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v. State of Alaska, Dept of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement Div. (12/30/99)
sp-5226
Meyer v. State of Alaska, Dept of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement Div.
(12/30/99) sp-5226
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before publication in
the Pacific Reporter. Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of
the Clerk of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone
(907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
HOWARD J. MEYER, JR., )
) Supreme Court No. S-8187
Appellant, )
) Superior Court No.
v. ) 3AN-94-2816 CI
)
STATE OF ALASKA, DEPARTMENT ) O P I N I O N
OF REVENUE, CHILD SUPPORT )
ENFORCEMENT DIVISION, )
ex rel. N.G.T., )
)
Appellee. ) [No. 5226 - December 30, 1999]
______________________________)
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of
Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage,
Rene J. Gonzalez, Judge.
Appearances: Barry J. Kell, Anchorage, for
Appellant. Terisia K. Chleborad, Assistant Attorney General,
Anchorage, Bruce M. Botelho, Attorney General, Juneau, for
Appellee.
Before: Matthews, Chief Justice, Compton,
Eastaugh, Fabe, and Bryner, Justices.
MATTHEWS, Chief Justice.
EASTAUGH, Justice, concurring.
FABE, Justice, with whom BRYNER, Justice,
joins, dissenting.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paternity case, the Child Support Enforcement
Division (CSED) seeks to establish Howard Meyer's parentage of
N.G.T. The superior court granted summary judgment to CSED, ruling
that Meyer is N.G.T.'s biological father. Meyer appeals, arguing
that his denial of intercourse with N.G.T.'s mother during the
possible period of conception created a genuine issue of material
fact. Because we agree that Meyer's denial of intercourse creates
a question of fact sufficient to withstand summary judgment, we
reverse the superior court's decision and remand Meyer's case for
trial.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
M.T. lives in Savoonga. Howard Meyer lives in Anchorage.
Meyer met M.T. in Nome in 1987 and subsequently developed a sexual
relationship with her.
From April 8 through April 12, 1992, M.T. attended a
conference in Anchorage. A receipt from M.T.'s hotel lists four
telephone calls placed to Meyer's home and office on April 8 and 9.
M.T. alleges that she and Meyer had intercourse on April 9, 1992.
She gave birth to N.G.T. on December 26, 1992. M.T. claims that
Meyer is N.G.T.'s biological father.
Although Meyer expressed uncertainty regarding the
precise dates and locations of his sexual contacts with M.T., he
admitted to having a sexual relationship with her. However, Meyer
stated under oath that his last sexual encounter with M.T. occurred
in 1991, and he denied having intercourse with her between March
15, 1992, and April 15, 1992, the possible period of N.G.T.'s
conception.
Gene Proof Technologies in Nashville, Tennessee, analyzed
blood samples from N.G.T., M.T., and Meyer. The test placed the
probability of Meyer's parentage at 99.98%, raising a presumption
of paternity under AS 25.20.050(d). [Fn. 1] The genetic odds
favoring Meyer's paternity are said to be 6243 to 1.
After discovery, CSED moved for summary judgment on the
paternity issue. CSED authenticated the genetic test results with
a six-page affidavit from the director of Gene Proof Technologies.
The affidavit emphasized the accreditation of Gene Proof
Technologies and provided a detailed explanation of the methodology
and results of the testing procedures. Meyer opposed CSED's
motion, arguing that his denial of sexual intercourse with M.T.
during the period of N.G.T.'s conception sufficiently rebutted the
presumption of his paternity for purposes of summary judgment.
The superior court granted CSED's motion for summary
judgment. The court found that CSED had satisfied its initial
burden by establishing a 99.98% probability of Meyer's paternity,
and by sufficiently authenticating the genetic test results with
the director's six-page affidavit.
Meyer moved for reconsideration. He offered the
affidavit of a paternity testing expert, and submitted his sworn
interrogatory answers in which he denied having intercourse with
M.T. during the period of possible conception. The superior court
considered the motion, but ultimately denied Meyer's request to set
aside the paternity judgment. The court found that Meyer's
interrogatory answers denying intercourse with M.T. during the
relevant period did not reasonably rebut CSED's evidence of
paternity. Meyer appeals.
III. DISCUSSION
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
CSED, establishing Meyer's paternity as a matter of law. Meyer
argues that his sworn denial of sexual intercourse with M.T. during
the period of N.G.T.'s conception was sufficient to raise a
material fact issue precluding summary judgment. We agree.
We review grants of summary judgment de novo. [Fn. 2] We
must "determine whether any genuine issue of material fact exists
and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment on the law
applicable to the established facts."[Fn. 3] All factual
inferences are drawn in favor of the non-moving party, and the
existence of a dispute regarding any material fact precludes
summary judgment. [Fn. 4]
The party opposing summary judgment need not produce all
of its evidence but instead must only show the existence of a
genuine factual dispute. [Fn. 5] In rendering its summary judgment
determination, the court should examine the pleadings, affidavits,
and discovery answers to ascertain whether any genuine issues of
material fact exist. [Fn. 6] We have noted that "any evidence
sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact"precludes a
summary finding of paternity. [Fn. 7]
The court does not weigh the evidence or witness
credibility on summary judgment. [Fn. 8] Therefore, while it is
true that the genetic test results establish a rebuttable
presumption of paternity in this case and shift the burden to the
putative father to prove non-paternity by clear and convincing
evidence, the clear and convincing standard is irrelevant on
summary judgment. Recently we held:
The standard of proof for setting aside a
release is clear and convincing evidence. But that standard only
comes into play when a fact finder is called upon to consider the
parties' reasonable expectations. . . . It has no direct
application at the summary judgment stage.[ [Fn. 9]]
The clear and convincing standard is only significant in the
context of weighing the evidence.
Meyer contends that his interrogatory answers establish
a material factual dispute regarding his purported intercourse with
M.T. during the period of N.G.T.'s conception. Meyer claims that
he and M.T. had intercourse on only two occasions, and that the
last time was in 1991. [Fn. 10] This would have been well before
the period during which conception of N.G.T. took place.
Meyer's sworn denial of sexual intercourse with M.T.
during the period of N.G.T.'s conception creates a factual issue
sufficient to preclude summary judgment in the present case.
Although we have recognized that a "scintilla of contrary evidence"
is insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact, [Fn. 11] a
putative father's sworn denial of sexual intercourse during the
possible period of conception is more than a scintilla of evidence.
[Fn. 12] Furthermore, this denial is not merely conclusory since
Meyer's basis of knowledge for the alleged fact -- that he did not
have sexual intercourse with the mother during the period of
conception -- is clear.
We do not hold that a denial of paternity contained in an
unsworn answer to a complaint would suffice to oppose summary
judgment. [Fn. 13] Rather, the defendant must be able to point to
"specific facts"controverting a showing of paternity, and the
evidence relied upon must be sworn to or must be otherwise
admissible. Meyer's sworn denial of intercourse during the
possible conception period meets this test.
In reaching our conclusion, we remain cognizant of the
significant statistical odds suggesting Meyer's paternity. CSED
supported its summary judgment motion with scientific test results
claiming a 99.98% probability of Meyer's paternity. [Fn. 14] This
statistical showing may prove decisive at trial. For purposes of
summary judgment, however, the court must interpret factual
disputes in favor of the non-movant. [Fn. 15] Viewed in this
light, Meyer's denial is sufficient to create a genuine factual
issue despite the scientific evidence.
IV. CONCLUSION
We REVERSE the superior court's grant of summary judgment
and REMAND this case for further proceedings.
EASTAUGH, Justice, concurring.
I join the court's opinion. Under Alaska's prevailing
summary judgment standard, [Fn. 1] Meyer's conclusory denial of
paternity was sufficient to create a genuine issue of material
fact. [Fn. 2] CSED has not argued that we should adopt a different
summary judgment standard, such as that employed in the federal
courts. [Fn. 3]
FABE, Justice, with whom BRYNER, Justice, joins, dissenting.
I. Introduction
In the face of CSED's strong body of scientific,
testimonial, and documentary evidence supporting a finding of
paternity, Howard Meyer contested summary judgment with only his
general denial of paternity. Pleading an inability to recall
specific dates or details as to when he last had sexual contact
with M.T., Meyer offered only his "belief"that it was prior to the
probable dates of conception. Because the Alaska legislature has
expressed a policy goal of parental responsibility in creating a
presumption of parentage when genetic tests establish a 95%
probability of paternity, and because Meyer's probability of
paternity is 99.98%, his equivocal denial of paternity does not
raise a genuine issue of fact. Where the putative father has the
burden to rebut the presumption of paternity, a mere denial of
paternity should not prevent the granting of summary judgment.
Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
II. The Evidence Offered by Meyer to Oppose Summary Judgment
Meyer argues that the following responses to plaintiffs'
interrogatories and requests for admission raise a genuine issue of
fact in this case. First, in response to an interrogatory
requesting the specific facts upon which Meyer intended to base his
denial of paternity, Meyer replied that M.T. had "assured"him that
she was taking birth control pills during the periods that they
engaged in sexual relations. Second, Meyer stated that he
"believed"that he had last had sexual intercourse with M.T. in
1991, more than nine months before N.G.T.'s December 26, 1992
birth.
Even this broad denial was not unequivocal. Indeed,
Meyer prefaced his interrogatory responses by stating that "[d]ue
to the passage of time, I am unable to recall each specific
occasion when I have had contact with [M.T.]. For the same
reasons, I am unable to recall the precise dates, times of day,
locations and circumstances surrounding each such contact that I
have had with her." It was only under "these limitations"that
Meyer stated his inconclusive denial. This is the full extent of
Meyer's proffered evidence opposing summary judgment.
Yet Meyer has not challenged CSED's strong evidence
supporting a paternity finding. He has not disputed M.T.'s hotel
and telephone receipts that indicate that he had contact with M.T.
at the time of conception. Nor has he challenged the specific date
of conception that M.T. offered. Meyer has offered no evidence
that M.T. had other sexual partners to controvert M.T.'s statement
that Meyer was her sole sexual partner during the time of
conception. The evidence offered by Meyer is thus insufficient to
raise a genuine issue of fact.
III. Alaska Civil Rule 56(e)
Alaska Civil Rule 56 highlights the concerns raised by
such insubstantial responses to a summary judgment motion. Rule
56(e) states in part:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's
pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
This rule clearly disapproves of Meyer's reliance on equivocal
denials of CSED's factual allegations and his failure to offer any
evidence affirmatively setting forth specific facts. While Meyer
does present evidence outside of his pleadings, these responses
amount to little more than a reiteration of his blanket denial of
paternity in his answer. [Fn. 1]
This court has affirmed summary judgment in other
contexts where the nonmovant has provided only his own meager
statements unsupported by other evidence. In Yurioff v. American
Honda Motor Co., [Fn. 2] the issue on summary judgment was the date
of an accident. The victim presented only his own deposition
testimony as evidence that the accident occurred on a certain date,
but the defendant presented authenticated hospital records
indicating a different date. We held that the victim's evidence
did not "reasonably tend[] to dispute or contradict"the
authenticated hospital records, and we therefore affirmed summary
judgment. [Fn. 3] Similarly, in Martech Construction Co. v. Ogden
Environmental Services, Inc., [Fn. 4] we indicated that an
affidavit from Martech's president stating that Ogden agreed to
purchase certain equipment, where no other evidence supported this
"naked assertion,"would not suffice to raise a genuine issue of
fact. [Fn. 5]
In a case factually similar to the present one, the
Colorado Supreme Court held that a general denial in the putative
father's opposition brief was not sufficient under Colorado's
analogous Rule 56(e) to defeat summary judgment. [Fn. 6] In People
ex rel. J.M.A., the plaintiff moved for summary judgment where
genetic tests indicated a 99.79% probability of paternity. [Fn. 7]
In response, the putative father filed an opposition brief
containing a general denial of paternity without affidavits or
other supporting evidence. [Fn. 8] The court determined that this
submission was equivalent to resting upon the mere denial in the
answer and therefore failed under Rule 56(e) to "demonstrate by
relevant and specific facts that a real controversy existed with
regard to his paternity."[Fn. 9]
IV. The Public Policy Underpinning the Presumption of Paternity
Even if indefinite denials made outside of the pleadings
may in some contexts suffice to withstand a summary judgment
motion, such denials should not be adequate in the present context
given the surrounding policy and statutory framework. Through AS
25.20.050(d), the legislature created a presumption of parentage
that arises when certain scientific test results establish a
probability of parentage of at least 95 percent. [Fn. 10] This
presumption may be rebutted, but only by clear and convincing
evidence. [Fn. 11] The legislature added this provision in 1984
with the explicit goal of "enhanc[ing] the efforts of those persons
who seek to enforce the payment of child support obligations by
noncustodial parents having the duty to support."[Fn. 12] The
legislature found that the failure to pay child support not only
creates severe hardships for the children and families -- often
"lower-income, single-parent families [] headed by women"-- but
also has deleterious effects upon society at large, contributing to
increased levels of public assistance payments, child abuse, and
delinquency. [Fn. 13] By shifting and heightening the burden of
proof, the legislature sent a clarion call that parents must be
responsible for their obligations to their children.
In line with this policy, other jurisdictions have
required the putative father to present more than mere denials of
paternity to defeat a summary judgment motion. The Colorado
Supreme Court in People ex rel. J.M.A. affirmed summary judgment
where the putative father submitted an opposition brief which
contained a general denial of paternity and failed to demonstrate
by "relevant and specific facts"that paternity was genuinely at
issue. [Fn. 14] And Illinois courts have enforced this public
policy by consistently holding that a general denial of paternity
without evidentiary support is not sufficient to defeat a summary
judgment motion where scientific testing has established the
presumption of paternity. [Fn. 15]
In the context of paternity cases, in which a blood test
result raises the presumption of paternity, we too should properly
effectuate the public policy of parental responsibility for
children by requiring the putative father to present more than an
equivocal general denial of paternity in order to defeat summary
judgment.
V. Conclusion
In light of the disfavored use of general denials in
opposing summary judgment as expressed in Rule 56(e) and the
paramount importance of establishing paternity, thereby ensuring
the financial support of children, I would hold that Meyer's
indefinite denial of paternity was inadequate to withstand CSED's
summary judgment motion.
Here, Meyer admitted having a sexual relationship with
the mother and could not remember the precise details of this
relationship. He presented nothing more than an equivocal denial
of paternity, basing his belief that he did not have sexual
intercourse with M.T. during the presumed period of conception on
mere supposition rather than on actual recollection of any specific
facts. In light of M.T.'s uncontroverted statement that Meyer was
her sole sexual partner during the presumed period of conception,
her documentary evidence of contact with Meyer in Anchorage during
this period, and blood tests indicating a 99.98% probability of
paternity, Meyer has failed to present any evidence that sets forth
specific facts or challenges M.T.'s assertions. Meyer's denial of
paternity is simply not enough to raise a genuine issue of fact for
purposes of Rule 56(e), and I would therefore affirm the trial
court's grant of summary judgment.
FOOTNOTES
Footnote 1:
AS 25.20.050(d) creates a presumption of parentage for certain
genetic test results which establish a probability of parentage at
95% or higher.
Footnote 2:
See Beilgard v. State, 896 P.2d 230, 233 (Alaska 1995).
Footnote 3:
Id. (quoting R.E. v. State, 878 P.2d 1341, 1345 (Alaska
1994)).
Footnote 4:
See Schumacher v. City and Borough of Yakutat, 946 P.2d 1255,
1256 (Alaska 1997).
Footnote 5:
See Totem Marine Tug & Barge, Inc. v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv.
Co., 584 P.2d 15, 25 (Alaska 1978).
Footnote 6:
See Alaska R. Civ. P. 56(c); French v. Jadon, Inc., 911 P.2d
20, 24 (Alaska 1996); Totem Marine Tug & Barge, 584 P.2d at 19.
Footnote 7:
In the Matter of J.B., 922 P.2d 878, 881 n.4 (Alaska 1996)
(emphasis added).
Footnote 8:
See Gudenau & Co. v. Sweeney Ins. Co., 736 P.2d 763, 765
(Alaska 1987) ("The court does not attempt to weigh the evidence
nor evaluate the credibility of witnesses on a motion for summary
judgment.").
Footnote 9:
Philbin v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough, ___ P.2d ___, Op. No.
5207 at 12 (Alaska, November 19, 1999); see also Gablick v. Wolfe,
469 P.2d 391 (Alaska 1970) (rejecting the contention that a court
must consider the clear and convincing standard on summary judgment
where the standard would apply at trial because Rule 56(c) only
requires a showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists to
be litigated and not a showing that a party will ultimately prevail
at trial). In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255-
56 (1986), the United States Supreme Court announced the federal
standard for summary judgment, finding that "the determination of
whether a given factual dispute requires submission to a jury must
be guided by the substantive evidentiary standards that apply to
the case." This court, however, rejected the federal standard for
summary judgment and instead reaffirmed the holding in Gablick.
See Moffatt v. Brown, 751 P.2d 939, 943-44 (Alaska 1988).
Footnote 10:
In his sworn answers to interrogatories, after stating that he
had sexual intercourse only twice with the mother, Meyer stated:
"My recollection is that the first was in the winter of 1988 or
1989, and the other in 1991." Drawing reasonable inferences from
this statement in favor of Meyer, as we must at this stage in the
proceedings, this is a statement by him that the last time he had
sex with the mother was in 1991 and thus that he did not have sex
with the mother during the period of possible gestation.
Footnote 11:
Yurioff v. American Honda Motor Co., 803 P.2d 386, 389 (Alaska
1990).
Footnote 12:
We note that the Minnesota Court of Appeals has reached a
similar result in two analogous cases. See Williams v. Curtis, 501
N.W.2d 653, 656 (Minn. App. 1993) (holding putative father's denial
of intercourse with mother during period of conception sufficient
to preclude summary judgment despite 99.21% statistical probability
of paternity); Nash v. Allen, 392 N.W.2d 244, 247 (Minn. App. 1986)
(holding putative father's denial of intercourse with mother during
period of conception sufficient to preclude summary judgment
despite 98.864% statistical probability of paternity); see also
People ex rel. M.C., 844 P.2d 1313 (Colo. App. 1992) (reversing the
trial court's grant of judgment notwithstanding the verdict where
the jury believed the putative father's denial of sexual
intercourse during the period of conception and found that he
successfully rebutted, by clear and convincing evidence, the
presumption of paternity attached by (a) the child's birth within
300 days after the marriage was terminated and (b) an unchallenged
blood test establishing a 99.9% probability of paternity).
In Smith v. Smith, 845 P.2d 1090, 1092 (Alaska 1993), the
superior court, after a trial, concluded that a husband was not the
father of his wife's child based on the husband's testimony that he
did not have sexual intercourse with her during the possible period
of conception. This finding was made despite scientific evidence
purporting to show a 99.59% probability of paternity. See id. We
vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings
because the trial court failed to indicate whether the husband had
overcome the statutory and common law presumptions of paternity by
clear and convincing evidence. See id. at 1092-93. But we did not
reject the possibility that findings of non-paternity by clear and
convincing evidence would be sustainable despite the scientific
evidence to the contrary. See id.
Footnote 13:
See Alaska R. Civ. P. 56(e) ("When a motion for summary
judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse
party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the
adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response, by
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.");
see also Rule 56(c) (listing answers to interrogatories among the
documents that can demonstrate a triable issue of fact). Compare
People ex rel. J.M.A., 803 P.2d 187, 192-93 (Colo. 1990) (holding
that a general denial of paternity by a putative father, without
any sworn statement in support, does not raise a genuine issue of
material fact so as to preclude summary judgment) with People ex
rel. M.C., supra note 12.
Footnote 14:
Meyer also challenges this scientific evidence. He contends
that it was not adequately authenticated, and he filed the
affidavit of a genetic scientist who expressed substantial doubt as
to the accuracy of the probability of paternity. Because Meyer's
denial of sexual intercourse during the period of conception
creates a genuine issue of material fact, it is unnecessary to
resolve whether these challenges also created genuine issues of
material fact.
Footnote 15:
See Merdes v. Underwood, 742 P.2d 245, 248 (Alaska 1987).
FOOTNOTES (Concurrence)
Footnote 1:
See Totem Marine Tug & Barge, Inc. v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv.
Co., 584 P.2d 15, 25 (Alaska 1978).
Footnote 2:
See In re J.B., 922 P.2d 878, 881 n.4 (Alaska 1996).
Footnote 3:
See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). See also Moffatt v.
Brown, 751 P.2d 939, 943 (Alaska 1988) ("Instead of adopting the
summary judgment standard articulated in Anderson, we choose to
continue our longstanding interpretation of our summary judgment
standard as contained in Civil Rule 56(c).").
FOOTNOTES (Dissent)
Footnote 1:
Cf. Western Pioneer v. Harbor Enters., 818 P.2d 654, 657
(Alaska 1991) (discounting nonmovant's testimony in support of
opposition to a summary judgment motion where it "reflect[ed] only
a restatement of his position in [the] litigation").
Footnote 2:
803 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1990).
Footnote 3:
Id. (quoting State, Dep't of Highways v. Green, 586 P.2d 595,
606 n.32 (Alaska 1978)).
Footnote 4:
852 P.2d 1146 (Alaska 1993).
Footnote 5:
Id. at 1149-50 n.7. The dissent agreed that "sometimes
testimony may be so internally inconsistent and in conflict with
the apparently reliable evidence offered by the proponent of a
summary judgment motion that it may not serve to create a genuine
issue of material fact and thus defeat summary judgment." Id. at
1156 n.1 (Matthews, J., dissenting).
Footnote 6:
See People ex rel. J.M.A., 803 P.2d 187, 193 (Colo. 1990).
Footnote 7:
Id. at 192 (applying 6A Colo. Rev. Stat. sec. 13-25-
126(1)(e)(IV)
(West 1987)).
Footnote 8:
See id. at 193.
Footnote 9:
Id.
Footnote 10:
AS 25.20.050(d).
Footnote 11:
See id.
Footnote 12:
See ch. 144, sec.sec. 1(b), 4, SLA 1984.
Footnote 13:
Ch. 144, sec. 1, SLA 1984.
Footnote 14:
803 P.2d at 193.
Footnote 15:
In Illinois, 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. sec. 45/11 (West 1993)
permits
genetic testing results to create a rebuttable presumption of
paternity. See People ex rel. Hughes v. Walker, [Fn. 16] 662
N.E.2d 177 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (affirming summary judgment where
putative father did not deny having sexual intercourse during
probable time of conception, but stated, without corroborating
evidence, that the mother had sexual relations with unidentified
man); [Fn. 17] People ex rel. Black v. Neby, [Fn. 18] 638 N.E.2d
276 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (affirming summary judgment where putative
father opposed motion by stating that he was not in Illinois during
month of conception despite plaintiff's production of traffic
ticket issued to him in Illinois city of mother's residence);
Breese v. Dewey, [Fn. 19] 584 N.E.2d 924 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)
(affirming summary judgment where putative father flatly denied
paternity, but pled insufficient memory or knowledge with respect
to all other relevant questions); Cf. In re Paternity of Smith,
[Fn. 20] 534 N.E.2d 669 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (reversing summary
judgment grant where putative father not only denied paternity but
also produced supporting documentary and testimonial evidence).
Footnote 16:
662 N.E.2d 177 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
Footnote 17:
See id. at 179-80.
Footnote 18:
638 N.E.2d 276 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
Footnote 19:
584 N.E.2d 924 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
Footnote 20:
534 N.E.2d 669 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)
