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Fairbanks Fire Fighters Assoc., Local 1324 v. City of Fairbanks (6/7/2002) sp-5579
Fairbanks Fire Fighters Assoc., Local 1324 v. City of Fairbanks (6/7/2002) sp-5579
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage,
Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
FAIRBANKS FIRE FIGHTERS )
ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 1324, )
) Supreme Court No. S-9715
Appellant, )
) Superior Court No.
v. ) 4FA-99-1551 CI
)
CITY OF FAIRBANKS, ) O P I N I O N
)
Appellee. ) [No. 5579 - June 7,
2002]
________________________________)
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State
of Alaska, Fourth Judicial District,
Fairbanks, Mark I. Wood, Judge.
Appearances: Michael A. MacDonald, Downes,
MacDonald & Levengood, P.C., Fairbanks, for
Appellant. Joseph W. Evans, Law Office of
Joseph W. Evans, Fairbanks, for Appellee.
Before: Fabe, Chief Justice, Matthews,
Eastaugh, Bryner, and Carpeneti, Justices.
CARPENETI, Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
I. This appeal poses the question whether the Alaska Labor
Relations Agency has jurisdiction to decide if an issue is
arbitrable. The agency ruled that it had that power, and held
that the underlying issue in this case was arbitrable. The
superior court concluded that the agency did not have that power,
but agreed that the underlying issue was arbitrable, and so it
affirmed the agency decision. We first hold that, while the
arbitrability issue is technically moot under the procedural
posture of this case,1 the public interest exception to the
mootness doctrine applies; we therefore reach the merits of this
appeal. Because we conclude that AS 23.40.210 reserves the power
to determine arbitrability to the Alaska Labor Relations Agency,
we reverse the contrary ruling of the superior court and affirm
the agencys ruling that it had the power to decide whether the
underlying dispute was arbitrable.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Fairbanks Fire Fighters Association, Local 1324 (the
union) filed grievances against the City of Fairbanks on behalf
of Jim Rice and Lee Despain under provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) between the union and the city. The
union claimed that the city improperly refused to rehire Rice and
Despain for positions that were open in the fire department. The
two men had previously been employed as firefighters by the city
but resigned those positions under conditions that led them to
sue the city for constructive discharge.2 Rice and Despain
prevailed at trial on their claims of constructive discharge, and
the court awarded monetary damages in their favor but did not
order reinstatement.
The union sought to enforce the CBAs arbitration
provisions before the Alaska Labor Relations Agency (ALRA).
However, the city responded that this grievance was not
arbitrable under the CBA because Rice and Despain were no longer
employees of the city when the grievance arose. The city also
argued that the ALRA did not have the power to decide the issue
of arbitrability and that only the court could decide which
issues were and were not arbitrable.
The ALRA disagreed with the city on both points. In
its decision, the ALRA ruled that it had the jurisdiction to
determine what cases are arbitrable under the CBA. Using that
power, the ALRA further held that the underlying grievance
involving Rice and Despain was arbitrable.
The city appealed the ALRA decision to the superior
court. In his decision, Superior Court Judge Pro Tem Mark I.
Wood held that the ALRAs ruling with regard to its ability to
hear questions of arbitrability was erroneous. However, the
superior court also held that the error was harmless because the
arguments offered by the city as to why Rice and Despain were not
covered by the CBA were meritless. The court accordingly held
that the grievance was subject to the arbitration provisions of
the CBA, and explicitly affirmed the ALRAs order.
The union now brings this appeal challenging the
superior courts finding that the ALRA did not have the power to
determine whether or not the issues in this case are arbitrable.
The city has not appealed the superior courts ultimate decision
that the grievance is subject to arbitration.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We resolve issues of standing and mootness using our
independent judgment because they are questions of law involving
matters of judicial policy.3
In administrative appeals, we directly review the
agency action in question.4 We apply a substitution of judgment
standard to the agencys decision that it has the power to
determine issues of arbitrability, because that ruling is a legal
conclusion concerning statutory and common law interpretation
that does not implicate agency expertise. The substitution of
judgment standard . . . applies where the agencys expertise
provides little guidance to the court or where the case concerns
statutory interpretation or other analysis of legal relationships
about which courts have specialized knowledge and expertise.5
IV. DISCUSSION
A. This Case Is Moot, but We Review It under the Public
Interest Exception to the Mootness Doctrine.
The party bringing this appeal, the union, prevailed
before the ALRA. The superior court affirmed that ruling. The
city does not appeal the adverse decisions of either the agency
or the superior court. The first question is whether the union
can appeal a decision in its favor simply because it was
dissatisfied with the reasoning of the superior court.
1. This appeal is moot.
1. We have ruled that, [u]nder ordinary circumstances, we will
refrain from deciding questions where events have rendered the
legal issue moot. 6 A claim is moot if it is no longer a
present, live controversy, and the party bringing the action
would not be entitled to relief, even if it prevails.7 Mootness
can also occur when a party no longer has a personal stake in the
controversy and has, in essence, been divested of standing.8 The
basic requirement for standing in Alaska is adversity.9
This case presents an unusual twist on the usual
mootness consideration. In most cases, mootness is found because
the party raising an appeal cannot be given the remedy it seeks
even if the court agrees with its legal position.10 In this case,
the union has already been given the remedy it seeks, and we
cannot give it any further relief even if we agree with the
unions legal argument. The union merely asks us to resolve an
intermediate legal question whether the ALRA has the power to
decide its own jurisdiction differently than the superior court
did, while reaching the same ultimate conclusion that the
superior court reached.
Although the situations are not exactly the same, we
have previously found that issues were moot because the appellant
was able to secure relief, even though the means by which
appellant secured relief were different from those argued by the
appellant below.11 The facts of the present case present an even
easier case for mootness because the union has been able to
secure relief. As a result, we find that the superior courts
decision to affirm the determination of the ALRA has rendered the
unions appeal moot.
2. This appeal merits application of the public interest
exception to the mootness doctrine.
We have held that we can choose to address certain
issues if they fall under the public interest exception to the
mootness doctrine.12 There are three main factors that we
consider in deciding whether to apply the public interest
exception: (1) whether the disputed issues are capable of
repetition, (2) whether the mootness doctrine, if applied, may
cause review of the issues to be repeatedly circumvented, and (3)
whether the issues presented are so important to the public
interest as to justify overriding the mootness doctrine.13 None
of the individual factors is dispositive; rather, we use our
discretion to determine whether the public interest dictates that
immediate review of a moot issue is appropriate.14
With regard to the first requirement, we have refused
to apply the public interest exception to unusual factual
circumstances that were unlikely to repeat themselves15 or
situations where the applicable statute or regulation was no
longer in force and was unlikely to be reinstated.16 Neither of
those exceptions applies here. This issue is likely to repeat
itself as questions of arbitrability are likely to arise with
regard to other CBAs put before the ALRA in the future, and no
statutory change has occurred.
The second requirement for the public interest
exception is that the issue will continually evade court review.
This question is close. It is possible that this issue will
arise again when it is not moot. In Legislative Council v.
Knowles,17 we were uncertain as to whether the issue would evade
review in the future, but we were persuaded to apply the public
interest exception because in that case the threatened harm
resulted when a claim was brought, not when it was concluded.18
This case presents a similar situation. Arbitrability is a
threshold question; thus, the harm is caused by the means of
resolution and not the resolution itself. Therefore, we find
that this requirement is met. The third requirement is
also satisfied. We have applied the public interest exception to
situations, otherwise moot, where the legal power of public
officials was in question. Specifically, in Knowles, we applied
the exception to the issue whether the governor had the right to
bring suit against the legislature.19 Even though later
enactments resolved the immediate conflict between the governor
and legislature, we agreed to consider, under the public interest
exception, the meaning of a constitutional prohibition of such
suits.20 Similarly, in Kodiak Seafood Processors Assn v. State,21
we considered the issuance of a permit for fishing in waters that
had been closed for over twenty-five years, despite the fact that
the permit was revoked prior to trial, which rendered many of the
issues moot.22 We refused on mootness grounds to consider issues
of procedural error that were admitted by the Department of Fish
and Game, but we did consider whether the commissioner had
exceeded his authority.23 We ruled that the scope of the
Commissioners power is an issue of public interest.24
The present case meets the important public interest
requirement. As this case raises a question of the power of
government officials, the issues are sufficiently important to
the public interest to merit consideration. Therefore, the
issue, though moot, has met the three-prong public policy
exception test.
B. The ALRA Has Jurisdiction To Decide Whether an Issue Is
Arbitrable.
The union argues that there are statutory, contractual,
and policy reasons that support the agencys power to decide the
arbitrability of this dispute. The superior court disagreed and
ruled that the ALRA erred by concluding that it had jurisdiction
to resolve [arbitrability].
In State v. Public Safety Employees Assn25 we held that
questions of arbitrability should be determined by the court
unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise.26
The decision in PSEA adopted the federal rule as stated by the
United States Supreme Court in AT&T Technologies, Inc. v.
Communications Workers of America.27 The Supreme Court based its
decision in that case on the long-established legal principle
that because the duty to arbitrate is contractual in nature, a
compulsory submission to arbitration cannot precede judicial
determination that the collective bargaining agreement does in
fact create such a duty. 28 However, PSEA is inapplicable to the
present situation.
PSEA dealt with the issue of whether a court or an
arbitrator should decide questions of arbitrability. Here, the
issue is whether the court or the ALRA, an administrative agency,
has jurisdiction to determine questions of arbitrability. The
latter issue is covered by positive statutory law giving the ALRA
jurisdiction. Specifically, AS 23.40.210 provides, in relevant
part:
The agreement shall include a grievance
procedure which shall have binding
arbitration as its final step. Either party
to the agreement has a right of action to
enforce the agreement by petition to the
labor relations agency.[29]
The union asserts that the ALRA has the power to decide
arbitrability because this statute gives the agency the power to
enforce the CBA, including the requirement for grievance
arbitration. We agree.
Because arbitrators have such broad discretion, it is
often problematic for them to decide their own jurisdiction, for
if they are wrong, there may be essentially no review. This is
so because the superior court reviews an arbitrators decision
under a standard giving extreme deference to the arbitrator.30 On
the other hand, a decision by the ALRA goes through an
administrative appeals process in which the decision is subject
to varying standards of scrutiny31 that allow for a much more
piercing review than review of an arbitrators decision.
Therefore, the concerns about the non-appealable nature of an
arbitrators award are not present with administrative agency
decisions.
V. CONCLUSION
Because this appeal does not present a live controversy
we conclude that the appeal is moot. But we also conclude that
the public policy exception to the mootness doctrine applies and
we therefore reach the merits of the appeal. For the reasons
stated above, we hold that the ALRA has jurisdiction to decide
questions of arbitrability under AS 23.40.210. We therefore
REVERSE the decision of the superior court; we AFFIRM the
decision of the ALRA that it had the power to decide whether the
present dispute is arbitrable.
_______________________________
1 Arbitrability is technically moot because the city has
not appealed the superior courts ruling that the underlying
dispute was arbitrable.
2 City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 20 P.3d 1097 (Alaska 2000).
3 Kleven v. Yukon-Koyukuk School Dist., 853 P.2d 518, 525
n.13 (Alaska 1993) (citing Bowers Office Prod., Inc. v. Univ. of
Alaska, 755 P.2d 1095, 1096 (Alaska 1988)).
4 N. Alaska Envtl. Ctr. v. State, Dept of Natural Res., 2
P.3d 629, 633 (Alaska 2000).
5 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
6 Gerstein v. Axtell, 960 P.2d 599, 601 (Alaska 1998)
(quoting Kodiak Seafood Processors Assn v. State, 900 P.2d 1191,
1195 (Alaska 1995)).
7 Id. (citing OCallaghan v. State, 920 P.2d 1387, 1388
(Alaska 1996)).
8 15 Martin H. Redish, Moores Federal Practice 101.90
(3d ed. 1998).
9 Trustees for Alaska v. State, 736 P.2d 324, 327 (Alaska
1987) (citing Moore v. State, 553 P.2d 8, 24 n.25 (Alaska 1976)).
10 See, e.g., R.I. v. C.C., 9 P.3d 274, 278 (Alaska 2000);
OCallaghan, 920 P.2d at 1388; Alaska Consumer Advocacy Program v.
Alaska Pub. Util. Commn, 793 P.2d 1028, 1032 n.1 (Alaska 1990).
11 Allen v. State, Dept of Revenue, Child Support
Enforcement Div., 15 P.3d 743, 749 (Alaska 2000) (finding that
appeal of lower courts denial of claim as untimely was moot since
same issue was to be decided in separate, pending case); Gerstein
v. Axtell, 960 P.2d 599, 601 (Alaska 1998) (holding that
successful acquisition of easement through eminent domain
proceeding mooted claim for use of easement as property right).
12 Kodiak Seafood Processors Assn v. State, 900 P.2d 1191,
1196 (Alaska 1995).
13 Id.
14 See, e.g., Legislative Council v. Knowles, 988 P.2d
604, 606-07 (Alaska 1999); Krohn v. State, Dept of Fish & Game,
938 P.2d 1019, 1021 (Alaska 1987) (quoting Kodiak Seafood
Processors Assn, 900 P.2d at 1196).
15 OCallaghan, 920 P.2d at 1388-89 (concerning legality of
specific procedures surrounding decision of candidate for
lieutenant governor to change party affiliation during campaign).
16 Krohn, 938 P.2d at 1022-23 (refusing to decide moot
issues under provisions of Open Meetings Act that were
subsequently amended).
17 988 P.2d 604 (Alaska 1999).
18 Id. at 606-07.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 900 P.2d 1191 (Alaska 1995).
22 Id. at 1193-94.
23 Id. at 1196.
24 Id.
25 798 P.2d 1281 (Alaska 1990) [hereinafter PSEA].
26 Id. at 1285 (quoting AT&T Techs., Inc. v.
Communications Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986)).
27 475 U.S. 643 (1986).
28 Id. at 649 (quoting John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v.
Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 546-47 (1964)).
29 AS 23.40.210(a).
30 An arbitrators award arising out of a labor management
contract is reviewed under a gross error standard, which means
that only those mistakes which are both obvious and significant
warrant reversing the arbitrators award. Public Safety Employees
Assn, Local 92, Intl Union of Police Assns, AFL-CIO v. State, 895
P.2d 980, 984 (Alaska 1995) (quoting City of Fairbanks v. Rice,
628 P.2d 565, 567 (Alaska 1981)). We have also held that when
the agreement incorporates the Uniform Arbitration Act, AS
09.43.010-.180, an even stricter standard applies: there are no
statutory grounds for review of an arbitrators determination as
to the meaning of contract provisions which do not pertain to the
issue of arbitrability. (Ahtna, Inc. v. Ebasco Constructors,
Inc., 894 P.2d 657, 661 (Alaska 1995) (internal quotations
omitted).)
31 Review of administrative decisions occurs under varying
standards based on the issue being appealed:
We have recognized four principal standards
of review of administrative decisions. The
substantial evidence test is used for
questions of fact. The reasonable basis test
is used for questions of law involving agency
expertise. The substitution of judgment test
is used for questions of law where no
expertise is involved. The reasonable and not
arbitrary test is used for review of
administrative regulations.
Handley v. State, Dept of Revenue, 838 P.2d 1231, 1233 (Alaska
1992) (citing Jager v. State, 537 P.2d 1100, 1107 n.23 (Alaska
1975)).
