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State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. White-Rodgers Corp. (9/26/2003) sp-5738
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. White-Rodgers Corp. (9/26/2003) sp-5738
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage,
Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY )
COMPANY, ) Supreme Court No. S-10530
)
Plaintiff, ) U.S. District Court No.
A01-146CV (JKS)
)
v. )
) O P I N I O N
WHITE-RODGERS CORPORATION, )
STATE INDUSTRIES, INC., and ) [No. 5738 - September 26,
2003]
SEMCO ENERGY, INC. d/b/a/ )
ENSTAR NATURAL GAS CO., )
)
Defendants. )
)
Certified Question from the United States
District Court for the District of Alaska,
James K. Singleton, Jr., Judge.
Appearances: Rod R. Sisson, Sisson &
Knutson, P.C., Anchorage, for Plaintiff State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co. Patrick D. McVey,
Riddell Williams P.S., Seattle, Washington,
Thomas A. Matthews and Thomas L. Hause,
Matthews & Zahare, P.C., Anchorage, for
Defendants White-Rodgers Corp. and State
Industries, Inc. Madelon M. Blum, Lynch &
Blum, P.C., Anchorage, for Defendant SEMCO
Energy, Inc., d/b/a ENSTAR Natural Gas Co.
Before: Fabe, Chief Justice, Matthews,
Eastaugh, Bryner, and Carpeneti, Justices.
PER CURIAM.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1995 a natural gas explosion destroyed the home of
William and Sally Brook. Their insurer, State Farm, paid the
Brooks' property damages. Nearly six years after the explosion,
State Farm sued in federal court to recover its payments from
three companies whose allegedly faulty products or negligent
actions caused the explosion. On certification from the federal
court, we now consider whether State Farm's claim for the Brooks'
property damages is covered by Alaska's two-year "tort" statute
of limitations or its six-year statute of limitations "for waste
or trespass upon real property." Because we have recently held
that the six-year statute for "trespass" attaches broadly to any
alleged interference with a possessor's property rights, we
conclude that the six-year limit governs State Farm's claim.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
This case arises on undisputed facts:
On March 23, 2001, State Farm Fire &
Casualty Company ("State Farm") filed its
original complaint, seeking to recover money
it paid out to William and Sally Brook when
their house was damaged in an explosion on
March 25, 1995. State Farm alleges that the
explosion was caused by a natural gas leak
that State Farm traces to products
manufactured, sold, or supplied by Defendants
White-Rodgers Corporation, State Industries,
Inc., and Semco Energy, Inc. d/b/a Enstar
Natural Gas (collectively "Defendants").
More specifically, State Farm alleges
that Defendant Enstar negligently inspected,
installed, and/or maintained the natural gas
service regulator, which controls (i.e.,
reduces) the pressure of gas supplied to the
residence from the higher "street pressure"
of the main gas supply line. State Farm
further alleges that a White-Rodgers gas
control valve installed on a State Industries
water heater was defective and/or negligently
designed and/or manufactured, because it
released gas when exposed to the "street
pressure" of the main gas supply line.
Defendants moved for summary judgment
arguing that State Farm's real property
claims were not brought within the two-year
statute of limitations of AS 09.10.070.
State Farm concedes that the action was not
commenced within two years, but contends that
the six-year statute of limitations of
AS 09.10.050 applies to its real property
claims.
At the time pertinent to State Farm's claim, AS
09.10.070 provided in part: "A person may not bring an action . .
. for any injury to the person or rights of another not arising
on contract and not specifically provided otherwise . . . unless
the action is commenced within two years."1 In contrast, AS
09.10.050 provided in part: "Unless the action is commenced
within six years, a person may not bring an action . . . for
waste or trespass upon real property[.]"2 In considering the
defendants' summary judgment motion, the federal district court
predicted that the six-year trespass statute would likely apply
to State Farm's claim. To support this conclusion, the court
cited McDowell v. State,3 which at that time was our most recent
decision interpreting these two- and six-year statutory limits
for similar claims. Nevertheless, because it found no Alaska
Supreme Court case directly on point, the federal court certified
the matter to us for resolution under Alaska Rule of Appellate
Procedure 407.4 We granted the federal court's request and now
answer the certified question.5
III. DISCUSSION
When the federal court issued its certification
request, our case law left the certified question unsettled. In
McDowell v. State, we had declined to read the six-year statute
of limitation's reference as adopting the narrow, historical
distinction between "trespass" - a direct invasion of property -
and "trespass on the case" - an indirect invasion;6 looking
instead to "the plain or common meaning of the term," we held
that AS 09.10.050's six-year limit for "trespass upon real
property" "is not restricted to actions that allege technical
trespass, but instead includes actions that allege an
interference with the possessor's property rights."7 But as the
federal court recognized in its certification order, McDowell
might not control the present case. The complaint in McDowell
alleged an interference with exclusive possession caused by a
direct invasion onto the plaintiff's land - spilled or leaked
petroleum seeping from adjacent property;8 arguably, then,
McDowell's broad reading of AS 09.10.050 might not be dispositive
here, since State Farm's complaint alleges no direct, trespassory
entry onto the Brooks' property.
After the federal court issued its certification order,
however, we resolved this uncertainty in Fernandes v. Portwine,
squarely extending McDowell to a nuisance claim that entailed no
direct trespassory invasion.9 Confirming McDowell's broad
reading of the six-year trespass statute, our decision in
Fernandes "look[ed] to the type of injuries claimed, as opposed
to the causes of action pled,"10 concluding:
"Trespass" has both a narrow and a broad
meaning. The narrow meaning refers to an
unlawful entry upon the land of another. The
broad meaning encompasses, as we recognized
in McDowell in a statute of limitations
context, any "unlawful interference with
one's person, property, or rights." The
broader definition here, as in McDowell,
determines the meaning of AS 09.10.050.
Using this definition, the Portwines'
nuisance claims were encompassed by
AS 09.10.050.[11]
The defendants in the present case attempt to
distinguish Fernandes, arguing that State Farm's claim "sounds
in" products liability or tort and alleges no "unlawful" entry
onto or interference with the Brooks' property. But under the
reading of AS 09.10.050 we adopted in McDowell and Fernandes,
these distinctions have no legal consequence. Looking to the
injuries claimed, rather than to the cause of action pled, we
find that State Farm's claim for property damages alleges a
substantial interference with the Brooks' right to possess and
use their residence; and because this claim alleges wrongful
conduct that would be actionable if proved, that is, conduct that
would make the defendants legally liable for the damages, the
nature of the alleged interference is "unlawful," as required by
Fernandes. We thus hold Fernandes to be controlling precedent
here.
IV. CONCLUSION
Given the undisputed statement of facts certified by
the federal court, we conclude that the six-year "trespass"
statute of limitations in AS 09.10.050 governs State Farm's
claims.
_______________________________
1AS 09.10.070 was amended in 1997, after the Brooks' cause of
action arose, but the parties agree that the pre-1997 version of
the applicable statute of limitations applies to State Farm's
claims. Moreover, the parties do not contend that the 1997
amendments would have any effect here, even if they applied.
2Though AS 09.10.050 was recently amended in other respects, its
trespass provision remains substantially identical.
3957 P.2d 965 (Alaska 1998).
4Alaska Rule of Appellate Procedure 407(a) authorizes this court
to answer "questions of law of this state which may be
determinative of the cause then pending in the certifying court
. . . [if] there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of
the supreme court of this state."
5The United States District Court actually posed two separate
questions: whether AS 09.10.050 would apply to "any alleged
negligent or other tortious injury to real property" and, more
specifically, whether State Farm's claim in this case constitutes
"waste or trespass upon real property" under that provision. We
choose to focus on the second, more specific question, finding it
unnecessary to decide whether the six-year time limit would
necessarily govern all claims for negligent and tortious injuries
to real property. Cf. Toner for Toner v. Lederle Lab., Div. of
Am. Cyanamid Co., 779 F.2d 1429, 1433 (9th Cir. 1986)
(recognizing that a court accepting certification is not bound
by the certifying court's phrasing and "may reformulate the
relevant state law questions as it perceives them to be, in light
of the contentions of the parties").
6957 P.2d at 969-70.
7Id. at 970.
8Id. at 967, 970.
956 P.3d 1, 5-6 (Alaska 2002).
10Id. at 6 (approvingly quoting superior court's decision).
11Id. (footnotes omitted).
