You can
search the entire site.
or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices.
Western Star Trucks, Inc. v. Big Iron Equipment Service, Inc. (11/26/2004) sp-5847
Western Star Trucks, Inc. v. Big Iron Equipment Service, Inc. (11/26/2004) sp-5847
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage,
Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
WESTERN STAR TRUCKS, INC., and )
WESTERN STAR TRUCKS SALES, INC., ) Supreme Court No. S-10807
)
Appellants, )
) Superior Court No.
v. ) 4FA-00-49 CI
)
BIG IRON EQUIPMENT SERVICE, INC., ) O P I N I O N
)
Appellee. ) [No. 5847 - November 26,
2004]
)
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State
of Alaska, Fourth Judicial District,
Fairbanks, Mary E. Greene, Judge.
Appearances: Susan Orlansky, Ruth Botstein,
Feldman & Orlansky, Anchorage, for
Appellants. Thomas Van Flein, David A.
Carlson, Clapp, Peterson & Stowers, LLC,
Anchorage, for Appellee.
Before: Bryner, Chief Justice, Matthews,
Eastaugh, Fabe, and Carpeneti, Justices.
MATTHEWS, Justice.
A manufacturer of commercial trucks misrepresented the
consequences of an oral agreement that it made with a potential
parts and service dealer. The Unfair Trade Practices and
Consumer Protection Act prohibits misrepresenting the
consequences of an oral agreement. Dicta in our case law
indicate that the act only applies to transactions involving
consumer goods and services. The question in this case is
whether the act applies to a misrepresentation by a manufacturer
of commercial trucks to a potential parts and services dealer.
We answer yes because of the plain language of the act. The
dicta were meant to highlight the distinction between
transactions involving real estate and other transactions.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Western Star Trucks, Inc., manufactures commercial
trucks. When its dealership in Fairbanks closed in 1999, the
owners of Western Star Trucks in Alaska were left with no
convenient place to buy parts or obtain warranty services. After
receiving a number of concerned calls from truck owners, Western
Star sent its employees Rick Jarchow and Mike Murphy to Fairbanks
with instructions to fix the problem. Murphy called on Dave
Evans, formerly the service manager for the dealership in
Fairbanks, who was then working for Big Iron Equipment Service,
Inc. What followed was a series of meetings between Murphy,
Jarchow, Evans, and the president of Big Iron, Mike Scott.
These meetings resulted in an oral agreement, but what
was agreed to was disputed. Evans and Scott claimed that Murphy
and Jarchow promised that Big Iron would be the new Western Star
parts and service dealer for Alaska. Murphy and Jarchow, on the
other hand, claimed that they agreed that Big Iron was to be
Western Stars interim warranty station to perform truck repairs
and that Western Star would send Big Iron a dealer application
packet.
Relying on its understanding of the agreement, Big Iron
proceeded to spend over $50,000 in order to assume dealership
responsibilities. It also submitted a formal written dealership
application. After a period in which Big Iron performed warranty
work, Western Star rejected Big Irons dealership application and
awarded a dealership to another company.
Big Iron sued Western Star for breach of contract,
promissory estoppel, intentional or negligent misrepresentation,
and unfair trade practices. After a bench trial, Superior Court
Judge Mary E. Greene found for Western Star on the contract and
promissory estoppel claims. But the court found that Big Iron
had proved its claim for negligent misrepresentation, finding
that Western Star made a false representation when Murphy told
Big Iron that they would receive paperwork that was just a
formality. The court also found that this conduct violated AS
45.50.471(b)(14), a portion of the Unfair Trade Practices and
Consumer Protection Act, which prohibits representing that an
agreement confers or involves rights, remedies or obligations
which it does not confer or involve, or which are prohibited by
law. The court found that Big Irons actual damages were
$58,120.36. The court added prejudgment interest to this amount,
trebled the sum under the treble damages provision of the act,1
and entered judgment in favor of Big Iron for $180,990.94 plus
attorneys fees and costs.
Western Star appeals from the courts conclusion that
the act applies and the consequent trebling of actual damages.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issues of statutory interpretation are questions of law
which this court reviews in its independent judgment.2 Under
this standard the court adopts the rule of law that is most
persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy.3
DISCUSSION
Western Star contends that the Unfair Trade Practices
and Consumer Protection Act does not apply to a transaction
between a commercial vehicle manufacturer and a potential dealer,
and therefore Big Iron should recover only untrebled actual
damages. Western Stars argument is that the general prohibitions
of the act only apply to transactions involving consumer goods
and services and that the subsection on which the court relied,
.471(b)(14), prohibiting misrepresentations of rights, remedies,
and obligations, falls within this category.
Big Iron responds on both procedural and substantive
grounds. Procedurally, it contends that this argument was not
raised in the trial court and therefore must be considered waived
for purposes of appeal. Substantively, Big Iron argues that the
superior court correctly applied the act to the transaction in
question. We agree with Big Irons substantive position, thus
mooting consideration of its procedural point.
AS 45.50.471 Is Not Limited to Cases Involving Consumer
Goods or Services
Western Star appeals only the trial courts finding that
its conduct was a violation of the act. The court specifically
found a violation of AS 45.50.471(b)(14), which defines as an
unfair act: representing that an agreement confers or involves
rights, remedies or obligations which it does not confer or
involve, or which are prohibited by law.4 Western Star argues
that this was wrong because the statute does not apply to a
transaction such as this that does not involve consumer goods or
services. Big Iron argues that the plain meaning of the statute
encompasses this situation and that there is no legislative
history to suggest otherwise.
When interpreting a statute, this court looks to three
factors: the language of the statute, the legislative history,
and the legislative purpose behind the statute.5 This court has
rejected a mechanical application of the plain meaning rule,
. . . adopt[ing] a sliding scale approach instead.6 Under this
approach, the plainer the statutory language is, the more
convincing the evidence of contrary legislative purpose or intent
must be.7
Western Stars argument is not supported by the literal
language of the act. The act applies to all unfair or deceptive
acts in the conduct of trade or commerce,8 particularly if the
act falls within the specific categories enumerated in subsection
.471(b). But Western Stars argument is supported by language in
two of our decisions, State v. First National Bank of Anchorage,9
and Aloha Lumber Corp. v. University of Alaska.10
First National Bank involved an attempt by the state to
apply the act to certain practices of a real estate subdivider.
We held that the sale of real property is not within the
regulatory scope of the [act].11 In reaching this conclusion we
stated that the act is directed at regulating practices relating
to transactions involving consumer goods and services.12 But the
issue in First National Bank was not whether the act applied to
transactions involving personal property or services used by
businesses as distinct from personal property or services sold to
consumers. Instead, our usage of the phrase consumer goods and
services was merely a convenient but imprecise way of
distinguishing sales and services involving real estate from
those involving other property and services.
We reached our conclusion in First National Bank based
on the structure of subsection .471(b) and by reviewing
authorities from other states. Using the principle of ejusdem
generis we concluded that transactions centered on real estate
were not included because most of the twenty-five enumerated
prohibited transactions13 involved goods or goods and services
or were commonly associated with consumer goods and services
transactions. We stated:
Immediately following AS 45.50.471(a) is a
list of twenty-five specific acts or
practices which are expressly prohibited as
unfair methods of competition and deceptive
acts or practices. AS 45.50.471(b). Of
these, thirteen concern practices relating to
transactions involving goods or goods and
services generally.FN10 The remaining twelve
deal with practices involving the sale of
particular types of goodsFN11 or
services,FN12 or relate to certain types of
activities commonly associated with consumer
goods and services transactions.FN13 While
subsection (b) makes clear that this list is
not exclusive, none of the enumerated
prohibited acts mentions real property. Nor
do any other provisions of the Act suggest
that the legislature intended the sale of
real property to come within the Acts
purview.[14]
_____________________________________________
____
FN10 See AS 45.50.471(b)(1), (2), (3), (4),
(5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (11), (13) and (19).
FN11 AS 45.50.471(b)(18) (resetting vehicle
odometers); (21) (selling frozen meat as
fresh); (25) (failure to comply with AS
45.50.800-45.50.850, the Alaska Gasoline
Products Leasing Act).
FN12 AS 45.50.471(b)(17) (excess charges for
warranty repairs); (23) (failure to comply
with AS 45.45.130- 45.45.240, regulating
motor vehicle repairs); (24) (prohibiting
certain practices in connection with
counseling, consulting or arranging for
future services relating to the disposition
of a body upon death).
FN13 AS 45.50.471(b)(10) (misrepresentations
regarding price reductions); (14)
(misrepresenting legal rights or obligations
in an agreement); (15) (misrepresenting the
need for parts, replacement or repair
service); (16) (misrepresenting the authority
of an agent or representative to negotiate
the terms of a consumer transaction); (20)
(selling or offering to sell a right of
participation in a chain distributor scheme);
(22) (failure to comply with AS 45.02.350,
regulating the sale of goods or services by
door-to-door solicitation).
We note that twelve of the thirteen subsections of
.471(b) mentioning goods or goods and services, as set out in
footnote 10 quoted above, could apply to commercial goods and
services as readily as to those offered to consumers. The only
exception would be subsection (19) referring to chain referral
sales plans directed to consumers. Likewise, as to the four
subsections that do not mention goods or services but are general
in application, three (10), (14), and (15) would apply to
commercial goods and services as well as to consumer goods and
services. Only subsection (16) in this category is limited to
consumer transactions.15 Thus, the ejusdem generis approach
employed in First National Bank does not serve to distinguish
between transactions based on commercial and consumer products or
services.
In First National Bank we relied on a New Jersey case,
Neveroski v. Blair.16 The New Jersey court had applied a ejusdem
generis approach to the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act to conclude
that a misrepresentation in connection with the sale of real
property was not covered under the act. As quoted in First
National Bank, the New Jersey court concluded that the act was
directed only at regulating transactions involving products and
services sold to consumers in the popular sense.17 It appears
that the New Jersey court used language relating to consumer
transactions advisedly because the New Jersey act used the word
merchandise, which was defined in the act to include anything
offered, directly or indirectly, to the public for sale.18 But
there is nothing similar in the Alaska act that could serve to
limit the Alaska act to goods and services offered to the public.
We also noted in First National Bank that the acts of several
states involving deceptive merchandising practices specifically
included real estate whereas the Alaska act does not.19 Both the
New Jersey case and the statutes of other states cited in our
First National Bank discussion support the proposition that real
estate transactions were not intended to be covered by the Alaska
act, but neither would support a conclusion that the Alaska act
covered consumer but not commercial non-real estate transactions.
Aloha Lumber involved the sale of standing timber on
University land.20 A prospective buyer brought a claim under the
act against the University. We held that the act did not apply
to a sale of standing timber because standing timber is real
property not a consumer good.21 In reaching this conclusion we
did not undertake a new analysis of AS 45.50.471, but relied on
First National Bank.22 As in First National Bank, the issue in
Aloha Lumber was only whether transactions centered on real
property were covered by the act.
While First National Bank and Aloha Lumber clearly hold
that the act does not apply to transactions involving real
estate, we do not think that these cases should be interpreted to
bar the application of the act to transactions between businesses
involving services or commercial or consumer personal property.
As noted, many of the enumerated categories of subsection (b)
apply as readily to such transactions. Further, the New Jersey
case on which we relied for its ejusdem generis approach in First
National Bank and the statutory examples we cited were focused on
the distinction between real estate transactions on the one hand
and transactions not involving real estate on the other. They do
not support making a distinction under the Alaska act between
consumer and commercial transactions.
The legislative history of the act indicates that while
consumer protection was the dominant motive underlying the act,
the act was not intended to be limited to consumer transactions.
As first enacted in 1970, section .471 contained thirteen
enumerated prohibitions that correspond to the first thirteen
subsections in current subsection .471(b).23 The House Judiciary
Committee Report that accompanied the 1970 bill that became the
act states that the bill is based on legislation developed in
large part by the Federal Trade Commission, [and] is designed to
meet the increasing need in Alaska for the protection of
consumers as well as honest businessmen from the depredations of
those persons employing unfair or deceptive trade practices.24
The model legislation mentioned in the committee report is not
further identified, but the prohibitions of the 1970 act closely
resemble those in the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act of
1966 promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws.
The Alaska act was amended in 1974. Current
prohibitions 14 through 20 were added and subsection .471(a) was
revised to parallel the declaration of unlawfulness contained in
the Federal Trade Commission Act.25 Also added was current
section .545 requiring that in interpreting section .471 due
consideration and great weight should be given to interpretations
of the Federal Trade Commission Act by the Federal Trade
Commission and the federal courts.26 The governors transmittal
letter concerning the 1974 amendments states in part:
The language of the present Act is
amended to conform to the language of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, and the
interpretation provision is provided to
enable the Attorney General and the courts of
the state to utilize the body of law created
by the Federal Trade Commission. The Federal
Trade Commission and the Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws have
recommended the use of such conforming
language so that the consumer and the
businessman are provided with uniformity in
unfair trade laws.[27]
Both the committee report relating to the 1970 act and
the governors transmittal letter with respect to the 1974
amendments emphasize the need to protect consumers, but they do
not state that consumers are the only group protected by the act.
The 1970 Judiciary Committee Report includes honest businessmen
with consumers as those in need of protection from the
depredations of those employing unfair or deceptive trade
practices.28 The Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act on which
the 1970 act appears to have been modeled clearly is not limited
to the protection of consumers. The prefatory note to the
Uniform Act makes it clear that the act was also intended to
protect businesses from deceptive trade practices by other
businesses.29 Further, it is clear that 15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1), the
Federal Trade Commission Act, is not limited to consumer
transactions.30 Subsection .471(a) should likewise not be so
limited since subsection .471(a) closely parallels the language
of the federal act and the legislature has specifically provided
that due consideration and great weight should be given to
interpretations of the federal act.
We thus conclude that no sufficient reason exists for
departing from the literal language of the act in connection with
commercial transactions not involving real estate. Consequently,
we affirm the judgment of the superior court.
AFFIRMED.
_______________________________
1 AS 45.50.531(a).
2 In re Life Ins. Co. of Alaska, 76 P.3d 366, 368 (Alaska
2003).
3 Id.
4 AS 45.50.471(a) and (b) provide:
(a) Unfair methods of competition and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the
conduct of trade or commerce are declared to
be unlawful.
(b) The terms unfair methods of
competition and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices include, but are not limited to,
the following acts:
(1) fraudulently conveying or
transferring goods or services by
representing them to be those of another;
(2) falsely representing or designating
the geographic origin of goods or services;
(3) causing a likelihood of confusion or
misunderstanding as to the source,
sponsorship, or approval, or another persons
affiliation, connection, or association with
or certification of goods or services;
(4) representing that goods or services
have sponsorship, approval, characteristics,
ingredients, uses, benefits, or quantities
that they do not have or that a person has a
sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation,
or connection that the person does not have;
(5) representing that goods are original
or new if they are deteriorated, altered,
reconditioned, reclaimed, used, secondhand,
or seconds;
(6) representing that goods or services
are of a particular standard, quality, or
grade, or that goods are of a particular
style or model, if they are of another;
(7) disparaging the goods, services, or
business of another by false or misleading
representation of fact;
(8) advertising goods or services with
intent not to sell them as advertised;
(9) advertising goods or services with
intent not to supply reasonable expectable
public demand, unless the advertisement
prominently discloses a limitation of
quantity;
(10) making false or misleading
statements of fact concerning the reasons
for, existence of, or amounts of price
reductions;
(11) engaging in any other conduct
creating a likelihood of confusion or of
misunderstanding and which misleads, deceives
or damages a buyer or a competitor in
connection with the sale or advertisement of
goods or services;
(12) using or employing deception,
fraud, false pretense, false promise,
misrepresentation, or knowingly concealing,
suppressing, or omitting a material fact with
intent that others rely upon the concealment,
suppression or omission in connection with
the sale or advertisement of goods or
services whether or not a person has in fact
been misled, deceived or damaged;
(13) failing to deliver to the customer
at the time of an installment sale of goods
or services, a written order, contract, or
receipt setting out the name and address of
the seller and the name and address of the
organization that the seller represents, and
all of the terms and conditions of the sale,
including a description of the goods or
services, which shall be stated in readable,
clear, and unambiguous language;
(14) representing that an agreement
confers or involves rights, remedies or
obligations which it does not confer or
involve, or which are prohibited by law;
(15) knowingly making false or
misleading statements concerning the need for
parts, replacement, or repair service;
(16) misrepresenting the authority of a
salesman, representative or agent to
negotiate the final terms of a consumer
transaction;
(17) basing a charge for repair in whole
or in part on a guaranty or warranty rather
than on the actual value of the actual
repairs made or work to be performed on the
item without stating separately the charges
for the work and the charge for the guaranty
or warranty, if any;
(18) disconnecting, turning back or
resetting the odometer of a vehicle to reduce
the number of miles indicated;
(19) using a chain referral sales plan
by inducing or attempting to induce a
consumer to enter into a contract by offering
a rebate, discount, commission, or other
consideration, contingent upon the happening
of a future event, on the condition that the
consumer either sells, or gives information
or assistance for the purpose of leading to a
sale by the seller of the same or related
goods;
(20) selling or offering to sell a right
of participation in a chain distributor
scheme;
(21) selling, falsely representing or
advertising meat, fish or poultry which has
been frozen as fresh food;
(22) failing to comply with AS
45.02.350;
(23) failing to comply with AS 45.45.130
-- 45.45.240;
(24) counseling, consulting or arranging
for future services relating to the
disposition of a body upon death whereby
certain personal property, not including
cemetery lots and markers, will be furnished
or the professional services of a funeral
director or embalmer will be furnished,
unless the person receiving money or property
deposits the money or property, and money or
property is received, within five days of its
receipt, in a trust in a financial
institution whose deposits are insured by an
instrumentality of the federal government
designating the institution as the trustee as
a separate trust in the name only of the
person on whose behalf the arrangements are
made with a provision that the money or
property may only be applied to the purchase
of designated merchandise or services and
should the money or property deposited and
any accrued interest not be used for the
purposes intended on the death of the person
on whose behalf the arrangements are made,
all money or property in the trust shall
become part of that persons estate; upon
demand by the person on whose behalf the
arrangements are made, all money or property
in the trust including accrued interest,
shall be paid to that person; this paragraph
does not prohibit the charging of a separate
fee for consultation, counseling or
arrangement services if the fee is disclosed
to the person making the arrangement; any
arrangement under this paragraph which would
constitute a contract of insurance under AS
21 is subject to the provisions of AS 21;
(25) failing to comply with the terms of
AS 45.50.800 -- 45.50.850 (Alaska Gasoline
Products Leasing Act);
(26) failing to comply with AS 45.30
relating to mobile home warranties and mobile
home parks;
(27) failing to comply with AS
14.48.060(b)(13);
(28) dealing in hearing aids and failing
to comply with AS 08.55;
(29) violating AS 45.45.910(a), (b), or
(c);
(30) failing to comply with AS
45.50.473;
(31) violating the provisions of AS
45.45.400;
(32) knowingly selling a reproduction of
a piece of art or handicraft that was made by
a resident of the state unless the
reproduction is clearly labeled as a
reproduction; in this paragraph,
reproduction means a copy of an original if
the copy is
(A) substantially the same as the
original; and
(B) not made by the person who made the
original;
(33) violating AS 08.66 (motor vehicle
dealers);
(34) violating AS 08.66.200 -- 08.66.350
(motor vehicle buyers agents);
(35) violating AS 45.63 (telephonic
solicitations);
(36) violating AS 45.68 (charitable
solicitations);
(37) violating AS 45.50.474 (on board
promotions);
(38) referring a person to a dentist or
a dental practice that has paid or will pay a
fee for the referral unless the person making
the referral discloses at the time the
referral is made that the dentist or dental
practice has paid or will pay a fee based on
the referral;
(39) advertising that a person can
receive a referral to a dentist or a dental
practice without disclosing in the
advertising that the dentist or dental
practice to which the person is referred has
paid or will pay a fee based on the referral
if, in fact, the dentist or dental practice
to which the person is referred has paid or
will pay a fee based on the referral.
(40) violating AS 45.50.477(a)-(c);
(41) failing to comply with AS
45.50.475;
(42) violating AS 45.35 (lease-purchase
agreements);
(43) violating AS 45.25.400 -- 45.25.590
(motor vehicle dealer practices);
(44) violating AS 45.66 (sale of
business opportunities).
5 Muller v. BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., 923 P.2d 783,
787 (Alaska 1996).
6 Id. at 787-88.
7 Id.
8 AS 45.50.471(a).
9 660 P.2d 406 (Alaska 1982).
10 994 P.2d 991 (Alaska 1999).
11 660 P.2d at 414.
12 Id. at 412.
13 The list has since been expanded to forty-six.
14 Id. at 412-13.
15 The express limitation to consumers in subsection (16)
suggests that transactions falling within the other subsections
were not intended to be so limited.
16 358 A.2d 473, 480 (N.J. Super. 1976).
17 Id. at 480 (quoted in First National Bank, 660 P.2d at
413).
18 Id. at 479 (quoted in First National Bank, 660 P.2d at
413).
19 First National Bank, 660 P.2d at 413 n.14.
20 994 P.2d 991 (Alaska 1999).
21 Id. at 1002.
22 Id.
23 Ch. 246, 2, SLA 1970.
24 Judiciary Committee Report on HCSCS for Senate Bill No.
352, House Journal Supp. No. 10 at 1, 1970 House Journal 744
(emphasis added).
25 15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1) provides: Unfair methods of
competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby declared
unlawful.
26 AS 45.50.545 provides: In interpreting AS 45.50.471 due
consideration and great weight should be given the interpretation
of 15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1) ( 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission
Act).
27 1974 House Journal 122, Letter of Governor William A.
Egan to the Honorable Tom Fink, Speaker of the House.
28 House Journal Supp. No. 10 at 1.
29 The prefatory note states in part as follows:
The tort action for deceptive trade practices
or passing off developed from the common-law
action for trademark infringement. It
embraced imitation of fanciful and coined
marks and names as well as those which had
developed trade significance but did not
qualify technically as trademarks. The
action was historically available whenever
one trader diverted patronage from a rival by
falsely representing that his goods were the
goods of his rival.
The prefatory note goes on to observe that this
doctrine was developed largely in the federal courts as federal
common law. When federal common law was abolished in Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), federal judges were
obliged to rely on state law which had marked time and was poorly
developed. Thus one reason for the Uniform Deceptive Trade
Practices Act was to reinstate the causes of action available to
businesses against other businesses that had developed as a
matter of federal common law but were effectively extinguished by
the Erie doctrine. 74 U.L.A. 265 (1985) (prefatory note to
Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act).
The prefatory note also indicates that another purpose
of the proposed act was to alter the common law doctrine under
which a businessmen was not generally subject to common law
liability to a fellow tradesman for false or deceptive
advertisement. Id. at 266.
The comment to section 2(a)(5) of the Deceptive Trade
Practices Act corresponding to subsection .471(b)(4) of the
Alaska act refers to an Alaska Territorial case, Alaska Sales &
Service, Inc. v. Rutledge, 128 F. Supp. 1 (D. Alaska 1955), in
which the court held that a complaint by a franchised dealer
against a nonfranchised seller of automobiles that the latter was
misrepresenting his authority stated a valid cause of action for
unfair competition. Similarly, other sections of the commentary
in the Uniform Act refer to cases between businesses as
illustrative examples of the conduct intended to be prohibited by
the act. See, e.g., Parkway Baking Co. v. Freihofer Baking Co.,
255 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1958); Triangle Publications v. Rohrlich,
167 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1948); L.E. Waterman Co. v. Gordon, 72 F.2d
272 (2d Cir.1934); Maytag Co. v. Meadows Mfg. Co., 35 F.2d 403
(7th Cir. 1929); Burlington Mills Corp. v. Roy Fabrics, 91 F.
Supp. 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), affd per curiam, 182 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir.
1950); Mayfair Farms, Inc. v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 172 A.2d 26
(N.J. Super. 1961); Electrolux Corp. v. Val-Worth, Inc., 6 N.Y.2d
556 (N.Y. 1959).
30 The federal courts have repeatedly and historically
applied [the provisions of 15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1)] to situations not
involving consumers. Larsen Chelsey Realty Co. v. Larsen, 656
A.2d 1009, 1020 (Conn. 1995) (citing Yamaha Motor Co., Ltd. v.
Federal Trade Commn, 657 F.2d 971 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied
sub nom. Brunswick Corp. v. Federal Trade Commn, 456 U.S. 915
(1982); Sandura Co. v. Federal Trade Commn, 339 F.2d 847 (6th
Cir. 1964); American Tobacco Co. v. Federal Trade Commn, 9 F.2d
570 (2d Cir. 1925), aff'd, 274 U.S. 543 (1927)).
