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Parker v. Alaska Child Support Enforcement Division (6/12/98), 960 P 2d 586
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before publication in
the Pacific Reporter. Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of
the Clerk of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone
(907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
STEVE D. PARKER, )
) Supreme Court No. S-7793
Appellant, )
) Superior Court No.
v. ) 3AN-95-8721 CI
)
STATE OF ALASKA, DEPARTMENT ) O P I N I O N
OF REVENUE, CHILD SUPPORT )
ENFORCEMENT DIVISION, ex rel. )
R.A.W., )
)
Appellee. ) [No. 4999 - June 12, 1998]
______________________________)
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of
Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage,
Brian C. Shortell, Judge.
Appearances: Brent A. Johnson, Anchorage, for
Appellant. Terisia K. Chleborad, Assistant Attorney General,
Anchorage, Bruce M. Botelho, Attorney General, Juneau, for
Appellee.
Before: Matthews, Chief Justice, Compton,
Eastaugh, Fabe, and Bryner, Justices.
PER CURIAM
Steve Parker, a resident of California, challenges the
superior court's jurisdiction in an action seeking a judgment of
paternity and child support. Parker was stationed in Ketchikan in
1978 while a member of the United States Coast Guard. During this
time, he engaged in sexual intercourse with an Alaska resident.
This contact resulted in the conception of a child, also an Alaska
resident, for whom the State seeks the decree in this case. We
hold that the trial court properly exercised personal jurisdiction
over Parker.
Under the catch-all provision of our "long-arm"statute,
AS 09.05.015(c), [Fn. 1] personal jurisdiction may be exercised to
the extent permitted by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. [Fn. 2] See Alaska
Telecom, Inc. v. Schafer, 888 P.2d 1296, 1299 (Alaska 1995). For
the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
to be constitutional, the defendant must have sufficient "minimum
contacts"with the forum state so that maintaining a suit in the
forum state "does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.'" International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
(1940)).
Jurisdiction is permissible over a nonresident defendant
where his contacts with the forum are such that he could reasonably
anticipate being haled into court in the forum state. See Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985).
"The unilateral activity of those who claim
some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the
requirement of contact with the forum State. . . . [I]t is
essential in each case that there be some act by which the
defendant purposefully avails [him]self of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State . . . ."
Puhlman v. Turner, 874 P.2d 291, 293 (Alaska 1994) (quoting Hanson
v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). A nonresident defendant
must have fair warning that his activities may foreseeably subject
him to jurisdiction in Alaska. See Washington Ins. Guar. Ass'n,
922 P.2d at 240.
If the defendant's activities in the forum state are
"continuous and systematic,"the forum may assert "general
jurisdiction"over the defendant, and the cause of action need not
arise out of the contacts with the forum state. However, where the
cause of action arises out of the contacts with the forum state,
the court may have "specific jurisdiction,"even where the
defendant has only one contact with the forum state. Alaska
Telecom, 888 P.2d at 1300.
This case involves specific jurisdiction; the paternity
action arises directly out of Parker's conduct in the state. In
cases involving specific jurisdiction, "if the defendant has
'purposefully directed' his activities at residents of the forum,
and the litigation results from alleged injuries 'that arise out of
or relate to' those activities,"he should reasonably anticipate
being haled into court in that forum. Id. (quoting Rudzewicz, 471
U.S. at 472). Specific jurisdiction "is justified on the basis of
the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the
litigation." Glover v. Western Air Lines, Inc., 745 P.2d 1365,
1367 (Alaska 1987) (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v.
Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 & n.8 (1984)).
Parker purposefully directed his activities at the mother
of his child, resulting in the child's birth. A person engaging in
sexual intercourse with a resident of Alaska while in Alaska should
foresee the possibility that a child might be born and that a
paternity and support action might be brought. A number of
authorities support this view. See, e.g., Bell v. Arnold, 279
S.E.2d 449, 450 (Ga. 1981); People ex rel. Black v. Neby, 638
N.E.2d 276, 277 (Ill. App. 1994); Larsen v. Scholl, 296 N.W.2d 785,
790 (Iowa 1980); Jones v. Chandler, 592 So. 2d 966, 972 (Miss.
1991); State, Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Cummings, 515 N.W.2d 680, 684
(Neb. App. 1994). We therefore conclude that Parker had sufficient
minimum contacts with Alaska.
Once minimum contacts are established, we must then
decide whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. See
American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. International Seafoods of
Alaska, Inc., 735 P.2d 747, 753 (Alaska 1987). Because Parker
purposefully directed his activities at an Alaskan resident, he
must demonstrate "compelling circumstances which render Alaska's
exercise of jurisdiction . . . so unreasonable as to constitute a
denial of due process." Id. at 754. However, Parker failed to
demonstrate or argue any compelling interest against the exercise
of personal jurisdiction both in the trial court and on appeal.
[Fn. 3]
We reject all of Parker's other arguments because they
are dependent on his incorrect assertion that insufficient minimum
contacts exist in this case. The judgment is AFFIRMED.
FOOTNOTES
Footnote 1:
AS 09.05.105(c) provides: "The jurisdictional grounds stated
in (a)(2) - (10) of this section are cumulative and in addition to
any other grounds provided by the common law."
Footnote 2:
Parker argues that he is entitled to additional protection
under the state constitution because it should be construed to
afford him broader protection from suit than the federal
constitution. We reject this and adhere to our view that the reach
of the long-arm statute is coextensive with the limits of due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Washington Ins. Guar.
Ass'n v. Ramsey, 922 P.2d 237, 240 (Alaska 1996); Alaska Telecom,
Inc. v. Schafer, 888 P.2d 1296, 1299 (Alaska 1995); Glover v.
Western Air Lines, Inc., 745 P.2d 1365, 1367 (Alaska 1987);
Volkswagenwerk, A.G. v. Klippan, GmbH, 611 P.2d 498, 500 (Alaska
1980).
Footnote 3:
In his reply brief Parker raises for the first time the
argument that Alaska would be an inconvenient forum. We reject
this assertion because Parker fails to show that defense of the
suit would be burdensome or that any witnesses or evidence are
located in California. Cf. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 611 P.2d at 502
(holding that although "[i]nconvenience to at least some parties"
would occur because "legal doctrine, documents, exhibits,
witnesses, and counsel"from Germany and Alaska would be involved,
exercise of personal jurisdiction would not violate due process).
Further, the State has a fundamental interest as a matter of social
policy in requiring parents to support their children. The child
was conceived in Alaska and resides in Alaska. As the child's home
state, Alaska has an interest in protecting the child.
