues of state law, federal courts have held that
attorneys fees may be awarded where permitted or provided under
the relevant state law.44 However, awarding fees is still part of
the bankruptcy procedure, and as such it is a decision for the
bankruptcy court to make.45
In sum, it was the sole province of the bankruptcy
court, and not the superior court or this court, to award
attorneys fees to Erikson for his efforts in responding to
Rockstads bankruptcy petition.46 Thus we reverse and vacate the
portion of the trial courts attorneys fees award that included
fees incurred by Erikson in connection with the bankruptcy
petition.
V. CONCLUSION
Because any error regarding Rockstads statute of
limitations defense was rendered harmless by his trial
admissions, we AFFIRM the trial courts grant of summary judgment
to Erikson on Rockstads statute of limitations defense. We
AFFIRM summary judgment to Erikson on Rockstads usury defense.
We AFFIRM the trial courts application of quasi-estoppel to
enforce the parties agreement and foreclose on Rockstads interest
in his home. We also AFFIRM the superior courts award of costs
and attorneys fees to Erikson, except its award of the costs and
attorneys fees incurred in litigating Rockstads bankruptcy
proceeding, which we VACATE.
_______________________________
1 At the time the agreement was made, Rockstad was
married. Rockstad and his wife owned the home as tenants by the
entirety, and their names both appear on the title of the home.
The Rockstads subsequently dissolved their marriage, and
Rockstads wife now resides in California. All indications are
that the house is still owned by both Rockstads, as tenants in
common. The significance of these facts will be discussed in
Part IV.C, infra.
2 Erikson estimated the total amount Rockstad repaid,
including the Offset, at $16,755.76.
3 Rockstad filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 13 in
September 2002, but moved for and was granted an order dismissing
his bankruptcy petition in December of that same year. In March
2003 the superior court stayed execution of its judgment pending
Rockstads appeal to this court. The superior court provided that
if the judgment or any part of it was affirmed, or the appeal
dismissed, Rockstad would be liable for the portion of the
judgment affirmed, plus interest, costs, and fees. The superior
court included Eriksons post-judgment costs and attorneys fees,
including those associated with the bankruptcy proceedings, in
the total judgment. Erikson calculated his post-trial costs and
fees at $5,078.29, an amount that included costs and fees
associated with the bankruptcy proceeding. Erikson successfully
moved to have $5,078.29 in funds held in the courts registry
released to him.
4 OConnor v. Star Ins. Co., 83 P.3d 1, 3 (Alaska 2003).
5 Rausch v. Devine, 80 P.3d 733, 737 (Alaska 2003).
6 K & K Recycling, Inc. v. Alaska Gold Co., 80 P.3d 702,
712 (Alaska 2003).
7 Ellis v. City of Valdez, 686 P.2d 700, 702 (Alaska
1984).
8 Witt v. State, Dept of Corrections, 75 P.3d 1030, 1033
(Alaska 2003) (internal citations omitted).
9 K & K Recycling, 80 P.3d at 712.
10 Bustamante v. Alaska Workers Compensation Bd., 59 P.3d
270, 272 (Alaska 2002).
11 Willoya v. State, Dept of Corrections, 53 P.3d 1115,
1119 (Alaska 2002).
12 Our cases reviewing trial court procedural decisions
for abuse of discretion generally involve the application of
existing procedural rules that are intended to provide a trial
court with leeway. See, e.g., Edelman v. Edelman, 61 P.3d 1, 4-5
(Alaska 2002) (reviewing decision to retain jurisdiction over
certain claims and to award attorneys fees); Bustamante, 59 P.3d
at 272 (reviewing decision to appoint counsel for civil
litigant); Willoya, 53 P.3d at 1119-21 (reviewing decisions to
allow attorney to withdraw, to refuse to sanction attorney, to
refuse to order withdrawing attorney to send litigant all
litigation materials within thirty days, and to refuse to appoint
discovery master). The present case, however, involves the
decision by a trial court to create an entirely new procedural
rule. In Stalnaker v. Williams, 960 P.2d 590 (Alaska 1998), we
were required to determine the proper standard of review
applicable to an agencys choice of procedure in the absence of
any instructive agency provision. We treated such an agency
decision as an issue of law. Id. at 595.
13 Laverty v. Alaska R.R. Corp., 13 P.3d 725, 738 (Alaska
2000).
14 See, e.g., Bauman v. Day, 892 P.2d 817, 829 (Alaska
1995).
15 Willoya, 53 P.3d at 1119.
16 Hinsberger v. State, 53 P.3d 568, 572 (Alaska 2002).
17 Dome Labs. v. Farrell, 599 P.2d 152, 159 n.24 (Alaska
1979).
18 Cf. Municipality of Anchorage v. Higgins, 754 P.2d
745, 748 (Alaska 1988) ([W]e may uphold the lower courts ruling
if there is any other ground apparent, from the record, which, as
a matter of law, would support the result reached by the trial
court.) (citing Carlson v. State, 598 P.2d 969, 973 (Alaska
1979)).
19 Erikson asserts that the usury claim was properly
stricken by the trial court, given the paucity of evidence in
support of Rockstads motion, and the rule requiring the court to
view all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party. This slightly misstates the relevant law. Reviewing a
grant of summary judgment, this court views all facts in the
light most favorable to the non-prevailing party, not the non-
moving party. Ellis v. City of Valdez, 686 P.2d 700, 702 (Alaska
1984). This standard is commonly phrased in terms of the non-
moving party because it is the non-movant at whose expense
summary judgment is usually granted. This case is unusual,
however, because summary judgment was granted to Erikson, the non-
movant. Rockstad, the non-prevailing party, was entitled to have
all factual inference resolved in his favor.
20 Williams v. Crawford, 982 P.2d 250, 253 (Alaska 1999).
21 McMillan v. Anchorage Cmty. Hosp., 646 P.2d 857, 863
(Alaska 1982).
22 45 Am. Jur. 2d Interest and Usury 352 (2003).
23 Hobbs v. McLean, 117 U.S. 567, 576 (1886).
24 Erikson argues additionally that Rockstad knew that
Erikson was borrowing the money to lend to Rockstad on Eriksons
credit cards, and that [t]he Note provides, in essence, that
Rockstad was to indemnify Erikson for the sums he had to pay on
his credit cards as a result of his borrowing the funds to lend
to Rockstad. Therefore, Erikson asserts, the interest referred
to in the Note is actually just Eriksons loan expenses, which, as
such, are not subject to the usury law. We need not reach this
argument, because we affirm the superior court on the grounds
above.
25 AS 34.15.010 states in relevant part:
(b) In a deed or conveyance of the family
home or homestead by a married man or a
married woman, the husband and wife shall
join in the deed or conveyance.
. . . .
(d) Failure of the spouse to join in the deed
or conveyance does not affect the validity of
the deed or conveyance, unless the spouse
appears on the title.
26 Jamison v. Consol. Utils., Inc., 576 P.2d 97, 102
(Alaska 1978) (quoting Donaldson v. Le Nore, 540 P.2d 671 (Ariz.
1975)).
27 Id.
28 Id. at 102.
29 Id. at 102-03.
30 Rockstad also appeals the superior courts alternative
ground for allowing the foreclosure, which was that the deed was
proper under the doctrine of estoppel by deed. However, because
we hold that the superior court properly granted foreclosure
based on quasi-estoppel, we need not consider the propriety of
the other grounds for its decision.
31 Dansereau v. Ulmer, 955 P.2d 916, 919 (Alaska 1998).
32 Demoski v. New, 737 P.2d 780, 788 (Alaska 1987).
33 Ursin Seafoods, Inc. v. Keener Packing Co., 741 P.2d
1175, 1181 (Alaska 1987).
34 Rockstad does concede that his post-trial untimeliness
. . . may have caused Mr. Erikson extra expenses, and accordingly
has offered to pay $799 of Eriksons post-trial fees.
35 Gamble v. Northstore Pship, 28 P.3d 286, 290 (Alaska
2001).
36 Although the superior court did not actually award any
fees incurred in the bankruptcy case, its Order Granting Stay of
Execution Pending Appeal suggests that such fees will apply
following this appeal. We therefore reach this issue.
37 Torrey v. Hamilton, 872 P.2d 186, 188 n.3 (Alaska
1994).
38 In re Larrys Apartment, L.L.C., 249 F.3d 832, 838 (9th
Cir. 2001).
39 Wagner v. Key Bank of Alaska, 846 P.2d 112, 116 (Alaska
1993) (citing 28 U.S.C. 1334(a) (1988)); see also U.S. Const.,
art. I, 8, cl. 4 ([The Congress shall have the power] To
establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies
throughout the United States.).
40 See, e.g., Choy v. Redland Ins. Co., 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d
94, 101-104 (Cal. App. 2002); Mason v. Smith, 672 A.2d 705, 707-
08 (N.H. 1996); Shiner v. Moriarty, 706 A.2d 1228, 1238 (Pa.
Super. 1998).
41 Gonzales v. Parks, 830 F.2d 1033, 1036 (9th Cir. 1987).
42 In re Larrys Apartment, 249 F.3d at 838.
43 In Torrey we held that the attorneys fees incurred in
the adversary proceeding in bankruptcy are not recoverable as
costs of collection for the original state court judgment, but
this holding was based on our interpretation of Rule 82, not a
contractual fee-shifting provision. 872 P.2d at 187-88.
44 See, e.g., In re Baroff, 105 F.3d 439, 441 (9th Cir.
1997).
45 See, e.g., In re Hassen Imps. Pship, 256 B.R. 916, 920-
21 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2000).
46 Eriksons other arguments on this point are meritless.
Erikson asserts that [g]iven the fact of the supersedeas bond,
the substantial equity in Rockstads residence and in other
assets, . . . the judgment, having been recorded, is now
oversecured. Erikson argues that Am. Jur. 2d Bankruptcy 2302
(2003) supports the proposition that [t]he holder of an
oversecured claim can recover . . . any reasonable fees. This
authority, however, is clearly referring to recovery in the
federal court where bankruptcy proceedings occurred. Erikson
also argues he should be able to bring supplemental proceedings
under Civil Rule 15(d), for his expenses incurred in collection
efforts. Rule 15(d) authorizes supplemental pleadings, not
supplemental proceedings, and the pleading stage of this case has
long passed. Erikson offers no authority to support the notion
that a supplemental pleading may be offered to cover post-
judgment fees, nor could we locate any.
