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S.H. v. State, Dept. of Health & Social Services (03/08/2002) sp-5544
S.H. v. State, Dept. of Health & Social Services (03/08/2002) sp-5544
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage,
Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
S.H., )
) Supreme Court No. S-9932
Appellant, )
) Superior Court Nos.
v. ) 3AN-98-493/494/495/496/497 CP
)
STATE OF ALASKA, ) O P I N I O N
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & )
SOCIAL SERVICES, DIVISION OF ) [No. 5544 - March 8, 2002]
FAMILY & YOUTH SERVICES, )
)
Appellee. )
________________________________)
)
R.H., )
) Supreme Court No. S-9938
Appellant, )
)
v. )
)
STATE OF ALASKA, )
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & )
SOCIAL SERVICES, DIVISION OF )
FAMILY & YOUTH SERVICES, )
)
Appellee. )
________________________________)
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State
of Alaska, Third Judicial District,
Anchorage, John Reese, Judge.
Appearances: Gayle J. Brown, Law Offices of
Gayle Brown, Anchorage, for Appellate S.H.
J. Stefan Otterson, Law Office of Thom F.
Janidlo, Anchorage, for Appellant R.H. Jan
Hart De Young, Assistant Attorney General,
Anchorage, and Bruce M. Botelho, Attorney
General, Juneau, for Appellee.
Before: Fabe, Chief Justice, Eastaugh,
Bryner, and Carpeneti, Justices. [Matthews,
Justice, not participating.]
FABE, Chief Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Department of Health and Social Services, Division
of Family and Youth Services (DFYS) petitioned to terminate the
parental rights of S.H. and R.H. In April 1999 a DFYS social
worker removed S.H.s five children from the home after receiving
a report that S.H. was using cocaine and that R.H. had returned
home in violation of a restraining order. The primary issue
before the superior court was whether the parents recent efforts
to eliminate substance abuse and domestic violence from the home
and to attend to their childrens complicated needs were
sufficient to remedy their harmful conduct within a reasonable
amount of time. After a four-day hearing in September 2000, the
trial court terminated the parental rights of S.H. and R.H. Both
parents appeal. Because the trial courts findings are not
clearly erroneous, we affirm.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
A. The Children
R.H. and S.H. were married from 1991 to 2000. S.H. is
the mother of four boys and one girl: J.F., a son born in 1986;
S.F., a son born in 1990; T.H., a son born in 1992; V.H., a
daughter born in 1994; and D.H., a son born in 1995. R.H. is the
father of the three youngest children. J.F. and S.F. were
fathered by two different men.
1. J.F.
J.F., the eldest child, was born in 1986 to S.H. and an
Alaska Native who has not been involved in J.F.s upbringing and
is not a party to this appeal. J.F. is eligible for membership
in the Orutsararmuit tribe by virtue of his fathers membership.
J.F. was hospitalized twice in 1999 at Charter North
Hospital (Charter) due to aggression and his attempt to jump out
of a window at a shelter. He was subsequently transferred to
Alaska Childrens Services (ACS) residential treatment where he
remained for at least nine months. According to his ACS case
manager:
[J.F.] has a history of defying parents and
other adults, severe verbal and physical
outbursts, destroys property, attempts to
injure children, lies, acts without
considering consequences, ADHD [attention
deficit hyperactivity disorder] per
diagnosis, easily agitated, refuses to comply
with normal duties, attempts to manipulate
others, associates with negative peers, fire
setting, mood swings, depression, anxiety and
grief issues.
When hospitalized at Charter, J.F. admitted, I get mad quickly.
I have an anger problem. J.F. was diagnosed as possibly
suffering post traumatic stress disorder and major depression.
Psychological testing revealed that he may have been sexually
abused.
2. S.F.
S.F. was born in December 1990 to S.H. and another man
who is not a party to this appeal. S.F. was described as having
a history of defying parents and other adults, hyperactive
behavior, impulsive behavior, usually withdrawn and quiet,
anxious, needs constant supervision, history of abuse and
neglect, shows no attachment, grief and loss issues. He also has
varied symptoms of repressed anxiety. A neuropsychologist who
assessed him concluded that S.F. needs to reside in a structured,
predictable, and highly supportive environment that provides him
with the experience of safety and consistent guidance. . . .
[E]xcessive environmental stimuli should be limited . . . because
he is easily overwhelmed.
3. T.H.
T.H. was born in August 1992. From the summer of 1998
to January 1999, T.H. was admitted to Charter three times for two
to three weeks each time. Upon the initial intake, he was
described as follows:
This five-year-old, who has been treated by
Dr. Lynn Clark for attention deficit on
Ritalin and imipramine, has manifested severe
behavior to the point of bizareness [sic].
He is not containable by his parents with
extreme aggression, fighting, kicking and
severe destruction of property. His behavior
is unremitting and also violent to other
children with having to be under observation
continuously.
The admitting doctor stated that T.H. looks as if he could be in
a black and white picture as a refuge[e] child behind barbed wire
in a wartime photo. Thusly trauma is written on his face. After
his third hospitalization, T.H. was transferred from Charter to
ACS residential treatment where he lived from February 1999 to
February 2000.
A neuropsychological evaluation to assess T.H.s
aberrant behavior and emotional dysfunction in May 2000 revealed
that his hyperactive and aggressive behavior has not ceased. He
was again admitted to Charter after reporting that he had
experienced auditory hallucinations telling him to harm himself.
T.H. was diagnosed with post traumatic stress disorder and was
found to be clearly struggling with psychosis.
4. V.H.
V.H., the only daughter of S.H. and R.H., was born in
May 1994. In June 1997 DFYS received a report of suspected
sexual abuse of V.H. The report alleged that S.H. had invited a
couple she had met on a dating chat line to her house to engage
in sexual activities. S.H. had previously learned that the
couple had lost custody of their children to the state. The man
reportedly assaulted T.H. and molested V.H., then three years
old, while in the home. The incident was reported to the
Anchorage Police Department.
One of V.H.s teachers reported in May 2000 that V.H.
had come to school disheveled and unkempt, that she exhibited
difficulties with her school work, and that she displayed
inappropriate behaviors with the male children in her class. A
neuropsychologist recommended that V.H. reside in a very
structured, predictable, and nurturing environment where
appropriate displays of affection are emphasized and personal
boundaries are gently clarified.
5. D.H.
D.H., the youngest child, was born in December 1995.
He was hospitalized during January 1996 for lung problems and was
diagnosed with reactive airway disease. Despite recommendations
to refrain from smoking around D.H., DFYS social workers who
visited the home noted that S.H. and R.H. continued to smoke in
the home. A licensed therapist who assessed D.H. in January 2000
testified that D.H. had been harming his foster parents pets, had
reenacted domestic violence in his play, and had described
violence in his home.
B. DFYS Involvement
Ten reports of suspected child abuse were made to DFYS
starting in 1987. On June 5, 1997, the first substantiated report
to DFYS was made based on an incident in which R.H. assaulted
J.F., T.H., and S.H. while he was intoxicated. According to
DFYSs petition, [o]fficers reportedly had to draw their weapons
on [R.H.] to get him to remove a meat cleaver. Less than three
weeks later, DFYS received the report regarding suspected sexual
abuse of V.H. and assault of T.H. by a man S.H. met on a dating
chat line. It was also reported that S.H. had been verbally and
physically abusive to the children.
After this incident, S.H. complied with DFYS
instructions to refrain from associating with the man from the
chat line and his wife, and S.H. called Southcentral Foundation
to become involved in a parent support group and to start V.H. in
therapy. However, within several weeks S.H. began missing
appointments. In the summer of 1997 DFYS referred the family to
the Anchorage Center for Families for counseling.
During T.H.s hospitalization in June 1998, home-based
services were arranged for the family with the Anchorage Center
for Families. S.H. and R.H. agreed to participate in mental
health assessments, substance abuse evaluations, parenting
classes, random urinalysis tests, and three Alcoholics
Anonymous/Narcotics Anonymous (AA/NA) meetings per week. S.H.
and R.H. were warned that they were at high risk for DFYS
involvement if they did not work on their case plan.
In July 1998 DFYS received a report that S.H. and R.H.
were participating only marginally in T.H.s treatment at Charter
and that they had threatened to abandon T.H. if he did not behave
as they wished. A fourth substance abuse evaluation was
scheduled, but in October 1998 the Anchorage Center for Families
decided to discontinue services to the family due to chronic
noncompliance. Between October 1998 and August 1999, DFYS
developed three case plans to address the needs of the children
and to assist R.H. and S.H. in meeting those needs.
C. Procedural History
In the fall of 1998 the trial court found that probable
cause existed to believe that the five children were in need of
aid. The court ordered temporary supervisory custody to DFYS,
while permitting the children to remain in the home. In January
1999 DFYS filed a second petition for temporary custody alleging
that S.H. and R.H. were not complying with the DFYS case plan to
eliminate domestic violence and substance abuse from the home.
After a hearing in early February 1999, Superior Court Judge John
Reese awarded supervisory custody to DFYS but allowed the
children to stay with S.H., on the condition that R.H. stay away
from the home.
In April 1999 DFYS received a report that R.H. had
returned to the home in violation of the courts order and that
both parents were using crack cocaine. The DFYS social worker
who went to the home also reported that it was extremely filthy
and that S.H. was smoking cigarettes, despite being told
previously by the court that smoking was prohibited due to [D.H.]
and [T.H.s] asthma. DFYS removed the five children from the
home, placing J.F. and T.H. in Alaska Childrens Services
residential treatment and situating V.H, D.H., and S.F. in foster
care.
R.H. relinquished his parental rights of T.H., V.H.,
and D.H. in October 1999. In February 2000 DFYS developed a
permanency plan to terminate S.H.s parental rights, indicating
that S.H. has not addressed any of the issues outlined in
previous case plans. DFYS petitioned to terminate parental
rights on May 12, 2000. In May or June 2000 R.H.s request to
withdraw the relinquishment of his parental rights was granted.
On July 10, 2000, DFYS amended its petition to include the
termination of R.H.s parental rights. In August 2000 DFYS sent a
letter to R.H. at Spring Creek Correctional Center, inquiring
about R.H.s participation in the case plan while incarcerated.
R.H. failed to respond to the letter.
After a four-day hearing in September 2000, Judge Reese
terminated S.H. and R.H.s parental rights. Both S.H. and R.H.
appeal this order, and their appeals have been consolidated.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
We apply the clearly erroneous standard when reviewing
a trial courts findings on termination of parental rights.1
Clear error arises only when our review of the entire record
leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that the superior
court has made a mistake.2 Whether the superior courts factual
findings satisfy applicable child in need of aid statutes and
rules is a question of law that we review de novo.3
B. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Concluding that S.H.
Failed To Remedy the Conduct or Conditions in the Home
that Place the Children at Substantial Risk of Harm.
Under AS 47.10.088(a), parental rights may be
terminated if the court finds: (1) that the child is in need of
aid under AS 47.10.011; (2) that the parent has failed to remedy
the conduct or conditions that place the child at a substantial
risk of harm or failed to remedy the conduct or conditions within
a reasonable time; and (3) that the department made reasonable
efforts to provide family support services to prevent out-of-home
placement of the child or to return the child to the family home.4
The court must also consider the best interests of the child and
any fact relating thereto.5 The superior court found that this
three-part test was satisfied. It further found that DFYS had
complied with the Indian Child Welfare Acts placement
requirements6 as they pertained to J.F.
S.H. does not contest the finding that her children are
in need of aid. Rather, she maintains that the trial court erred
in concluding that she had failed within a reasonable time to
remedy the conduct or conditions in the home that place the
children at substantial risk of harm. S.H. argues that by
divorcing her abusive husband and by entering substance abuse
treatment, she has taken substantial steps to remedy the primary
causes of the emotional damage suffered by the children.
Judge Reese found that the children are in need of aid
under five statutory factors: AS 47.10.011(1) (abandonment); AS
47.10.011(6) (substantial risk of physical harm); AS 47.10.011(8)
(mental injury to the child); AS 47.10.011(9) (neglect); and AS
47.10.011(10) (substance abuse of the parent). In his ruling
from the bench, Judge Reese noted:
[S.H.] started her treatment program last
week. [R.H. is] going to start his next
Monday. . . . Even if you succeeded in
those, it would be months and months before
anyone could say with a straight face that
there was success happening. And, of course,
we all know that the success in these kinds
of programs is very elusive. And the kids
just dont have time. They need permanency.
We conclude that Judge Reese did not err in finding that S.H.
failed to remedy her substance abuse problem within a reasonable
time.
Contrary to S.H.s assertion that her substance abuse
problem did not start until April 1999, she tested positive for
cannabinoids, cocaine, alcohol, opiates, and amphetamines seven
times from April 1994 to October 1995. In 1999 she began using
crack cocaine on weekends. S.H. claims that [s]he was actively
seeking treatment by September of 1999. But between April 1999
and March 2000, S.H. tested positive nineteen times for cocaine
and cannabinoids. S.H. also failed to follow through on two
earlier drug assessment plans and repeatedly failed to complete
outpatient treatment.7
In February 2000 DFYS developed a case plan for
termination of S.H. and R.H.s parental rights. But even the
imminent threat of losing her children was not enough to motivate
S.H. to cease her drug use: In March 2000 she tested positive
for cocaine and she admitted to having used cocaine as recently
as May 2000.8 The June 2000 assessment indicated that S.H.s
resistance to treatment was high and that she was at high risk
for relapse. It also noted that S.H. appears ambivalent
concerning need for treatment and that she has continued to use
illicit substance[s] despite negative consequences.
In making a determination that a parent has failed to
remedy the harmful conduct within a reasonable amount of time,
the court may consider any fact relating to the best interests of
the child, including
(1) the likelihood of returning the
child to the parent within a reasonable time
based on the childs age or needs;
(2) the amount of effort by the parent
to remedy the conduct or the conditions in
the home;
(3) the harm caused to the child;
(4) the likelihood that the harmful
conduct will continue; and
(5) the history of conduct by or
conditions created by the parent.[9]
S.H.s substance abuse history, which reflects a pattern of
periods of progress followed by periods of heavy substance abuse
and neglect of her childrens needs, supports Judge Reeses finding
that S.H. failed to remedy her substance abuse problem within a
reasonable time.10
The court properly considered that several more months
would pass before S.H. or R.H. could provide a sober, healthy,
and stable family environment in which they could focus on their
childrens complicated special needs. The fact that DFYS already
had exhibited such patience with this family made immediate
attention to these childrens needs all the more crucial. The
record also indicates that there is a high risk that S.H.s
substance abuse will continue. The harm caused by S.H. and R.H.s
substance abuse, neglect, and abandonment of their children is
evidenced by the fact that the children require therapy as a
result of mental and physical injuries received in the home
environment. If S.H. had been progressing in outpatient
treatment during the year prior to the permanency hearing, her
argument that the waiting list for residential treatment made it
impossible for her to remedy her conduct within a reasonable time
would carry more weight. But she continued to use cocaine during
this period, failed to pursue individual counseling, and was
noncompliant with outpatient drug treatment.
In addition, we agree with the trial court that S.H.
did not remedy her failure to address her childrens emotional and
therapeutic needs. Judge Reese concluded that the anger and
addiction issues are large and important . . . but the main issue
here is the parental participation in the childrens lives, and
especially in their treatment. In finding that the children are
in need of aid, Judge Reese recognized the parents inability to
succeed in following the case plans in any reasonable scope and
their woefully inadequate efforts to attend to the childrens
complicated and special emotional and therapeutic needs. We
conclude that the trial court did not err in ruling that S.H.
failed to remedy her conduct within a reasonable period of time.
C. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Terminating R.H.s
Parental Rights.
1. Termination of the parental rights of R.H. to
T.H., V.H., and D.H. was in the best interests of
the children.
R.H. maintains that all three children were still
subject to being moved to new placements at the time of trial and
that there is no indication that DFYS will ever find an adoptive
home for T.H., given the childs severe behavioral problems. R.H.
further argues that although there was testimony that the
children need a permanent placement, there was no evidence
presented regarding the time in which such a placement must be
made.
The trial court must consider the best interests of the
child in determining whether to terminate parental rights.11 R.H.
cites A.B. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services12 in
support of his argument that termination of his parental rights
would leave his children orphaned, which would not be in their
best interests. Contrary to R.H.s assertion, A.B. stands for the
proposition that the risk of a child being half-orphaned should
be considered in the best interests analysis where DFYS seeks to
terminate only one parents rights and the child will remain in
the other parents custody.13 Here, DFYS seeks to terminate the
rights of both parents, and, therefore, A.B. does not apply.
The timeliness of a permanent stable placement for the
children is paramount, particularly in this case.14 The record
indicates that the children are in need of a permanent placement
with foster parents, adoptive parents, or guardians who can meet
the childrens special needs and who will be consistent, reliable,
and capable of participating in the childrens treatment. There
is a substantial body of evidence regarding the extensive needs
of the children, the parents history of failing to meet those
needs, and the childrens repeated exposure to the parents
substance abuse and domestic violence.
Both R.H. and S.H. testified that they have been
physically violent towards each other. In July 1995 the court
ordered that R.H. was not to have contact with S.H. after he was
convicted of assaulting her. In May 1997 R.H. was charged with
assaulting S.H., J.F., and T.H. In her petition for a protective
order, S.H. reported that R.H. had hit her ten-year-old son and
when she tried to intervene, R.H. hit me and [threw] a toy at my
4 yr son, and then took kni[v]es from my kitchen and then thats
when I call[ed] the cops. He was convicted of disorderly conduct
and was sentenced to five years probation, ordered to have no
contact with S.H. or the children, and ordered to complete a
domestic violence intervention program.15 From June 1997 to
August 1999, S.H. obtained three domestic violence protective
orders against R.H. for his conduct, ranging from verbal threats
and harassment to assaults against S.H. and the children.
It is evident from the record that there is a need for
the children to be placed immediately in a permanent stable home.
The trial court did not err in finding that termination of R.H.s
parental rights was in the childrens best interests.
2. R.H. failed to remedy his conduct in a reasonable
time.
R.H. argues that there was no testimony that he would
not be able to provide for the childrens needs within a
reasonable time period. He asserts that the only testimony
concerning his parenting style was entirely positive.16 Although
R.H. recognizes that it would take some additional time to
overcome his substance abuse problem, he maintains that the
evidence does not indicate that time had run out. R.H. testified
that he would be out of prison and prepared to assume
responsibilities as a parent eighteen months from the time of
trial.
We agree with the trial court that R.H.s efforts were
too little, too late. Although R.H. completed parenting classes
in prison in August and September 1999, he signed up to begin
residential drug treatment that would start only after trial, in
October 2000, in a program offered through Wildwood Correctional
Facility. And R.H. has presented scant evidence that he has
attended to the medical or mental health needs of his children.
As recently as December 1998, he was openly defiant towards DFYSs
efforts to help him address his own needs and the needs of his
children. Given his history of domestic violence and substance
abuse from 1995 to 1999, we conclude that the trial court did not
err in finding that R.H. had not remedied his harmful conduct
within a reasonable amount of time.
3. DFYS made reasonable efforts to prevent the break-
up of the family.
R.H. argues that DFYS made no efforts to prevent the
break-up of the family in the four months between his withdrawal
of his relinquishment of parental rights in May 2000 and the
termination of parental rights hearing. Before terminating
parental rights, the trial court must find that DFYS has complied
with the provisions of AS 47.10.086 concerning reasonable
efforts.17 Alaska Statute 47.10.086(a) provides in pertinent
part:
[T]he department shall make timely,
reasonable efforts to provide family support
services to the child and to the parents or
guardian of the child that are designed to
prevent out-of-home placement of the child or
to enable the safe return of the child to the
family home, when appropriate, if the child
is in an out-of-home placement.
DFYS must identify and actively offer to the parent family
support services that will assist the parent or guardian in
remedying the conduct or conditions in the home that made the
child a child in need of aid.18
We have held that a parents demonstrated lack of
willingness to participate in treatment may be considered in
determining whether the State has made reasonable remedial
efforts.19 Despite R.H.s explicit refusal to work on the November
1998 DFYS case plan, DFYS developed case plans in March 1999 and
August 1999 that focused on R.H.s domestic violence and substance
abuse. Again, R.H. stated that he was unwilling to work on the
case plan unless he could have custody of his child from a
previous relationship. A therapist at Alaska Childrens Services
testified that in 1999 R.H. told her that he did not want to have
contact with T.H. because [T.H.] did not do anything for him and
therefore he did not want to do anything for [T.H.].
R.H. claims that he relinquished his parental rights
because he hoped it would improve S.H.s chances of keeping
custody of the children. But this does not change the fact that
he had from November 1998, when DFYS developed the first case
plan, to May 2000, when he relinquished his parental rights, to
take advantage of the services that DFYS offered him. Instead,
he repeatedly rejected DFYSs efforts.
Because R.H. had consistently refused to participate in
DFYS case plans, we conclude that DFYSs efforts with R.H. to
prevent the break-up of the family were reasonable. After R.H.
withdrew his relinquishment of parental rights, DFYS offered him
programs and services through the Department of Corrections,
including health and parenting classes, residential drug
treatment in a therapeutic community, and urinalysis testing. In
addition, in August 2000 a DFYS social worker sent a letter to
R.H. reminding him of his case plan objectives and inquiring
about the programs available in the prison and his participation
in the case plan. As we recognized in A.M. v. State, [i]t is of
no particular consequence that the Department of Corrections
(DOC), rather than DFYS, made these active remedial efforts.20
The trial court did not commit error by finding that DFYS made
reasonable remedial efforts.
IV. CONCLUSION
The trial court did not err in finding that termination
of R.H. and S.H.s parental rights is in the best interests of the
children, that the parents failed to remedy the conduct that put
the children at risk of physical and emotional injury within a
reasonable amount of time, and that DFYS made reasonable efforts
to prevent the break-up of the family. We AFFIRM the trial
courts order terminating R.H. and S.H.s parental rights.
_______________________________
1 M.W. v. State, Dept of Health & Soc. Servs., 20 P.3d
1141, 1143 (Alaska 2001).
2 Id.
3 Id.; E.M. v. State, Dept of Health & Soc. Servs., 959
P.2d 766, 768 (Alaska 1998).
4 J.H. v. State, Dept of Health & Soc. Servs., 30 P.3d
79, 85-86 (Alaska 2001) (citing AS 47.10.088(a)(1)(B), AS
47.10.088(a)(2), and AS 47.10.086).
5 AS 47.10.088(b).
6 25 U.S.C. 1915(b).
7 S.H. attributes to DFYS her failure to remedy her
substance abuse problem in the twelve months between when she
claims DFYS first identified her problem in August 1999 and the
termination hearing in September 2000. S.H. argues that DFYS did
not adequately assess her need for in-patient treatment. Judge
Reese put it best when he said: The responsibility of the state
to provide reasonable efforts and active efforts does not
eliminate the responsibility of the parents to do their part as
well. And thats where the failure was here.
8 S.H. also claims she attempted to comply with DFYSs
drug assessment plan and that her full compliance with DFYS case
plans was not required for her to remedy the conduct or
conditions that placed her children at risk. However, the trial
court correctly concluded that her attempt to comply with the
drug assessment plans was insufficient to remedy her conduct
within a reasonable time. Furthermore, Judge Reese did not base
his decision on S.H.s lack of full compliance with the case plan.
Rather, he found that S.H. and R.H.s inability to succeed in
following the case plans in any reasonable scope supported the
conclusion that these parents had not remedied their harmful
conduct.
9 AS 47.10.088(b).
10 See J.H. v. State, Dept of Health & Soc. Servs., 30
P.3d 79, 96 (Alaska 2001) (holding that despite mothers progress
in attempting to conquer her substance abuse problem, she had
failed to remedy her conduct within a reasonable time).
11 AS 47.10.088(c).
12 7 P.3d 946, 954-955 (Alaska 2000) (In light of DFYSs
efforts to unite S.B. and R.H. . . . termination of her parental
rights has, in effect, left S.B. half-orphaned. If R.H. turns
out to be a satisfactory parent for S.B., it is difficult for us
to see how severing all ties with A.B. is in S.B.s best
interests.).
13 See id. at 955 n.27 (The situation would be different
if DFYS were attempting to place S.B. into a permanent adoptive
home. . . . Here, however, . . . DFYS was seeking to place S.B.
with her father, at least until DFYS determines that the father
is also not an adequate parent.); A.H. v. State, Dept of Health &
Soc. Servs., 10 P.3d 1156, 1166 (Alaska 2000) (concluding that
A.B. does not control because the State petitioned to terminate
the parental rights of both [parents], planning to free the
children for adoption).
14 Cf. AS 47.10.086(b) (providing that once the court
finds that the requirements for termination of parental rights
have been met, [t]he department shall then make reasonable
efforts to place the child in a timely manner in accordance with
the permanent plan) (emphasis added); AS 47.05.065(5) ([N]umerous
studies establish that . . . (C) it is important to provide for
an expedited placement procedure to ensure that all children,
especially those under the age of six years, who have been
removed from their homes are placed in permanent homes
expeditiously.).
15 When asked by his attorney whether he had ever
intentionally hurt his children, R.H. responded, No, Id never do
that. Not with the way I was raised.
16 The testimony that R.H. cites concerning his entirely
positive parenting style came from one neighbor whose only
contact with R.H. was while talking to him while R.H. was in his
yard doing chores or playing with the children. That neighbor
never saw R.H. in the home with his children.
17 AS 47.10.088(a)(2).
18 AS 47.10.086(a)(1)-(2).
19 See N.A. v. State, 19 P.3d 597, 603-04 (Alaska 2001);
A.M. v. State, 945 P.2d, 296, 306 (Alaska 1997); A.H. v. State,
10 P.3d 1156, 1164 (Alaska 2000); A.A. v. State, Dept of Family &
Youth Servs., 982 P.2d 256, 262-63 (Alaska 1999).
20 945 P.2d at 305; A.A., 982 P.2d at 263.
