You can
search the entire site.
or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices.
Municipality of Anchorage v Repasky et al. (10/26/2001) sp-5491
Municipality of Anchorage v Repasky et al. (10/26/2001) sp-5491
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before publication in
the Pacific Reporter. Readers are requested to bring errors to the
attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street,
Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
MUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE, )
) Supreme Court No. S-8985
Appellant, )
) Superior Court No.
v. ) 3AN-96-5494 CI
)
JOHN REPASKY, JR., NATHAN L. ) O P I N I O N
POWELL, SANDRA A. GROENEVELD, )
and JOSEPH D. BRAMMER, ) [No. 5491 - October 26, 2001]
individually and each as the )
parent and representative of )
a minor child, )
)
Appellees. )
______________________________)
)
MUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE, ) Supreme Court No. S-9205
)
Appellant, ) Superior Court No.
) 3AN-97-5648 CI
v. )
)
SHARON LONG, )
)
Appellee. )
______________________________)
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of
Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage,
Michael L. Wolverton, Judge.
Appearances: William A. Greene, Deputy
Municipal Attorney, and Mary K. Hughes,
Municipal Attorney, Anchorage, for Appellant.
John E. Havelock, Anchorage, for Appellees
John Repasky, Jr., Nathan L. Powell, Sandra A.
Groeneveld, and Joseph D. Brammer. Joe P.
Josephson, Josephson & Associates, Anchorage,
for Appellee Sharon Long. Howard S. Trickey
and Andrena L. Stone, Jermain, Dunnagan &
Owens, P.C., Anchorage, for Amicus Curiae
Anchorage School District.
Before: Matthews, Chief Justice, Eastaugh,
Bryner, and Carpeneti, Justices. [Fabe,
Justice, not participating.]
EASTAUGH, Justice.
BRYNER, Justice, dissenting.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1995 and again in 1997, after the Anchorage Assembly
enacted ordinances for the Anchorage School District's annual
budgets and for the local source appropriations for those budgets,
Anchorage Mayor Rick Mystrom invoked the item veto power and
reduced the total amount of each budget and local source
appropriation. Was this a valid exercise of the mayor's veto
power? We hold that it was. We conclude that the item veto power
granted by the Anchorage Municipal Charter extends to the
assembly's school district budget and local source appropriation
ordinances. We also conclude that Alaska law does not prevent home
rule municipalities from granting this power to their mayors. We
therefore reverse the superior court decision which held that the
charter does not confer this power on the Anchorage mayor.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
These appeals concern the process used to determine the
Anchorage School District's budgets and local source appropriations
for 1995-96 and 1997-98. Anchorage is a home rule municipality.
[Fn. 1] Per the Alaska Statutes, the Anchorage Municipal Charter,
and the Anchorage Municipal Code, the Anchorage School Board must
submit the school district's annual budget to the Anchorage
Municipal Assembly for approval. [Fn. 2] The assembly may approve,
reduce, or increase the total amount of the school budget and the
amount of the local contribution to the school budget, [Fn. 3] but
it may not modify individual items within the budget. [Fn. 4] If
the assembly does not act within thirty days, the school board's
budget proposal becomes the school district's budget and local
source appropriation without further assembly action. [Fn. 5]
In February 1995 the school board submitted a proposed
school district budget of about $353 million for the 1995-96 school
year, about $87 million of which was to be appropriated from local
sources. On March 28, 1995, the assembly enacted Anchorage
Ordinance (AO) 95-60, which reduced by exactly $1 million dollars
both the total amount of the district's proposed budget and the
amount to be appropriated from local sources. On April 3 Mayor
Rick Mystrom took what he termed a "line item veto action"and
reduced the total amounts of the budget and the local source
appropriation as approved by the assembly by an additional
$2,344,430. The assembly's attempt to override the veto failed.
The 1995-96 school district budget was accordingly reduced to about
$350 million, about $84 million of which was appropriated from
local sources.
The events in 1997 were similar. The school board sent
the assembly a proposed budget of about $362 million for the 1997-
98 school year, about $100 million of which was to be appropriated
from local sources. A week later the assembly enacted AO 97-49,
which reduced by exactly $1 million both the district's proposed
budget and the proposed local source appropriation. Three days
later the mayor exercised what he called his "line item veto"power
and reduced by a further $2 million both the total budget and the
local source appropriation. No motion to override this veto was
presented to the assembly for consideration. The 1997-98 school
budget was accordingly reduced to about $359 million, about $100
million of which was appropriated from local sources.
This litigation began when John Repasky Jr., and others,
who had sued the Anchorage School District about another dispute,
amended their complaint, challenging the mayor's authority to veto
the district's 1995-96 and 1997-98 budgets. Both sides moved for
summary judgment on the issue of the mayor's veto authority. While
that action was proceeding, Sharon Long sued the municipality to
challenge the 1997 veto.
The superior court consolidated the cases for oral
argument and entered a decision resolving both cases. It ruled
that the mayor did not have authority to veto the assembly's total
school budget or the local source appropriation for the school
budget. The municipality appealed in both cases and we
consolidated the cases on appeal. The parties permitted the school
district to file an amicus brief. [Fn. 6]
III. DISCUSSION
May the Anchorage mayor veto or reduce the total amounts
of the assembly's school budget and local source appropriation
ordinances? We first consider whether the Anchorage charter grants
the mayor any veto power over school budget and local source
appropriation ordinances. If it does, we must then consider
whether that power is "substantially irreconcilable"with the state
education scheme reflected in Alaska law.
A. Standard of Review
We review grants of summary judgment de novo and will
affirm if there are no genuine issues of material fact, and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. [Fn. 7]
We apply our independent judgment when interpreting the Alaska
Statutes. [Fn. 8] Because the municipality's charter is a
constitutional document [Fn. 9] and its code is a statutory
document, we apply our independent judgment in interpreting the
charter and code.
B. Overview of the Mayoral Veto Power and the School Budget
Process
1. Local government and the mayoral veto
The Alaska Constitution vests "all local government
powers"in boroughs and cities. [Fn. 10] It authorizes the voters
of a first class city or borough to adopt a home rule charter [Fn.
11] and provides that "[a] home rule borough or city may exercise
all legislative powers not prohibited by law or by charter."[Fn.
12] Title 29 of the Alaska Statutes delineates both the powers and
structures of local governments.
The Municipality of Anchorage is a home rule
municipality. [Fn. 13] It was incorporated as a unified
municipality in September 1975, when voters adopted by referendum
its constitutional document, the Home Rule Charter for the
Municipality of Anchorage. [Fn. 14] Its executive and
administrative power is vested in the mayor. [Fn. 15] Its
legislative power is vested in the assembly. [Fn. 16] Since 1990
subsection 5.02(c) of the charter has expressly granted the mayor
both a general and a "line item"veto power. [Fn. 17]
As we will see, it is important to the outcome of these
cases that Anchorage is a home rule municipality.
2. The education budget process
Article VII, section 1 of the Alaska Constitution
mandates that "[t]he legislature shall by general law establish and
maintain a system of public schools open to all children of the
state. . . ." To this end, Title 14 of the Alaska Statutes creates
Alaska's public education system. [Fn. 18] The legislature
delegated the state's authority to manage the operations of the
schools to local school districts. [Fn. 19]
The Anchorage School District is geographically
coextensive with the Municipality of Anchorage. [Fn. 20] The
municipality, as required by statute, [Fn. 21] established the
Anchorage School Board [Fn. 22] and charged it with operating the
municipality's schools. [Fn. 23] Although the school board is
elected by the same voters who elect the municipal assembly, and is
part of the municipality, "it is a legislative body with legal
responsibilities which in important respects are distinct from
those exercised by the assembly."[Fn. 24] Further, while the
legislature has delegated significant local control over education,
this court has made it clear that the Alaska Constitution mandates
"pervasive state authority in the field of education."[Fn. 25]
The relationship between the school board and the
assembly in the school district budget process is established by AS
14.14.060, [Fn. 26] which corresponds to Anchorage charter section
6.05 [Fn. 27] and Anchorage Municipal Code section 6.10.050. These
provisions require the school board to submit the district's annual
budget to the assembly for approval. [Fn. 28] Within thirty days
after receiving the budget, the assembly may approve, reduce, or
increase the total amount of the district's budget. [Fn. 29] The
assembly may modify the budget only as to the total amount; it may
not modify individual items within the budget. [Fn. 30] The
assembly must approve the budget as amended and must determine the
total amount of local source money [Fn. 31] and appropriate the
necessary funds. [Fn. 32] If the assembly does not act in a timely
manner, the amounts the school board proposes become the school
district's budget and local source appropriation. [Fn. 33]
The municipality by ordinance has added a School Budget
Advisory Commission to this process. [Fn. 34] Composed of members
appointed by the mayor and confirmed by the assembly, the
commission advises the assembly on the details of the school budget
and recommends what action should be taken on the budget. [Fn. 35]
C. Does Subsection 5.02(c) of the Charter Give the Mayor
Power to Veto and Reduce the Assembly's School District
Budget and Local Source Appropriation Ordinances?
In interpreting a constitutional document such as the
Anchorage charter, [Fn. 36] we first look to its language. [Fn. 37]
We therefore begin with the text of charter subsection 5.02(c),
which provides in pertinent part: "The mayor has the veto power.
The mayor also has line item veto power. The mayor may, by veto,
strike or reduce items in a budget or appropriation measure."[Fn.
38]
We first consider whether the charter gives the mayor
power to veto the assembly's school budget ordinance in its
entirety. We next consider whether the charter grants the mayor
item veto power over the school budget ordinance such that the
mayor may reduce its total amount.
1. The general veto power
The municipality argues that the first sentence of
subsection 5.02(c) gives the mayor power to veto all assembly
ordinances, including school budget ordinances, unless a specific
prohibition provides otherwise. Repasky, Long, and the school
district argue that because the charter does not expressly allow
for a mayoral veto over the school budget, no such power exists.
The municipality's reading is more persuasive. First,
the language of charter subsection 5.02(c) is sweeping. It
expresses no limit on the general veto power. And charter
subsection 16.03(a) supports the idea that subsection 5.02(c)
grants a general veto power unless specifically enumerated
exceptions apply. Section 16.03 established the former Anchorage
Telephone Utility (ATU) and stated that the mayor's veto power did
not extend to assembly actions concerning the appointment of ATU
directors. [Fn. 39] No comparable provision of the charter
prohibits the mayor from vetoing assembly actions regarding the
school budget. We therefore conclude that the charter grants the
mayor a general veto power over the entire school district budget
ordinance.
2. The item veto power
In 1990 the following language was added to charter
subsection 5.02(c): "The mayor also has line item veto power. The
mayor may, by veto, strike or reduce items in a budget or
appropriation measure."[Fn. 40] The municipality points out that
this amendment came about because the municipality's 1990 Charter
Review Commission believed it necessary to clarify whether the
mayor had line item veto power. The municipality argues that even
before the 1990 amendment, the mayor could reduce the total amount
of the municipality's school budget appropriation and that the
amendment simply "clarified"that "budgets"were also measures the
mayor could reduce by veto. Long and the school district respond
that this added language does not extend the line item veto to
school budgets. They argue that the terms "budget"and
"appropriation"as defined in the charter do not encompass the
school budget.
a. The terms "budget"and "appropriation"in
charter subsection 5.02(c) encompass the
school budget.
The charter defines "appropriation"as "a unit of funding
. . . in the municipal budget."[Fn. 41] Long and the school
district argue that the school budget is not a "unit of funding .
. . in the municipal budget." They think it significant that
separate sections of the charter discuss the municipal and school
budgets. [Fn. 42] The school district argues that this separation
is highlighted by the mayor's ability to transfer unencumbered
funds between departments within all appropriations except the
school budget appropriation. [Fn. 43] Long and the school district
therefore argue that the item veto extends only to the municipal
budget and not to the separate school budget. The school district
also asserts that the term "budget"in the charter does not
encompass the school system budget, because the Charter Review
Commission did not mention the school budget when it discussed the
item veto and because we have held that the "assembly has no
legislative power to make appropriations for specific items,
programs or priorities provided for by the school board's budget."
[Fn. 44]
The municipality replies that the Anchorage School
District is part of the municipality, and that therefore the
assembly's annual school budget ordinance -- which approves the
total amount of the district's annual budget, determines the amount
of funding from local sources, and appropriates the local source
funds for the district's budget -- is by its terms a municipal
"budget or appropriation measure."[Fn. 45] The municipality also
notes that the subsection 5.02(c) veto power does not distinguish
between the budgets for general government, the school district,
and the utilities, each of which has a separately identifiable
municipal budget. [Fn. 46] Finally, the municipality offers two
reasons why the school budget process is described in a separate
section of the municipal charter: first, because the school system
operates on a separate fiscal year, and second, because the
procedures for approving the school budget differ from the
procedures for approving other budget items, not because the school
budget was intended to be segregated from the municipal budget.
We find the municipality's interpretation more
persuasive. First, the school budget ordinance qualifies as a
"budget measure"under subsection 5.02(c). A school budget
ordinance is in appearance and substance a "budget measure."
Appellees provide no persuasive reason why it should not be treated
as such.
Second, it is significant that the school district is
governmentally part of the municipality, [Fn. 47] that the school
district budget is for amounts that must be expended in order to
operate public schools in the municipality, and that the school
district budget includes amounts the municipality must contribute
from local sources to operate the school system. We therefore
agree with the municipality that the term "municipal budget"as
used in the charter's definition of "appropriation"[Fn. 48]
inherently includes the school district budget.
Further, as the municipality points out, the charter uses
the term "appropriation"in sections which deal exclusively with
the school budget. [Fn. 49] This usage indicates that the charter
framers considered the school district budget ordinance to be an
"appropriation." Subsection 6.05(c) directs the assembly to
"appropriate"funds for the school district. [Fn. 50] The
ordinance appropriating these funds is both an "appropriation"and
an "appropriation measure"for purposes of the charter. [Fn. 51]
Placing the topic of the school budget in a charter section apart
from sections concerning other municipal budgets does not mean that
the school budget is not part of the total municipal budget.
Finally, given its absolute and relative size, it is
counterintuitive to think that the school district's local source
appropriation is not part of the municipal budget. The 1997-98
local source school appropriation required the municipality to
contribute $100,228,823; this was about twenty-nine percent of the
district's total operating budget of $358,723,000. [Fn. 52] The
local source school appropriation is also a very large part of the
total municipal budget. [Fn. 53]
b. The mayor has item veto power over the total
amount of the school budget.
We have thus concluded that the language of subsection
5.02(c) granting the mayor line item veto power encompasses the
school budget ordinances. But as Long recognizes, giving the mayor
line item veto power over a school district budget ordinance is
potentially problematic because the assembly's school budget
ordinance only addresses the total amount of the budget. The
ordinance does not list the individual proposed expenditures that
make up the total proposed school district budget or local source
appropriation. The mayor's veto messages characterized his 1995
and 1997 vetoes as "line item"vetoes. Perhaps the mayor felt he
was exercising a "line item"veto because he was not vetoing the
entire school budget ordinance, but was only reducing its total
amount. [Fn. 54] In this sense, the mayor exercised an item veto
over a single-item appropriation.
Is a single-item appropriation an "item"for purposes of
the item veto? The item veto historically originated as a reform
measure conceived in part to prevent legislators from "logrolling"
when enacting appropriations bills which necessarily address many
subjects and need not be confined to a single subject. [Fn. 55]
The item veto therefore typically addresses appropriations
containing numerous items. [Fn. 56] But another historical purpose
was to give the executive branch some ability to reduce a
legislature's excessive appropriations [Fn. 57] -- a purpose still
recognized as valid. [Fn. 58] Thus, the fact that the assembly's
school district budget ordinance only specifies the total amount,
and lists no component items, does not mean that the total amount
is not an "item." The ordinance appropriates "a sum of money
dedicated to a particular purpose."[Fn. 59]
We therefore hold that the charter grants the mayor the
power to veto the entire school district budget ordinance, or to
exercise an item veto and reduce the total amount of the budget
ordinance and the total amount of the local source appropriation.
D. Is the Veto Power Substantially Irreconcilable with State
Law?
Having held that the municipality's veto power extends to
the total amounts of school district budget and local appropriation
ordinances, we must decide whether, as Long, Repasky, and the
school district argue, state law impliedly prohibits that power.
[Fn. 60]
The Municipality of Anchorage is a home rule municipality
and therefore has "all legislative powers not prohibited by law or
by charter."[Fn. 61] By contrast, a general law municipality "is
an unchartered borough or city [with] legislative powers conferred
by law."[Fn. 62] In deciding whether the state has limited the
powers of home rule municipalities, we first look for prohibitions,
not grants of power.
Long, Repasky, and the school district do not claim that
state law expressly prohibits the Anchorage mayor from having this
veto power. Alaska Statute 29.20.270(c) expressly prohibits a
mayoral veto of "appropriation items in a school budget ordinance."
[Fn. 63] But this prohibition does not apply to home rule
municipalities, [Fn. 64] and therefore does not apply to the
Municipality of Anchorage. [Fn. 65] Alaska law does not expressly
prohibit the municipality from conferring this power on its mayor.
State law can also prohibit a municipality from
exercising authority "by implication such as where the statute and
ordinance are so substantially irreconcilable that one cannot be
given its substantive effect if the other is to be accorded the
weight of law."[Fn. 66] In general, for state law to preempt
local authority, it is not enough for state law to occupy the
field. [Fn. 67] Rather, "[i]f the legislature wishes to 'preempt'
an entire field, [it] must so state."[Fn. 68]
But in the context of public education -- a field subject
to "pervasive"state control [Fn. 69] -- we have precluded even
home rule municipalities from acting unless they were exercising
power delegated by the legislature. [Fn. 70] A home rule
municipality cannot enact an ordinance which conflicts with a state
education statute. [Fn. 71]
The relevant constitutional provisions are not
determinative. One requires the legislature to "establish and
maintain a system of public schools."[Fn. 72] Another expresses
an intention "to provide for maximum local self-government,"and
provides that "[a] liberal construction shall be given to the
powers of local government units."[Fn. 73] Another provides that
home rule municipalities "may exercise all legislative powers not
prohibited by law or charter."[Fn. 74]
Two statutes are of particular interest here. Alaska
Statute 14.14.060(c) is important because Long, Repasky, and the
school district argue that it impliedly prohibits the disputed veto
power. Alaska Statute 29.20.270(c)(1) is important because the
legislature made its express prohibition on vetoing appropriation
items in school budget ordinances inapplicable to home rule
municipalities.
1. Effect of AS 14.14.060(c)'s silence about a mayoral
role or veto
Alaska Statute 14.14.060(c) gives assemblies power to
determine and appropriate the total amount of local moneys for
their districts' annual budgets. Repasky, Long, and the school
district invoke this statute in making three main arguments to show
that the state's pervasive authority over education precludes item
vetoes of school district budget ordinances.
First, they find it significant that AS 14.14.060(c)
grants the assembly power in the school budget appropriation
process, but says nothing of a mayoral role in that process. The
school district finds the omission especially significant because
two other subsections of AS 14.14.060 specifically grant authority
to the municipal executive branch in education contexts other than
the budget-approval process. [Fn. 75] It consequently reasons that
the Alaska legislature did not intend to give municipal mayors any
role in the appropriation process described in AS 14.14.060(c).
Long similarly argues that a mayoral veto would usurp the school
board's authority and upset the legislatively created relationship
between the school board and the assembly. She asserts that the
state gave primary educational authority to the school board, a
limited fiscal review power to the assembly, and no power to the
mayor. Repasky asserts that a mayoral veto would interfere with
the assembly's statutory role, a role which he characterizes as
akin to a veto power over the school board's legislative actions.
We are not persuaded that the absence of any reference in
AS 14.14.060(c) to a mayoral role or veto is controlling. The
statute gives municipal assemblies power to enact ordinances
approving or reducing school district budgets. It does not try to
describe comprehensively what happens after an assembly enacts an
appropriation ordinance.
Further, the statute addresses the legislative
appropriation power. It does not give the assembly a veto-like
power which might conceptually conflict with a mayoral veto or make
a mayoral veto redundant. The Alaska legislature also would have
recognized that municipal budget ordinances are legislative
enactments which are typically subject to the veto or item veto
power. Nonetheless, it did not prohibit exercise of the veto power
in the school budget ordinance context in AS 14.14.060(c) or
elsewhere in Title 14. It withheld that power in Title 29, but
only as to non-home rule municipalities. [Fn. 76]
We think it is important that the legislature, which
would have known that the prohibition in AS 29.20.270(c)(1) did not
apply to home rule municipalities, did not address the veto issue
in AS 14.14.060(c). If the legislature had intended to prohibit
mayors of all classes of municipalities from vetoing school budget
ordinances, it easily could have carried out that intention in AS
14.14.060(c). The existence of AS 29.20.270(c)(1) implies that the
legislature did not consider AS 14.14.060(c) to preclude that veto
power. And by making the express prohibition set out in AS
29.20.270(c)(1) inapplicable to home rule municipalities, [Fn. 77]
the legislature impliedly chose to let each home rule municipality
decide whether to give its mayor the power to veto or reduce school
district budget ordinances.
The dissent contends that it was not necessary to make AS
29.20.270(c)(1)'s veto prohibition expressly applicable to home
rule municipalities. [Fn. 78] It reasons that AS 14.14.060 and
.065 make it clear that no municipality (including a home rule
municipality) could give its mayor veto power over assembly action
on a school district budget. [Fn. 79] But if this were so, the
express prohibition in AS 29.20.270(c)(1) would be unnecessary for
any municipality, home rule or not, because AS 14.14.060 and .065
would be all the prohibition needed. The specific prohibition in
AS 29.20.270(c)(1) instead indicates that the legislature did not
read AS 14.14.060 and .065 to prohibit such vetoes expressly or
impliedly, [Fn. 80] as to any class of municipality. [Fn. 81]
The issue here is really whether the veto power
interferes with the role of the assembly, not the school board.
The school board's power is at least partly legislative. [Fn. 82]
But the assembly's power to approve the total amount of the budget
and appropriate the local source money is also typically
legislative. That the Anchorage electorate, in adopting the
charter and later amending it, chose to reallocate some of the
assembly's legislative power by giving the mayor a veto power does
not change the relationship between the assembly and the school
board. And as between the school board and the municipality, the
legislature chose to delegate the final budget approval power to
the municipality. In effect, the municipality has allowed its
mayor to share some of the assembly's influence over the amount
appropriated. Doing so, in our view, does not detract from the
school board's role in proposing a budget, [Fn. 83] deciding how to
spend amounts appropriated and setting educational policy, [Fn. 84]
or administering expenditures after appropriation. [Fn. 85]
We therefore conclude, as the municipality argues, that
the authority granted to the assembly by AS 14.14.060(c) is subject
to any veto power the mayor has over assembly actions. Citing the
constitution, the municipality asserts that as a home rule
municipality it "may exercise all legislative powers not prohibited
by law or by charter."[Fn. 86] It contends that although the
state has pervasive authority over education, it has not prohibited
the municipality from exercising its legislative powers, including
the mayoral veto power, in the field of education. We agree.
Further, Repasky's first argument seems to rest in part
on his assertion that the mayor was not unambiguously given this
veto power. The same assumption may underlie the school district's
contention that our decisions in Peninsula Marketing Ass'n v.
Rosier [Fn. 87] and Ross v. City of Sand Point [Fn. 88] foreclose
the municipality's argument. In Rosier we determined that the
Commissioner of Fish and Game could not use the commissioner's
emergency powers to veto decisions of the Board of Fisheries. [Fn.
89] In Ross we held that a mayor could not override an employment
decision of the city's grievance committee. [Fn. 90] These cases
are distinguishable from the present dispute because the executives
there relied only on implied veto powers. [Fn. 91] The executive
in Rosier had no veto authority originating from another source.
[Fn. 92] And the mayor in Ross could not veto the grievance
board's decisions because the city had not granted the mayor any
veto power [Fn. 93] when it created its personnel system as
required by state statute. [Fn. 94] The mayor's statutory
authority to appoint, suspend, or remove employees [Fn. 95] was not
equivalent to a veto power. [Fn. 96] In comparison, we concluded
above in Part III.C that subsection 5.02(c) of the Anchorage
charter granted the mayor power to veto the assembly's ordinances.
Long, Repasky, and the school district cite two of our
decisions, Tunley v. Municipality of Anchorage Sch. Dist. [Fn. 97]
and Macauley v. Hildebrand, [Fn. 98] to support their contention
that state law, particularly that found in AS 14.14.060(c), is
substantially irreconcilable with this mayoral veto power.
We held in those two cases that home rule municipalities
had not been granted authority to act in educational policy matters
delegated to the local school boards. [Fn. 99] In one, a
municipality attempted to impose accounting controls over
expenditure of funds already appropriated for operating the
district's schools. [Fn. 100] In the other, an assembly attempted
to determine which schools would be closed. [Fn. 101] Both cases
concerned operational and policy choices broadly delegated to
school boards. And in both cases the municipalities' attempts to
exercise authority did not arise from the limited authority the
Alaska legislature had delegated to the municipalities.
That is not the situation here. The legislature
expressly gave municipalities the power to approve or reduce the
total amounts of the proposed budget and local appropriation. The
mayoral veto is not substantially irreconcilable with that power.
2. Effect of AS 14.14.060(c)'s time requirements
Second, Long, Repasky, and the school district argue that
the process AS 14.14.060(c) describes and the schedule it
contemplates would be incompatible with the delays mayoral vetoes
would cause. They note that the statute provides that if the
assembly does nothing for thirty days after receiving the budget,
the budget proposal becomes the budget and local source
appropriation. [Fn. 102] The municipality responds that this
simply means that local powers over the school budget are cut off
after thirty days, and that AS 14.14.060 "does not mean nor imply
that during the allotted 30 day period the Municipality cannot
exercise its home rule powers." We find the municipality's
argument more persuasive. Alaska Statute 14.14.060(c) only
addresses the appropriation process and does not undertake to
describe all events that may follow the assembly's enactment of a
school budget ordinance.
3. Consequences of allowing veto
Third, reasoning that because courts do not read
ambiguous legislation to reach absurd results, [Fn. 103] Repasky
argues that allowing this veto would lead to "convoluted political
consequences." He anticipates that an assembly might take no
action on a school budget ordinance, leading to automatic approval,
in order to deny the mayor a veto opportunity; he also anticipates
that a mayor might veto the ordinance just before the thirty-day
window expires, in order to prevent an override vote. Further, he
claims that permitting a mayoral veto would require the school
budget to clear hurdles never intended by the legislature.
But we do not read AS 14.14.060(c) as intending to
insulate school district budgets from local political influences.
The statute makes it clear that the local appropriations for a
school district are subject to municipal approval. Arguments that
an item veto would be undesirable in the context of appropriations
for the critical function of public education -- because the veto
is exercised without a public hearing, is exercised by only one
person, and might not be successfully overridden -- would apply
with equal force to most public appropriations. Those arguments
generally implicate the item veto power; they do not assist in
interpreting AS 14.14.060(c).
Repasky and Long's arguments demonstrate that the mayor's
veto adds an extra political element to the school budget process,
but they do not establish that the veto power irreconcilably
conflicts with Title 14. Other parts of the municipal budget are
enacted by the assembly and are subject to a mayoral veto. [Fn.
104] Allowing the mayor to veto the school budget ordinance puts
the appropriation process on footing equivalent, but not identical,
to that of other municipal budgets. The municipality's school
budget is a large part of the municipality's expenditures and
property taxes. The municipality argues that the school budget is
growing faster than any other municipal expenditure and caused a
fifty-one percent increase in property taxes between 1990 and 1998.
[Fn. 105] Such assertions explain the municipality's interest in
exercising the appropriation power granted by AS 14.14.060(c).
They also illustrate why home rule municipalities might choose to
adopt an item veto power that encompasses school district
appropriation ordinances. And they are consistent with the absence
of an express or implied prohibition preventing a home rule
municipality from sharing its legislative power with its mayor as
a means of directly influencing the school budget and the resulting
burden on local taxpayers.
4. Implied prohibition summary
State law does not expressly prohibit home rule
municipalities from adopting this veto power. Education is subject
to pervasive state control in Alaska. But AS 14.14.060(c) gives
municipalities, not their school boards, the final word over the
total amount of their school districts' proposed budgets. Only the
school boards can decide how to spend the available funds, but the
municipalities may limit the funds available. An item veto that
only affects the total amount the assembly appropriates respects
this limitation on the powers of the school boards. Alaska Statute
14.14.060(c) does not prohibit the municipality from delegating to
the mayor, in the form of the veto power, part of the assembly's
role in the process of approving the budget ordinance. Alaska
Statute 14.14.060(c) does not address what happens after the
assembly enacts an appropriation ordinance. It does not specify or
imply a procedure that is inconsistent with a mayoral veto. And
finding in AS 14.14.060(c) some implicit prohibition on this veto
power would be inconsistent with AS 29.20.270(c)(1) and AS
29.10.200. Where possible, we construe sections of a statutory
scheme to be consistent with one another. [Fn. 106] We therefore
hold that allowing a mayoral veto over the school budget does not
irreconcilably impede the purposes of Title 14.
Contrary to the dissent's argument, [Fn. 107] we are not
favoring the constitution's home rule clause over its public
education clause. We read Titles 14 and 29 of the Alaska Statutes
to allow home rule municipalities to permit their executives to
apply the item veto power to school budget ordinances. We thus
adhere to a policy choice the Alaska legislature has already made.
We consequently conclude that AS 14.14.060 and charter
subsection 5.02(c) are not "so substantially irreconcilable that
one cannot be given its substantive effect if the other is to be
accorded the weight of law."[Fn. 108]
IV. CONCLUSION
We conclude that Anchorage Municipal Charter subsection
5.02(c) grants the mayor the item veto power over the assembly's
school district budget and local source school budget appropriation
ordinances. We also conclude that AS 14.14.060(c)'s grant of
authority to the assembly does not preclude a home rule
municipality from giving its mayor this veto power. We finally
conclude that this veto power is not substantially irreconcilable
with state law. Accordingly, we REVERSE the judgment below and
REMAND for entry of judgment for the municipality.
BRYNER, Justice, dissenting.
I disagree with the court's decision to uphold the
mayor's power to reduce the school district budget by veto. In my
view, the court's opinion misinterprets Alaska law and disregards
settled standards for resolving conflicts between state and
municipal law. I would hold that our law narrowly delegates the
power of school-budget approval to the assembly alone, expressly
insulating its actions from reduction by veto.
I. STATE LAW PRECLUDES A MAYORAL VETO.
A. Constitutional and Statutory Framework
Public education in Alaska is a function of state
government. Article VII, section 1 of the Alaska Constitution
provides that "[t]he legislature shall by general law establish and
maintain a system of public schools open to all children of the
State."[Fn. 1] We have consistently interpreted this provision as
"a clear 'mandate for pervasive state authority in the field of
education.'"[Fn. 2] The legislature has assigned primary
responsibility for exercising this authority to local school
boards. [Fn. 3] Because municipal revenues make up a large portion
of a school district's budget, the legislature has also decided "to
give municipal assemblies certain powers with regard to school
board budgetary and accounting processes."[Fn. 4] But the
legislature has delegated none of the school board's budgeting
power to mayors.
Although Anchorage is a home rule city, AS 14.14.065
requires it to be treated as a borough in its dealings with the
Anchorage School District's school board:
The relationships between the school
board of a city school district and the city
council and executive or administrator are
governed in the same manner as provided in AS
14.14.060 for the school board of a borough
school district and the borough assembly and
executive or administrator.
Alaska Statute 14.14.060, the statute mentioned in the
above-quoted provision, delineates a borough school district's
relationship to its corresponding borough government. Subsection
.060(c) expressly covers school district budgets and the
appropriation of borough school funds, conferring certain narrow
powers on the assembly and vesting it with specific
responsibilities:
(c) Except as otherwise provided by
municipal ordinance, the borough school board
shall submit the school budget for the
following school year to the borough assembly
by May 1 for approval of the total amount.
Within 30 days after receipt of the budget the
assembly shall determine the total amount of
money to be made available from local sources
for school purposes and shall furnish the
school board with a statement of the sum to be
made available. If the assembly does not,
within 30 days, furnish the school board with
a statement of the sum to be made available,
the amount requested in the budget is
automatically approved. Except as otherwise
provided by municipal ordinance, by June 30,
the assembly shall appropriate the amount to
be made available from local sources from
money available for the purpose.
B. Alaska Statute 14.14.060(c) Gives Certain School-Budget
Powers to the Assembly, but Not to the Mayor.
The plain language of AS 14.14.060(c) delegates budgetary
powers and duties directly to the assembly -- not to the borough as
a whole; not to its mayor; not to a combination of the assembly and
the mayor. The statute's narrow scope of delegation becomes even
clearer when we consider subsection .060(c) in light of
AS 14.14.060's other subsections; their delegating language
expressly differentiates between a borough's assembly and its
administrator.
For instance, subsection .060(a) states that "[t]he
borough assembly may by ordinance require that all school money be
deposited in a centralized treasury"; but the subsection then
specifies that "[t]he borough administrator shall have the custody
of, invest, and manage all money in the centralized treasury."[Fn.
5] Similarly, subsection .060(f) makes the school board
responsible for custodial services and routine maintenance, but
directs that all major rehabilitation and repair be provided by
"[t]he borough assembly through the borough administrator."[Fn. 6]
These provisions demonstrate beyond cavil that, in delegating
specified school district powers to local government through AS
14.14.060, the legislature knew how to distinguish between the
assembly and the mayor and that it fully appreciated the need to do
so explicitly when it wanted to draw that distinction.
Common sense and plain meaning, then, point strongly to
the conclusion that, in assigning the power to approve a borough
school district's budget to "the assembly,"the legislature meant
just that.
The court shrugs off this evidence of legislative intent,
theorizing that subsection .060(c)'s narrow delegation to the
assembly implicitly carries with it the mayor's legislative power:
"[A]s between the school board and the municipality, the
legislature chose to delegate the final budget approval power to
the municipality. In effect, the municipality has allowed its
mayor to share some of the assembly's influence over the amount
appropriated."[Fn. 7]
But the court's theory strains plain meaning, especially
when subsection .060(a) is viewed -- as it must be viewed -- in
conjunction with AS 14.14.065. The latter provision requires that
in a city like Anchorage "[t]he relationships between the school
board of [the] city school district and the city council and
executive or administrator"must be "governed in the same manner as
provided [for boroughs] in AS 14.14.060." By recognizing that
AS 14.14.060 governs "relationships"-- in other words, that it
describes the powers of a city's "school board,"its "city
council,"and its "executive or administrator"in relation to each
other -- AS 14.14.065 forecloses the possibility that
AS 14.14.060(c)'s delegation of power to "the assembly"was
intended to encompass powers belonging to the mayor; for in a
provision defining the powers of the "assembly"in relation to the
"administrator,"each term necessarily excludes the other. [Fn. 8]
The court's theory also violates AS 14.14.060's core
purpose. The court correctly notes that municipalities contribute
large sums of local source funds to the school district budget and
therefore have a legitimate stake in the school-budget process.
[Fn. 9] But the municipality's stake in local source funding
hardly justifies reading AS 14.14.060(c) as a provision that
abdicates state control over the school board budget and allows the
municipality to treat the board as a de facto municipal agency.
State law creates the school board as an independent governmental
body; [Fn. 10] and under the Alaska Constitution's public education
clause, [Fn. 11] the state has an overriding interest in preserving
the board's independence, so that its actions will be faithful to
"[t]his constitutional mandate for pervasive state authority in the
field of education."[Fn. 12] Moreover, state revenues comprise
the lion's share of a school district budget; even in Anchorage,
where local source contributions outpace those of smaller
municipalities, state appropriations pay more than seventy percent
of the annual school district budget. [Fn. 13]
Thus, while the city undeniably has a legitimate stake in
the school district's budgetary process, the state's interest is
both constitutionally and economically superior. And because a
school board's ability to capture adequate state funding depends on
an early and reliable determination of local source funding, the
board has a critical need to ensure that the municipal contribution
is promptly determined, without being derailed by local politics.
Alaska Statute 14.14.060(c) reflects these concerns: it strives to
afford municipalities an opportunity to determine the amount of
their local source contributions, but at the same time it protects
the state's vital and overriding interest in early certainty.
Despite the court's assertion to the contrary, nowhere
does AS 14.14.060(c) "expressly"give municipalities "the power to
approve or reduce the total amounts of the proposed budget and
local appropriation"; [Fn. 14] rather, it "expressly"delegates
power only to "the assembly." And in spite of the court's view
that AS 14.14.060(c) "does not try to describe comprehensively what
happens"when a school board submits its budget to the assembly for
approval, [Fn. 15] the statute does just that.
The first sentence of subsection .060(c) specifies that
the board must submit its budget for the following school year to
the assembly by May 1. [Fn. 16] While the first sentence suggests
that the budget is submitted "for approval of the total amount,"
the next sentence of subsection .060(c) makes it clear that the
assembly's approval power is limited to determining the amount of
the local source contribution; and to exercise this power, the
assembly must make its determination and notify the board within
thirty days. [Fn. 17] The subsection's third sentence then
specifies what happens if the assembly fails to act as prescribed:
the school board's proposed local source contribution is
automatically deemed approved. [Fn. 18] Finally, the fourth
sentence of subsection .060(c) provides that once the approved
amount of local source funding is fixed, the assembly must
appropriate that amount no later than June 30. [Fn. 19]
Thus, AS 14.14.060(c) does "describe comprehensively what
happens": it defines a two-step process for assembly action on the
school board budget; the first step is optional, the second
mandatory. First, if it acts promptly to make the determination
and inform the board, the assembly may approve the amount of the
local source contribution; failing that, the amount stated in the
school board budget is automatically approved. Second, once the
approval occurs -- by action or inaction -- the assembly must
appropriate the approved amount by June 1; the statute allows no
other amount, so the issue of a mayoral veto becomes moot.
Neither the tight and comprehensive structure of this
statute nor its underlying purpose leaves room for the "extra
political wrinkle"of a mayoral veto. Assuming, then, that the
court is correct in construing the Anchorage charter to "reallocate
some of the assembly's legislative power,"[Fn. 20] this
reallocation violates the letter and spirit of AS 14.14.060(c) and
is therefore invalid.
C. Alaska Statute 29.20.270(c) Explicitly Prohibits a
School-Budget Veto.
Alaska's laws regulating municipal government, codified
in Title 29 of the Alaska Statutes, confirm the legislature's
intent to use the plain meaning of "assembly"in Title 14's
provisions establishing relationships between school boards,
assemblies, and mayors. Alaska Statute 29.20.270(c)(1) forbids a
mayor from using the veto to "strike or reduce . . . appropriation
items in a school budget ordinance."[Fn. 21]
Although the court denies it, this unambiguous provision
certainly does "expressly prohibit the municipality from conferring
[the veto] power on its mayor."[Fn. 22] While the court attempts
to avoid the express meaning of the statute by finding an implied
exemption for home rule municipalities under AS 29.10.200, [Fn. 23]
the attempt is unconvincing.
Alaska Statute 29.10.200 provides that "[o]nly the
following provisions of this title [AS 29.] apply to home rule
municipalities as prohibitions on acting otherwise than as
provided." The statute then lists fifty-nine provisions of Title
29 that directly limit home rule municipalities from "acting
otherwise"than as required therein. This list omits reference to
AS 29.20.270(c)(1)'s ban on vetoes of school district appropriation
items. [Fn. 24] Based on the omission, the court infers that
subsection .270(c)(1)'s prohibition does not apply to home rule
municipalities. [Fn. 25] But the court draws this inference too
hastily. It overlooks the necessary implications of AS 14.14.065's
command that cities be treated in the same manner as boroughs are
treated under AS 14.14.060 for purposes of determining
relationships between their school boards, their assemblies, and
their mayors. [Fn. 26]
The question framed by AS 29.10.200 is whether its
omission of the school-budget veto prohibition frees home rule
cities to act "otherwise than as provided"by the prohibition. The
omission admittedly precludes AS 29.20.270(c)(1) from applying
directly to a home rule city. But we must next ask whether the
veto ban might apply indirectly. The answer to this question is
"Yes." As already mentioned, AS 14.14.065 and 14.14.060 specify
that for school-budget purposes, the rules governing relationships
between a home rule city's school board, assembly, and mayor are
the same rules that apply to ordinary boroughs. For these
purposes, then, AS 14.14.065 makes a home rule city "a borough
governed in the same manner as provided in AS 14.14.060."[Fn. 27]
Since AS 29.20.270(c)(1)'s ban on school district vetoes
restricts a general-law borough administrator's veto power when a
borough assembly exercises its delegated authority to modify or
approve a school budget under AS 14.14.060(c), and because
AS 14.14.065 unambiguously regards home rule cities as boroughs in
their relationships with their school boards, assemblies, and
mayors, AS 29.20.270(c)(1)'s school-budget veto ban attaches to a
home rule city: the city is a functional borough under AS 14.14.065
and AS 14.14.060.
Hence, AS 29.20.270(c)'s omission from AS 29.10.200 is
inconsequential. Far from indicating that "the legislature
impliedly chose to let each home rule municipality decide whether
to give its mayor the power to veto or reduce school district
budget ordinances,"[Fn. 28] this omission evinces the
legislature's recognition that subsection .270(c)(1)'s veto ban did
not need to be listed in AS 29.10.200. Again, home rule cities are
ordinary boroughs, not home rule cities, for purposes of
AS 14.14.060(c); as such, they are governed by the veto ban
regardless of its omission from AS 29.10.200. [Fn. 29] And even if
paragraph .270(c)(1)'s prohibition did not apply to home rule
municipalities, a mayoral veto would not be authorized under AS
14.14.060(c)'s narrow delegation of power to the assembly alone.
The court errs in concluding otherwise.
II. THE COURT HAS APPLIED THE WRONG STANDARD IN CONSTRUING STATE
LAW TO ALLOW MAYORAL VETOES OF SCHOOL BUDGET ORDINANCES.
The court compounds these errors by applying the wrong
standard to determine whether a home rule mayor's school-budget
veto impermissibly conflicts with the requirements of state law.
In selecting the applicable standard, the court assigns predominate
weight to the Alaska Constitution's home rule clause, which gives
home rule municipalities "all legislative powers not prohibited by
law or by charter."[Fn. 30] Relying on this constitutional
language, the court declares that, "[i]n deciding whether the state
has limited the powers of home rule municipalities, we first look
for prohibitions, not grants of power."[Fn. 31] While recognizing
that state law can sometimes restrict a home rule municipality's
power implicitly, the court reasons that an implied restriction can
only occur when a "'statute and ordinance are so substantially
irreconcilable that one cannot be given its substantive effect if
the other is to be accorded the weight of law.'"[Fn. 32] This
standard leads the court to uphold the municipality's position
because, in the court's view, "a mayoral veto over the school
budget does not irreconcilably impede the purpose of Title 14."
[Fn. 33]
But the court has fashioned a constitutionally lopsided
standard: while heeding the municipality's call to honor the
constitution's broad grant of home rule power, this standard all
but ignores Repasky's equally compelling call to enforce
constitutional language granting the state exclusive control over
public education.
As already discussed, the Alaska Constitution's public
education clause expressly provides that "[t]he legislature shall
by general law establish and maintain a system of public schools
open to all children of the State."[Fn. 34] Our cases hold that
"[t]his constitutional mandate for pervasive state authority in the
field of education could not be more clear."[Fn. 35] We have
emphasized that the public education clause is "mandatory,""not
permissive"; and we have declared this provision to be
"unqualified"in specifying that "no other unit of government
shares responsibility or authority."[Fn. 36] For these reasons we
have sternly warned against inferring a surrender of the state's
constitutional prerogatives from any law that transfers limited
educational powers to local government:
That the legislature has seen fit to delegate
certain educational functions to local school
boards in order that Alaska schools might be
adapted to meet the varying conditions of
different localities does not diminish this
constitutionally mandated state control over
education.[ [Fn. 37]]
In the case before us, then, when we gauge how broadly to
apply AS 14.14.060(c)'s delegation of power to "the assembly,"we
must use a standard that acknowledges the tensions between two
competing constitutional mandates: article VII's public education
clause and article X's home rule clause. Yet by holding that the
mayoral veto must survive unless it "irreconcilably impede[s] the
purposes of Title 14,"the court inexplicably emphasizes only one
of these mandates -- the home rule clause. [Fn. 38]
The court's standard might serve well when used to
resolve conflicts between municipal home rule powers and ordinary
statutes. But we have never used it to decide the validity of home
rule actions that conflict with state laws rooted in the public
education clause. To the contrary, our cases involving educational
functions articulated a standard that would allow us to interpret
a statute like AS 14.14.060(c) as an implicit delegation of power
only if the delegated power would affirmatively promote the state's
educational purposes.
Beginning in Chugach Electric Ass'n v. City of Anchorage,
[Fn. 39] we adopted a "local activity rule"as "an expedient
method"to apply when home rule ordinances "either directly or
collaterally impede . . . implementation"of policies expressed in
state laws. [Fn. 40]
A year later, in Macauley v. Hildebrand, [Fn. 41] we
considered a case involving a conflict between a home rule charter
provision that required a school district to use the borough
accounting system and a statute that allowed centralized accounting
only if the school board consented. [Fn. 42] Reviewing the test
that we adopted in Chugach Electric, we noted that "the
determination of whether a home rule municipality can enforce an
ordinance which conflicts with a state statute"hinged on "whether
the matter regulated is of statewide or local concern."[Fn. 43]
Applying this formulation, we struck the charter provision, ruling
that "[t]he outcome of the local activity test in the case at bar
is dictated by Article VII, Section 1 of the Alaska Constitution
[the public education clause]."[Fn. 44]
We next dealt with conflicting state and home rule
provisions in Jefferson v. State. [Fn. 45] There, we backed away
from Chugach Electric's local activity rule. Using the
constitution's home rule clause as the appropriate starting point
for analysis, we enunciated for the first time a test based on the
notion of substantial irreconcilability:
The test we derive from Alaska's
constitutional provisions is one of
prohibition, rather than traditional tests
such as statewide versus local concern. A
municipal ordinance is not necessarily invalid
in Alaska because it is inconsistent or in
conflict with a state statute. The question
rests on whether the exercise of authority has
been prohibited to municipalities. The
prohibition must be either by express terms or
by implication such as where the statute and
ordinance are so substantially irreconcilable
that one cannot be given its substantive
effect if the other is to be accorded the
weight of law.[ [Fn. 46]]
The Jefferson test resembles the standard that the court
applies here, and that test undeniably gives preference to
municipal laws having close ties to the home rule clause. But
Jefferson qualified its endorsement of the substantial
irreconcilability test, declaring that this standard must give way
when, as here, a home rule power butts against the mandate of the
Alaska Constitution's public education clause.
The public education clause was not directly at issue in
Jefferson. The conflict there arose between a city charter
provision governing disposition of public utility assets and a
state law precluding a city located within an organized borough
from disposing of such assets after the borough exercised areawide
power over the subject. [Fn. 47] Applying the "substantially
irreconcilable"test, Jefferson resolved this conflict in favor of
the state, finding the city's action to be irreconcilable with the
state statute because the statute's "prohibition [was] express."
[Fn. 48] But Jefferson did not stop its analysis there. It
proceeded to examine its newly adopted standard in light of this
court's earlier case law, emphasizing that "[o]ur decision . . . is
in accord with this court's opinions relating to cases of conflict
between local ordinances and state enactments."[Fn. 49]
Jefferson's discussion of Macauley v. Hildebrand is
especially germane to the present controversy because the conflict
in Macauley involved a statutory delegation of educational power
implicating the public education clause in much the same way that
AS 14.14.060(c) implicates the clause here. In discussing
Macauley, Jefferson expressly recognized that conflicts like these
present exceptional circumstances in which the home rule clause
must ordinarily yield:
The statute involved in Macauley was an
express delegation by the state legislature to
municipal corporations of a constitutionally
mandated legislative power. We reasoned that
the language of the state constitution
mandating maintenance of a school system by
the state vested the legislature with
pervasive control over public education.
Thus, home rule municipalities were precluded
from exercising power over education unless,
and to the extent, delegated by the state
legislature; and the local ordinance was
therefore overridden by the statute.[ [Fn. 50]]
Jefferson's public education test, then, is the obverse
of the test that the court espouses here: to invalidate a municipal
action, the test looks not for an express prohibition or
irreconcilable conflict, but merely for the absence of a specific
delegation. Under the test that Jefferson articulates for public
education clause cases, then, state law has the preference; it
prevails in the absence of express delegation: "[H]ome rule
municipalities [are] precluded from exercising power over
education"except when that power is "delegated by the state
legislature."[Fn. 51]
Our most recent decision addressing a home rule city's
exercise of delegated public education power, Tunley v.
Municipality of Anchorage School District, [Fn. 52] refines
Jefferson's public education clause test by describing the
circumstances in which an implied delegation of power may be found.
Tunley considered the scope of AS 14.14.060(d)'s
provision vesting municipal assemblies with authority to "determine
the location of school buildings."[Fn. 53] The Anchorage School
Board was sued because it closed two schools without assembly
approval. [Fn. 54] In rejecting a challenge to the board's
unapproved action, we declined to read subsection .060(d)'s
delegation to the assembly of power to determine "location"as
carrying with it an implied power over closure. [Fn. 55] We
explained our narrow interpretation of subsection .060(d) by noting
that, although the provision's express delegation of approval power
over location was consistent with the overall purpose of AS
14.14.060, "[t]his statutory consistency is not furthered by . . .
assembly power to determine which schools are to discontinue
operations." Tunley thus enforced section .060's express
delegation of the power to locate but suggested that the section
could not be interpreted to extend an implied or inherent
delegation of the power to close unless that power was necessary to
promote consistency with the section's underlying educational
purpose.
Applying these principles here dictates the conclusion
that AS 14.14.060(c)'s express delegation of approval power only to
"the assembly"cannot be construed to imply a broader delegation of
veto power to the mayor. For a veto power of that kind would do
nothing to promote consistency with AS 14.14.060's basic goal.
As the court itself acknowledges, the veto power adds a
new wrinkle to the school budget process -- "an extra political
element"that was not previously there. [Fn. 56] Although this
extra wrinkle undeniably serves local political interests by
enhancing mayoral control over the school budget, it adds nothing
of benefit to the statutorily established school budget process:
the added political wrinkle is neither necessary nor helpful to
promote consistency with any of AS 14.14.060(c)'s educational
purposes -- the only purposes properly at issue here. Indeed, as
we have seen, one of subsection .060(c)'s most prominent goals is
to keep the school-budget process wrinkle free. At best, then,
this new political element might prove to be a minor inconvenience
to the school budget process.
And at worst, of course, the veto power might prove to be
far more than a mere wrinkle or minor hindrance. While local
school districts are in one sense a part of municipal government,
in another sense -- their constitutional and statutory sense --
they are independent state institutions that work locally with
municipal government. [Fn. 57] And as this court has previously
emphasized, "[n]owhere is the independent status of the Anchorage
School Board more apparent than in school system budgetary
matters."[Fn. 58]
The statutory delegation of power at issue here,
AS 14.14.060(c), attempts to strike a careful balance between the
state's vital constitutional interest in maintaining pervasive
authority over public education and the legitimate local interest
in ensuring "that Alaska schools might be adapted to meet the
varying conditions of different localities [in a way that] does not
diminish this constitutionally mandated state control over
education."[Fn. 59] By extending subsection .060(c)'s reach
beyond the statute's express delegation to the assembly and nudging
school-budget approval power within the city executive's sphere of
control, the court unavoidably dilutes the school district's
independence. The court's action tilts the original balance of
powers decidedly away from pervasive state authority and school
district autonomy. It distorts, rather than promotes, subsection
.060(c)'s educational goal.
Apart from causing this kind of institutional distortion,
shifting the balance of state and municipal power will also unleash
anomalous procedural consequences. Whether the mayor plays any
role in the school-budget approval process will become an arbitrary
exercise in assembly timing: the assembly can choose to leave the
mayor out of the loop entirely by delaying its approval action
until the last moment or by failing to act at all; [Fn. 60] and if
the assembly includes the mayor by acting promptly, it risks
excluding itself if it ultimately is unable to override a veto.
Finally, distributing the assembly's share of school-
budget power is bound to have awkward institutional ramifications.
A school board acts as its district's legislative body. [Fn. 61]
Subsection .060(c) narrowly delegates this power to the assembly,
effectively designating the municipality's legislative body as the
board's legislative adjunct. But in this adjunct capacity, the
assembly serves the same executive as the board: the school
district superintendent. By introducing the mayor to this
institutional mix, the court adds a second executive head to the
district's adjunct legislative body, creating a patchwork anatomy
that invites institutional turmoil. The district's adjunct
legislative body now must respond to conflicting signals emanating
from separate heads on opposite sides of its torso.
I seriously doubt that any local government would have
-- or could have -- devised such a strange process intentionally.
And I am convinced that a state government dedicated to maintaining
an independent local school system under Alaska's "constitutional
mandate for pervasive state authority in the field of education"
[Fn. 62] should not tolerate its continued existence.
III. CONCLUSION
Without a trace of irony, the court foretells the
consequences of its decision: "Allowing the mayor to veto the
school budget ordinance puts the appropriation process on footing
equivalent . . . to that of other municipal budgets."[Fn. 63] Yet
Alaska's constitution requires school districts statewide to stand
on their own feet. By treating the school budget like "other
municipal budgets"the veto power correspondingly treats the school
board like an ordinary municipal agency, thereby divesting the
board of its constitutionally mandated independence. As the court
itself all but concedes, then, its decision spells the end for
independent local schools in home rule municipalities. I dissent
from the court's opinion and would affirm the superior court's
decision holding that AS 14.14.060(c) does not authorize school-
budget vetoes.
FOOTNOTES
Footnote 1:
Anchorage Municipal Charter art. III, 3.01; see also Area G
Home & Landowners Org. v. Anchorage, 927 P.2d 728, 729 & n.1
(Alaska 1996).
Footnote 2:
AS 14.14.060(c); Charter art. VI, 6.05; Anchorage Municipal
Code (AMC) 6.10.050, .080.
Footnote 3:
AS 14.14.060(c); Charter art. VI, 6.05(a); AMC 06.10.050.
The state contributes a large part of the budget of each school
district; the municipality contributes the remaining amount from
"local sources." See AS 14.14.060(c); AMC 6.10.050, .080(B).
Footnote 4:
AS 14.14.060(c) ("the assembly shall determine the total
amount of money to be made available from local sources for school
purposes"); Charter art. VI, 6.05(b) ("The assembly may increase
or decrease the budget of the school district only as to total
amount.").
Footnote 5:
See AS 14.14.060(c).
Footnote 6:
Alaska R. App. P. 212(c)(9).
Footnote 7:
Taranto v. North Slope Borough, 909 P.2d 354, 355 (Alaska
1996).
Footnote 8:
Fancyboy v. Alaska Village Elec. Coop., Inc., 984 P.2d 1128,
1132 (Alaska 1999).
Footnote 9:
Area G Home & Landowners, 927 P.2d at 731.
Footnote 10:
Alaska Const. art. X, 2.
Footnote 11:
Alaska Const. art. X, 9.
Footnote 12:
Alaska Const. art. X, 11.
Footnote 13:
Charter art. III, 3.01; see also Area G Home & Landowners,
927 P.2d at 729.
Footnote 14:
Area G Home & Landowners, 927 P.2d at 729. Creation of the
municipality united the former City of Anchorage and the Greater
Anchorage Area Borough. Id.; see also Charter art. I, 1.02.
Footnote 15:
Charter art. V; see also AS 29.20.220, .250.
Footnote 16:
Alaska Const. art. X, 4; Charter art. IV, 4.01.
Footnote 17:
Subsection 5.02(c) provides in pertinent part:
The mayor has the veto power. The mayor also
has line item veto power. The mayor may, by
veto, strike or reduce items in a budget or
appropriation measure.
Footnote 18:
AS 14.03.010 (establishing "in the state a system of public
schools to be administered and maintained as provided in this
title"); see generally Tunley v. Municipality of Anchorage Sch.
Dist., 631 P.2d 67, 74-77 & n.26 (Alaska 1980).
Footnote 19:
AS 14.12.020(b); AS 29.35.160.
Footnote 20:
AS 14.12.010; AS 29.35.160(a).
Footnote 21:
AS 29.35.160.
Footnote 22:
Charter art. VI, 6.01; AMC 29.10.010.
Footnote 23:
Charter art. VI, 6.01 & 6.03; AMC 29.10.010.
Footnote 24:
Tunley, 631 P.2d at 75; see also Charter art. VI, 6.03
(delineating powers of school board).
Footnote 25:
Macauley v. Hildebrand, 491 P.2d 120, 122 (Alaska 1971).
Footnote 26:
AS 14.14.060 is made applicable to home rule municipalities
(like Anchorage) by AS 14.14.065, which provides in pertinent part:
The relationships between the school board of
a city school district and the city council
and executive or administrator are governed in
the same manner as provided in AS 14.14.060
for the school board of a borough school
district and the borough assembly and
executive or administrator.
AS 14.14.060(c) provides:
Except as otherwise provided by municipal
ordinance, the borough school board shall
submit the school budget for the following
school year to the borough assembly by May 1
for approval of the total amount. Within 30
days after receipt of the budget the assembly
shall determine the total amount of money to
be made available from local sources for
school purposes and shall furnish the school
board with a statement of the sum to be made
available. If the assembly does not, within
30 days, furnish the school board with a
statement of the sum to be made available, the
amount requested in the budget is
automatically approved. Except as otherwise
provided by municipal ordinance, by June 30,
the assembly shall appropriate the amount to
be made available from local sources from
money available for the purpose.
Footnote 27:
Charter 6.05(c) tracks the language of AS 14.14.060(c), and
provides:
The assembly shall approve the budget of the
school district as amended and appropriate the
necessary funds at least 60 days prior to the
end of the fiscal year of the school district.
If the assembly fails to approve the school
district budget and make the necessary
appropriation within the time stated, the
budget proposal shall become the budget and
appropriation for the fiscal year of the
school district without further assembly
action.
Footnote 28:
AS 14.14.060; Charter art. VI, 6.05; AMC 6.10.050, .080.
Footnote 29:
See AS 14.14.060(c) (providing that assembly "shall determine
the total amount to be made available from local sources . . . .");
Charter art. VI, 6.05(b) (providing assembly "may increase or
decrease the budget . . . ."); AMC 6.10.050. As part of this
process, the assembly must also determine the portion of the
municipality's school budget to be funded from local sources and
appropriate the local moneys to fund the school budget. AS
14.14.060(c); AMC 6.10.050, .080(B).
Footnote 30:
AS 14.14.060(c); Charter art. VI, 6.05(b). Subsection
6.05(b) of the charter provides:
The assembly may increase or decrease the
budget of the school district only as to total
amount. The school district may not
appropriate or otherwise incur the expenditure
of any funds, regardless of the source, in
excess of the total amount of the budget, as
approved by the assembly, without prior
approval by the assembly.
Footnote 31:
AS 14.14.060(c).
Footnote 32:
Id.; Charter art. VI, 6.05(c).
Footnote 33:
Charter art. VI, 6.05(c).
Footnote 34:
AMC 04.50.070.
Footnote 35:
Id. The commission recommended eliminating $12.5 million from
the total amount of the proposed school budget for 1995-96. The
commission recommended reducing the school board's proposed 1997-98
budget by $3 million.
Footnote 36:
Area G Home & Landowners, 927 P.2d at 731.
Footnote 37:
Lagos v. City of Sitka, 823 P.2d 641, 643 (Alaska 1991).
Footnote 38:
AMC 2.30.100 provides similarly.
Footnote 39:
Charter art. XVI, 16.03(a). That subsection provides in
relevant part:
The Anchorage Telephone Utility shall be
governed by a board of directors consisting of
five members. . . . Exercise of the power of
the veto by the mayor shall not extend to
actions of the assembly with respect to
appointment of directors.
(Emphasis added.) This limitation on the mayoral veto also appears
in AMC 2.30.100, which provides:
A. The mayor has the veto power as provided
in Charter section 5.02(c).
B. The mayor may not veto actions of the
assembly concerning the adoption or
abandonment of a manager plan of government as
provided in the laws of the state or actions
of the board of equalization or the board of
adjustment.
C. The mayor may not veto actions of the
assembly with respect to appointment of
directors of the Anchorage Telephone Utility,
enactment of legislation by the Assembly under
Charter section 16.03(h), approval of the
annual budget of the Anchorage Telephone
Utility, and actions of the Assembly with
respect to Anchorage Telephone Utility matters
reserved to the assembly under the Charter.
Footnote 40:
Subsection 5.02(c) provides in full (1990 addition
emphasized):
The mayor has the veto power. The mayor also
has line item veto power. The mayor may, by
veto strike or reduce items in a budget or
appropriation measure. The veto must be
exercised and submitted to the assembly with a
written explanation within seven days of
passage of the ordinance affected. The
assembly, by two-thirds majority vote of the
total membership, may override a veto any time
within 21 days after its exercise.
Footnote 41:
Charter art. XVII, 17.13(a). This subsection provides in
full:
"Appropriation"means a unit of funding
provided for by the assembly in the municipal
budget. An appropriation may be specific as
to particular expenditures or general as to an
entire department or agency as the assembly
deems appropriate.
Footnote 42:
Charter art. VI, 6.05 (school budget); art. XIII, 13.05
(addressing municipal budget and appropriations process).
Footnote 43:
Charter art. XIII, 13.06(b) (providing that "[e]xcept as to
the school budget, the mayor may transfer all or part of any
unencumbered balance between categories within an appropriation").
Subsection 13.06(b) also permits the school board to transfer
unencumbered funds between categories within the school budget
appropriation.
Footnote 44:
Tunley, 631 P.2d at 75-76.
Footnote 45:
Charter art. V, 5.02(c).
Footnote 46:
Charter art. XIII, 13.03 (general government); art. VI,
6.05 (schools); art. XVI, 16.01(b) (utilities); 16.03(f) (former
Anchorage Telephone Utility).
Footnote 47:
The Anchorage School District is coextensive with the
Municipality of Anchorage. AS 14.12.010; AS 29.35.160(a).
Footnote 48:
Charter art. XVII, 17.13(a).
Footnote 49:
Charter art. VI, 6.05(c); art. XIII, 13.06(b).
Footnote 50:
Charter art. VI, 6.05(c) ("The Assembly shall approve the
budget of the school district and appropriate the necessary funds.
. . .") (emphasis added)).
Footnote 51:
Charter art. V, 5.02(c); art. XVII, 17.13(a).
Footnote 52:
Cf. Macauley, 491 P.2d at 122 n.6 (noting that by statute
(since repealed), the state supplied "a minimum of 90% of school
operating funds.").
Footnote 53:
AMC 21.05.075A ("Nearly 70% of the local tax dollar now goes
to elementary and secondary educational programs.").
Footnote 54:
The parties do not discuss whether the mayor has to sign the
assembly's school budget ordinance for it to become law. Charter
article X, subsection 10.01(c) dictates that an ordinance takes
effect "upon adoption"by the assembly. Thus, no mayoral signature
is needed.
Footnote 55:
Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice of the Philippine Islands, 299
U.S. 410, 415 (1937); Alaska Legislative Council v. Knowles, 21
P.3d 367, 373 & n.33 (Alaska 2001); Cenarrusa v. Andrus, 582 P.2d
1082, 1091 (Idaho 1978).
Footnote 56:
See generally Richard Briffault, The Item Veto in State
Courts, 66 Temp. L. Rev. 1171 (1993).
Footnote 57:
Alaska Legislative Council, 21 P.3d at 367.
Footnote 58:
See Briffault, supra note 56, at 1179-80.
Footnote 59:
Alaska Legislative Council, 21 P.3d at 371. Although the
school district's financial plan specifies proposed expenditures by
category and by fund, the assembly in considering the school
district's budget and appropriation ordinance must effectively
treat the ordinance as proposing a single figure for a particular
purpose. Charter art. VI, 6.05(b) (assembly may increase or
reduce school budget "only as to total amount"). See also AS
14.14.060(c) (requiring board to submit budget to assembly "for
approval of the total amount").
Footnote 60:
The superior court did not decide this issue, having held that
the veto power was not intended to extend to the school board
budget. Having reached the opposite conclusion about the power
conferred, we must consider the second issue, because it could be
an alternative ground for affirming the superior court's judgment.
We apply our independent judgment to this issue because it raises
only questions of law. See supra Part III.A.
Footnote 61:
Alaska Const. art. X, 11; AS 29.04.010; see also Charter
art. III, 3.01.
Footnote 62:
AS 29.04.020.
Footnote 63:
AS 29.20.270 deals with the mayoral veto power. AS
29.20.270(c) provides in pertinent part: "The veto does not extend
to (1) appropriation items in a school budget ordinance . . . ."
Footnote 64:
AS 29.10.200 ("Only the following provisions of this title
apply to home rule municipalities as prohibitions on acting
otherwise than as provided."); see also Faipeas v. Municipality of
Anchorage, 860 P.2d 1214, 1222 n.3 (Alaska 1993) (noting that
legislature enacted AS 29.10.200 to make explicit which provisions
of Title 29 applied to home rule municipalities and which did not).
Footnote 65:
AS 29.10.200; Charter art. III, 3.01.
Footnote 66:
Jefferson v. State, 527 P.2d 37, 43 (Alaska 1974).
Footnote 67:
Id. at 43 & n.33.
Footnote 68:
Id.
Footnote 69:
Macauley v. Hildebrand, 491 P.2d 120, 122 (Alaska 1971).
Footnote 70:
Jefferson, 527 P.2d at 43 n.33 (characterizing Macauley v.
Hildebrand, 491 P.2d 120, as follows: "Thus, home rule
municipalities were precluded from exercising power over education
unless, and to the extent, delegated by the state legislature; and
the local ordinance was therefore overridden by the statute").
Footnote 71:
Macauley, 491 P.2d at 122 (blocking enforcement of Juneau
ordinance which conflicted with state education statute because
ordinance conflicted with state law on matter of statewide
concern).
Footnote 72:
Alaska Const. art. VII, 1.
Footnote 73:
Alaska Const. art. X, 1.
Footnote 74:
Alaska Const. art X, 11.
Footnote 75:
AS 14.14.060(a), (f).
Footnote 76:
AS 29.10.200; AS 29.20.270(c).
Footnote 77:
AS 29.10.200.
Footnote 78:
Dissent at 41.
Footnote 79:
Id.
Footnote 80:
We assume that the legislature would not enact a statute which
would be superfluous and we interpret statutory language to avoid
superfluity. Kodiak Island Borough v. Exxon Corp., 991 P.2d 757,
761 (Alaska 1999) ("We must also presume 'that the legislature
intended every word, sentence, or provision of a statute to have
some purpose, force, and effect, and that no words or provisions
are superfluous.'"(quoting Rydwell v. Anchorage Sch. Dist., 864
P.2d 526, 530-31 (Alaska 1993)).
Footnote 81:
AS 29.10.200.
Footnote 82:
E.g., Copper River Sch. Dist. v. Traw, 9 P.3d 280, 286 (Alaska
2000).
Footnote 83:
See AS 14.14.060(c).
Footnote 84:
See Tunley, 631 P.2d at 77.
Footnote 85:
See Macauley, 491 P.2d at 121.
Footnote 86:
Alaska Const. art. X, 11; see also AS 29.04.010.
Footnote 87:
890 P.2d 567 (Alaska 1995).
Footnote 88:
952 P.2d 274 (Alaska 1998).
Footnote 89:
Rosier, 890 P.2d at 573.
Footnote 90:
Ross, 952 P.2d at 277.
Footnote 91:
Rosier, 890 P.2d at 573; Ross, 952 P.2d at 277.
Footnote 92:
Rosier, 890 P.2d at 573 (holding that implying a veto power
"would eviscerate powers explicitly granted"to the board by
statute).
Footnote 93:
Ross, 952 P.2d at 277.
Footnote 94:
See AS 29.20.410(a).
Footnote 95:
AS 29.20.250(a).
Footnote 96:
Ross, 952 P.2d at 277.
Footnote 97:
631 P.2d 67 (Alaska 1980).
Footnote 98:
491 P.2d 120 (Alaska 1971).
Footnote 99:
Tunley, 631 P.2d at 76-77; Macauley, 491 P.2d at 122.
Footnote 100:
Macauley, 491 P.2d at 121.
Footnote 101:
Tunley, 631 P.2d at 75-76.
Footnote 102:
AS 14.14.060(c).
Footnote 103:
Sherman v. Holiday Constr. Co., 435 P.2d 16, 19 (Alaska 1967)
(refusing to interpret statute to produce "glaringly absurd"
results).
Footnote 104:
As noted above, however, the budget for the former Anchorage
Telephone Utility was not subject to a mayoral veto. Charter art.
XVI, 16.03; AMC 2.30.100(c).
Footnote 105:
The School Budget Advisory Commission proposed reducing the
school district's 1997-98 budget proposal by $3,000,000. The
assembly and mayor's reductions totaled $3,000,000. The Advisory
Commission noted that, even as so reduced, the budget was about
nine percent larger than the budget for the prior year.
Footnote 106:
Rosier, 890 P.2d at 573 (quoting Norman J. Singer, Sutherland
Statutory Construction 46.06 (5th ed. 1992) ("A statute should be
construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no
part will be inoperative or superfluous, void, or
insignificant.")).
Footnote 107:
Dissent at 45.
Footnote 108:
Jefferson, 527 P.2d at 43.
FOOTNOTES (Dissent)
Footnote 1:
See also AS 14.03.010 (establishing "in the state a system of
public schools to be administered and maintained as provided in
this title").
Footnote 2:
Tunley v. Municipality of Anchorage Sch. Dist., 631 P.2d 67,
77 (Alaska 1981) (quoting Macauley v. Hildebrand, 491 P.2d 120, 122
(Alaska 1971)); see also Jefferson v. State, 527 P.2d 37, 44
(Alaska 1974).
Footnote 3:
See Tunley, 631 P.2d at 76.
Footnote 4:
Id.
Footnote 5:
Emphasis added.
Footnote 6:
Emphasis added.
Footnote 7:
Slip Opinion at 26.
Footnote 8:
In other words, to adopt the court's interpretation would
require the nonsensical conclusion that, in describing the powers
of the "assembly"in relation to the powers of the "administrator,"
section .060 means "administrator"when it says "administrator,"
but means "assembly and/or administrator"when it says "assembly."
Footnote 9:
See, e.g., Slip Opinion at 16, 17-18.
Footnote 10:
See, e.g., Tunley v. Municipality of Anchorage Sch. Dist., 631
P.2d 67, 76 (Alaska 1981).
Footnote 11:
Alaska Const. art. VII, 1.
Footnote 12:
Id.
Footnote 13:
See Slip Opinion at 3-4.
Footnote 14:
Slip Opinion at 29.
Footnote 15:
Slip Opinion at 24.
Footnote 16:
"Except as otherwise provided by municipal ordinance, the
borough school board shall submit the school budget for the
following school year to the borough assembly by May 1 for approval
of the total amount."
Footnote 17:
"Within 30 days after receipt of the budget the assembly shall
determine the total amount of money to be made available from local
sources for school purposes and shall furnish the school board with
a statement of the sum to be made available."
Footnote 18:
"If the assembly does not, within 30 days, furnish the school
board with a statement of the sum to be made available, the amount
requested in the budget is automatically approved."
Footnote 19:
"Except as otherwise provided by municipal ordinance, by June
30, the assembly shall appropriate the amount to be made available
from local sources from money available for the purpose."
Footnote 20:
Slip Opinion at 26.
Footnote 21:
AS 29.20.270 provides, in relevant part:
(a) Except as provided in (c) - (e) of
this section, the mayor may veto an ordinance,
resolution, motion, or other action of the
governing body and may strike or reduce
appropriation items.
. . . .
(c) The veto does not extend to
(1) appropriation items in a school
budget ordinance[.]
. . . .
(e) The veto does not extend to an
ordinance adopted under AS 04.11.501. This
subsection applies to home rule and general
law municipalities.
Footnote 22:
Slip Opinion at 21.
Footnote 23:
Slip Opinion at 20-21.
Footnote 24:
AS 29.10.200 lists, in numerical order, provisions in Title 29
that apply to home rule municipalities and that restrict municipal
power. Subsection .200(15) lists AS 29.20.270(e), which prohibits
vetoes of local-option elections conducted under AS 04.11.501, as
a provision applicable to home rule municipalities. See note 21,
supra. The section .200 list mentions no other subsection of AS
29.20.270, thereby implicitly excluding subsection .270(c)'s ban on
mayoral vetoes of school-budget appropriations as a Title 29
prohibition that directly applies to home rule municipalities.
Footnote 25:
See Slip Opinion at 24-25.
Footnote 26:
AS 29.20.270(c)(1)'s veto ban and AS 29.10.200's list of
exemptions were originally enacted in 1972 as part of the 1972
Municipal Code Revision Act. See 118 SLA 1972. The 1972 revision
recodified but did not substantively amend AS 14.14.065 or the
forerunner of AS 14.14.060. See former AS 14.14.065 (1970); former
AS 07.15.330(d) (1971). Because AS 14.14.060(c)'s provisions
predate AS 29.20.270(c)(1)'s veto ban and the home rule exemptions
arising under AS 29.10.200, there is no basis for concluding that
the references to boroughs and cities in AS 14.14.065 and AS
14.14.060(c) would exclude home rule cities or boroughs. For
purposes of determining relations between the assembly and mayor in
school district matters, then, AS 14.14.065 appears to require all
cities -- home rule and general law -- to be treated as an ordinary
borough would be treated under AS 14.14.060(c).
Footnote 27:
AS 14.14.065.
Footnote 28:
Slip Opinion at 25.
Footnote 29:
In contrast, AS 29.10.200(15) does specifically list
subsection (e) of AS 20.20.270 as a provision that applies to home
rule municipalities. Subsection .270(e) prohibits mayors from
vetoing a local option "ordinance adopted under AS 04.11.501." See
note 21, supra. Since no provision of Title 4 would independently
apply subsection .270(e)'s veto ban to a home rule city, it was
necessary for the legislature to list the ban in AS 29.10.200(15)
if the legislature intended it to apply to home rule cities.
Footnote 30:
slip Opinion at 6-7; Alaska Const. art. X, 11.
Footnote 31:
Slip Opinion at 20.
Footnote 32:
Slip Opinion at 21 (quoting Jefferson v. State, 527 P.2d 37,
43 (Alaska 1974)).
Footnote 33:
Slip Opinion at 33.
Footnote 34:
Alaska Const. art. VII, 1.
Footnote 35:
Macauley v. Hildebrand, 491 P.2d 120, 122 (Alaska 1971).
Footnote 36:
Id. (emphasis added).
Footnote 37:
Id.
Footnote 38:
Slip Opinion at 33.
Footnote 39:
476 P.2d 115 (Alaska 1970).
Footnote 40:
Id. at 122.
Footnote 41:
491 P.2d 120 (Alaska 1971).
Footnote 42:
Id. at 120-21.
Footnote 43:
Id. at 122.
Footnote 44:
Id.
Footnote 45:
527 P.2d 37 (Alaska 1974).
Footnote 46:
Id. at 43 (footnote omitted).
Footnote 47:
Id. at 41-42.
Footnote 48:
Id. at 43.
Footnote 49:
Id. at 44.
Footnote 50:
Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
Footnote 51:
Id. Notably, Jefferson recognized that the statute at issue
in Macauley directly prohibited the challenged home rule charter
provision at issue there and that the Macauley court could have
resolved the conflict on that narrow basis, but elected not to:
"Although the statutory prohibition in Macauley was direct, this
court offered another reason for striking down the questioned
ordinance." Jefferson, 527 P.2d at 44.
Footnote 52:
631 P.2d 67 (Alaska 1981).
Footnote 53:
Id. at 76.
Footnote 54:
See id. at 69-70.
Footnote 55:
Id. at 76.
Footnote 56:
Slip Opinion at 31.
Footnote 57:
See Tunley, 631 P.2d at 75.
Footnote 58:
Id.
Footnote 59:
Macauley v. Hildebrand, 491 P.2d 120, 122 (Alaska 1971).
Footnote 60:
See AS 14.14.060(c).
Footnote 61:
See Tunley, 631 P.2d at 75.
Footnote 62:
Macauley, 491 P.2d at 122.
Footnote 63:
Slip Opinion at 31.
