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Griswold v Homer (11/16/2001) sp-5503
Griswold v Homer (11/16/2001) sp-5503
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before publication in
the Pacific Reporter. Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of
the Clerk of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone
(907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
FRANK S. GRISWOLD, )
) Supreme Court No. S-9627
Appellant, )
) Superior Court No.
v. ) 3HO-98-141 CI
)
CITY OF HOMER, ) O P I N I O N
)
Appellee. ) [No. 5503 - November 16, 2001]
______________________________)
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of
Alaska, Third Judicial District, Homer,
Harold M. Brown, Judge.
Appearances: William R. De Vries, Homer, for
Appellant. Gordon J. Tans, Perkins Coie, Anchorage, for Appellee.
Before: Fabe, Chief Justice, Eastaugh,
Bryner, and Carpeneti, Justices. [Matthews,
Justice, not participating.]
CARPENETI, Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
Frank S. Griswold challenges a city ordinance permitting
automobile-related uses in Homer's central business district.
Griswold alleges that the ordinance amounts to spot zoning, that
proper procedures were not followed in passing the ordinance, and
that disqualifying conflicts of interest exist. The superior court
dismissed all of Griswold's claims on summary judgment. Because
Griswold has failed to establish a material difference between this
case and our decision in Griswold v. City of Homer (Griswold I),
[Fn. 1] we hold that Griswold I is controlling precedent. We also
hold that the superior court properly dismissed Griswold's
procedural and conflict of interest claims. Therefore, we affirm
the decision of the superior court.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
The Homer Zoning Ordinance, originally enacted in 1983
and amended in 1989, disallowed car lots and automobile-related
services throughout Homer's central business district (CBD). [Fn.
2] Pre-existing uses in violation of this restriction were allowed
as "grandfathered" nonconforming uses. [Fn. 3]
A. Ordinance 92-18 - Griswold I
In 1990 local businessman Guy Rosi, Sr. requested that
the Homer City Council amend the zoning laws to permit automobile-
related activities in the CBD. In 1991 he alternatively requested
that his lot be rezoned to permit automobile sales and related
services. Rosi operated an automotive repair business within the
CBD that was a grandfathered nonconforming use, while the
automobile sales business that he had previously operated on the
same lot was not permitted because it had been discontinued for
more than one year.
After public hearings regarding automobile-related
services in the CBD and a favorable recommendation from the
planning commission, the city council adopted Ordinance 92-18,
which amended the city code to allow certain automobile-related
businesses in a thirteen-lot section of the CBD that included
Rosi's property. It added the following as a permitted use:
hh. Automobile and vehicle repair, vehicle
maintenance, public garage, and motor vehicle sales, showrooms and
sales lots, but only on Main Street from Pioneer Avenue to the
Homer Bypass Road, excluding corner lots with frontage on Pioneer
Avenue or the Homer Bypass Road, be allowed as a permitted use.
The city council voted unanimously to pass the ordinance. One
participating council member, Brian Sweiven, owned one of the
thirteen lots covered by the amendment.
Frank Griswold lives in the CBD and owns an automobile
repair business there that has been grandfathered as a
nonconforming use. Griswold challenged the validity of the
ordinance, claiming that a conflict of interest existed with regard
to Sweiven and that the ordinance amounted to illegal spot zoning
for the benefit of landowner Rosi. After a bench trial, the
superior court rejected Griswold's claims, and an appeal followed.
In Griswold I, [Fn. 4] we affirmed the validity of the
ordinance on zoning law grounds. After an extensive consideration
of the legal merits of Griswold's claims, we affirmed the findings
of the superior court that the ordinance did not amount to spot
zoning. Specifically, we held that it was not error to find that
the change was consistent with the city's comprehensive plan, was
enacted to serve the general interests of the community, and was
supported by legitimate, nondiscriminatory justifications. [Fn. 5]
However, we did rule that a conflict of interest existed with
regard to council member Sweiven. [Fn. 6] The case was remanded to
the superior court with instructions to consider whether the
ordinance should be invalidated. [Fn. 7]
The superior court entered judgment declaring the
ordinance invalid on July 27, 1997. In response, the city council
officially repealed Ordinance 92-18 via Ordinance 97-10.
B. Ordinance 98-9(A)
In November 1997 a new ordinance proposing changes to the
zoning laws identical to those contained in Ordinance 92-18 was
introduced to the city council to address the "same public welfare
issues and concerns" as the invalidated ordinance. [Fn. 8] The
city council referred the new ordinance, identified as Ordinance
98-9, to the planning commission as required under the Homer City
Code.
The planning commission held a public hearing on the
proposed ordinance on March 18, 1998, and returned the proposed
ordinance to the council with a recommendation that it not be
adopted.
The city council gave Ordinance 98-9 a first reading at
its May 11, 1998 meeting. The council then held its own public
hearing on the proposed ordinance. At a second reading, on June
22, 1998, the city council amended the proposed ordinance to
require that visibility screening fences be erected around any
automobile parts, automobiles in disrepair, or automobiles awaiting
repair or customer pickup. The amended proposal was renamed
Ordinance 98-9(A).
The first sentence of the amendment in Ordinance 98-9(A)
is almost identical to the complete language of the amendment in
Ordinance 92-18. [Fn. 9] The only significant difference between
the two ordinances is the additional fencing language in Ordinance
98-9(A), which provides:
Vehicles awaiting repair or service;
inoperable vehicles; vehicles for parts, and vehicles awaiting
customer pickup shall be parked inside a fenced enclosure so as to
be concealed from view, on all sides. The fence shall be a minimum
height of 8' and so constructed to prohibit visibility of anything
inside of the enclosure. The portion of any vehicle exceeding 8'
in height shall be permitted to be visible outside of the fence.
Vehicle parts (usable or unusable), vehicle service supplies, and
any other debris created in the repair or servicing of vehicles
shall also be stored inside the fenced enclosure out of view of the
public.
The city council passed Ordinance 98-9(A) at the same meeting at
which it was amended.
Griswold filed this suit in superior court to have
Ordinance 98-9(A) declared invalid. He argued that the ordinance
amounts to illegal spot zoning because, in part, it was enacted as
the result of prejudice and arbitrary decision-making, has no
legitimate public purpose, and does not comply with the
comprehensive plan for the city of Homer. He also alleged that two
council members had a disqualifying conflict of interest and should
not have participated in discussions nor voted on the ordinance.
Finally, he argued that amending the ordinance after the public
hearing and consideration by the planning commission violated
procedural requirements.
On November 29, 1999, the superior court granted partial
summary judgment to the city on Griswold's procedural and spot
zoning claims, leaving only Griswold's conflict of interest claims.
The court ruled that the spot zoning claims were precluded by this
court's decision in Griswold I, and that the procedural claims
should be dismissed because the amendments did not so alter the
ordinance as to require resubmission to the planning commission.
On January 23, 2000, the court granted summary judgment against
Griswold on the conflict of interest issue because his claim, even
accepted as true, did not amount to a conflict of interest. Final
judgment against Griswold was entered on February 25, 2000.
Griswold appeals the decision of the superior court,
arguing that: (1) the superior court improperly applied collateral
estoppel to preclude his contention that Ordinance 98-9(A) amounts
to spot zoning, [Fn. 10] (2) the superior court erred in finding
that the fencing amendment did not require resubmission of the
ordinance to the planning commission, and (3) the superior court
erred in finding that Council Member Al Waddell did not have a
conflict of interest. [Fn. 11]
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
"The applicability of collateral estoppel to a particular
set of facts is a question of law." [Fn. 12] We "review such
questions of law using our independent judgment." [Fn. 13]
We use our independent judgment to review grants of
summary judgment. [Fn. 14] We "will affirm a grant of summary
judgment if the evidence in the record, viewed in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, fails to disclose a genuine
issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." [Fn. 15] We may affirm a grant of
summary judgment on any basis appearing in the record. [Fn. 16]
IV. DISCUSSION
A. The Superior Court Properly Dismissed Griswold's
Spot Zoning Claims on Summary Judgment.
The superior court granted the city's request for summary
judgment on Griswold's claim that Ordinance 98-9(A) amounted to
impermissible spot zoning. The superior court found that
Griswold's claims were satisfactorily determined in Griswold I and
should not be relitigated.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel, also called issue
preclusion, "bars relitigation, even in an action on a different
claim, of all issues of fact or law that were actually litigated
and necessarily decided in a prior proceeding." [Fn. 17] The dual
purposes of the doctrine are to protect litigants from "the burden
of relitigating an identical issue with the same party or his privy
and . . . [to] promot[e] judicial economy by preventing needless
litigation." [Fn. 18]
Griswold contends that collateral estoppel does not apply
to his claims in this case for three reasons: (1) the issues here
are not identical to those in Griswold I, (2) there was no final
judgment averse to his position in the previous case, and (3) the
circumstances surrounding the zoning decision have changed so
significantly as to permit relitigation of the issues.
However, we need not reach the question of whether the
issues are "identical" as required by collateral estoppel in order
to affirm the decision of the superior court. Even if his claim is
not precluded, Griswold must show that this case is not settled by
the application of Griswold I as controlling legal precedent.
Whether there are factual differences that avoid the preclusive
effect of Griswold I or whether there are material differences that
avoid application of the legal rule of Griswold I on summary
judgment are two questions that proceed under similar analyses.
In Griswold I, we considered the inclusion of automobile-
related businesses in Homer's CBD under three aspects of a spot
zoning claim. We noted that "it is the role of elected
representatives rather than the courts to decide whether a
particular statute or ordinance is a wise one." [Fn. 19] The
deference shown to such an ordinance meant that:
[t]he party claiming a denial of substantive
due process has the burden of demonstrating that no rational basis
for the challenged legislation exists. This burden is a heavy one,
for if any conceivable legitimate public policy for the enactment
is apparent on its face or is offered by those defending the
enactment, the opponents of the measure must disprove the factual
basis for such a justification.[ [Fn. 20]]
In light of this standard, we concluded that sufficient public
policy reasons existed to conclude that Ordinance 92-18 did not
amount to spot zoning.
Specifically, we held that, first, the amendment could be
understood as consistent with the comprehensive plan's intent to
limit the CBD to commercial and business activities. [Fn. 21]
Second, we held that in addition to benefitting Rosi, the amendment
could be understood as benefitting the community by advancing
legitimate legislative goals, including: regulating the density of
population, stabilizing land values, and promoting health, safety,
and welfare. [Fn. 22] Finally, we held that the size of the area
rezoned was not so small as to direct a finding that the amendment
was spot zoning. [Fn. 23]
Griswold's claims do not present changes significant
enough to avoid application of the precedent established in
Griswold I. Griswold claims that land use in the CBD has changed
so significantly that the decision in Griswold I does not apply.
However, reconsideration of a previous zoning decision generally
requires either that other zoning classifications in the area have
changed or use has changed to the point that the character of the
area is completely different. [Fn. 24] The laundry list of minor
changes that Griswold presents in this case evidences only a more
intensified version of the same land use.
Griswold also alleges that the fencing requirement added
to the amendment makes the issue in this case different. We have
recognized the "classic" definition of spot zoning as "the process
of singling out a small parcel of land for a use classification
totally different from that of the surrounding area, for the
benefit of the owner of such property and to the detriment of other
owners." [Fn. 25] The addition of the fencing requirement does not
change the ordinance in a way that suggests spot zoning under this
definition -- there is no change in the parcel of land affected, no
change in the differing use classification, and no change in the
allegedly-benefitted owner. As a result, the fencing requirement
does not create a material difference.
Finally, Griswold argues that the fact that the planning
commission gave its approval to the amendment in Griswold I, but
did not do so here, is a relevant change. However, the city
council is not bound in any way by the planning commission's
recommendation. Therefore, whether the planning commission
approved of the change does not create a material difference in the
question whether the challenged amendment was spot zoning.
Griswold fails to present a material difference between
this case and the clearly established legal precedent of Griswold
I. As a result, our holding that such an ordinance has sufficient
public policy basis for legitimacy is conclusive of the question
presented in this case. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the
superior court without reaching the specific question of whether
collateral estoppel was appropriate in this case.
B. The Superior Court Properly Found that Ordinance
98-9(A) Did Not Require Review by the Planning
Commission Subsequent to Amendment.
Griswold argues that the ordinance should have been
resubmitted to the planning commission after it was amended by
adding the fencing requirement. The superior court found that the
change did not sufficiently alter the substance of the ordinance to
require resubmission.
The Homer City Code specifically outlines the procedures
to be followed by the city council in amending zoning ordinances.
[Fn. 26] The city code generally requires that public hearings be
held and that the planning commission provide a written
recommendation on any proposed zoning amendment. [Fn. 27] Although
the council is not bound by opinions expressed at public hearings
or by the planning commission, submission of proposals to that
process is required. Neither party contends that Ordinance 98-9
was not initially submitted under the proper procedures; the only
question is whether the subsequent amendment requires the amended
ordinance, Ordinance 98-9(A), to begin that procedure again.
In similar circumstances, we have held that amended
ordinances must be resubmitted only if the amendment results in a
material change to the subject covered by the ordinance. In
Liberati v. Bristol Bay Borough, [Fn. 28] a proposed ordinance
imposed a tax to be paid by all purchasers of red salmon and red
salmon eggs caught within the borough. Immediately before passage,
the ordinance was amended to include all raw fish and to make it
clear that the seller did not have the burden of collecting or
accounting for the tax. We ruled that amendments must be "so
substantial as to change [the] basic character" of the ordinance in
order to require the process to be repeated, and that the immediate
case fell "far short of that standard." [Fn. 29]
Similarly, in Jefferson v. City of Anchorage, [Fn. 30] a
proposed ordinance to increase the annual salary of the mayor from
$6,000 to $24,000 was amended to provide that the increase would be
considerably less if the mayor chose to serve on a part-time basis.
[Fn. 31] An Anchorage ordinance required that the proposed
ordinance be posted five days prior to final passage. Although the
original form of the ordinance was published eight days before
final passage, the amended version was only published two days
before final passage. Despite the change, we held that when there
is "no material change in the subject treated in the proposed
ordinance, it was not necessary to proceed as though it was a new
one." [Fn. 32]
Griswold argues that changes to a zoning ordinance are
different because of the requirement that such changes be submitted
to a planning commission. He relies upon cases from other
jurisdictions to support this difference. For example, in Colorado
Leisure Products, Inc. v. Johnson, [Fn. 33] a county commission was
presented with a recommendation from the planning commission that
80 acres of a 160-acre parcel be rezoned. The county commission
amended the proposal to rezone the entire 160 acres. The court
held that the zoning action was void because the county commission
acted "without having the benefit of the planning commission's
input and expertise." [Fn. 34]
Similarly, in Maricopa County Board of Supervisors v.
Bell 51st Investors, [Fn. 35] the Arizona court invalidated a
zoning amendment made by the county board of supervisors. In that
case the local zoning commission recommended rezoning one square
mile in a two square mile tract of land. The board of supervisors
amended the proposal to include the entire two square miles and
passed the ordinance. The court held that the board of supervisors
could not "initiate its own zoning changes without first obtaining
the views of the Planning and Zoning Commission." [Fn. 36]
The city distinguishes these cases on the ground that the
amended ordinance involved additional land that was not covered by
the original. The city points to another Arizona case in which an
appellate court noted that the requirement of resubmission to a
zoning commission after amendment is not absolute. [Fn. 37]
"Variations from the original notice may be considered where a
classification or subject matter either is of a more restrictive
nature or is a minor or insubstantial variation from the noticed
proposals." [Fn. 38] Other cases have supported the idea that
amendments to zoning proposals do not need to be resubmitted if the
changes are minor. [Fn. 39]
The amendment inserted in the current case is both minor
and of a more restrictive nature than the original proposal. It
does not alter the subject matter of the ordinance, and it does not
alter the amount of land affected or the permitted use
classification. It merely provides a condition upon a certain form
of use. In addition, the amendment has the effect of narrowing the
zoning change. The city is correct that requiring resubmission
after minor, narrowing changes like the one involved in this case
would so encumber the process as to discourage effective and proper
amendment by the council.
In addition, as we noted in Liberati, [Fn. 40] amendment
by the council is provided for in state statutes, which provide
that after public hearings, the city council can "adopt [an
ordinance] with or without amendment." [Fn. 41] Although cases
involving amendments to zoning ordinances may deserve greater
scrutiny, we hold that the amendment considered here is such a
minor change that it does not require resubmission.
C. No Actionable Conflict of Interest Exists with
Regard to Council Member Waddell.
Griswold argues that council member Al Waddell should not
have participated in the consideration or vote on Ordinance 98-9(A)
because of a conflict of interest. The superior court granted the
city's motion for summary judgment on this claim.
Alaska state law directs municipalities to adopt a
conflict of interest ordinance that requires members of a governing
body to disclose when they have a "substantial financial interest"
in an official action. [Fn. 42] The city of Homer's conflict of
interest provisions state that a "substantial financial interest"
means "a financial interest that could be affected by an official
action, which might reasonably result in a pecuniary gain or loss
exceeding $300." [Fn. 43] Whether such an interest exists and
requires an excuse from voting are questions to be determined by
the mayor, [Fn. 44] whose decision can be overridden by a majority
of the city council. [Fn. 45]
Griswold argues that there are two grounds on which
Waddell has a substantial financial interest in the passage of
Ordinance 98-9(A). First, he claims that Waddell intends to
initiate automobile-related businesses on property that he owns
within the CBD, but not in the area covered by the ordinance.
Griswold argues that the present ordinance is a significant "step"
toward allowing automobile sales on Waddell's property. Second,
Griswold argues that a conflict exists because Waddell operates a
snow removal business which uses sand stored on Rosi's property.
However, the sand is owned by another man, Paul Hodgson, and
Waddell has agreed to add salt to Hodgon's sand pile in exchange
for use of the sand in his snow removal service. There is no
direct business relationship between Waddell and Rosi.
We have found a substantial financial interest where
members of a governing board had a "narrow and specific interest"
in the immediate subject of a regulation. In Carney v. State,
Board of Fisheries, [Fn. 46] the fisheries board passed a
regulation allocating water area and salmon resources between drift
and set netters in a section of Bristol Bay. Four members of the
board either held permits for drift netting or worked for drift net
fishing operations in the covered area. We ruled that a conflict
existed because the effect of the regulation was to benefit drift
netters in the affected area, including the four board members.
[Fn. 47] We held that this differentiated their interests from the
general interests of the industry as a whole and made them
"narrowly and specifically interested." [Fn. 48]
Similarly, in Griswold I, we found a conflict of interest
with regard to council member Brian Sweiven, who owned one of the
thirteen lots in the area affected by the ordinance. [Fn. 49]
Despite the city's claim that Sweiven's home and appliance repair
business would not be affected by the ordinance allowing auto sales
and services, we ruled that the ordinance was likely to increase
the value of Sweiven's land because the potential uses of the land
would be increased. [Fn. 50]
Council member Waddell's situation is distinguishable
from these cases. Viewing Griswold's allegations in the light most
favorable to Griswold, they do not rise to the level of creating a
violation. Under Griswold's own version of the facts, Waddell does
not own any property in the area affected by Ordinance 98-9(A) nor
does he participate in any business operations that are directly
benefitted by the ordinance. Therefore, Waddell does not have a
direct connection to the subject matter of Ordinance 98-9(A); at
best, his connections are attenuated.
We hold that the benefit created by such an attenuated
connection is too speculative to amount to a disqualifying conflict
of interest. Griswold's allegations fail to indicate how the
amended ordinance would provide any direct benefit to Waddell
without requiring an intervening step or additional council action.
This means that Waddell does not have a "narrow and specific"
interest in the subject matter of this regulation in the same way
as the fisheries board members in Carney or council member Sweiven
in Griswold I.
Because neither of the two arguments raised by Griswold
creates a convincing case that Waddell has a substantial financial
interest in the changes proposed in Ordinance 98-9(A), we hold that
the superior court properly dismissed Griswold's claim on summary
judgment.
V. CONCLUSION
Without reaching the question whether collateral estoppel
was properly applied in this case, we hold that Griswold has failed
to show that the circumstances in this case are materially
different so as to avoid application of the controlling legal rule
in Griswold I. We also hold that the superior court correctly
found that the Homer City Council followed proper procedures in
passing Ordinance 98-9(A). Finally, the superior court properly
found that council member Waddell would not have a disqualifying
conflict of interest even if all of Griswold's allegations are
assumed to be true. As a result, we AFFIRM the decision of the
superior court in full.
FOOTNOTES
Footnote 1:
925 P.2d 1015 (Alaska 1996).
Footnote 2:
See id. at 1017.
Footnote 3:
See HCC 21.64.010.
Footnote 4:
925 P.2d 1015 (Alaska 1996).
Footnote 5:
See id. at 1020-25.
Footnote 6:
See id. at 1027.
Footnote 7:
See id. at 1030.
Footnote 8:
Council member Sweiven, whose conflict of interest led to the
invalidation of the ordinance in Griswold I, was not on the city
council at this time.
Footnote 9:
Ordinance 92-18 refers to Alaska Highway 1 as "the Homer
Bypass Road," whereas Ordinance 98-9(A) refers to the highway as
"the Sterling Highway."
Footnote 10:
Although Griswold lists his complaints about the council's
improper purpose as four different issues in this appeal (improper
motive, primary purpose to assist Rosi, spot zoning, and no
legitimate public purpose), his charges all revolve around the
requirements for a claim of spot zoning. Since each of those four
issues was also considered in Griswold I and may be precluded by
that decision, they will be considered together for purposes of
this appeal.
Footnote 11:
Griswold's initial complaint claimed that both Waddell and
Council Member Dennis Leach had disqualifying conflicts of
interest, but he does not raise the argument with respect to Leach
in this appeal.
Footnote 12:
Chilton-Wren v. Olds, 1 P.3d 693, 696 (Alaska 2000).
Footnote 13:
Id.
Footnote 14:
See DeNardo v. GCI Communication Corp., 983 P.2d 1288, 1289
(Alaska 1999).
Footnote 15:
Id. at 1289-90 (quoting Baxley v. State, 958 P.2d 422, 428
(Alaska 1998)).
Footnote 16:
See id. at 1290.
Footnote 17:
Campion v. State, 876 P.2d 1096, 1098 (Alaska 1994) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Footnote 18:
Id. (citing Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326
(1979)).
Footnote 19:
Griswold I, 925 P.2d 1015, 1019 (Alaska 1996).
Footnote 20:
Id. (quoting Concerned Citizens of S. Kenai Peninsula v. Kenai
Peninsula Borough, 527 P.2d 447, 452 (Alaska 1974)).
Footnote 21:
See id. at 1021.
Footnote 22:
See id. at 1023-24.
Footnote 23:
See id. at 1024-25.
Footnote 24:
See Burke v. Village of Glenview, 628 N.E.2d 465, 469 (Ill.
App. 1993); 4 Edward H. Ziegler Jr., Rathkoph's The Law of Zoning
and Planning sec. 48.06 (West 4th ed. 1997).
Footnote 25:
Griswold I, 925 P.2d at 1020 (interior quotation marks
omitted).
Footnote 26:
The code is in accord with state statutes, which require that
such zoning changes be made by ordinance and outline how an
ordinance should be passed. See AS 29.25.010; AS 29.25.020.
Footnote 27:
HCC 21.70.020 provides:
Amendment Procedure.
a. Any valid request by an individual to
initiate a zoning ordinance amendment shall be submitted to the
City Manager.
b. Zoning amendments requested by the City
Council shall be introduced at any regular or special meeting of
the Council.
c. In each instance, the City Manager shall
immediately forward the request to the City Planning Director. The
Planning Director shall arrange notice and schedule public hearings
as follows:
1. A public hearing shall be held by
the Homer Advisory Planning Commission on the proposed amendment in
accordance with Chapter 21.69 of this title. After the public
hearing, the Homer Advisory Planning Commission shall send its
written recommendations to the City Council along with all
certified copies of minutes and public records relating to the
proposed amendment.
2. The City Council, in accordance with
ordinance enactment procedures of the Homer City Code, may or may
not adopt the amendment as a City ordinance.
3. Footnote 28:
4. 584 P.2d 1115 (Alaska 1978).
5. Footnote 29:
6. Id. at 1119.
7. Footnote 30:
8. 513 P.2d 1099 (Alaska 1973).
9. Footnote 31:
10. Id. at 1100.
11. Footnote 32:
12. Id. at 1102.
13. Footnote 33:
14. 532 P.2d 742 (Colo. 1975).
15. Footnote 34:
16. Id. at 745.
17. Footnote 35:
18. 495 P.2d 1315 (Ariz. 1972).
19. Footnote 36:
20. Id. at 1318.
21. Footnote 37:
22. Summit Properties, Inc. v. Wilson, 550 P.2d 104, 109
(Ariz. App. 1976).
23. Footnote 38:
24. Id.
25. Footnote 39:
26. See, e.g., Westland West Community Ass'n v. Knox County,
948 S.W.2d 281, 283 (Tenn. 1997) ("If the revision is
inconsequential and would not have altered the [regional planning
commission]'s recommendation, resubmission is not mandated.").
27. Footnote 40:
28. See Liberati, 584 P.2d 1115, 1119 (Alaska 1978).
29. Footnote 41:
30. AS 29.25.020(b)(6); see also HCC 01.08.020.
31. Footnote 42:
32. AS 29.20.010.
33. Footnote 43:
34. HCC 01.12.010.
35. Footnote 44:
36. See HCC 01.12.040.
37. Footnote 45:
38. See HCC 01.12.050.
39. Footnote 46:
40. 785 P.2d 544 (Alaska 1990).
41. Footnote 47:
42. See id. at 548.
43. Footnote 48:
44. See id.
45. Footnote 49:
46. Griswold I, 925 P.2d 1015, 1025, 1027 (Alaska 1996).
47. Footnote 50:
48. See id. at 1026-27.
49.
