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Chugach Electric Assoc., Inc. v. Regulatory Commission of Alaska (6/21/2002) sp-5585
Chugach Electric Assoc., Inc. v. Regulatory Commission of Alaska (6/21/2002) sp-5585
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage,
Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
CHUGACH ELECTRIC )
ASSOCIATION., INC., )
) Supreme Court No. S-9692
Appellant, )
) Superior Court No.
v. ) 3AN-98-11584 CI
)
REGULATORY COMMISSION OF ) O P I N I O N
ALASKA and MUNICIPALITY OF )
ANCHORAGE d/b/a MUNICIPAL ) [No. 5585 - June 21,
2002]
LIGHT & POWER, )
)
Appellees. )
________________________________)
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State
of Alaska, Third Judicial District,
Anchorage, Sen K. Tan, Judge.
Appearances: Andrew F. Behrend, Heller
Ehrman White & McAuliffe, Anchorage; Michael
C. Dotten, Heller Ehrman White & McAuliffe,
Portland; and Donald W. Edwards, Chugach
Electric Association, Anchorage, for
Appellant. Ron Zobel, Assistant Attorney
General, Clyde E. Sniffen, Jr., Assistant
Attorney General, Anchorage, and Bruce M.
Botelho, Attorney General, Juneau, for
Appellee Regulatory Commission of Alaska.
Paul J. Jones, Assistant Municipal Attorney,
and William A. Greene, Municipal Attorney,
Anchorage, for Appellee Municipality of
Anchorage d/b/a Municipal Light & Power.
Before: Fabe, Chief Justice, Matthews,
Eastaugh, Bryner, and Carpeneti, Justices.
CARPENETI, Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
This case requires us to determine whether an electric
utility that supplies electric service within a specific
geographic area pursuant to a certificate of public convenience
and necessity must obtain regulatory commission approval before
selling power outside its assigned geographic area. Because AS
42.05.221(a) requires a utility to obtain an additional
certificate for each type of utility service it provides and
because the appellant in this case did not obtain such a
certificate, we affirm the decision of the Regulatory Commission
of Alaska.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Chugach Electric Association, Inc. (Chugach) is an
electric utility that has received a certificate of public
convenience and necessity from the Regulatory Commission of
Alaska1 (commission) to supply electric service to consumers
within a specific geographic area. Anchorage Municipal Light and
Power (ML&P) is also a public utility authorized to provide
electric service to consumers under a certificate of public
convenience and necessity.
In the fall of 1997, Chugach offered to sell
electricity directly to two commercial customers who were
requesting it from Chugach. Because these customers were located
in the service area designated for ML&P, Chugach offered to
compensate ML&P for distributing the electricity as well as
metering and related services2 at a rate to be determined by the
commission.
ML&P responded to Chugachs offer by filing a complaint
with the commission alleging that Chugach was violating Alaska
law by attempting to serve customers outside its geographic area.
ML&P asked the commission to enjoin Chugach from providing
electricity outside that area. Chugach, allowed to intervene,
maintained that although ML&P had a lawful monopoly over
distribution services3 in the area, it did not have a monopoly
over the electricity itself as a commodity and therefore could
not prevent consumers from purchasing electric power as a
commodity from other suppliers. Chugach additionally claimed
that ML&P violated federal antitrust law by preventing Chugach
from selling electricity over ML&Ps lines. Chugach then asked
the commission for a declaratory judgment that ML&P was not
entitled to monopolize sales of electric power to customers who
receive transmission and distribution services from ML&P.
Chugach also asked the commission for a ruling compelling ML&P to
deliver, under appropriate tariffs to be approved by the
commission, Chugachs electricity to willing buyers in ML&Ps
distribution area.
Both parties moved for summary judgment. The
commission held that [t]he Legislatures charge in AS 42.05.221(d)
to the Commission to eliminate competition that the Commission
finds is not in the public interest impliedly authorizes the
Commission to grant monopolies when competition is not in the
public interest. The commission also held that the provision of
electric power constituted a service and therefore was subject to
AS 42.05.221(a). It further held that AS 42.05.221(d) does not
restrict the commissions authority to regulate competition
between electric facilities to only those areas where duplication
of facilities and competition already exists. Finally, the
commission ruled that federal antitrust principles did not apply,
but that if they did apply, ML&P would be immune under the state
action doctrine. Accordingly, the commission ruled in ML&Ps
favor.
On appeal, Superior Court Judge Sen K. Tan affirmed the
commissions order and final judgment. In his decision, Judge Tan
ruled that AS 42.05.221(a) requires Chugach to obtain prior
approval from the commission before selling electricity outside
of its allotted geographical area. The superior court also
concluded that the commissions interpretation of state law did
not implicate any federal antitrust legal doctrines or
principles, and that the state action immunity doctrine applied
and was satisfied.
Chugach now appeals to this court.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In an administrative appeal where the superior court
acts as an intermediate appellate court, we directly review the
agency action in question.4
Chugach and the commission agree that the issues before
this court are not matters that fall within [the commissions]
unique expertise5 as this issue presents a matter of strict
statutory construction.6 Because no agency expertise is
involved, we review the commissions statutory construction under
an independent judgment standard.7 As we substitute our
judgment, it is our duty to adopt the rule of law that is most
persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy. 8
We review the commissions findings of fact for clear
error and reverse only if there is not substantial evidence to
support the findings.9 However, even under the independent
judgment standard [we have] noted that the court should give
weight to what the agency has done, especially where the agency
interpretation is longstanding.10
IV. DISCUSSION
Chugach Must First Obtain a Certificate of Public
Convenience and Necessity Before Attempting To Sell Its
Electricity.
Chugach maintains that the commission does not have the
authority to restrain competition between electric utilities by
prohibiting Chugach from selling electricity without first
obtaining a second certificate of public convenience and
necessity to serve power in a particular geographic location.
Instead, Chugach argues, the commission may only limit
competition for a commodity such as the sale of electricity once
it has determined the utilities are already competing and that
such competition is not in the public interest.11 ML&P and the
commission argue that the statutory language is clear that an
additional certificate is needed for each new use and that only
in instances where a certificate has been previously obtained
does AS 42.05.221(d) apply.
Alaska Statute 42.05.221(a) provides:
A public utility may not operate and receive
compensation for providing a commodity or
service without first having obtained from
the commission under this chapter a
certificate declaring that public convenience
and necessity require or will require the
service. Where a public utility provides
more than one type of utility service, a
separate certificate of convenience and
necessity is required for each type. A
certificate must describe the nature and
extent of authority granted in it, including,
as appropriate for the services involved, a
description of the authorized area and scope
of operations of the public utility.
Alaska Statute 42.05.221(d) provides:
In an area where the commission determines
that two or more public utilities are
competing to furnish identical utility
service and that this competition is not in
the public interest, the commission shall
take appropriate action to eliminate the
competition and any undesirable duplication
of facilities. This appropriate action may
include, but is not limited to, ordering the
competing utilities to enter into a contract
that, among other things, would:
(1) delineate the service area
boundaries of each in those areas of
competition;
(2) eliminate existing duplication and
paralleling to the fullest reasonable extent;
(3) preclude future duplication and
paralleling;
(4) provide for the exchange of
customers and facilities for the purposes of
providing better public service and of
eliminating duplication and paralleling; and
(5) provide such other mutually
equitable arrangements as would be in the
public interest.
Chugach argues that by not making findings under AS 42.05.221(d),
the commission placed a prior restraint on the competition for
utilities authorized to provide a particular type of service. It
argues that the correct interpretation of the two provisions of
AS 42.05.221 is that a public injury and a finding of competition
must first be made before the commission can restrict competition
between electric utilities that already have certificates to
provide electric service to the public. It claims that any other
interpretation would render AS 42.05.221(d) meaningless.
1. Whether Chugach has the right to provide electric service
within ML&Ps area is not precluded by collateral estoppel.
ML&P argues that the commission has already applied AS
42.05.221(d) to eliminate competition between Chugach and ML&P.
Therefore, it argues that consideration of this issue is barred
by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
Collateral estoppel bars the relitigation by parties of
an issue when:
(1) the party against whom the preclusion is
employed was a party to or in privity with a
party to the first action; (2) the issue
precluded from relitigation is identical to
the issue decided in the first action; (3)
the issue was resolved by final judgment on
the merits; and (4) the determination of the
issue was essential to the final judgment.[12]
Chugach and ML&P have long been parties in litigation
against each other resulting in an AS 42.05.221(d) determination
establishing specific geographical areas in which each utility
could provide its service.13 In that earlier case, the commission
recognized situations might arise where it would become necessary
for one of the utilities to engage in work within the others
service area. Thus, the commission established certain
procedures to address this concern, including a waiver by the
incumbent utility or commission approval.
The commission also noted that there may be times when
the utilities might need to run transmission or intertie lines
through the others service area. The commission chose not to
limit these activities, provided that service is not extended to
new customers within that certified service area unless allowed
under another provision. We upheld the service areas established
by the commission, although we vacated those portions of the
order dealing with the transferring of facilities between the two
parties.14
After remand, Chugach, ML&P, and the commission
resolved the issue regarding the transferring of the facilities.
But the issue at hand is distinct from the previous litigation.
Here, instead of arguing that it has a territorial right to
proceed, Chugach raises a matter of statutory interpretation. It
questions how AS 42.05.221(a) and (d) should be applied. ML&P
contends that the commissions prior order precluded Chugach from
retaining or acquiring customers within ML&Ps area. But this is
separate from the issue of whether a determination must be made
under subsection (a) or under subsection (d) before allowing
Chugach to procure customers. Chugach also distinguishes this
claim in that the previous order was specific to distribution
only, making no determination about providing the commodity of
electricity itself outside of Chugachs service area. Finally,
all of the commissions decisions are predicated on the public
interest. But the public interest might have changed since the
commissions previous orders. Because the issues previously
resolved and the one now before the court are not identical,
Chugach is not estopped from litigating the present case.
In short, although Chugach and ML&P have a long history
of court battles and many previous orders have been entered
regarding their allocated areas, the instant action is distinct
from these cases and therefore not precluded by previous
decisions.
2. The commission may use its general powers as a
means to limit competition.
The commission has implied powers.15 An organization
like the commission is an administrative agency that has whatever
powers are expressly granted to it by the legislature or
conferred upon it by implication as necessarily incident to the
exercise of powers expressly granted.16
Chugach reads the commissions order to say the
commissions power to limit competition is solely a result of some
general inference. Chugach argues that because the commission
lacked specific authority, the commission and the superior court
were forced to infer that the commission had general powers to
control competition within the framework of AS 42.05.221 instead
of properly utilizing AS 42.05.221(d) for this purpose. This,
however, is not what the commission held. Instead, it stated
that its power to control competition derived from three places:
AS 42.05.141,17 AS 42.05.221(a), and AS 42.05.221(d). No one
contests Chugachs proposition that the statutory scheme allows
for some competition. Chugach simply fails to acknowledge that
that competition results only from the commissions issuance of
certificates and can be curtailed only by the commission under AS
42.05.221(d) after it makes the requisite findings. Moreover,
Chugachs reading of the statute contravenes the well-established
interpretation of AS 42.05.221(a) to require public utilities to
obtain approval from the commission prior to offering a
competitive service in a particular market.18
3. The commissions and superior courts interpretation of AS
42.05.221(a) and (d) does not render subsection (d) meaningless.
1. In Alaska, a certificate of public convenience and necessity
does not confer a grant of monopoly power.19 Thus, Chugach claims
that any previously certified utility is allowed to begin
competing for consumers without additional advance notice or
approval from the commission. The only check on this
competition, according to Chugach, is AS 42.05.221(d), which
allows competition to be limited only after the commission
determines that competition between two or more utilities is
taking place and that such competition is not in the public
interest. Chugach thus asks: If ML&P does not have a monopoly
by virtue of its certificate, how can it deny its customers the
ability to buy electricity from a competing seller? Chugachs
argument is unpersuasive. As ML&P correctly notes, monopolies
exist not because [they are] inherent in the issuance of [a]
certificate, but because the Commission has not authorized any
other utility to provide competing services within the area . . .
.
The plain language of AS 42.05.221(a) requires an
additional certificate prior to any utility providing an
additional type of service.20 Chugach presents no legislative
history to contest this plain meaning, nor does it present any
case law to support its interpretation.21 Chugach argues that
because AS 42.05.221(d) is the only subsection to mention
competition, it is therefore the only part of the statute that
regulates competition. But the commission has other statutes it
may utilize to limit competition. Alaska Statute 42.05.221(a) is
one of these. Under AS 42.05.241, a certificate may not be
issued unless the commission finds that the applicant is fit,
willing, and able to provide the utility services applied for and
that the services are required for the convenience and necessity
of the public.22 The commission can grant the certificate in
whole or in part and may add conditions that it deems necessary
to protect and promote the public interest, including ordering
the applicant to serve an area not applied for. The commission
may also deny any applicant for good cause. Under AS 42.05.271,
these certificates can be revoked or suspended by the commission
on complaint or on its own motion after good cause is shown. A
necessary consequence of these provisions regarding certificates
is that a utility is usually prohibited from providing service
outside of the area granted in the certificate until the utility
applies for a new certificate. This is not in conflict with AS
42.05.221(d). Alaska Statute 42.05.221(a) allows the commission
to prevent utilities from duplicating service until the
commission finds it is in the public interest and AS 42.05.221(d)
authorizes the commission to eliminate or limit any existing
competition if it is found to be harmful to the public interest.
The proper application of AS 42.05.221(a) in no way
conflicts with the application of AS 42.05.221(d). One situation
involving the proper use of subsection (d) arose when municipally-
owned utilities came within the purview of AS 42.05.221. These
utilities were not previously required to obtain a certificate.
When the municipally-owned utilities came under this statute,
both Chugach and ML&P were operating within the same district.
The commission then utilized AS 42.05.221(d) to separate the two
operations and provide them with distinct territories.23
Alaska Statute 42.05.221(a) requires a separate
certificate where a utility provides more than one type of
service. Chugachs interpretation of AS 42.05.221 would render
subsection (a) meaningless. The commission would have no
authority to require a utility to acquire a new or modified
certificate before it began to provide services outside of its
designated area as AS 42.05.221(a) does not distinguish between
services, commodities, uses, or facilities.
Despite Chugachs claims, the commissions interpretation
of AS 42.05.221(a) does not render subsection (d) of that
provision meaningless. In addition, interpreting the statute as
Chugach suggests would have precisely that effect.
4. Chugach incorrectly construes other statutes to show the
State of Alaskas preference for competition.
Chugach argues that other relevant statutes show the
State of Alaskas preference for competition over state
regulation. Chugach relies on AS 42.05.311, which states that a
public utility having any type of distribution or transmission
facilities shall, for a reasonable compensation, permit another
public utility to use them when the public convenience and
necessity require this use and the use will not result in
substantial injury to the owner, or in substantial detriment to
the service to the customers of the owners. According to
Chugach, an electric utility cannot use the facilities of a
second utility for any purpose other than competition, evidencing
the preference for competitive over anticompetitive conduct.
Chugach fails to note the conditional language of the
statute, which warrants shared use only when the public
convenience and necessity require it. Joint use is not required
by statute. Instead, if utilities fail to agree on whether joint
use is appropriate, a party may apply to the commission for an
order mandating it.24 Thus, even if the legislature intended AS
42.05.311 to engender competition, the commission may do so only
after it finds that such competition is in fact appropriate.
5. There is no distinction between services and commodities
under Alaskas public utilities law.
In the proceedings before the commission and the
superior court, Chugach attempted to avoid the effect of AS
42.05.221(a) by arguing that the sale of electricity by itself
was the sale of a commodity rather than the provision of a
service.25 Chugach argued that its certificate establishes a
description of the authorized area for services only, not for
commodities. Chugach thus contended that the service area
description in its certificate applied only to services and not
to the retail sale of the commodity of electricity itself. Both
the commission and Judge Tan correctly rejected this argument
based on the broad statutory definition of the word service,
which includes commodities.26
V. CONCLUSION
A. The commission correctly held that AS 42.05.221(a) required
Chugach to obtain an additional certificate of public convenience
and necessity prior to engaging in contact with consumers
regarding electricity sales outside its allotted area. This
interpretation of the statute does not render AS 42.05.221(d)
meaningless and is in accordance with other similar provisions.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the decision of the superior court that
affirmed the commissions decision.
_______________________________
1 In 1999 the name of the Alaska Public Utilities
Commission was changed to the Regulatory Commission of Alaska in
accordance with ch. 25, 30(a), SLA 1999.
2 ML&P had already established its right to provide
distribution service in the geographic area involved in this
case. Alaska Pub. Utils. Commn v. Chugach Elec. Assn, 580 P.2d
687 (Alaska 1978), revd on other grounds by City & Borough of
Juneau v. Thibodeau, 595 P.2d 626 (Alaska 1979). Thus, Chugach
in this case sought to provide only the commodity of electricity
over ML&Ps lines to customers requesting electricity from
Chugach.
3 [D]istribution services . . . refers to delivery or
distribution unbundled from the sale of the commodity in this
case the sale of electric power. Harvey L. Reiter, Competition
Between Public and Private Distributors In a Restructured Power
Industry, 19 Energy L.J., 333, 334 n.3 (1998). Chugach thus
attempted to engage in retail wheeling with ML&P, the process by
which utilities deliver electric power sold by a third party
directly to retail customers allowing an individual retail
customer to choose his or her electricity supplier, but still
receive delivery using the power lines of the local utility.
Scott B. Finlinson, The Pains Of Extinction: Stranded Costs In
The Deregulation Of The Utah Electric Industry, 1998 Utah L. Rev.
173, 187 n.109.
4 See N. Alaska Envtl. Ctr. v. State, Dept of Natural
Res., 2 P.3d 629, 633 (Alaska 2000).
5 Tlingit-Haida Regl Elec. Auth. v. State, 15 P.3d 754,
761 (Alaska 2001).
6 Natl Bank of Alaska v. State, Dept of Revenue, 642 P.2d
811, 815 (Alaska 1982).
7 Id.
8 Cook Inlet Pipe Line Co. v. Alaska Pub. Utils. Commn,
836 P.2d 343, 348 (Alaska 1992) (citing Guin v. Ha, 581 P.2d
1281, 1284 n.6 (Alaska 1979)).
9 Tlingit-Haida Regl Elec. Auth., 15 P.3d at 761.
10 Natl Bank of Alaska, 642 P.2d at 815 (citing State,
Dept of Revenue v. Debenham Elec. Supply Co., 612 P.2d 1001, 1003
n.6 (Alaska 1980)).
11 AS 42.05.221(d).
12 Alaska Contracting & Consulting, Inc. v. State, Dept of
Labor, 8 P.3d 340, 344-45 (Alaska 2000) (quoting Renwick v.
State, Bd. of Marine Pilots, 971 P.2d 631, 634 (Alaska 1999)).
13 Alaska Pub. Utils. Commn v. Chugach Elec. Assn, 580
P.2d 687 (Alaska 1978), revd on other grounds by City & Borough
of Juneau v. Thibodeau, 595 P.2d 626 (Alaska 1979).
14 Id. at 696.
15 Alaska Pub. Utils. Commn v. Municipality of Anchorage,
902 P.2d 783, 788 (Alaska 1995) (citing Far N. Sanitation, Inc.
v. Alaska Pub. Utils. Commn, 825 P.2d 867 (Alaska 1992)).
16 Id. (quoting Glacier State Tel. Co. v. Alaska Pub.
Utils. Commn, 724 P.2d 1187, 1190 (Alaska 1986)).
17 AS 42.05.141 provides in part:
(a) The Regulatory Commission of Alaska
may do all things necessary or proper to
carry out the purposes and exercise the
powers expressly granted or reasonably
implied in this chapter . . . .
18 Chugach suggests that federal antitrust law provides an
overlay to state law that bars the commission from exercising its
general powers and precludes its longstanding interpretation of
AS 42.05.221. But we disagree. In the Sherman Act, Congress,
exercising the full extent of its constitutional power, sought to
establish a regime of competition as the fundamental principle
governing commerce in this country. City of Lafayette v.
Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 398 (1978) (internal
citations omitted).
In California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn v. Midcal
Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980), the Court found two
standards for antitrust immunity stemming from the Courts earlier
decision in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943): First, the
challenged restraint must be one clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed as state policy; [and] second, the policy
must be actively supervised by the State itself. Id. at 105
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Alaskas policy
of anticompetitive conduct for utilities that have a certificate
of public convenience and necessity is not only permitted but
compelled. AS 45.50.572(d) immunizes public utilities that have
been issued a certificate of public convenience and necessity
from state antitrust law. AS 42.05.221(a) requires certificates
of public convenience before a utility can operate. AS
42.05.221(d) then allows the commission to take appropriate
action to control competition if it finds that competition not in
the public interest. These statutes, read separately or
together, evidence a stronger case for meeting the first prong of
Midcal than was seen in S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc.
v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 64 (1985). In that case, the
Court upheld a practice allowing a rate bureau to submit a joint
rate proposal for rates on behalf of its members to the
applicable state agency in each state for consideration
regardless of the fact none of these states had legislation
compelling collective ratemaking, noting that, [i]f more detail
than a clear intent to displace competition were required of the
legislature, States would find it difficult to implement through
regulatory agencies their anticompetitive policies. Id. at 64.
The purpose of the agency is to deal with problems outside the
realm of the legislatures knowledge. Id. Thus, to require
express authorization for every action that an agency might find
necessary to effectuate state policy would diminish, if not
destroy, its usefulness. Id. Chugach does not argue whether the
State of Alaskas policy to regulate public utilities is actively
supervised by the state in its brief, relying instead on its
arguments regarding the first prong of the Midcal test. Despite
the fact Chugach did not argue against it, it seems relatively
clear that the issuance of certificates of public convenience as
well as other policies relating to public utilities are actively
supervised by the state. Unlike the situation in Snake River
Valley Elec. Assn v. PacifiCorp, 238 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2001),
where the utility with the distribution facilities had the power
to withhold its consent from other utilities wishing to serve its
customers, ML&P has no such power. Therefore, the second prong
of Midcal is easily met.
19 Chugach Elec. Assn, Inc. v. City of Anchorage, 426 P.2d
1001, 1003 (Alaska 1967).
20 We apply a sliding scale approach in matters of
statutory interpretation, and have rejected a mechanical
application of the plain meaning rule. Moody-Herrera v. State,
Dept of Natural Res., 967 P.2d 79, 84 (Alaska 1998). Thus, the
plainer the language of the statute is, the more convincing the
evidence contrary to that language must be. Anchorage Sch. Dist.
v. Hale, 857 P.2d 1186, 1189 (Alaska 1993). Basic principles of
statutory construction militate against interpreting a statute in
a manner that renders other provisions meaningless.
Contradictions should be harmonized. Rollins v. State, Dept of
Revenue, Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 991 P.2d 202, 208
(Alaska 1999) (quoting M.R.S. v. State, 897 P.2d 63, 66 (Alaska
1995)); Homer Elec. Assn v. Towsley, 841 P.2d 1042, 1045 (Alaska
1992) (stating [a]s a general rule, a statute should be construed
so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part
will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
21 See Homer Elec. Assn, 841 P.2d at 1043-44 (noting the
most reliable guide to a statutes meaning is the statutes words
in conjunction with their common usage. Legislative history and
context are still considered; however, they must present a
compelling case that the literal meaning of the language of the
statute is not what the legislature intended.).
22 See, e.g., Alaska Fedn for Cmty. Self-Reliance v.
Alaska Pub. Utils. Commn, 879 P.2d 1015, 1020 (Alaska 1994).
23 Alaska Pub. Utils. Commn v. Chugach Elec. Assn, Inc.,
580 P.2d 687, 696 (Alaska 1978), revd on other grounds by City &
Borough of Juneau v. Thibodeau, 595 P.2d 626 (Alaska 1979).
24 AS 42.05.321(a).
25 Chugach has now apparently abandoned the argument.
26 AS 42.05.990(6) provides: service means, unless the
context indicates otherwise, every commodity, product, use,
facility, convenience, or other form of service that is offered
for and provided by a public utility for the convenience and
necessity of the public.
