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Hubbard v. Hubbard (03/29/2002) sp-5554
Hubbard v. Hubbard (03/29/2002) sp-5554
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage,
Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
TIMOTHY W. HUBBARD, )
) Supreme Court No. S-9562
Appellant, )
) Superior Court No.
v. ) 3AN-99-4066 CI
)
AMY L. HUBBARD, ) O P I N I O N
)
Appellee. ) [No. 5554 - March 29,
2002]
________________________________)
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State
of Alaska, Third Judicial District,
Anchorage, John Reese, Judge.
Appearances: William T. Ford, Anchorage, for
Appellant. Amy L. Hubbard, pro se, Eagle
River, Alaska.
Before: Fabe, Chief Justice, Matthews,
Eastaugh, Bryner, and Carpeneti, Justices.
MATTHEWS, Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
Timothy Hubbard was held to be equitably estopped from
disestablishing paternity of his stepson, Joshua. On appeal he
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence concerning the
financial harm requirement of such a determination. We conclude
that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding of
financial harm.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Amy Hoover (subsequently, Hubbard) gave birth to a son,
Joshua, in October 1991. Joshua's biological father was David
Walters, a resident of Ohio. Alaska's Child Support Enforcement
Division (CSED) brought a child support action against Walters
after Joshua was born. Walters acknowledged paternity of Joshua,
and agreed in writing to pay child support of $500 per month.
Amy married Timothy Hubbard in April 1994. By mutual
agreement with Timothy, Amy asked CSED to terminate the child
support case against Walters. Timothy and Amy also had Walters
sign a form relinquishing his parental rights and consenting to
Joshua's adoption by Timothy.1 But Joshua was never adopted by
Timothy, and Walters's parental rights were never terminated by a
court. Timothy did, however, legitimate Joshua by having his
name placed on Joshua's birth certificate.2 During Timothy and
Amy's marriage, Joshua viewed Timothy as his father.
Timothy and Amy separated in October 1997. As part of
the divorce proceedings, Timothy sought to have his paternity of
Joshua disestablished. Superior Court Judge John Reese found
Timothy to be equitably estopped from disestablishing paternity,
finding both emotional and financial harm. As to emotional harm
the court found:
I think Tim has - aside from the litigation,
Tim has acted honorably at all times towards
Josh and that's why Josh loves him as much as
he does and for him to - you can't just pull
the plug. Otherwise there would be no such
thing as equitable estoppel in paternity
cases.
. . . .
Joshua would be terribly harmed by
disestablishment. Mr. Hubbard has put
himself in this position willingly, knowing
the risks, knowing the situation and the
favors involved, knowing what his obligations
are. And he made his heart and soul
available to Joshua and he can't, at this
late date, withdraw from that commitment.
The law does not allow it so the request for
disestablishment is denied.
With respect to financial harm the court found:
Mr. Hubbard participated in the decision to
drop the [CSED] proceedings against Mr.
Walters for child support. He intended to
adopt Joshua. Paperwork was prepared. He
participated in that. When that adoption
became impractical because of the move, he
swore under oath that he was Joshua's father
in the Ohio documents and intended by that,
among other things, to have his name put on
the birth certificate as the father, which
apparently has happened. And he continued to
act as a father toward Joshua in every way.
. . . .
All the elements of estoppel are present and
it is strong evidence there would be
financial detriment[:] the cost of interstate
litigation, perhaps the risk of losing
interstate litigation. Mr. Walters certainly
has an estoppel argument that he could raise
himself in defense of a paternity case.
Whether support from Mr. Walters could be
enforced, what kind of support is available
to Mr. Walters with the family array that he
has. We have no evidence of his income. We
do have evidence that he has two older
children whose support obligation would, of
course, come off the top before other
calculations would occur so that I think
there's quite a bit of evidence that there
would be financial difficulties involved in
pursuing Mr. Walters for support.
The court entered its findings of fact and conclusions
of law in January 2000. Timothy appeals.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In an estoppel case, the superior court's factual
findings are reviewed for clear error.3 Whether the doctrine of
equitable estoppel may be applied under the facts as found is a
question of law which this court reviews independently.4
IV. DISCUSSION
A putative father cannot be equitably estopped from
disestablishing paternity unless his child has been prejudiced by
his or her reliance on the father's representations of
paternity.5 Evidence in the record supports Judge Reese's
findings, which Timothy does not seriously dispute, that Timothy
represented himself as Joshua's father, and that Joshua both
personally and as represented by Amy reasonably relied on that
representation. Resolution of this case thus turns entirely upon
the question whether Joshua was prejudiced by that reliance:
Timothy argues that Joshua was not, while Amy argues that he was.
At one time, proof that a child would be emotionally
harmed by disestablishment of paternity was sufficient to show
prejudice.6 That broad standard no longer applies. Instead,
evidence of financial harm is required to support a finding of
equitable estoppel.7
A biological father's duty of support arises at the
birth of his child.8 The biological father's duty of support
exists, moreover, even if another man's presumptive paternity has
not yet been disestablished.9 What financial harm then is
sufficient to give rise to an estoppel against a stepfather which
requires the stepfather to make child support payments after his
divorce from the children's mother? While each case is fact
sensitive, our case law and a case on which we relied in B.E.B.
provide some useful standards and illustrations.
In Wright v. Black we noted that financial detriment
would exist where "the child is deprived of the mother's
potential action to hold the natural father responsible for the
support of the child; . . ."10 While that may be the typical
example of sufficient financial harm, the lead case on which we
relied in B.E.B., Miller v. Miller,11 went into more detail:
To prove equitable estoppel, the custodial
parent has the burden to establish not only
representation of support and reliance but
also detriment, i.e., that the children will
suffer future financial detriment as a result
of the stepparent's representation or conduct
that caused the children to be cut off from
their natural parent's financial
support. . . .
For example, at the final hearing if the
custodial parent demonstrates that he or she
(1) does not know the whereabouts of the
natural parent; (2) cannot locate the other
natural parent; or (3) cannot secure
jurisdiction over the natural parent for
valid legal reasons, and that the natural
parent's unavailability is due to the actions
of the stepparent, a trial court could hold
that the stepparent is equitably estopped
from denying his or her duty to support the
children.
If, as in the present case, the wife knows
where the natural father is, she has the
burden to bring him before the court and to
seek child support from him. Once in court
the burden is on the natural father to show
why he should not, in equity, be required to
pay child support for his children. If the
court finds that the natural father should
not be required to pay child support due to
the stepfather's conduct, the natural father
having relied thereon and having placed
himself in such a position that he is unable
to meet that obligation, the stepparent
should be responsible for the children's
continued support. This, of course, is
subject to modification or change whenever
the natural father can meet his
obligation. . . .
It is only when a stepparent by his or her
conduct actively interferes with the
children's support from their natural parent
that he or she may be equitably estopped from
denying his or her duty to support the
children. . . . If a stepparent marries a
divorced parent who is not receiving any
child support, or if during their marriage
the natural parent stops paying child support
without interference from the stepparent, the
stepparent does not thereby inherit the
permanent support obligations of the
nonpaying natural parent. The stepparent must
take positive action interfering with the
natural parent's support obligation to be
bound.[12]
In the present case the facts support an estoppel based
on, to use the language of Miller, Timothy's "positive action
interfering with the natural parent's support obligation . . . ."
As noted, as a consequence of a child support enforcement action,
Walters had signed an agreement agreeing to pay child support of
$500 per month. Amy testified that she had this action withdrawn
"at the urging of" Timothy. Her testimony was confirmed by Amy's
aunt, Nancy Biggerstaff, with whom the family lived while in
Anchorage. She testified that Timothy and Amy "wanted [Walters]
out of the picture." She also stated that "they had me prepare
the documents . . . the consent to adopt and of relinquishment.
We forwarded that to [Walters]." These facts adequately support
the finding of the trial court that Timothy participated in the
decision to terminate the child support proceedings against
Walters. Taken together with the cost and uncertainty of
reinstituting support proceedings against Walters as found by the
trial court we conclude that the record supports the trial
court's conclusion that the financial harm element of estoppel
has been satisfied.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated the judgment of the superior
court is AFFIRMED.
_______________________________
1 In the relinquishment of parental rights that Walters
signed, he agreed that "the minor child shall hereafter be a
stranger to me for all purposes . . . ."
2 This occurred when the parties were living in North
Carolina. Joshua was born in Ohio. Timothy's counsel represents
that under Ohio law this creates a rebuttable presumption of
paternity and that since Timothy is not Joshua's natural father,
this presumption has been rebutted. We accept this
representation and conclusion for the purposes of this case.
3 See Wright v. Black, 856 P.2d 477, 479 (Alaska 1993),
overruled in part on other grounds by B.E.B. v. R.L.B., 979 P.2d
514, 520 n.47 (Alaska 1999).
4 See Wright, 856 P.2d at 479 n.2.
5 See B.E.B., 979 P.2d at 516.
6 See Wright, 856 P.2d at 481.
7 B.E.B., 979 P.2d at 520. There are a number of reasons
for the rule requiring financial prejudice. As we explained in
B.E.B.:
The duty of support has traditionally been
rooted in the biological ties between a
parent and a child. This well-accepted
principle weighs heavily in favor of a rule
that makes estoppel the exception, not the
norm. Yet under [the] broad emotional harm
standard, the exception would dominate: "To
rule . . . that the exception applies
whenever a child has reached an age when he
or she could have a meaningful appreciation
of paternity would make the exception the
rule and the rule applicable only to one and
two year olds."
Id. at 519 (footnote omitted). Moreover, requiring a non-
biological father to assume a post-divorce support obligation is
unlikely to encourage a lasting bond between the non-biological
father and the child. By contrast, estoppel based on emotional
harm may discourage the husband of the mother of the child from
assuming a parent-like role during the marriage. For these
reasons we concluded in B.E.B. "that the risk of emotional harm
inherent in severing a child's relationship with a psychological
parent cannot itself suffice as a basis for invoking the doctrine
of paternity by estoppel; to support a finding of estoppel, the
evidence must show financial prejudice." Id. at 520.
8 See State, Dep't of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement
Div. v. Kovac, 984 P.2d 1109, 1112 (Alaska 1999).
9 See id.
10 856 P.2d 477, 481 (Alaska 1993).
11 478 A.2d 351 (N.J. 1984).
12 Id. at 358-59.
