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Riddell v. Edwards (9/5/2003) sp-5733
Riddell v. Edwards (9/5/2003) sp-5733
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage,
Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
ROBERT J. RIDDELL, )
) Supreme Court No. S-10025
Appellant, )
) Superior Court No.
v. ) 1KE-97-154 PR
)
IRVIN H. EDWARDS, ) O P I N I O N
)
Appellee. ) [No. 5733 - September 5,
2003]
)
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State
of Alaska, First Judicial District,
Ketchikan, Larry R. Weeks, Judge.
Appearances: Robert J. Riddell, pro se, Ward
Cove. Bryan T. Schulz, Holman & Schulz,
Ketchikan, for Appellee (no brief filed).
Before: Fabe, Chief Justice, Matthews,
Eastaugh, Bryner, and Carpeneti, Justices.
BRYNER, Justice.
CARPENETI, Justice, dissenting.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a probate proceeding involving the estate of his
deceased wife, Robert J. Riddell petitioned as a surviving spouse
to receive his statutory homestead allowance, family allowance,
and elective share. Despite finding that Riddell had
"ingratiated himself" to his wife before their marriage "for the
purpose[] of obtaining her assets" and that his wife had suffered
from dementia for the majority of their relationship, the
superior court ruled that Riddell and his wife had been validly
married and that the estate had no standing to argue that the
marriage was voidable. The court nonetheless concluded that
Riddell's unconscionable conduct warranted establishing a
constructive trust to give the estate Riddell's statutory
benefits. Because the superior court's finding that the marriage
was valid is not disputed and because Alaska law unconditionally
gives the surviving spouse of a valid marriage the right to
marital allowances and a share of the estate based solely on the
existence of a valid marriage, we hold that the necessary
elements for a constructive trust are lacking and that
establishing the trust exceeded the court's equitable powers. We
thus vacate the trust and remand with directions to fix the
amount of Riddell's statutory benefits.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
In December 1993 Lillie Rahm-Riddell, who was in her
early nineties, met Robert J. Riddell, who was in his mid-
sixties. Riddell ingratiated himself to Lillie and became her
handyman. He soon moved in with her and started to isolate her
from her family and friends. Riddell married Lillie in Ketchikan
in May 1995, while guardianship proceedings were pending to
determine Lillie's competency to manage her personal and
financial affairs. Those proceedings resulted in the appointment
of the Public Guardian as Lillie's primary conservator; several
months later, prompted by reports of domestic violence, the
superior court entered an order restraining Riddell from
contacting Lillie. Lillie moved to an assisted-living home in
Washington state. Riddell spirited her away from the home and
took her to Oregon, where they lived together until Lillie died
in September 1997. The entire time that Lillie knew Riddell, she
suffered from Alzheimer's disease and/or senile dementia.1
Lillie's brother, Irvin H. Edwards, accepted the
superior court's appointment as personal representative of her
estate. Ensuing litigation between the estate and Riddell
generated three appeals. In the first appeal, we affirmed the
superior court's order invalidating for lack of testamentary
capacity a will that Lillie executed shortly before her death
leaving her entire estate to Riddell.2 In the second, we
affirmed the superior court's order denying creditor claims that
Riddell filed against the estate seeking compensation for alleged
premarital and marital services to Lillie.3
The third appeal, which we now consider, arises from
two related superior court orders: (1) an order declaring
Lillie's marriage to Riddell valid and finding Riddell eligible
as Lillie's surviving spouse to claim his statutory rights to
allowances and share; and (2) a subsequent order, based on a
finding of fraudulent conduct by Riddell toward Lillie,
establishing a constructive trust in the estate's favor to
receive Riddell's payments of allowances and share. Our decision
requires us to describe these orders in considerable detail.
In the course of the probate proceedings, after Riddell
petitioned for his statutory allowances and share, the superior
court ordered briefing and conducted a hearing to determine the
validity of the marriage. The estate sought to invalidate the
marriage, arguing that it was voidable because Lillie had been
incompetent and Riddell had fraudulently induced her to enter
into the marriage. Following the hearing, the court issued a
thoughtful and carefully reasoned decision that found clear and
convincing evidence of Riddell's fraudulent conduct toward Lillie
but nevertheless rejected the estate's challenge to the marriage
and declared Riddell eligible to claim allowances and share.
The superior court began its decision by unequivocally
recognizing the compelling evidence of Riddell's misconduct
toward Lillie:
A review of the prior evidence and the
new evidence leaves no question to any
objective observer by clear and convincing
evidence Mr. Riddell ingratiated himself to
[Lillie] for the purposes of obtaining her
assets. She was suffering from dementia, was
alone and lonely and he did small things for
her in a way that kept her from making
decisions that she would have made when she
was fully competent. He isolated her by
changing her phone, bullying family and
friends that were old and frail themselves in
such a way that they were not able to be
supportive of her.
Three separate court actions involving
injunctions under the Domestic Violence law,
a conservatorship and a guardianship were
filed. Lawyers, a conservator, a temporary
guardian and a guardian ad litem were
appointed for [Lillie]. Mr. Riddell defeated
them all. In his own words, he and [Lillie]
sneaked to Juneau to get a marriage license
and got married secretly in Ketchikan while
conservator proceedings were pending.
Mr. Riddell physically intimidated
friends, family, lawyers and caregivers. He
spirited [Lillie] away from the nursing home
in Washington and kept her from authorities
despite attempts to locate her by lawyers, a
private investigator and court orders that he
disclose her whereabouts.
Mr. Riddell provided [Lillie] with the
attention she craved and did small things for
her that made her life better. He also
abused her physically and cut her off from
her friends and family so that she was
utterly dependent upon him for all her needs.
But the court also recognized that this evidence did
not necessarily render Lillie's marriage invalid. Noting that
"[p]ersons suffering from dementia have fluctuating periods of
more contact with reality and ability to cope," the court
reviewed the evidence and found credible testimony indicating
that Lillie was competent and understood the consequences of her
actions at the time that she married Riddell. In the court's
view, then, the evidence did not convincingly prove Lillie's
incompetence when she entered into the marriage: "this court
cannot say that at the time she applied for the marriage license
or when she actually participated in the ceremony she did not
understand that she was getting married."
The superior court then proceeded to consider the legal
significance of this finding; in so doing, it drew an important
distinction between marriages that are void and those that are
merely voidable. The court noted that, in AS 25.24.020, the
Alaska Legislature defined a narrow class of marriages as legally
void. That statute provides:
A marriage which is prohibited by law on
account of consanguinity between the persons,
or a subsequent marriage contracted by a
person during the life of a former husband or
wife which marriage has not been annulled or
dissolved is void.
In contrast, the court pointed out, AS 25.24.030
defines a broader class of marriages as voidable. Alaska Statute
25.24.030 provides:
A marriage may be declared void for any of
the following causes existing at the time of
the marriage:
(1) [under the age of legal consent];
(2) that either party was of unsound mind,
unless that party, after coming to reason,
freely cohabited with the other as husband
and wife;
(3) that the consent of either party was
obtained by fraud, unless that party
afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts
constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with
the other as husband and wife;
(4) that the consent of either party was
obtained by force, unless that party
afterwards freely cohabited with the other as
husband and wife;
(5) [failure to consummate].
The court further noted an early Oregon Supreme Court
decision4 construing statutory provisions similar to Alaska's to
allow a marriage to be declared void on the ground of incapacity
only when the party lacked capacity to understand the transaction
and its quality and consequences. And the court also emphasized
the legislature's intent to allow a challenge under this broader
class of voidable marriages to be brought only by a party to the
marriage; AS 25.05.031 unequivocally states the limitation:
If either party to a marriage is incapable of
consenting to it at the time of the marriage
for want of marriageable age of consent or
sufficient understanding, or if the consent
of either party is obtained by force or
fraud, or if either party fails to consummate
the marriage, the marriage is voidable but
only at the suit of the party under the
disability or upon whom the force or fraud is
imposed.
Given this statute, the court concluded that "[t]he personal
representative of the estate may not bring a suit regarding the
voidability of a marriage on . . . behalf of a party under a
disability after that party has died."
After surveying cases from other jurisdictions, the
superior court further determined that Alaska's statutory scheme
reflects the majority view, which the court characterized as
precluding the personal representative of a deceased spouse from
challenging the validity of the spouse's marriage in the absence
of either an express statutory provision allowing post-mortem
challenges or gross fraud coupled with mental disability.
Applying this analysis, then, the superior court
examined the circumstances of the case at issue here to determine
whether they established that Lillie's marriage was either void
under AS 25.24.020 (as opposed to being merely voidable under
AS 25.24.030) or involved the kind of gross fraud that led other
jurisdictions to entertain post-mortem claims of invalidity by
personal representatives. Because the court found the evidence
as a whole to show that Lillie "understood the nature of her
decision to marry Mr. Riddell," it declined to find the marriage
void. The court went on to consider whether the case fell within
the gross-fraud exception, which allows post-mortem challenges to
a valid marriage upon proof of gross fraud arising from "a
combination of incompetence and egregious behavior." Though it
noted that "Mr. Riddell did isolate [Lillie] from her family and
friends and he may have married her to obtain her property," the
court found that "his conduct did not rise to the level of gross
fraud."
Accordingly, the superior court's order declared the
marriage valid under AS 25.24.020's voidness criteria and
precluded the estate from challenging it under AS 25.24.030's
provisions describing voidable marriages; on this basis the court
ruled that Riddell was Lillie's surviving spouse and was
therefore eligible to claim a surviving spouse's statutory
allowances and share.
But the court's first order merely declared that
Riddell was eligible to claim his statutory allowances and share;
it did not actually direct the estate to pay. Moreover, in
declining to allow the estate to pursue its challenge to Lillie's
marriage, the court cited and discussed Patey v. Peaslee, a case
involving analogous facts in which the New Hampshire Supreme
Court construed New Hampshire laws to preclude a personal
representative's action to invalidate the deceased spouse's
marriage but nonetheless allowed the personal representative to
pursue an equitable claim seeking to establish a constructive
trust in favor of the estate.5 This discussion of Patey in the
superior court's first order planted the seeds for the order that
followed.
After receiving the order declaring him eligible to
receive the statutory marital allowances and share, Riddell filed
a motion seeking to enforce that order. In response, the estate
cross-moved to establish a constructive trust requiring Riddell's
allowances and share to be paid to the estate. The superior
court's second order granted the estate's cross-motion for a
constructive trust. The court preliminarily observed that "[a]
constructive trust can be imposed in any case where a wrongful
acquisition or detention of property to which another is entitled
has occurred." Relying on its earlier order, the court
reiterated its view that the record "leaves no question to any
objective observer by clear and convincing evidence [that] Mr.
Riddell ingratiated himself to [Lillie] for the purposes of
obtaining her assets." And quoting Patey v. Peaslee, the court
emphasized that its earlier order validating the marriage did not
bar the estate's request for a constructive trust:
Although this court was unable to find the
type of gross fraud needed to invalidate the
marriage in its previous findings, that does
not mean the "exercise of equity jurisdiction
to impose a constructive trust with respect
to property acquired from the decedent" is
not warranted here.[6]
After reviewing Patey's list of relevant criteria to
consider in establishing a constructive trust, the court ruled
that, "[b]ecause of the previous factual findings by the court,
this court finds clear and convincing evidence that a
constructive trust is warranted."
Riddell appeals.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Although we generally defer to the trial court's broad
discretion in balancing equitable principles, we use our
independent judgment for legal issues and review de novo the
court's interpretation of the law and its application of law to
facts.7
B. The Elements of a Constructive Trust
A constructive trust is an equitable remedy that
becomes available upon clear and convincing proof that the party
against whom the trust will be imposed has been unjustly enriched
by receiving assets that rightly belong to the party in whose
favor the trust will be created.8 We have said that a
"constructive trust may be defined as a [device] used by chancery
to compel one who unfairly holds a property interest to convey
that interest to another to whom it justly belongs"; the trust
arises to prevent the property holder from retaining property
obtained "by reason of unjust, unconscionable, or unlawful
means."9 At a minimum, then, a constructive trust presupposes a
transfer or holding of property in which the equitable
beneficiary has a legal interest and unconscionable conduct by
the property's holder in connection with its acquisition.
In its order imposing a constructive trust, the
superior court did not expressly consider whether Riddell's claim
of allowances and share would result in a transfer of property
belonging to the estate, or in which the estate had some legal
interest. But the court's earlier order, which recognized the
validity of Riddell's marriage to Lillie, weighs heavily against
the presence of this necessary element.
The estate has not challenged the superior court's
decision upholding the validity of the marriage despite Lillie's
vulnerable mental condition and Riddell's fraudulent conduct.
Because that decision turned on the trial court's evaluation of
competing evidence and has not been disputed, we have no occasion
to question it here. A prospective heir generally has no
recognized right to a living relative's property: we have held
that a decedent's property interests devolve to heirs and
devisees only upon death;10 and even then the heirs and devisees
receive their interests only "subject to" the surviving spouse's
statutory allowances and share,11 which similarly vest upon death
and depend solely on the surviving spouse's marital status - that
is, on the existence of a valid marriage.12
By ruling that Riddell's marriage was valid and could
not be set aside by the estate, the superior court effectively
determined that Riddell's statutory entitlements to allowances
and share had vested upon Lillie's death - before Lillie's estate
ever received any cognizable interest or right to the portion of
Lillie's estate that vested in Riddell. As a matter of law,
then, the court's order validating the marriage ruled out the
existence of an element necessary to support the court's
subsequent decision to impose a constructive trust: a finding
that the portion of Lillie's estate passing to Riddell "justly
belong[ed]" to the estate.13
Moreover, even if we assume that the estate had a
cognizable interest in these funds, the superior court's
declaration of a valid marriage would still rule out the second
prerequisite for a constructive trust: a finding that Riddell
obtained his statutory rights "by reason of unjust,
unconscionable, or unlawful means."14 As already explained,
Riddell acquired his statutory right to allotments and share
solely because he married Lillie and survived her with their
marriage intact. For reasons we address below in Part III.C. of
this opinion, we conclude that the superior court's order
declaring the marriage to be valid despite Riddell's
unconscionable premarital conduct precludes a finding that he
acquired his statutory rights because of that conduct.
To be sure, as the superior court noted in its order
validating the marriage, Riddell's fraudulent conduct persisted
after he married Lillie; and as this court made clear in
Riddell I, Riddell's continuing misconduct ultimately caused
Lillie to execute a new will shortly before her death, naming
Riddell as her sole beneficiary.15 But the superior court's
earlier decision invalidating that will for lack of testamentary
capacity - the decision we affirmed in Riddell I16 - directly
addressed the harm caused by that ongoing misconduct. And
neither the new will nor the unconscionable postmarital conduct
that led to its execution had any effect on Riddell's right to
the statutory benefits, since his right to those benefits
depended solely on the validity of the marriage at its inception
and on his survival of Lillie while still her spouse. Moreover,
the estate did not assert, nor did the superior court find, that
Riddell's misconduct during the marriage brought about or
hastened Lillie's death, thereby causing his statutory benefits
to vest sooner, or that it had any other causal connection to the
timing or ultimate vesting of his right to the benefits.
The absence of a causal link between Riddell's
unconscionable postmarital conduct and his right to receive the
statutory benefits of marriage thus readily distinguishes his
case from cases involving constructive trusts imposed against
murderers - a category that the dissent mistakenly describes as
being similar to the one before us.17 For as the dissent itself
acknowledges, the constructive trust principle applies in those
cases because "the title to property is acquired by murder as it
is where the title is acquired by fraud, duress, or undue
influence."18 Thus, in the present case, the causal link that
justifies imposing a constructive trust in cases of spousal
murder19 - and that certainly would have justified a constructive
trust had it been found to exist here - is missing.
C. General Principles Governing Equitable
Relief
A consideration of generally recognized principles
governing equitable relief confirms the conclusion that a
constructive trust was improper under these circumstances. Two
equitable principles are relevant here.
First, a court acting in equity ordinarily " `cannot
[intrude] in matters that are plain and fully covered by [a]
statute.' "20 Here, the Alaska Legislature has explicitly set out
the property interests that vest upon death in a surviving
spouse: homestead allowance, family allowance, and elective
share; the legislature has specified the circumstance that makes
them vest: the existence of a "surviving spouse" - that is, a
spouse who remained legally married at the time of death; and the
legislature has attached no other prerequisite to the surviving
spouse's statutory right.21 Similarly, by specifying the
requirements for a valid marriage and limiting the ways in which
a marriage may be invalidated, the legislature has fully covered
the manner in which courts may determine whether a person
qualifies as a "surviving spouse" for purposes of acquiring a
vested statutory right to allowances and share.22 As the superior
court recognized in upholding the validity of Riddell's marriage,
the legislature deliberately limited the right to challenge the
validity of a marriage that is voidable on grounds of disability,
force, or fraud, extending that right exclusively to "the party
under the disability or upon whom the force or fraud is imposed."23
Given the superior court's findings that Riddell's marriage was
neither void ab initio because of Lillie's incapacity nor
voidable after her death for gross fraud arising from "a
combination of [Lillie's] incompetence and [Riddell's] egregious
behavior," it follows that the statutory provisions governing a
surviving spouse's automatic entitlements to allotments and share
"fully covered" Riddell's situation.24
A second, closely related equitable principle that
controls these circumstances is that a court must not apply
equity to do indirectly " `what the law or its clearly defined
policy forbids to be done directly.' "25 Here, the superior court
recognized that Lillie, despite her incapacity, understood the
consequences of her actions when she accepted Riddell in
marriage; the court further held that, even when combined with
Lillie's incapacity, Riddell's fraudulent actions were not
sufficiently gross to allow a post-mortem claim that the marriage
was voidable. In consequence, as we have seen, the law required
the court to declare Riddell eligible to receive the statutory
benefits of a surviving spouse; indeed, the court's first order
recognized that requirement. Yet by subsequently invoking the
same factual findings of fraud and incompetence to trigger the
equitable mechanism of a constructive trust, the court did
indirectly what the law specifically forbade it to do directly:
in nullifying Riddell's already vested right to allotments and
share and awarding the money to the estate, the court effectively
allowed the estate to avoid on equitable grounds the direct legal
consequences of the court's earlier legal conclusion that Lillie
had made "a competent decision about her marriage" and had
"understood the nature of her decision to marry Mr. Riddell."
D. Other Considerations
We recognize that the superior court rested its
decision in part on the New Hampshire Supreme Court's decision in
Patey v. Peaslee and that Patey approved pursuit of an action for
a constructive trust under closely similar circumstances.26 Yet
the majority's decision in Patey cites no useful authority for
its unconventional application of the constructive trust remedy;
as far as we can determine, the decision has never been followed
under similar circumstances since it was issued in 1957. And in
our view, the dissent in Patey persuasively argues essentially
the same point we make here: that the status and benefits of
marriage are within the province of the legislature and that a
court must avoid using its equitable powers to invalidate rights
that flow from surviving a legally valid marriage when the
legislature so clearly directs those rights.27 We thus decline to
follow Patey.
We further recognize that Alaska's Uniform Probate Code
generally gives trial courts broad latitude to supplement
statutory provisions with equitable principles: AS 13.06.015
specifies that "[u]nless displaced by the particular provisions
of [the code], the principles of law and equity supplement those
provisions."28 Yet nothing in this opinion discourages the use of
these broad supplemental powers; we merely hold that the factual
circumstances the trial court found here did not leave room for
equitable supplementation: the "particular provisions" of
statutory law governing void and voidable marriages and accrual
of allowances and share fully covered this situation and
affirmatively "displaced" the equitable remedy of constructive
trust. We apply no broad limitations on the use of equitable
measures in probate cases; instead, we merely hold that the
selected measure of a constructive trust did not apply here.29
The facts in this case obviously make it tempting to
deny Riddell any benefit from his fraudulent conduct; this makes
the recourse of a constructive trust seem alluringly sensible.
But allowing offensive factual circumstances to dictate an
unauthorized legal remedy can have a pernicious effect in the
long-run by upsetting the complex and delicate balance that our
system of government strives to maintain between the
legislature's lawmaking powers and the courts' traditional
equitable powers. The superior court here carefully examined all
relevant evidence and declared Riddell to be the surviving spouse
of a valid marriage. The legislature has spelled out the rights
that Riddell acquires by virtue of his status. To dilute these
plain and complete legislative directives with a legally
inappropriate equitable remedy would impermissibly expand the
court's equitable powers at the expense of established positive
law.
We must therefore vacate the order imposing a
constructive trust and remand this case to allow the superior
court to determine the amount of Riddell's allowances and share.30
In remanding the case, however, we note that the applicable
statutes specify the amount of both the homestead allowance and
elective share31 but leave the amount of the family allowance in
the court's discretion.32 To this extent, the statutes allow the
superior court to factor equitable considerations into its
decision on remand.
IV. CONCLUSION
We REVERSE the order imposing a constructive trust and
REMAND for further proceedings to establish the amount of the
statutory allowances and share.
CARPENETI, Justice, dissenting.
Because the finding that a marriage is valid is not
inconsistent with the imposition of a constructive trust, I
dissent from today's Opinion. A comparison of the legal
requirements of a valid marriage with the legal requirements of a
constructive trust shows why there is no inconsistency in the
superior court's decision and why it should be affirmed.
Moreover, AS 13.06.015 authorizes the superior court's imposition
of a constructive trust; the Opinion errs in concluding that the
equitable remedy was "displaced" by the statutes governing
marriages and accrual of allowance and share. Finally, other
states have imposed constructive trusts in situations similar to
the one before the court, and a leading treatise specifically
approves the procedure.
Legal requirements for valid marriage and constructive
trust
There are only limited circumstances in which a
marriage may be declared void. The legislature has provided that
a marriage may be declared void only if, at the time of the
marriage, a party was under the age of consent, a party was of
unsound mind, force or fraud was used in obtaining consent, or
there was failure to consummate the marriage.33 Moreover, in
order for the marriage to be invalidated, the disability or undue
influence must exist at the moment that a person enters into the
marriage.34 These requirements narrowly confine the situations in
which one's consent to marry is not considered valid.
In contrast to the well-defined, limited circumstances
in which a marriage may be declared void, a constructive trust
may be imposed in a broad range of circumstances. In imposing a
constructive trust, there is no requirement that the unjust or
unconscionable conduct occur at the moment that title transfers
or that a statutory right attaches, only that the defendant holds
the property in circumstances that are unjust. As we said in
McKnight v. Rice, Hoppner, Brown & Brunner, quoting from a
leading treatise, a constructive trust is "a [device] used by
chancery to compel one who unfairly holds a property interest to
convey that interest to another to whom it justly belongs."35
The Opinion quotes McKnight to this effect,36 but it
mistakenly assigns dispositive significance to the superior
court's finding of a valid marriage, holding that this finding
"ruled out the existence of an element necessary to . . . a
constructive trust: a finding that the portion of Lillie's estate
passing to Riddell `justly belong[ed]' to the estate."37 The
finding of a valid marriage, and the subsequent passing of a
portion of Lillie's estate to Riddell through allowances and
shares, merely sets the stage for the determination of whether
there are grounds for application of the constructive trust
doctrine: "It is then [after the property passes under the will
or by intestacy] that the equitable principle as to unjust
enrichment becomes applicable."38
The Opinion's discussion of "the second prerequisite"
for a constructive trust is even farther off the mark. Although
it quotes McKnight to the effect that a finding that one obtained
property "by reason of unjust, unconscionable, or unlawful means"39
will justify imposition of a constructive trust, it reads
"unjust" and "unconscionable" completely out of the quotation and
focuses only on "unlawful." That is error; our use of "or" in
McKnight makes clear that Riddell's use of either "unjust" means
or "unconscionable" means to acquire an interest gives the court
a sufficient basis to impose a constructive trust. The superior
court in the present case did exactly that, using a constructive
trust as an equitable remedy to take Riddell's unjustly acquired
interest in the estate and vest it in the rightful40 beneficiaries
of the estate.
Because Riddell's marriage was not unlawful - in the
Opinion's phrase, because it was "valid despite Riddell's
unconscionable premarital conduct"41 - the Opinion ignores that
his conduct in procuring the marriage was undoubtedly "unjust"
and, indeed, "unconscionable."
Thus it is clear that, despite the Opinion's claim,
there is no "absence of a causal link between Riddell's
unconscionable . . . conduct and his right to receive the
statutory benefits of marriage."42 Quite to the contrary, the
conduct that the Opinion twice describes as "unconscionable"43 -
what the superior court described, with the apparent agreement of
the Opinion,44 as "fraudulent conduct toward Lillie, "bullying . .
. and physical[] intimidat[ion of] friends [and] family," finding
that Riddell "abused [Lillie] physically" - while it did not
invalidate the marriage, is precisely the type of conduct that
supports the superior court's finding that Riddell's "legal title
to property has been obtained through actual fraud, concealment,
by taking advantage, or, under circumstances rendering it
unconsci[onable] for" him to retain the interest. Indeed, the
Opinion notes that the superior court found that Riddell had
induced Lillie to marry him " `for the purpose[] of obtaining her
assets' and that his wife had suffered from dementia for the
majority of their relationship."45 As the superior court
carefully explained, it upheld the validity of the marriage
despite those findings and although "even immediately afterward,
[Lillie] didn't remember that she had married Mr. Riddell,"
because the superior court "cannot say that at the time she
applied for the marriage license or when she actually
participated in the ceremony she did not understand that she was
getting married." In other words, the superior court made no
finding that Riddell's unconscionable conduct did not lead to the
marriage. To the contrary, it effectively found that Riddell had
fraudulently induced the marriage. The superior court found only
that, at the moment she applied for the license and at the moment
she was married, it could not say that she was unaware of what
she was doing.
Alaska Statute 13.06.015
The legislature has made it clear that, in deciding
claims arising under the probate code, a court may exercise its
equitable powers unless explicitly forbidden to do so: Alaska
Statute 13.06.015 provides that "[u]nless displaced by the
particular provisions of AS 13.06_AS 13.36, the principles of law
and equity supplement those provisions." No part of any of the
"particular provisions" of the probate code dealing with
allowances and share displace the principle of equity; they
merely establish Alaska's positive statutory law on those
subjects. Without citation to authority, the Opinion mistakenly
looks outside of the probate code, to provisions of the statutes
dealing with divorce and dissolution,46 to reach its conclusion
that AS 13.06.015 does not apply: "the `particular provisions'
of statutory law governing void and voidable marriages and
accrual of allowances and share fully covered this situation and
affirmatively `displaced' the equitable remedy of constructive
trust."47 But the test under AS 13.06.015 is not whether Alaska
law "fully covered" the situation. It is whether any particular
provisions of the probate code should be read as displacing the
superior court's authority to invoke the equitable doctrine of
constructive trust. Given that AS 13.06.015 so unambiguously
states that principles of equity apply "[u]nless displaced by
particular provisions of AS 13.06-AS 13.36," today's holding that
a finding of a valid marriage is inconsistent with the equitable
doctrine of constructive trust adopts an unduly restrictive view
of our law.
In support of its conclusion, the Opinion cites Pacific
Scene, Inc. v. Penasquitos, Inc.48 for the proposition that a
court acting in equity generally "cannot [intrude] in matters
that are plain and fully covered by [a] statute."49 While the
proposition is unexceptionable,50 Pacific Scene lends no support
to the Opinion's conclusion, for that case dealt with a statutory
scheme that is far different from the Alaska probate code
sections that are before us in this case. In Pacific Scene, the
California legislature had enacted a "comprehensive statutory
revision" that "comprise[d] a broad and detailed scheme
regulating virtually every aspect of corporate dissolution."51
The court described such legislation as covering the situation
where "course of conduct, parties, things affected, limitations
and exceptions are minutely described, indicat[ing] a legislative
intent that the statute should totally supersede and replace the
common law dealing with the subject matter."52 That is a
completely different situation than the one before us now.
The statutes before us now are garden-variety probate
laws that establish allowances and shares, and in no way suggest
that they are intended to preclude the court's use of general
principles of equity. They do not specifically "displace" the
equitable power of the superior court to give an unjustly-
inherited share back to the estate through constructive trust.
Nor does the superior court's decision "do indirectly
what the law or its clearly defined policy forbids to be done
directly," as the Opinion claims.53 The legislature did not
forbid the superior court from imposing a constructive trust
after allowing Riddell to inherit from the estate. The
legislature did require that the superior court recognize the
validity of the marriage, and the court did so. The superior
court did not invalidate the marriage or ignore the statutory
mandate to give Riddell his share of the estate. Riddell was
allowed to inherit his statutorily-prescribed share. After
fulfilling the statutory directive, the superior court used the
equitable powers specifically envisioned by AS 13.06.015 to carry
out the legislature's statutory scheme, creating a constructive
trust to take back Riddell's unjustly-acquired gains.
The superior court complied with all applicable
statutes, and did not do indirectly what the law forbade it to do
directly. The Opinion's argument - that once the law of voidable
and void marriages is applied, Riddell's allowances and share are
established and a constructive trust may not be imposed - is
wrong, as is shown by this discussion from Scott on Trusts:
Where the Statute of Wills and the
statute of distributions make no provision as
to the effect of murder of the decedent by
the legatee or heir, the property passes
under the will or by intestacy to him. It is
then that the equitable principle as to
unjust enrichment becomes applicable. That
principle is as applicable where the title to
property is acquired by murder as it is where
the title is acquired by fraud, duress, or
undue influence. By imposing a constructive
trust upon the murderer, the court is not
making an exception to the provisions of the
statutes but is merely compelling the
murderer to surrender the profits of his
crime and thus preventing unjust
enrichment.[54]
Thus, "where the title is acquired by fraud, duress, or undue
influence," a constructive trust is imposed on the property after
it has already devolved to the spouse. The trust is then imposed
on the property for the benefit of the estate. Scott on Trusts
makes clear that this is proper.
The Opinion's approach would allow one spouse, who
murders the other, to retain his or her share of the estate in
the absence of positive legislation to the contrary.55 Alaska
lacked such legislation until 1996, when AS 13.12.80356 was
enacted.57 Under the majority's rigid interpretation of the
inheritance and marriage statutes, Alaska courts before that time
would have been forced to uphold the murderer's elective share,
as the " `particular provisions' of statutory law governing void
and voidable marriages and accrual of allowances and share"58
cover that situation to the same extent they cover this case. Yet
courts in several states have found that equity demands imposing
a constructive trust on the murderer's share, even in the absence
of a statute like AS 13.12.803.59 Likewise, the Alaska
legislature meant for the inheritance and marriage statutes to be
read in conjunction with AS 13.06.015, allowing the possibility
for courts to impose a constructive trust to prevent injustice in
limited circumstances. As Scott on Trusts definitively states,
the equitable principle of unjust enrichment, which allows the
imposition of a constructive trust, "is as applicable where the
title to property is acquired by murder as it is where the title
is acquired by fraud, duress, or undue influence."60
Judge Weeks was well within the law in imposing a
constructive trust to reclaim the property that he found - and
that this court today affirms on "compelling evidence"61 - was
gained by Riddell's "fraudulent conduct toward Lillie,"62
"bullying family and friends,"63 "physical[] intimidat[ion of]
friends, family, lawyers and caregivers,"64 and because he "abused
[Lillie] physically."65 This is a case in which equity fairly
demands that a constructive trust be imposed, and Judge Weeks was
correct in imposing one.
For all of the above reasons, I would affirm the
decision of the superior court imposing a constructive trust on
Riddell's statutory homestead allowance, family allowance, and
elective share. I therefore respectfully dissent.
_______________________________
1For additional background concerning Riddell and Lillie and the
administration of this estate, refer to Riddell v. Edwards, 32
P.3d 4 (Alaska 2001) ("Riddell I") and Riddell v. Edwards, Mem.
Op. & J. No. 1050 (Alaska, October 10, 2001) ("Riddell II").
2Riddell I, 32 P.3d at 5, 10.
3Riddell II, Mem. Op. & J. No. 1050 at 1.
4The superior court cited Coleman v. Coleman, 166 P. 47 (Or.
1917).
5Patey v. Peaslee, 111 A.2d 194, 198 (N.H. 1955) (barring heirs
from annulling marriage); Patey v. Peaslee, 131 A.2d 433, 435
(N.H. 1957) (recognizing constructive trust as appropriate
equitable remedy).
6Internal footnote omitted citing Patey, 111 A.2d at 198.
7See, e.g., Leis v. Hustad, 22 P.3d 885, 887 (Alaska 2001);
Hamilton v. Blackman, 915 P.2d 1210, 1213 (Alaska 1996); Leisnoi,
Inc. v. Stratman, 835 P.2d 1202, 1207 (Alaska 1992); Wood v.
Collins, 812 P.2d 951, 955 n.4 (Alaska 1991).
8See, e.g., McKnight v. Rice, Hoppner, Brown & Brunner, 678 P.2d
1330, 1334-35 (Alaska 1984) (elements); City of Lakewood v.
Pierce County, 30 P.3d 446, 450 (Wash. 2001) (elements and
standard of proof).
9McKnight, 678 P.2d at 1335 (quoting George Gleason Bogert &
George Taylor Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees 471, at 3
(rev. 2d ed. 1978)).
10See Sheehan v. Estate of Gamberg, 677 P.2d 254, 256-57 (Alaska
1984).
11In this regard, AS 13.16.005 expressly provides:
The power of a person to leave property by
will, and the rights of creditors, devisees,
and heirs to the property are subject to the
restrictions and limitations contained in AS
13.06 - AS 13.36 to facilitate the prompt
settlement of estates. Upon the death of a
person, that person's real and personal
property devolves to the persons to whom it
is devised by the last will or to those
indicated as substitutes for them in cases
involving lapse, renunciation, or other
circumstances affecting the devolution of
testate estates, or in the absence of
testamentary disposition, to the heirs, or to
those indicated as substitutes for them in
cases involving renunciation or other
circumstances affecting devolution of
intestate estates, subject to homestead
allowance, exempt property and family
allowance, to rights of creditors, elective
share of the surviving spouse, and to
administration.
(Emphasis added.)
12Alaska's statutory rights to allowances and share are set forth
in AS 13.12.402, AS 13.12.404, and AS 13.12.202. AS 13.12.402
states: "A decedent's surviving spouse is entitled to a homestead
allowance of $27,000. . . . The homestead allowance is exempt
from and has priority over all claims against the estate.
Homestead allowance is in addition to a share passing to the
surviving spouse . . . by way of elective share."
AS 13.12.404(a) provides:
In addition to the right to homestead
allowance . . . , the decedent's surviving
spouse and minor children . . . are entitled
to a reasonable allowance in money out of the
estate for their maintenance during the
period of administration. . . . The family
allowance is exempt from and has priority
over all claims except the homestead
allowance.
AS 13.12.202(a) provides: "The surviving spouse of a
decedent who dies domiciled in this state has a right of election
. . . to take an elective share amount equal to one-third of the
augmented estate."
13McKnight, 678 P.2d at 1335 (quoting Bogert, supra note 9, 471,
at 3).
14Id. (quoting Bogert, supra note 9, 471, at 3).
15Riddell I, 32 P.3d 4, 6 (Alaska 2001).
16Id. at 9-10.
17Dissent at 19, 26-28.
18Dissent at 26 (quoting 5 Austin Wakeman Scott & William Franklin
Fratcher, The Law of Trusts 492, at 440 (4th ed. 1989))
(emphasis in dissent altered).
19See 5 Scott & Fratcher, supra note 18, 492, at 440 ("[A]
constructive trust is imposed upon one who acquires property
through his own wrong.") (emphasis added).
20Pacific Scene, Inc. v. Penasquitos, Inc., 758 P.2d 1182, 1186
(Cal. 1988) (quoting Marsh v. Edelstein, 88 Cal. Rptr. 26, 31
(Cal. App. 1970)); accord I.N.S. v. Pangilinan, 486 U.S. 875, 883
(1988) ("[I]t is well established that `[c]ourts of equity can no
more disregard statutory and constitutional requirements and
provisions than can courts of law.' ") (quoting Hedges v. Dixon
County, 150 U.S. 182, 192 (1893)).
21See supra note 12. As already indicated, these property
interests vest upon death; the property interests of other heirs
and devisees are necessarily subordinate because they devolve
"subject to" the surviving spouse's statutory interest.
22See AS 25.24.010 (only spouse may maintain action to have
marriage declared void); AS 25.24.020 (definition of void
marriages); AS 25.24.030 (definition of voidable marriages); AS
25.05.031 (marriage is voidable only by spouse).
23AS 25.05.031.
24Pacific Scene, Inc., 758 P.2d at 1186.
25Id. (quoting Marsh, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 31).
26131 A.2d 433, 435 (N.H. 1957).
27See id. at 437-38 (Blandin, J., dissenting); see also Ch. 58,
pmbl., SLA 1963 (stating that the legislature's purpose was "[t]o
provide a comprehensive marriage code"); Batey v. Batey, 933 P.2d
551, 554 (Alaska 1997) (declining to use common law definition
that countered express legislative intent).
28Citing AS 13.06.015, the dissent questions whether the statutory
provisions governing void and voidable marriages can displace the
court's equitable power in a probate case: because those
definitions are located outside the probate code and therefore do
not qualify as "particular provisions" of the probate code, the
dissent reasons, AS 13.06.015 does not allow them to displace the
supplemental powers granted in that provision. Dissent at 23-25.
But by providing that the right to marital allowances and share
turn on the existence of a "surviving spouse," see supra note 12,
the probate code necessarily incorporates the marriage code's
definitional provisions that give the term meaning - if not as
"particular provisions" of the probate code that can displace the
court's supplemental equity powers, then at least as "principles
of law" directly applicable under AS 13.06.015's express terms.
29The dissent attempts to portray this conclusion as "holding that
a finding of a valid marriage is inconsistent with the equitable
doctrine of constructive trust." Dissent at 24. But our
decision is considerably narrower, holding that the imposition of
a constructive trust on a surviving spouse's statutory benefits
is impermissible only when, as here, the surviving spouse's
unconscionable conduct neither caused an invalid marriage nor
otherwise caused or helped to cause the statutory benefits
arising from that marriage to vest.
30Our decision renders Riddell's remaining arguments moot, making
it unnecessary to consider them.
31AS 13.12.402 ($27,000); AS 13.12.202(a)- (b) (one-third of the
augmented estate; supplemental share under certain
circumstances).
32AS 13.12.404(a) ("a reasonable allowance").
33AS 25.24.030.
34Id. After quoting the superior court to the effect that
"[p]ersons suffering from dementia have fluctuating periods of
more contact with reality," the Opinion notes that "Lillie was
competent and understood the consequences of her actions at the
time that she married Riddell. . . . [T]he evidence did not
convincingly prove Lillie's incompetence when she entered into
the marriage." Opinion at 5 (emphasis added).
35McKnight v. Rice, Hoppner, Brown & Brunner, 678 P.2d 1330, 1335
(Alaska 1984) (quoting G. Bogert, Trusts and Trustees 471, at 3
(rev. 2d ed. 1978)).
36Opinion at 11-12.
37Id.
38Austin Wakeman Scott & William Franklin Fratcher, The Law of
Trusts 492, at 440 (4th ed. 1989).
39Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Bogert, supra note 3, 471 at 3).
40The Opinion strains to find a requirement that the equitable
beneficiary have a "legal interest" in the property, Opinion at
10, and then concludes that because title vested in Riddell upon
Lillie's death, the superior court's "order validating the
marriage ruled out the existence of an element necessary to
support the court's subsequent decision to impose a constructive
trust: a finding that the portion of Lillie's estate passing to
Riddell `justly belong[ed]' to the estate." Opinion at 11-12.
But the constructive trust doctrine, a creature of equity,
contains no requirement of a "legal interest" as the Opinion
narrowly defines it. Rather, the constructive trust doctrine
looks to whether there is an equitable interest in the property:
"A constructive trust is imposed upon a person in order to
prevent his unjust enrichment. To prevent such unjust enrichment
an equitable duty to convey the property to another is imposed
upon him." Restatement of Restitution 160 cmt. c (1937).
41Opinion at 12 (emphasis on "unconscionable" added; emphasis on
"despite" deleted).
42Id. at 13.
43Id. at 12, 13. While conceding that Riddell's conduct was
unconscionable both before the marriage ("Riddell's
unconscionable premarital conduct," Opinion at 12) and after the
marriage ("Riddell's unconscionable postmarital conduct," Opinion
at 13), the Opinion seeks to avoid the unescapable conclusion
that there is therefore a clear causal link between Riddell's
unconscionable conduct and his receipt of the statutory benefits
of marriage. The Opinion seeks to distinguish this case from
cases imposing constructive trusts against murderers by pointing
to the "absence of a causal link between Riddell's unconscionable
postmarital conduct and his right to receive the statutory
benefits of marriage." (Opinion at 13, emphasis added.) But in
conceding that Riddell's conduct was unconscionable both before
and after the marriage, the Opinion concedes that the causal link
it denies actually does exist.
44The Opinion refers to the "compelling evidence" of Riddell's
misconduct. Opinion at 4.
45Opinion at 1-2.
46The Opinion refers to the provisions of law governing void and
voidable marriages, which are found in the statutes dealing with
divorce and dissolution, AS 25.24.020-.030. Opinion at 14.
Besides being inapplicable to AS 13.06.015, which refers
specifically to AS 13.06-AS 13.36, the statutes dealing with
divorce and dissolution make no mention of specifically
displacing any principles of equity, much less the doctrine of
constructive trust.
47Opinion at 17.
48758 P.2d 1182 (Cal. 1988).
49Opinion at 14 [bracketed material is as inserted in the
Opinion].
50With the possible exception that the California court said
"positive" statute, 758 P.2d at 1186, not "[a]" statute, Opinion
at 14, suggesting that a positive - that is, a clear and strong -
declaration of law limiting the court's equitable powers is
required before such powers may be limited.
51758 P.2d at 1184.
52Id. at 1183 (citation and internal quotations omitted) (emphasis
added).
53Opinion at 15 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
54Austin Wakeman Scott & William Franklin Fratcher, The Law of
Trusts 492, at 440 (4th ed. 1989) (emphasis added).
55The Opinion attempts to distinguish the present case from the
case of a murdering spouse by pointing to the "absence of a
causal link between Riddell's unconscionable postmarital conduct
and his right to receive the statutory benefits of marriage."
Opinion at 13. As shown above, there is a causal link in this
case between Riddell's unconscionable conduct - which occurred
both before and after the marriage - and his receipt of benefits:
Riddell fraudulently induced Lillie to marry him in order to
obtain her assets.
56AS 13.12.803(a) provides, in relevant part:
An individual who feloniously kills the
decedent forfeits all benefits . . . with
respect to the decedent's estate, including
an intestate share, an elective share, an
omitted spouse's or child's share, a
homestead allowance, exempt property, and a
family allowance.
57Ch. 75, 3, SLA 1996.
58Opinion at 17.
59See, e.g., In re Estate of Danforth, 705 S.W.2d 609, 611-12 (Mo.
App. 1986) (holding that wife not allowed to profit by inheriting
from husband's estate when she committed fraud in procuring
marriage and conspiracy in murdering husband); Garwols v.
Bankers' Trust Co., 232 N.W. 239, 242 (Mich. 1930) (using common
law to supplement statutory scheme to prevent son from inheriting
from estate of his mother whom he murdered).
60Scott & Fratcher, supra note 6, 492, at 440.
61Opinion at 4.
62Id.
63Id.
64Id.
65Id.
